Realists who are supposed to object that, since truth means agreement of idea with object, and since we have e.g. presentations of colours and the notion of causality, therefore there must be colours and causality (and not merely correlates to them) in the transcendent reality. If any realist is so silly as to make this objection he is conclusively answered by Dr. Müller, who points out that only judgments can be true and not presentations, and asserts that the agreement involved in truth is the agreement of the content of a judgment with its object. What the supposed realist has done is to confuse Truth, which is a predicate of judgments alone, with Faithfulness to Reality, which is a quality of representations and as such may be a quality of objects either of sense or of thought. He has also used the definition of truth as a criterion of the truth of a particular theory of knowledge. This, Dr. Müller says, is very inconsistent, because the realist admits that, as a rule, you have to find out whether a particular judgment is true by criteria other than the definition of truth, and only wants to take the high priori road' in the case of the objects of presentations. I agree with Dr. Müller's conclusions here, but I am sceptical about the supposed realist who is refuted. The objection that he makes to Idealrealismus is so absurd that it is scarcely possible to state it even plausibly. It is strange, by-the-bye, that Dr. Müller's realists always regard the soul as a mirror and are justly blamed for doing so; it never seems to have struck them that the soul might directly cognise transcendent reality. I cannot agree with Dr. Müller that the definition of truth can never be used as a criterion of any particular theory. If truth means agreement and some one produces a theory that rests on the view that truth is coherence it is surely open to us to criticise his theory because we disagree with his notion of truth. The rest of the book is devoted to an analysis of faithfulness and its relations to truth. Here, too, there is much that I (at any rate) find obscure. We are told that colours, for example, are themselves syntheses of phenomenal factors of the second order. On the objective side these include ether waves. Hence colours can be said to have phenomenal faithfulness,' for they are representations of ether waves and other factors which are themselves phenomenal. But these factors of the second order are themselves syntheses of factors of the first order. This is plain enough, though of very doubtful validity. I cannot see in what sense an ether wave is a phenomenon. It never appears to any one and never can do so. Surely then it is either a piece of transcendent reality or nothing at all. But now there comes a passage which I cannot follow. We are told that the world of everyday and the world of physics both have phenomenal faithfulness and are both syntheses of factors of the second order. But surely ether waves belong to the physical world, and we learnt that they were syntheses of factors of the first order. Nor do I see quite what is meant by saying that the physical world has phenomenal faithfulness. I suppose, however, that the author means that ether waves are as much representations of colours as are colours of ether waves. If this is what is meant we must grant that the transcendent reality has phenomenal faithfulness too. In § 12 there are some very odd remarks about invariance. If A is a representation of B, that which A and B have in common is called an invariant for the transformation. Now the degree of faithfulness depends in any given case on the range of invariance, and the measure of this is the biological one of fitness in the representation to support and develop life. To this I can only reply that I think the author must be confusing community with closeness of correlation. There can never be much in common to phenomenal and transcendent reality, and I see no reason to suppose that there is more community as the faithfulness of the representation increases. But increased faithfulness does mean greater closeness of correlation in the sense that the relation between original and representation approaches nearer to a one-one relation. In § 15 there is another mass of difficulties. Faithfulness can belong to what Dr. Müller calls Urteilsbilder'. Since these include the world of physics I suppose they are objects that can only be known by descriptions. The objects of such judgments are 'relations in a representation'. These representations may be contents of presentations or judgments. Hence presumably they are psychical, for he says that he uses 'content' in Meinong's sense; and he certainly said that the content of a judgment was the affirmation or negation of the existence of its object. Now he gives as an example of the judgments that he has in mind, This table is round'. I cannot see that the object of this judgment is a relation in a synthesis of affirmations or negations or of anything psychical. But perhaps it is only meant that the representations in question may but need not be psychical in character. But then, after telling us that the object of a judgment is a relation in a synthesis, he adds that the object is a synthesis with maximum invariance of faithfulness. I really do not see how it can be both a relation in a synthesis and a synthesis. It is useless for me to labour through the whole book, since it is evident that it is either hopelessly confused or wholly beyond my intelligence. I will therefore merely add that it contains a chapter on the Value-theory of Truth and appendices on the possibility of different systems of truth and on the character of the Laws of Logic. I have tried to be fair to the author, and if I have failed (as is not unlikely) it is from no lack of goodwill.' C. D. BROAD. VII.