of their future naval programs. This opinion, which undoubtedly incorporated the opinion of his principal subordinates, was not expressed with any purpose of misleading, for it was a well-known fact at the time to every one in the profession that Germany's position in the matter of submarines was that of a third-class power.

When hostilities commenced Germany had twenty-five submarines in commission and was building perhaps half a dozen more. They were all of the Krupp-Germania type, and von Tirpitz explained almost apologetically that they had built a few just to be able to form some conclusions regarding them based on their own experience. It was evident at that time, however, that no great thought or attention was being devoted to their development, nor were ideas from outside sought.

Any casual student of European politics during the last fifteen years knows that in every international complication that arose and

threatened European peace Germany was always to be found on one side and England on the other side as potential antagonists. If Germany had foreseen every contingency and provided for it in advance, she must necessarily have regarded the participation of England as an adversary in the present conflict, or, in fact, in any conflict in which Germany was involved, as a possibility at least, even if a remote one, and she must also have foreseen that the participation of England would bring about the enforced inactivity of the German high-sea fleet.

She could also have foreseen the situation that now prevails, i. e., the submarine branch of her naval service would be the only one that could deliver any effective blows against England. Under these circumstances, how is it possible to explain the utter failure of the German government to comprehend, or, if they comprehend, to provide for the role that submarines are playing today? Is it possible

the general staff and the Reichs Marineamt. refused to recognize the possibility of England's participation as even a remote contingency, and that no appropriate preparation was made to meet it? It would almost seem so, for when England definitely entered into the conflict against Germany steps were taken in feverish haste to lay down over sixty submarines at once, and that number has since been largely augmented.

Estimates have appeared in print according to which Germany was credited with having over 700 submarines in her possession last May and that 1,200 would be in commission by the end of this year. It can hardly be possible that such an estimate has been made by any person familiar with the shipbuilding facilities of Germany, even making all due allowance for abnormal expansion of these facilities to meet the necessities of the occasion. It has been stated that drydocks would even be utilized for the purpose of erecting them, as if the problem were primarily one of ground. space.

The entire shipbuilding capacity of Germany is very limited, compared with England, for instance, and the difficulty of finding highly trained and skilled shipbuilding labor such as is required for the intricate work of constructing a submarine would militate heavily against any sudden increase in the tonnage that could be turned out. Taking into account all the shipbuilding facilities of Germany, both private and governmental, making the most liberal allowance for the maximum extension of these facilities under pressure of war, bearing in mind at the same time the difficulty experienced in obtaining certain necessary machinery and appliances and in obtaining skilled labor, and deducting the number of submarines that have probably been lost or destroyed by the enemy, it does not seem possible that Germany had more than 200 submarines in commission last May. Of this number approximately two-thirds would be constantly available for duty, while the other one-third would be en route either to or from the various shore

bases for the replenishment of supplies and for repairs.

To arrive at a fair or accurate estimate of the rate at which Germany can build submarines in the future is somewhat more difficult. Assuming, however, that all yards in the country were utilized exclusively for this kind of work and that no mercantile shipbuilding or repairs to the battle fleet were undertaken, which, of course, is far from being the case, the probability is that not more than 100 submarines could be completed every six months.

Information at hand would indicate that the actual recent output has been approximately 10 per month, of which the great majority are in the neighborhood of 800 tons to 1,000 tons displacement. Several groups of about 1,500 tons have also been commissioned and quite recently the construction of a flotilla of eight so-called submarine cruisers. of 2,800 tons displacement has been undertaken, of which three or more are reported completed and the remainder will be ready for service by next February. These vessels will mount two 6-inch guns, besides two guns of lighter caliber, and embody the innovation of an armored conning-tower. This is more or less essential where the conning-tower constitutes the central control station of the vessel and at the same time is the most vulnerable part. It is only feasible, however, on vesesls of great size, because of submerged stability considerations.

All the later Austrian submarines have been manufactured in Fiume and Trieste from German plans and constitute, in effect, a German submarine flotilla in the Mediterranean that has avoided the necessity of the hazardous journey from the North Sea through the Straits of Gibraltar.

Turkey and Bulgaria have not been contributory factors in the submarine plan of campaign.

The effect of the war on the submarine policy of Germany has manifested itself in (Continued on page 63)

W

HEN the advancing hordes of Huns and Goths swept down over the plains of northern Italy, even to the banks of the River Piave, the civilized world held its breath. When the Italian army opened the flood-gates of the river and made its stand against the further advance of the invader, the world breathed a sigh of relief. Venicefor a time, at least-was saved. Venicealways Venice-was the first thought of the world; not the military advantage that would come to the Teutons with further territory gained; not the loss of thousands of lives and the desolation of homes, nor yet the raping of a fair countryside, but Venice-the Wonder City of the World-was threatened.

Would the German howitzers, which respected not the Cathedral of Rheims, spare the wondrous beauty of St. Mark's? Would the fate of Louvain befall beautiful, proud Venice, the Bride of the Adriatic, the World's Treasure House of Art, and would vandal hands desecrate those shrines where have worshipped men of all religious creeds, but joined in one love for the outward and material expression of all that is most lovely in the minds and souls of men?

What other city of the world could, under the shadow of an impending fate, arouse such general apprehension? Not even Paris, and surely not London, for Venice stands unique in the minds of men as the birthplace of poetry, of romance and of art. For the moment she is reprieved, perhaps saved. Between her and the Huns stand the united armies of Italy. Shoulder to shoulder with them stand the fighting men of France and of England, battling again over land that has seen much valiant blood shed, the descendants of the Crusaders by the side of those of the Romans, the Genoese and the Florentines. Venice in her

maiden days was many times the object of attack; now she is the object of common defense and solicitude.

Venice is "all things to all men." Whoever has fallen under her spell has been captivated; yet no Circe she, for she has uplifted rather than dragged down. Here has been found the inspiration for the noblest art, the most exquisite decoration, the loftiest of poetry and the most delightful of romance. Today these are the things with which Venice is identified, yet to those who look deeper will be found a universal and fundamental truth that these developments of the higher arts are based upon a solid foundation of commercial achievement that makes them possible, that fosters them and gives them their opportunity for develop

ment.

Beneath the art treasures of Venice lies a splendid era of accomplishment when the maritime scepter of Tyre had passed to the city of the Adriatic, when the argosies of Venice sailed on every sea, when her merchants ruled the world. "Dynasties lived by grace of Tyre's credit and died at the calling of her loans," writes William Brown Meloney. "At a frown from her counting rooms nations trembled and kings beat their breasts; at a smile such a city as Carthage was born." So it was with Venice.

Italy was the first to claim the heritage left by Tyre and held it for the longest period in all history, but divided against herself she could not stand. Venice alone arose to her opportunity and against the bloody jealousy of Naples, Florence and Genoa became Mistress of the Seas until the scepter in turn passed from her to other hands. And it was during the seven centuries of her supremacy in the foreign trade of the world that she laid the foundation for the Venice that is to-day.