705 in 1915, and in matting and mats, from $618,766 in 1914 to $388,282 in 1915. Over against these import gains there were the serious declines in imports of raw silk, from $15,918,730 in 1914 to $11,433,400 in 1915; in furs, from $773,549 in 1914 to $412,705 in 1915, and in matting and mats, from $618,766 in 1914 to $388,282 in 1915. Again, as in the case of the exports, the significance of the figures appears in the lower, not the higher items, although here it is to be noted that China is capable of enormous increase of supplies in such conspicuous items as bristles, cowhides, furs, egg yolks, teas, soy bean, and mattings. But it is lamentable to note, in view of China's almost limitless resources, such inconsiderable imports to the United States as those of the minerals, utterly negligible except for the antimony and for pig iron, which amounts to $44,959; decorated china and porcelain, $50,364; vegetable fibers, $115,924; peanuts, $172,126; goat skins, which decreased from $2,126,706 in 1914 to $1,884,306 in 1915; sheep and all other minor skins, amounting to only $226,524; Chinese nut oil, which decreased from $1,943,400 in 1914 to $1,727,005 in 1915; silk laces and embroideries, amounting to only $72,713; cane sugar, for which the American people have been actually suffering while China has an enormous surplus, $86,536; and rattans and reeds, $67,968. Is it too much to say, in view of these figures, that the American people stand in greater need of China's resources than do the Chinese people of the resources of the United States? China desires not merely to do her part in furnishing the values which shall be her offerings in the mutually advantageous exchange she seeks in future trade with the United States. She stands ready to supply her share of the joint capital needed for the lines of steamships that must be employed for transportation; indeed, Chinese capital, and the feeling common throughout Chinese trade, may be regarded as opposed to the establishment of steamship lines which shall be wholly foreign in capitalization and control. American capital which may look forward to the return of American shipping to the Pacific, and to the presence of American bottoms in Chinese ports, need not hesitate over any such venture because of lack of funds. Chinese capital is more than willing, it is insistent, that it be given the opportunity of meeting American investment dollar for dollar in all such enterprises. Where is the shipping man who will say that such a community of interest is not the most effective assurance of permanent prosperity? Even now, in the presence of America's urgent need for commercial steamships that can furnish transportation facilities needed for the war, China is in position to undertake construction on a scale which should be of material assistance. It lies within the scope of her industrial capacity either to build ships of large tonnage at such ports as Hong Kong and Shanghai, or to send to the United States Chinese workmen skilled to a degree where, given capable American overseers, they can effectively supplement the current scarcity of skilled ship labor here. The only proviso would be that at the expiration of their contract, the Chinese artisans shall be returned to China. We need them in our business. There are two yards at Hong Kong, in charge of English engineers, where no labor other than Chinese is employed. Mechanics, foremen, all are Chinese. At these plants have been built, for the China Steamship Navigation Company, four steamships of 5,000 tons each, now plying in the coastal trade between Hangkow in the North and Foo Chow in the South. Those vessels were launched as far back as five years ago. At Shanghai, Chinese skilled labor builds all coastal trade shipping, many up to 2,000 tons; and in the government yards at Kiang Lung the Chinese gun boats were built. The large ferry boats plying between Hong Kong and Kow Loon were all constructed in the Hong Kong shipbuilding plants by Chinese mechanics, under Chinese foremen. Sometimes, after many years of slow development and perhaps unnoticed by those to whom its possession should prove most desirable, a fruit of trade ripens into full perfection and hangs, ready to drop. A great portion of the trade of China-all that portion which bids fair to be most valuable, most desirable-has ripened now. Is the United States ready to stretch out its hand and take it? W Convoying Ships HEN the naval history of the war is written we shall probably learn the names of those who were responsible for the adoption of the convoy system, though at the moment we strongly suspect that the influence of American naval opinion was exerted largely in its favor, says The Nautical Gazette. There is no doubt that it took a good deal of persuasion to induce the British Admiralty to try the plan of sending fleets of merchantmen through the submarine zone under guard of war vessels. In fact, as one British writer on marine affairs puts it, the Admiralty agreed almost at the point of the bayonet; and this same writer complains that the shipowners were not asked to assist in perfecting the system. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is certain that convoying, as a measure of protection against submarine attack, has worked out reasonably well, and that as the American and British destroyer flotilla increases in size, it will be possible to give a greater proportion of protection to merchant carriers. Stopping the U-Boats By WALTER SCOTT MERIWETHER. It may not be amiss, nor yet in violation of any confidence, to say that to some degree the suggestions here made by Mr. Meriwether are being carried out. There has been a gratifying decline in the sinkings of merchant ships by U-boats, which is perhaps due to the method that has been adopted to stop them. We know of no chain that has been established as Mr. Meriwether suggests, but it is now an open secret that the greatest damage to U-boats has been done by destroyers dropping depth bombs. The plan here outlined suggests a possible combination plan that would be more fully effective.-THE EDITOR. Q UOTING an anonymous naval informant, the London correspondent of the New York Times says that while many schemes have been proposed for building a mine or net barrage, or both, for the purpose of preventing German submarines coming out or going back to their bases, no one of them has been successful. "Despite this fact" the unnamed informant added, "it has seriously been proposed by all sorts and conditions of men to build a barrage from Scotland to Norway, over a distance of about 220 miles, in very deep water and across a very strong tide." Well, why not? ""Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished" for if the Allies can block that runway for submarines they can confine U-boat depredations to the North Sea and the Mediterranean, as by reason of the narrowness of the other exits, the English Channel and the Gibraltar Straits, there is no doubt that both can be effectively closed by means of mines and nets. With all three channels sealed the depredations of U-boats, except in the North Sea and the Mediterranean, would necessarily cease. Those operating outside of these areas would soon be forced to intern, surrender or perish, while those at their bases, would be unable to go out. With the Atlantic and other oceans freed of the submarine menace, the armies and supplies of this nation, Canada, Brazil, Cuba, the British and French West Indies, could flow to the battle lines in France without interruption, while British transports from India, Australia and New Zealand could take the longer, but safe route around the Cape of Good Hope. So it all comes back to the North Sea passage. Stop the U-boats there and the rest is easy. But how? Realizing that this problem of stopping Uboats must be uppermost in the minds of the highly trained specialists who are seeking the solution, I would not have the temerity of presenting this plan except that it has undergone an acid test at the hands of some our own technical and naval experts whose opinions are worth while. Their conclusion-almost unanimous-is that while the plan would involve the rapid construction of a special class of vessel and a special equipment, and would also involve a large expenditure of money, the method would not only prove effective, but these experts do not see anyway by which the enemy could overcome it. Another, and his opinion is also worth while, reminded me that this is a navy job and that the navy should be able to attend to it without any help from civilians. Which reminds me that the submarine itself was the idea of a civilian, that the aeroplane, which may yet win the war, was the result of civilian genius, that it was a doctor who invented the Gatling gun, that the monitor was evolved from the brain of Ericsson, that it was a Londoner who with his little blocks of wood evolved the fleet tactics which Great Britain's sea lords adopted, that it was Arthur Pollen, another civilian, who showed the way to naval battle practice at long sea ranges. It is with this apology that the subjoined plan is submitted. This contemplates the employment of 3,700 patrol boats, one-half of |