secretory impulsions. The quantities are, of course, only rough guesses to distinguish the types of the normal from the abnormal. The distinction between the masculine and feminine type is certainly vague but some objective characterisation is possible. On the basis of the distinction the author gives many valuable practical hints for the understanding and treatment both of neurasthenia and of hysteria; but these hints are medical rather than psychological. The book is intended to provide rather an orientation for the student of neurasthenia and hysteria than a clinical text-book. It is written with vivacity; it keeps close to practice and, though many points are too dogmatically put to be uncritically accepted, the small book, as a whole, forms a sane and stimulating introduction to the handling of "minds in distress". The book is merely a sketch; but it is a pity that the writer did not find room for some account or criticism of the Freud psychology, which has at least had sufficient potency to create a school, and to compel controversy and trial wherever neurasthenia and hysteria and melancholia have been seriously studied. W. LESLIE MACKENZIE, Social Powers. Three Popular Lectures on the Environment, the Press and the Pulpit. By SIR HENRY JONES, LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A. Glasgow James Maclehose & Sons, 1913. Pp. 114. 2s. 6d. net. These lectures were delivered to different popular audiences, but are governed by one purpose: "to help plain men to realise the significance of the invisible world of moral and social and religious facts by which they live; and to induce a fuller use of earnest thought among them". The book, which is marked by the author's usual felicity of thought and diction, is therefore intended primarily not for students of philosophy but for the increasing number of people who are becoming interested in, and it may be, alarmed by, the moral and social problems of the day. No reader can fail to welcome Sir Henry Jones's enterprise, an adventure prompted by no spirit of moral knight-errantry, but constrained by social circumstances and social needs. Sir Henry Jones has a centripetal interest in the grave and ultimate issues of life, and his social earnestness which has stimulated succeeding generations of students will here reach and influence a wider circle. The first lecture emphasises the significance of the social environment. The importance of the physical environment we now understand. But we do not yet realise the presence and power of the other environment, all-pervading, intangible, invisible and inaudible. This environment makes us and we make it. The last lecture puts forward an eloquent plea for the recognition of the claims of reason in religion. Unreasoning authority is everywhere losing its power. Will dogmatism in theology survive despotism in politics? Religion as much as morals is a matter of rational judgment. Following natural science, religion ought to repudiate feeling as a criterion of truth. There is only one kind of proof, i.e., organic systematisation, and the facts of religion are as capable of proof as any other facts. The philosophical groundwork of the addresses amounts to a total repudiation of the either or hypothesis. We have no right to speak of either the individual or the State, either the man or his environment, either reason or faith, either the religious or the secular. Strictly philosophical principles, though always implied, are seldom explicitly mentioned. But the author in passing makes clear his position on some of the vexed problems of philosophy. With these statements many of the readers of the book will disagree, but no fruitful discussion of them can take place till they have been developed and demonstrated as a coherent body of doctrine. It is to be hoped that Sir Henry Jones will see his way to undertake that task. Instances of oversight in the proof-reading occur on pages 39 and 81. And a quite trivial point, probably due to a printer's error, stimulates curiosity. Why is Aspasia adorned with inverted commas? (p. 53). Has any one had the temerity to suggest that 'Aspasia,' in company with 'Homer' and 'Shakespere,' should be banished to the limbo of exploded superstitions? G. A. JOHNSTON. By Hypnotism and Disease: a Plea for Rational Psycho-therapy. This volume, admirably printed, is intended to present "the main features of Psycho-therapy in a form suitable for the intelligent reader of either sex". The author has produced a volume well fitted to fulfil his purpose. The exposition is compact and lucid. Dr. Millar aims less at originalty than at explanation to the non-technical, whether medical or not. He includes chapters on the interaction of mind and body, history of hypnotism, phenomena of hypnosis, the psychological aspect, methods, other methods of psycho-therapy (including psycpo-analysis), the psycho-neuroses, treatment or organic diseases, diseases of lost inhibition. There is an index and a bibliography to guide further study. Many illustrative cases are deteiled in the text. Altogether the book is a good introduction to the study of the neuroses and their psychotherapy. An Introduction to Metaphysics. translation by T. E. HULME. net. W. L. M. By HENRI BERGSON, Authorised Macmillan & Co. Pp. vi, 79. 