and that with one exception the restrictions which might have proved to be injurious were inoperative. § 16. General Summary of Profit and Loss to When on the eve of the declaration of independence of the American colonies Adam Smith was taking a broad survey of the economic position of the British Empire and its constituent parts, he was forced to the conclusion that the mother country, through this extension of empire, had gained nothing in military power or in revenue for the general advantage of the empire, and in fact had suffered loss as shown by the great increase in the national debt. As regards the monopoly two more sentences may be quoted of the nature of a general summary. "In the exclusive trade it is supposed consists the great advantage of provinces which have never yet afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the civil government or the defence of the mother country." But as regards the results of this exclusive trade we are told: "Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies." Even as regards trade the monopoly has only displaced a more advantageous trade with Europe; and not increased the aggregate volume. It is admitted that a particular order of men namely, the merchants who trade with the colonies, may have benefited from the monopoly, but their gain has been at the expense of the bulk of the nation. "The Nor can this gain be taken from the favoured class by taxation for the benefit of the nation. men whose revenue the monopoly increases constitute a particular order which it is both absolutely impossible to tax beyond the proportion of other orders, and extremely impolitic to tax beyond that proportion." The general result is that the provinces of the British Empire had not contributed, and at the time of writing did not contribute their fair share either towards the ordinary expenses of the civil government of the whole empire, or towards the ordinary expense for their own defence of a permanent character, or towards the extraordinary expense that was incurred in times of war, even though these wars were undertaken on account of the provinces themselves. And the irony of the whole situation lay in the fact that owing to a variety of causes the principal colonies were preparing the way for political separation from the country to which they owed so much. The irritation caused by the imposition of taxes, ostensibly for imperial purposes, of such small extent that they would not pay the expenses of collection-" peppercorn rents,' ," "shearing the wolf" -was sufficient to cut asunder for ever the ties which it was sought to tighten. Adam Smith had no illusions as to the weakness of the British Empire, and of the causes of that weakness. § 17. Alternative of Disintegration or "Countries which contribute neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire cannot be considered as provinces. They may perhaps be considered as appendages, as a sort of splendid and showy equipage of the empire The rulers of Great Britain have for more than a century past amused the people that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic. This empire has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has hitherto been not an empire but the project of an empire; not a gold mine but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost immense expense without being likely to bring any profit. It is surely now time that our rulers should either realise this golden dream in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as the people, or that they should awake from it themselves and endeavour to awaken the people. If the project cannot be completed it ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil or military establishments in time of peace; and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.' Confronted with this alternative of abandonment or organisation Adam Smith himself had no hesitation. "To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own laws, and to make peace and war, as they might think proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was and never will be adopted by any nation in the world. The most visionary enthusiasts would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure with any serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted." If such a separation were to take place by mutual agreement and with guarantees for free trade between the different parts of the disbanded empire, possibly this solution might be the best. The colonies, though not our subjects, in time of peace would at any rate be our good friends and give us the maximum benefit of trade, whilst in time of war they would certainly be our allies; and being left, on this supposition, to provide for their own defence, it is probable that they would be very effective allies. But this alternative of separation is rejected by Adam Smith at once on the grounds of national sentiment. In the meantime, however, we have gone very near the accomplishment of the feat which Adam Smith declared impossible, and have granted such 1 Book v. chap. iii. a degree of self-government to the principal colonies as to leave our sovereignty a shadow of what it was when he complained of the empire as an imaginary project. His own plan involved a complete scheme of imperial federation; the basis of which was representation in proportion to taxation for imperial purposes. |