-NEW BOOKS. The Positive Evolution of Religion: Its Moral and Social Reaction. By Nothing but respect can be felt for the almost lifelong devotion with which Mr. Harrison has served the cause of Positivism. Everybody knows his general standpoint, and everybody knows what to expect from him on a subject of this sort. In this book, which contains his "final thoughts on the general problem of religion" the reader's expectation will not be disappointed. Most of the chapters appeared originally in the form of public lectures delivered at Newton Hall. The author's general aim is to arrive at a true view of religion by examining the four main classes of objections to Positivism-'orthodox objections,' metaphysical objections,' 'philosophical objections,' and 'scientific and literary objections'. He meets these objections largely by raising counter-objections to the various systems on the basis of which these objections are advanced. The atmosphere becomes heavy with criticism and counter-criticism, and one is inclined to suspect that Mr. Harrison fancies that by pecking to pieces other nests he is feathering one for the Positivist Society. In the first chapter, which deals with Orthodox Criticism, many passages read like an irenicon. Like an irenicon, be it said; for one is sorely tempted to apply to Mr. Harrison's essay the term "ironicon" -a barbarous word which Mr. Harrison once applied to a famous article by Huxley. Positivism and Orthodoxy, according to Mr. Harrison, have several points in common. Both insist that the most important thing in life is the abiding sense of a beneficent and dominant power. Both agree in the need for a Church. Both maintain that man has a soul and that it must be stimulated by constant appeals to conscience. Mr. Harrison illustrates the agreement of Positivism and Orthodoxy from his own religious experience. "If I may speak of myself, I can look back in memory to the time when I took part with entire sincerity in the communion of the Church of England. I am not conscious of any break in spiritual life as I look back on that. I still believe that I am seeking the same end, am filled with the same heart, and am inspired by the same order of spiritual influences" (p. 4). But lest the Orthodox should be unduly elated at finding themselves almost Positivists without knowing it, Mr. Harrison affirms that on some points there is the sharpest opposition between Orthodoxy and Positivism. Positivism has no place for three things which Orthodoxy regards as essential-an Almighty God, a scheme of Personal Salvation and a Divine Revelation. And Orthodoxy would still have to stretch itself somewhat, I imagine, in order to agree with some of Mr. Harrison's views, e.g. that as men, as moralists and as religious heroes, Epaminondas and St. Louis were more perfect types than Jesus. One of the features of the book is the glibness with which the author talks of Orthodoxy. It is a curious fact that the only people who seem to know what Orthodoxy is are its opponents. The larger part of the book is devoted to an acute and searching criticism of Nature Worship, Polytheism, Catholicism, The Catholic Church, The Anglican Establishment, Orthodox Dissent and NeoChristianity. Mr. Harrison makes no attempt to deal with the rational basis of these systems. He confines himself to a consideration of their effects as influencing society. The general line of argument is that Positivism includes what is good, and excludes what is bad, in the various types of theological religion'. In the last chapters an effort is made to come to grips with more ultimate problems. The evoluti n of religion has consisted in a gradual shrinkage and restriction in its field. Polytheism is a shrinkage from Fetichism, Monotheism from Polytheism. From Catholicism Protestantism is a violent shrinkage. But almost the only truth which this theory contains is the very obvious one, upon which Mr. Harrison sufficiently insists, that whereas Fetichism sees the supernatural in everything, Polytheism tends to limit the numbers of its superhuman beings, and Monotheism confines itself to One. Certain consequences, of course, follow from this; but the theory insufficiently recognises the gradual enrichment of religion as it has evolved from the crude cultus of the savage. Every type of theological religion, says Mr. Harrison, must prove unsatisfying to the thoughtful man. It is Positivism or nothing. But what is Positivism? It is late in the day to ask this question. But it is perhaps worth while, because if one compares this book with Mr. Harrison's earlier essays 'one discovers that he seems to find it increasingly difficult to explain what Positivism is. It is so comprehensive that no single term can express it. Neither 'philosophy' nor religion' nor education' nor 'socialism' is by itself adequate to express the meaning of Positivism. "Positivism is at once a scheme of education, a form of religion, a school of philosophy and a phase of socialism" (p. xix). It