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duction of business letters, might often be necessary in one's own defence. If the publication of private letters would be a breach of trust, the publication has been, and may be restrained." It is easy to perceive the delicacy and importance of this branch of equity jurisdiction, relative to the publication of manuscripts and private corres pondence. The publication of private letters ought to be restrained, when it would be a breach of confidence and. trust, as letters of courtship, or when injurious to the character and happiness of others.
A copyright may exist in a translation as much as in an original composition, and whether it be produced by per sonal application and expense, or by gift. A copyright may exist in part of a work, without having an exclusive right to the whole, Gray's poems were collected and published, with additional pieces, by Mason; and Lord Bathurst protected, by injunction, the unauthorized publi cation of the additions. So, Lord Hardwicke restrained a defendant from printing Milton's Paradise Lost, with Doctor Newton's notes.d A mere colourable abridgment of a book is an evasion of the statute, and will be restrained; but, as Lord Hardwicke observed, this will not apply to a real and fair abridgment; for an abridgment may, with great propriety, be called a new book. It is very often extremely useful, and displays equally the invention, learning, and judgment of the author. A bona fide abridgment of Hawkesworth's Voyages has been held no violation of the original copyright. So, an abridgment of Johnson's Rasselas, given as an abstract in the Annual Register, was held not to be a piratical invasion of the
a 2 Ves. & Bea. 27. Perceval v. Phipps. 1 Ball. & B. 209. Earl of Granard v. Dunkin.
6 Wyatt v. Barnard, 3 Ves. & Bea. 77.
c Mason v. Murray, cited in 1 East, 360.
d Lord Kenyon, in 1 East, 361.
e Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141. VOL. II.
copyright, but innocent, and not injurious to the original work.a
A person cannot, under the pretence of quotation, pub lish either the whole, or any material part of another's work, but he may use what is in all cases very difficult to define, fair quotation. A man may adopt part of the work of another. The quo animo is the inquiry in these cases. The question is, whether it be a legitimate use of another's publication, in the exercise of a mental operation, deserving the character of an original work. If an encyclopædia or review should copy so much of a book as to serve as a substitute for it, it becomes an actionable violation of literary property, even without the animus furandi. If so much be extracted as to communicate the same knowledge as the original work, it is a violation of copyright. It must be in substance a copy. An encyclopædia must not be allowed, by its transcripts, to sweep up all modern works. It would be a recipe for completely breaking down literary property.c
But I cannot be permitted to go further into the details on this subject. The justice and the policy of securing to ingenious and learned men the profit of their discoveries and intellectual labour, were very ably stated by the Court of K. B. in the great case of Miller v. Taylor. The constitution and laws of the United States contain the declared sense of this country in favour of some reasonable provision for the security of their productions. The present law of Congress affords only a scanty and inadequate protection, and does not rise to a level with the liberal spirit of the age. Lord Camden once declaimed against literary property. "Glory," said he, "is the reward of science, and those who deserve it scorn all meaner views. It
a Dodsley v. Kinnersley, Amb. 403.
Vas not for gain that Bacon, Newton, Milton, and Locke, structed and delighted the would." In answer to this it may be said, that the most illustrious writers in every branch of science, within the last half century, have reaped a comfortable support, as well as immortal fame, from the fruits of their pen. The experiment in Great Britain has proved the utility, as well as the justice, of securing a liberal recompense to intellectual labour, and the prospect of gain has not been found, in the case of such men as Robertson, or Gibbon, or Sir Walter Scott, either to extinguish the ardour of genius, or abate the love of true glory.
OF TITLE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY, BY TRANSFER BY ACT OF LAW.
GOODS and chattels may change owners by act of law, in the cases of forfeiture, succession, marriage, judgment, insolvency, and intestacy. Those of succession and marriage have already been considered, and I shall now confine myself to the other means of acquiring title to chattels by act of law.
I. By Forfeiture.
The title of government to goods by forfeiture, as a punishment for crimes, is confined in this state to the case of treason. The right, so far as it exists in this country, depends, probably, upon local statute law; and the tendency of public opinion has been to condemn forfeiture of property, at least in cases of felony, as being an unnecessary and hard punishment of the felon's posterity. Every person convicted of any manner of treason, under the laws of this state, forfeits his goods and chattels, as well as his lands and tenements; but the rights of all third persons, existing at the time of the commission of the treason, are saved. Forfeiture of property for crimes in any other case, is expressly abolished; and even the attainder of treason does not extend to corrupt the blood of the offender, or to
a Laws of N. Y. sess. 24. ch. 29. s. 9.
b Ibid. sess, 36. ch. 8. s. 3,