tiations between Russia and the Central Powers, President Wilson was conducting a remarkable" peace offensive" to which reference is made elsewhere.

The desperation of the Russian masses due to misrule had been the chief cause of the growing power of the Bolsheviki and finally of their success in seizing the supreme authority and transferring it to the Soviets. No time was lost by Lenine and Trotzky in taking steps for a separate peace. On Dec. 1 Ensign Abram Krylenko, who had been appointed Commander in Chief of the Russian Armies, sent representatives carrying a white flag through the enemy lines with a proposal to the German commander for an armistice. On Dec. 5 it was agreed that there should be a suspension of hostilities for ten days, during which an armistice could be concluded. Two days later the Rumanian Government, which was at the mercy of its enemies by the disintegration of the Russian armies, decided to join Russia in arranging an armistice with the Central Powers. On Dec. 16 the armistice between the Central Powers and Russia was signed. It was to last four weeks, from Dec. 17 to Jan. 14, 1918.

Preparations were quickly made for a peace conference, and the first meeting of delegates was held at BrestLitovsk on Dec. 22. The German and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministers, Dr. von Kühlmann and Count Czernin, were the principal representatives of the Central Powers, and Adolph Joffee headed the Russian delegation.

The terms of peace proposed by the Russian delegates were based on the formula, "no annexations, no indemnities, and the free self-determination of peoples." They included, in addition to demands for the evacuation of all Russian territory occupied by Germany, the outline of a complete settlement of all the issues of the world war, such as Alsace-Lorraine, the Italian provinces of Austria, and the German oversea possessions.

On Dec. 25 Count Czernin presented the counterproposals of the Central Powers. The principle of self-determination was accepted, but in such a way

that henceforth Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and portions of Esthonia and Livonia would no longer form part of Russia. The other parts of Russia occupied by German troops would be evacuated as soon as the Russian armies were demobilized. The Central Powers also enunciated a series of proposals dealing with commercial relations which placed Russia practically under the domination of Germany.

Through Count Czernin the Central Powers took the opportunity to state the terms of a general peace upon which the Entente Allies might take part in the conference. A time limit of ten days was set for the Allies to join in the negotiations, and, when they refused to take any notice of the offer, the Central Powers withdrew their proposals for a general peace as "null and void." The conference thus from start to finish was able to deal only with the international situation in Eastern Europe.

The fundamental irreconcilability of the imperialist aims of the Central Powers and the radical Socialist principles on which Russian policy was now based was at once revealed The counterproposals which involved the removal of extensive territories and large populations outside the range of revolutionary progress were entirely unacceptable to the Russians and were officially rejected in a resolution adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which was published on Jan. 2. The resolution declared that the Governments of the Central Powers had been forced by internal pressure to accept the policy of no annexations and no indemnities, but they were in reality trying to carry out their old policy of evasions, and that nothing short of a complete evacuation of Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Provinces was possible if a democratic peace was to be concluded. The German Government refused to make any concessions, while the Russian attitude was summed up in Trotzky's remark, We did not overthrow the Czar to bow to German imperialism."

When the conference was resumed on Jan. 10, Trotzky was present with the

Vol. xlv.

Russian delegates. There were also representatives from Ukrainia, who, as we have seen, eventually made a separate peace. The first armistice being due to expire on Jan. 12, it was agreed to extend it to Feb. 12. The negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers again proved fruitless, and on Jan. 14 it was reported that they had broken down on the question of the Germans evacuating the Russian provinces. The conference then adjourned to Jan. 29.

On Jan. 23 the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets met to act on the report of the delegates at Brest-Litovsk, but it was not until the evening of Jan. 27 that Trotzky explained the situation. In a memorable speech he declared that

bourgeois Governments can sign any kind of peace, but the Government of the Soviets cannot " and that it was to the interest of all other Governments that a non-democratic peace should be concluded. "Either we shall be destroyed," he added, "or the power of the bourgeoisie throughout Europe will be destroyed. We have left the imperialistic war and shall never return to it." congress finally agreed to reject the German terms.