28. M. Bergson's classical essay, as most people interested in his philosophy know, is almost impossible to obtain in its original tongue. Consequently an unusually hearty welcome is due to this translation. "Almost every one of the French philosophers in his turn composed his Discours de la Méthode, says M. Levy-Brühl, and such is the nature of this essay, although it did not appear until after the publication of Les Données Immédiates and Matière et Mémoire. Its importance largely consists in its exposition of "intuition". Expounders and critics of Bergson alike have made large use of this essay, and those who read it in full for the first time are likely to find it, like Hamlet, "full of quotations". Mr. Hulme has done a useful piece of work, and done it well. If he had added one or two other articles also difficult to obtain, he would have done still better. ARTHUR ROBINSON. Modern Problems in Psychiatry. By ERNESTO LUGARO, Professor Extraordinary of Neuropathology and Psychiatry in the University of Modena. Translated by DAVID ORR, M.D., and R. G. Rows, M.D., with a Foreward by Sir T. S. CLOUSTON, M.D., LL.D. University of Manchester Publications, No. xlvii. Pp. vii, 305. The first edition of this book was noticed in MIND, N.S., No. 75. As in this, the second issue, the translators "have not thought it necessary to make any radical alterations in the text," and have confined themselves to "small changes," including errors, it is unnecessary to say more than that the book entirely deserves the success implied in a second edition. W. L. M. Aristote. Traductions et Études. Introduction à la Physique Aristotéli- Incidentally it may be permissible for the writer of this note to mention a passage in which he has himself fallen under M. Mansion's censure for the statement that Aristotle habitually thought of the integers as benannte Zahlen "numbers of " collections of sensible things. M. Mansion calls this (p. 79) an exaggeration, and says that it is not a legitimate deduction from the principle that numbers are only real as accidents of body. Aristotle admitted the absolute worth" (of numbers) "from the purely objective and logical point of view, though he insisted on protesting against the crass realism which projects the ideal tel quel into reality." 66 I observe, however, that on the preceding page (p. 78) M. Mansion falls into an error, frequently committed by Aristotle, of speaking of "equal" but different numbers. Properly speaking, there are no such things. Every integer B which is not identical with an integer A is unequal to A, or, if you deny this, you will be, at any rate, driven to invent entities of which this principle holds, and to say that the class of these new entities, and not the class of "integers," when so defined as to permit of equal but non-identical members, is the object studied by elementary Arithmetic. A. E. TAYLOR. A. Cournot, Métaphysicien de la Connaissance. Par E. P. BOTTINELLI. Published by Hachette. Pp. xii, 286. This work is an introduction to Cournot's philosophical views as developed in the Essai and the Traité. Cournot seems to me a very lucid writer, and an introduction is hardly necessary except to make him more widely known. M. Bottinelli gives a clear and full account of Cournot's more characteristic doctrines, but he refrains almost entirely from criticising them. Where he does criticise his conclusion is generally that it is Cournot's mode of expression rather than his thought that needs alteration. An exception, however, must be made in connexion with Cournot's theory of objective chance, where M. Bottinelli holds that there is a genuine error. Cournot's position is that there is objective chance in the sense of mutual independence of laws even in the sphere of mathematics, and that there is objective chance in the sense of spontaneous and unpredictable beginnings in the spheres of history and life. Our author holds (a) that Cournot sometimes confused the two meanings and was at any rate liable to make too many concessions to a mechanical view which he actually rejected; and (b) that chance has no real meaning as applied to pure mathematics, since it depends essentially on unfulfilled possibilities, and there are none in this region. In conclusion, I think that M. Bottinelli gives a more Bergsonian turn than is justifiable to some of Cournot's theories by his mode of expression; but it must be confessed that some passages that he quotes tend to support his interpretation. The book contains a very full bibliography of works by and about Cournot. Die Logik als Aufgabe. menologie und Logik. Dr. HANS DRIESCH. 