REPLY TO ALLIED DEMANDS 343 that General von der Goltz should be recalled. These demands were not complied with, and on the 23rd May the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris decided to dispatch an Allied Military Mission to the Baltic States to enforce the Allied demands. After a further exchange of Notes, the German Government replied to the Allied demands on the 8th June to the following effect: (1) That evacuation was taking place. (2) That General von der Goltz had not kept back arms, from the Lettish troops. (3) That the mobilization of Letts would endanger the lines of communication of the German troops. (4) That General von der Goltz could not interfere in Latvian internal affairs (implying that the Allied demand for the restoration of the Lettish Government involved such an interference). By the beginning of June the evident intention of the Germans to continue their advance northwards into Esthonia had created a very serious situation, and had shown clearly that the integrity of the Baltic States could not be preserved unless they were completely evacuated by German troops. On the 18th June, Marshal Foch, under instructions from the Supreme Council, directed the Germans : (a) to stop all further advance towards Esthonia; About this time the German Government were also informed through the Armistice Commission, that General Gough had been authorized to enter into direct communication with the local German command with a view to the settlement of all questions relating to the execution of the above demands. 9. Supreme Council demand evacuation under threat of economic pressure, 27th September. German troops, however, continued to arrive in the Mitau district, and the attitude adopted by General von der Goltz led to a fresh demand, transmitted on the 1st August, calling upon the German Government to recall General von der Goltz, to proceed at once with the evacuation of Latvia by land and by sea under the supervision of General Gough, and to complete the evacuation by the 30th August. At the end of September the situation remained materially unchanged, while lack of discipline among the German troops in the Baltic States had led to a number of acts of violence. Accordingly the Supreme Council again considered the case on the 27th September, and, in view of the non-compliance of the Germans with the many demands which had been presented by the Allies, decided to apply economic pressure to Germany in order to enforce the terms of the Armistice. At the same time the Supreme Council, rejecting the German Government's contention that it could not compel troops in the Baltic regions to obey orders, insisted on the complete evacuation of these regions by all German troops and formations, and on the withdrawal of all German soldiers who had been enlisted in Russian formations after demobilization. The decision to resort to pressure on Germany in order to obtain compliance with the Allied demands was communicated to the German Government in the following terms: 'The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that, until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed, they will not entertain any of the applications put forward by the German Government for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. They have consequently given instructions not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications. 'Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities from which the German Government might at the present time derive advantages or which it may seek from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals. 'In the event of non-compliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such other measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the Armistice.' This threat of pressure apparently created a strong impression on the German Government, who replied on the 4th October proposing that a mixed Commission comprising German representatives as well as representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers should be formed in order to examine the situation and then to take, supervise, and carry through the measures necessary for the expeditious completion of the evacuation'. It was at the same time intimated that General von der Goltz had been recalled and replaced by Lieutenant-General von Eberhardt. The German Government further declared its fixed PRESSURE ON GERMANY 345 purpose to do everything in its power to fulfil its obligations for evacuation, but protested vigorously against the threatened measures of compulsion. The Supreme Council replied maintaining its attitude with regard to the latter measures, until such time as the evacuation should be reported as proceeding satisfactorily, but agreed to the establishment of the proposed Commission. This body was set up with the least possible delay under the Presidency of the French General Niessel, and included representatives of each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with whom Admiral Hoppman was subsequently associated as the German representative. The Commission proceeded on the 5th November, first to Berlin, where it took cognizance of the measures taken by the German Government in connexion with the evacuation, and thence to Tilsit. Its task was much facilitated by the crushing defeat inflicted by the Letts on the Russo-German force under Colonel Bermont, after which the Commission interceded with both the Letts and Lithuanians on behalf of the Germans so as to allow their evacuation to proceed without further molestation. By the middle of December all the German troops in the Baltic States had been evacuated, but only with great loss to Lettish and Lithuanian property. The Commission was loyally supported by the German Delegate, Admiral Hoppman, but with this one exception the German authorities in the Baltic States persisted in placing all possible obstacles in the way of the evacuation, while General von Eberhardt's statements and promises proved as unreliable as those of his predecessor. 