The

The third session of the conference at Brest-Litovsk began on Jan. 29. The attention of the delegates was taken up by discussions of the standing of the Ukrainian and Finnish representatives. The Russian delegates contended that the Soviet Government had displaced the Governments in Ukrainia and Finland, but the delegates from these countries held that they had already been recognized and they therefore refused to retire.

The proceedings dragged on until Feb. 9, when each side summed up its arguments and the Ukrainian delegates signed the separate peace that made it useless for Russia to persist in the attempt to secure a peace based upon their formula. The following day Trotzky, on behalf of the Russian delegation, announced that they still rejected the German terms, but they regarded the war between Russia and the Central Powers as ended without a treaty. Trotzky added that the complete demobilization of all the Russian

armies confronting those of the Central Powers had been ordered. The German Foreign Minister replied that military operations had been suspended temporarily by the armistice, and on its expiration a state of war would again ensue if there were no peace treaty. Trotzky refused to prolong the negotiations, declaring finally that Russia was withdrawing from the war not only in appearance but in reality. With that the conference ended. Four days later the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets voted its indorsement of Trotzky's course of action.

Germany immediately resolved to resume military operations against Russia on the expiration of the armistice at noon on Feb. 18. Two hours later Germans crossed the Dvina bridge and entered Dvinsk, while all along the line from the Baltic coast to Volhynia in the south invading troops advanced eastward. The immediate objective in the north was the occupation of Esthonia and Livonia. The class struggle which had been the undoing of the Russian Republic was utilized by the Germans in stating their grounds for carrying out the new invasion. The purpose of occupying Esthonia and Livonia was to rescue the populations of those provinces from Bolshevist rule, while the campaign in the south was undertaken in response to an appeal of the Ukrainians" in which they implored "the peaceful and order-loving German people" to help them in their struggle against the Bolsheviki. In an army order Prince Leopold of Bavaria declared that the aim of the German advance was not annexation but the suppression of the infectious ideas of the Bolsheviki.

66

Meanwhile, the Bolshevist Cabinet, faced by the rapid German invasion, deliberated on the best course to take. After an all-night sitting, which concluded on the morning of Feb. 19, Lenine's proposal was adopted in favor of accepting the German terms unconditionally. His reasons were that Russia was entirely incapable of offering resistance and that peace was indispensable for the completion of the social revolution in Russia.

There was a delay of several days be

Vol. xiv.

fore the peace treaty was signed, and during this period the German invasion continued. Esthonia was occupied, and in the south the Germans came into touch with the Ukrainian troops. In the Caucasus the Turkish Army began an offensive on Feb. 23.

In these circumstances the Soviet Government called on the people to resist the invaders, and, if necessary, organize for guerrilla warfare to defend the republic against the bourgeoisie and imperialists of Germany.

The Central Powers, through von Kühlmann, announced on Feb. 23 a new peace offer imposing more drastic terms which must be accepted by Russia within forty-eight hours, signed within three days, and ratified within two weeks. At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets the German termis were accepted by 112 votes to 84, with 22 not voting, and a new peace delegation was appointed to go to Brest-Litovsk, where the treaty was signed on March 3. By this act Russia was dispossessed of nearly one-fourth of her European territories, inhabited by one-third of her total population. In addition to the loss of Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Esthonia, Livonia, and Cour'and, a portion of Transcaucasia, on the southeast of the Black Sea, was ceded.

Rumania, isolated from the western allies, was also being forced into a peace treaty with the Central Powers, but this and other developments belong to a later period than that now under review.

WAR AIMS

The beginning of December saw the opening of the peace offensive" conducted by President Wilson. On Nov. 30 Lord Lansdowne, the imperialist statesman who had for several years conducted British foreign policy, caused a sensation by publishing a plea for a negotiated peace. Both by reason of the commanding position he occupied and the ideas he espoused, President Wilson's plan for peace easily overshadowed that of the British nobleman. On the assembling of Congress on Dec. 4, 1917, the President read a message in which, after restating America's aims, he recommend

ed a declaration of war against AustriaHungary, which was duly adopted and approved three days later. As the President himself pointed out, the logic he used in support of this step seemed at first sight strange. But it was the inevitable conclusion of his argument, which took the line that America did not regard the German people with any enmity, but as the unfortunate victims of their rulers, from whose domination they were so far unable to free themselves. Austria-Hungary was in the same relation as the German people to the masters of Germany. Therefore, there must be war against Austria-Hungary, whose Government was not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes or feelings of its own peoples but as the instrument of another nation.