supplies a Creed for Thought, a Cult for Feeling, and a Discipline for Action. So far there is nothing new. It may all be deduced from Comte's definition of Positivism as " 'at once a philosophy and a policy". But in this latest exposition there is a closer approximation to a monistic view of the world than might be considered respectable in an orthodox Positivist. In earlier books Mr. Harrison himself has been prominent in insisting that Positivism never inclines to any type of Monism. He even quotes with approval Dr. Bridge's statement that "the repudiation of Unity, in the objective sense of the word, is the essence of Comte's philosophy" (The Philosophy of Common Sense, p. xxviii). Positivism has usually carefully distinguished Synthesis from Unity. But in this volume Mr. Harrison equates them. As against modern tendencies to fissiparous research, Positivism stands for Synthesis. It strives to weld in an organic unity all the aspects of human life. Noticeable also is another tendency which can only be called pseudomystic. The Religion of Humanity would seem to have its mysteries. "No one can explain it in a Lecture nor in fifty Lectures (p. 24); "There is no royal road to its understanding" (p. xix). It must be experienced: "it must grow into our conscience and sink into our conceptions". Is Positivism also seeking to gain "the modern mind" by giving it something whose blurred outlines it may love, but cannot understand? Its converts, one fears, will be few. The great opportunity of Positivism is past. It lay between 1850 and 1890 while the war between science and religion raged. But both science and religion rejected the synthesis which it offered. To-day Positivism can look only backward. We could wish that in these "final thoughts" Mr. Harrison had made some attempt to give a philosophical rationale of the fundamental principles of the evolution of religion. As it is, the book contains little that will be new to readers of The Creed of a Layman and The Philosophy of Common Sense, and it makes no contribution to the philosophy of religion. G. A. JOHNSTON. Kant's Doctrine of Freedom. By E. MORRIS MILLER, M.A. Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide, and London: George Robertson & Company, 1913. Pp. xvi, 184. 3s. 6d. net. It is a pleasure to welcome a book on Kant, written, printed and published in Australia. But unfortunately it seems to be contaminated with one of the characteristics of the Bush. In order to appreciate the thought contained in it, the reader must force his way through thickets of uncouth words and well-nigh impenetrable sentences. This strangeness of style is not due to carelessness. On every page there is evidence of laborious care. The phenomenon may best be explained as the progeny of the strictness of Kantstudium and the looseness of Melbourne English. The student who is not easily deterred by obstacles will find much of value in the book. It is perfectly clear that Mr. Miller's work represents the result of an extended and painstaking study of Kant, both in Kant's own works and in the immense literature which has grown up around him. Scattered throughout the book there are suggestive references to recent tendencies in philosophy. The capital expenditure on the book has obviously been great, and it is to be hoped that the return of interest will be proportionate. Mr. Miller's study consists mainly of an exposition and criticism of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. This contains the Positive Foundations' of the doctrine of Freedom. The account of 'Positive Foundations' is prefaced by two chapters on 'Negative Foundations,' which are the best in the book. They contain a critical account of Kant's negative idea of freedom as it appears in the Critique of Pure Reason. The problem of freedom necessarily involves for Kant a determination of the relation which man bears to the two worlds of which he is a member. The discussion of this relation implies the problems of the limits of human knowledge and of the possibility of establishing the existence of a spontaneous cause transcending these limits. Kant's task is therefore to demonstrate that the necessity of the material world exists only within certain limits. The existence of these limits implies their transcendence. But so far our idea of freedom is merely negative. It is the negative idea of an unconditioned cause which lies beyond the world of mechanical necessity. Of such freedom we cannot say anything except in negative terms. But the way has been opened for the realisation of this idea as a positive fact of morality. In dealing with this aspect of the problem, Mr. Miller follows the general arrangement of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. His central task consists in showing the relation of moral freedom and the moral law. He holds that the moral law presupposes the existence of freedom. The moral law is based on freedom, and not freedom on the moral law. On the other hand, we have Herbart's view that Kant founds the transcendental doctrine of freedom upon the conception of duty or the categorical imperative, as the fundamental principle of morals. Most Kant-students would probably maintain the same view as Mr. Miller. It is possible to quote from Kant texts to support either view. And it seems that both these one-sided views contain an element of falsehood and an element of |