2m. 40. C. D. BROAD. Eine Studie über die Beziehung zwischen Phano- This volume is complementary to one published in 1912, entitled Ordnungslehre, in which Logic was regarded as based on the concept of order. In the fundamental truth of philosophy, "I think something," that which I think is to be regarded as essentially ordered; and in so far as I ask what makes my experience ordered, I am engaged in a logical investigation. But the question arises, How am I to know that something makes my experience an ordered one? Dogmatism on this question can only be avoided by starting from the standpoint of Phenomenology, which gives, as it were, the maximum of information with a minimum of presupposition. If, then, starting from this standpoint, we simply examine our experience, we find certain aspects broadly predominant. One fundamental characteristic is, that into everything which is thought enter certain "signs" or "meanings," among which is that of validity with respect to order. Logic simply accepts these signs, and clarifies them. The justification of this view is contained in the present volume. A complete account of the concept of order involves an investigation into the nature of thought. The problem then is, What do we experience when we have the experience, 66 I think something"? 66 The discussion of the nature of mental activity here given may, from another point of view, be regarded as supplementary to the biological theories with which Prof. Driesch made English readers familiar in his Gifford Lectures in 1907-8. For mental activity is in principle the same as life," and in throwing light on the one we throw light on the other. In order to discover what is contained in the experience "I think something," recourse is had to the work of those psychologists who, mainly under the influence of Kulpe, have paid special attention to the psychology of thinking. The point of view of these investigators has been, that in order to get correct results, you must set your subject thinking. The subject has been given a problem (Aufgabe) to solve (e g. Is the question of immortality an ethical one?) and asked to state the results of his introspection during the process. When the questions are rightly set, and properly arranged in groups, the various aspects of the thinking process can be disentangled. The influence of the " Aufgabe " is thus fully recognised. The first thing to be noticed about this work is, that the "act of thinking" (nachdenken) is not observed at all. What the investigators find is, that we have thoughts, and what they describe consists entirely of thoughts. The "activity" which is supposed to produce or guide the course of these thoughts is at any rate not presented as an object. The thoughts seem to come, not as a continuous set leading to the desired result, but rather in a set of discontinuous leaps. The problem to be solved operates rather as a determining tendency" than as something before the mind. Consequently, to speak of an activity of thought at all, as something which operates continuously, is to complete the observed facts by means of theory. Hence we must first confine our attention to the facts as observed, and see how much they will give us. What we get, then, is a classification of thoughts. After discussing various classifications, Driesch proceeds to examine into what ultimate elements the experience "I have a thought can be analysed, and to show that his analysis is in substantial agreement with the results obtained by experimental psychology. He discusses fully only one of the elements-that of meaning. We may indicate the result as regards meaning somewhat as follows. Every thought presents certain characteristics or signs which can be classified and thus reduced to certain ultimate signs. It is commonplace to say that we never "think of" a number, or a chair, without some purpose, i.e. relation to some intellectual problem. In relation to this problem, every thought (a) is itself systematic, and is recognised as such. It is ordered, and brings order into the experience into which it enters. (Endgültigkeitszeichen mit Rücksicht auf Ordnung, or Ordnungszeichen.) Again, (b) it is more or less satisfactory, i.e. it can be accepted to a greater or less degree as bearing on the problem (Erledigungszeichen); (c) it has a certain temporal character (Zeitzeichen), and (d) it takes its place within a certain " "sphere or universe of discourse, and bears this mark (Erlebtheitskreis-zeichen). These marks make up the meaning which every thought possesses. For Phenomenology they are ultimate and independent. But in relation to |