The Brest-Litovsk conference gave a new impetus to the working-class movements in the allied countries for a statement of war aims. The British Labor Party on Dec. 17 issued a memorandum on war aims, supporting the demand for a general democratic peace. The British Government was not yet disposed to adopt these representations on the ground that a statement of war aims at the juncture would prove fruitless and it was impossible to wage war or secure peace by mere words, as Premier Lloyd George expressed it in a speech on Dec. 14. The labor unions refused to pledge themselves to help the Government to increase the nation's man power until they knew definitely what they were fighting for. Lloyd George thereupon agreed to tell them. On Jan. 5, 1918, he addressed a conference representing the organized workers of Great Britain and outlined the terms on which the Government was prepared to make peace.

President Wilson immediately followed with a statement of America's terms in an address to Congress on Jan. 8, in which he defined a peace plan with much more precision.

Both these statements were agreed upon the necessity of abolishing secret diplomacy, disarmament, the impartial adjustment of Germany's colonial claims, the restoration of Belgium, justice for Alsace-Lorraine, self-determination of

Vol. xlv.

the Italian and other peoples under Austrian rule, the restoration of Serbia, Armenian autonomy, Polish independence, and improved methods of international relationship. But on the question of the freedom of the seas Lloyd George was silent. But the most striking difference of attitude between President Wilson and the British Prime Minister was in regard to Russia. The President expressed sympathy for the aspirations of the Russian people and commended their representatives at Brest-Litovsk for their democratic stand against the Central Powers. Lloyd George, on the other hand, stated that the British Government could not be held accountable for decisions which the Soviet Government arrived at.

The German Imperial Chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister both replied on Jan. 24. Czernin's speech seemed conciliatory and expressed willingness to negotiate on the basis laid down by President Wilson. Hertling admitted that the British and American proposals contained certain principles for a general world peace to which Germany could assent, but was skeptical as to their full value when stated in specific detail. The Allies, he said, did not desire to destroy Germany, but they were casting covetous eyes on parts of the lands belonging to the other Central Powers. Before Germany could begin peace negotiations the Allies would have to abandon their assumption of the attitude of the victor speaking to the vanquished. Hertling concluded by inviting the Allies to put forward revised peace proposals. The speeches of both Hertling and Czernin plainly indicated that they were ready to talk peace in the then existing posture of affairs, and a good deal of the language used, particularly by Hertling, appeared for the purpose of covering a desire to carry the long-distance peace negotiations to a point where they could be transferred to a conference table.

President Wilson, in an address to Congress on Feb. 11, followed with the boldest bid he had yet made for peace, laying down four fundamental principles, which, if accepted by the Central Empires, would be sufficient to justify the United States in beginning actual negotiations. These four propositions were justice to all peoples so that peace would be permanent, no bartering of peoples and provinces, all territorial adjustments for the benefit of the populations concerned, and free play for national aspirations. Lloyd George, speaking in the House of Commons next day, (Feb. 12,) expressed extreme skepticism of the sincerity of both the German and Austrian Premiers.

At this point the "peace offensive" broke down. The expectation that Hertling and Czernin would take the first opportunity to reply to President Wilson and accept his four principles was doomed to disappointment because Germany, having now disposed of Russia, was preparing, at the behest of the war party, for another great offensive on the western front in the hope that this time a military decision might be obtained and terms of peace dictated by victorious Generals instead of being negotiated. In the weeks that followed, preparations were made with all the thoroughness for which the German Army was noted, and in the terrific onslaught that launched against the allied armies in France and Flanders all thought of peace disappeared. The allied Governments, well aware of the impending blow, reached an agreement for a greater coordination of effort by placing the supreme direction of the campaign on the whole of the western front under an Interallied War Council sitting at Versailles.

was

The story of the German offensive and the united stand of the Allies and America will come in the review of the period which followed.

Vol. xlv.