10. Summary of the Baltic Question. The incidents and decisions recorded above fall within two distinct periods, viz. : (a) from the 11th November 1918 to the 18th June 1919, during which time German troops remained in the Baltic States with the consent of the Allies; (b) the period subsequent to the Allied demand, made on the 18th June, for the complete evacuation of this region. The original provision under Article 12 of the Armistice Convention of the 11th November, that the German troops were to withdraw from Russian territory as soon as the Allies shall consider this (withdrawal) desirable' was a demand of which the expediency was doubtful. The idea underlying this clause was that German troops should protect these regions from Bolshevik invasion so long as such protection should be necessary, but that at the same time Germany should be prevented from thereby obtaining political advantages in the Baltic States. In fact, Article 12 was an effort to obtain from Germany loyal co-operation in a cause which it was the wish of the Allies to promote and of the Germans to hinder, and the Conference eventually realized that the attempt was impracticable. The German Government repeatedly disputed the interpretation placed on Article 12 by the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, that Germany had thereby undertaken to leave her troops in the east until the Allies considered their withdrawal advisable. The German Government contended that the words ' dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu' in the text of Article 12 denoted merely the extreme date to which the German troops could occupy the areas in question, and not the earliest date at which evacuation could take place. On these grounds the German Government, in a Note transmitted through the Armistice Commission on the 29th May, refused to recognize any orders for the retention of German troops in Russian territory. The German Government certainly realized the weakness of the Allied position during the early period of these negotiations, and it has been shown how they took advantage of it. In a Note dated the 11th October 1919, the German Government commented on the inconsistency of the Allied demands : 'The Allied and Associated Governments asked the German Government for the first time in their Note of June 18th to depart from the regions of the Baltic and Lithuania, after they had expressly demanded in May, and without regard to the protest of the German Government in connexion therewith, that the German troops should not be withdrawn from there.' Thus, the question of the German troops in the Baltic States was not placed on a really satisfactory basis until the Allied note of the 18th June referred to above, when the complete evacuation of Russian territory was first demanded. The right of the Allies to insist upon such evacuation was never disputed by the German Government, but the latter resorted to every form of subterfuge in order to postpone the execution of the Allied demand. ARTICLE 61 OF GERMAN CONSTITUTION 347 11. Article 61 of the German Constitution of August 1919. This case is mentioned as it involved vigorous intervention by the Peace Conference in a matter which was in no way connected with the Armistice Convention. Article 61 of the new German Constitution, signed on the 31st July 1919, provided for the admission to the Imperial Council of Germany of representatives from Austria, when that country should join the German Empire.1 The Conference informed the German Government that this Article contravened Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace, which says Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.' The Conference threatened to extend the occupation of German territory unless steps were at once taken to repeal the 61st Article of the new German Constitution. The German Government replied that it regarded the repeal as unnecessary in view of Article 178 of the new German Constitution, which stated that the German Constitution could not override the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They added that it was assumed in Germany that Article 61 could not come into force unless the League of Nations had first assented to the union of Austria to Germany. In view of this reply, the Conference contented itself with insisting that the German Government should formally recognize the principle that no Article in the German Constitution could be valid if it were contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace. The matter was ended by the Chief of the German Delegation signing a declaration to this effect at Versailles on the 22nd September 1919. 3 12. The Scapa Flow Incident and the delay in the Deposit of Ratifications. Germany, having already ratified the Treaty of Versailles on the 9th July 1919, the conditions necessary for its 1 Extract from Article 61: German-Austria shall, after it has joined the German Realm, have the right to participate in the Council of the Realm with such a number of mandates as shall correspond to the size of its population. Until that time the representatives of German-Austria shall have an advisory vote.' 2 For such purpose the Council must be unanimous. Therefore, a single power, e. g. France or Italy, can forbid Austria joining Germany. 3 Extract from Article 178: The conditions of the Peace Treaty, signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, are not affected by this Constitution.' |