the illustrious characters which it has produced in former times, its warriors, its statesmen, its poets, its philosophers, and men of letters of all kinds, we are disposed to view with the most partial admiration and to rank them (sometimes most unjustly) above those of all other nations. The patriot who lays down his life for the safety or even for the vain glory of this society appears to act with the most exact propriety. But though this sacrifice appears to be perfectly just and proper we know how difficult it is to make it and how few people are capable of making it. His conduct, therefore, excites not only our entire approbation but our highest wonder and admiration, and seems to merit all the applause which can be due to the most heroic virtue. The traitor, on the contrary, who in some peculiar situation fancies he can promote his own little interest by betraying to the public enemy that of his native country; who, regardless of the judgment of the man within the breast, prefers himself in this respect so shamefully and so basely to all those with whom he has any connection, appears to be, of all villains, the most detestable."

§ 2. Adam Smith not Cosmopolitan.

The following passage is still more remarkable as throwing light on Adam Smith's nationalism: "The love of our country seems not to be derived from the love of mankind. The former sentiment is altogether independent of the latter, and seems sometimes even

1 Theory of Moral Sentiments, part vi. section ii. chap. ii.

to dispose us to act inconsistently with it. France may contain, perhaps, near three times the number of inhabitants which Great Britain contains. In the great society of mankind, therefore, the prosperity of France should appear to be an object of much greater importance than that of Great Britain. The British subject, however, who upon that account should prefer on all occasions the prosperity of the former to that of the latter country, would not be thought a good citizen of Great Britain. We do not love our country merely as part of the great society of mankind; we love it for its own sake, and independently of any such consideration." Adam Smith, indeed, shows that the sentiment of nationality and patriotism may be pushed too far, and that the

mean principle of national prejudice is often founded upon the noble one of the love of our own country." He admits that France and England may each of them have some reason to dread the increase of the naval and military power of the other, but "it is beneath the dignity of two such great nations to envy the internal happiness and prosperity of the other, the cultivation of its lands, the advancement of its manufactures, the increase of its commerce, the security and number of its ports and harbours, and its proficiency in all the arts and sciences." 2

It is important to observe, however, that even as regards material and economic interests on Adam Smith's view the prosperity of our own country 1 Theory of Moral Sentiments, part. iv. section. ii. chap. ii.

2 Ibid.

ought to be our chief concern, though, as is shown in detail in the Wealth of Nations, we gain indirectly from the prosperity of our neighbours. "The love of our country seems in ordinary cases to involve in it two principles; first, a certain respect and reverence for that constitution or form of government that is actually established; and secondly, an earnest desire to render the condition of our fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and happy as we can. He is not a citizen, who is not disposed to respect the laws and obey the civil magistrate; and he is certainly not a citizen who does not wish to promote, by every means in his power, the welfare of the whole society of his fellow-citizens."

§ 3. Of Universal Benevolence.

The chapter in this section which is entitled "Of universal benevolence "1 completes the survey of the moral duties of the individual to others. "Though our effectual good offices can very seldom be extended to any wider society than that of our own country; our good will is circumscribed by no boundary but may embrace the immensity of the universe." "Nor does the magnanimous resignation to the will of the great Director of the universe seem in any respect beyond the reach of human nature. In the greatest public, as well as private disasters, a wise man ought to consider that he himself, his friends, and countrymen have only been ordered upon the forlorn station of the universe. A wise man should

1 Theory of Moral Sentiments, part vi. section ii. chap. iii.

surely be capable of doing what a good soldier holds himself at all times in readiness to do." But although "the idea of the divine being who rules the universe is of all objects of human contemplation by far the most sublime"; and although " we look with reverence on the man who is capable of absorbing himself in contemplation of this kind," we are told, as the conclusion of the whole matter, that "the most sublime speculation of the contemplative philosopher can scarce compensate the neglect of the smallest active duty. The administration of the great system of the universe is the business of God and not of man. To man is allotted a much humbler department: the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country."

§ 4. Two Popular Errors.

It ought to be abundantly clear from the foregoing passages that popular opinion on Adam Smith's philosophy is fundamentally wrong on two points. In the first place, he did not inculcate any doctrines implying that every individual ought simply to look to his own interests, regardless of the interests of others; and in the second place, he did not maintain that the policy of nations ought to be directed solely by cosmopolitan considerations. These two ideas, as so often happens with popular delusions,

1 Some writers have laid too much stress on Adam Smith's "natural theology" and the optimism supposed to be based on it. In particular, the reference to the "invisible hand" which directs private people towards the public good has been strained to absurd lengths. Adam Smith was the ardent admirer of Hume and Voltaire, and his theology was not altogether uncritical.

are in effect contradictory, except on the simple supposition that absolute laisser faire is best for the individual and also for humanity. This, however, so far as Adam Smith is concerned, is a greater delusion than the other two which it is advanced to reconcile.

The real Adam Smith never thought of the individual in isolation. The foundation of his whole system of moral philosophy is sympathy; the test of right conduct is the opinion of the impartial spectator; the individual is a member of a family; and through the family life he is brought in touch with ever-widening circles of friends and associates until he naturally regards himself as a member of the state. And here for most practical purposes the sympathies of the individual find their natural boundaries; although no doubt in moments of exaltation he may indeed seek to enter into communion with the spirit of the universe, and in the same way he may on occasion regard himself as a citizen of the world and a lover of all humanity.

§ 5. Defence of more Importance than Opulence -the Navigation Act.

It is remarkable, in view of the attacks that have been made by List and others on the cosmopolitan ideas of Adam Smith on economic matters, that it is in the Wealth of Nations itself that the nationalism of Adam Smith finds the most unreserved and unqualified expression. "The great object of the political economy of every country is to increase the