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BATTLES OF YPRES AND MESSINES: SOLID LINE, FORMER ALLIED POSITION; BROKEN LINE, ALLIED FRONT AT END OF 1917.

ly in the enemy's first and support trenches on a front of about 3,000 yards east and north of Boesinghe. All hostile attempts to eject them failed, and during the night seventeen bridges were thrown across the canalby our troops.

This operation greatly facilitated the task of the allied troops on this part of the battle front, to whose attack the Yser Canal had previously presented a formidable obstacle. Whether the withdrawal which made it possible was due to the desire of the German infantry to escape our bombardment, or to their fear that our attack would be inaugurated by the explosion of a new series of mines is uncertain.

Plan of First Attack

(40) The front of the allied attack extended from the Lys River opposite Deulemont northward to beyond Steenstraat, a distance of over fifteen miles, but the main blow was to be delivered by the 5th Army on a front of about seven and a half miles, from the Zillebeke-Zandvoorde road to Boesinghe, in

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Covering the right of the 5th Army, the task of the 2d Army was to advance short distance only. Its principal object at this stage was to increase the area threatened by the attack and so force the enemy to distribute the fire of his artillery. I had other tasks in view for it at a later period.

On the left of the 5th Army the 1st French Army was to advance its right in close touch with the British forces and secure them from counterattack from the north. This entailed an advance of considerable depth over difficult country, and ultimately involved the capture of the whole peninsula lying between the Yser Canal and the floods of the St. Jansbeek and the Martjevaart.

The plan of attack on the 5th Army front was to advance in a series of bounds, with which the right of the 1st French Army was to keep step. These bounds were arranged so as to suit as far as possible both the position of the principal lines of the enemy's defenses and the configuration of the ground.

It was hoped that in this first attack our troops would succeed in establishing themselves on the crest of the high ground east of Ypres, on which a strong flank could be formed for subsequent operations, and would also secure the crossings of the Steenbeek. For this purpose four army corps were placed at the disposal of General Sir Hubert Gough.

The Battle Opened

(41) At 3:50 A. M. on the morning of the 31st of July the combined attack was launched. English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh troops delivered the main assault on the British front.

Preceded at zero hour by discharges of thermit and oil drums and covered by an accurate artillery barrage from a great number of guns, the allied infantry entered the Ger

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On the greater part of the front of the main attack the resistance of the German infantry was quickly overcome and rapid progress was made. The difficult country east of Ypres, where the Menin road crosses the crest of the Wytschaete - Passchendaele Ridge, formed, however, the key to the enemy's position, and here the most determined opposition was encountered. None the less, the attacking brigades, including a number of Lancashire battalions, regiments from all parts of England, and a few Scottish and Irish battalions, fought their way steadily forward through Shrewsbury Forest and Sanctuary Wood and captured Stirling Castle, Hooge, and the Bellewarde Ridge.

Further north British and French troops carried the whole of the first German trench system with scarcely a check, and proceeded in accordance with the time table to the assault of the enemy's second line of defense. Scottish troops took Verlorenhoek, and, continuing their advance, by 6 A. M. had reached Frezenberg, where for a short time stiff fighting took place before the village, and the strong defenses round it were captured. South of Pilckem a Prussian Guard battalion was broken up by Welsh troops after a brief resistance and Pilckem was taken. Sharp fighting occurred also at a number of other points, but in every instance the enemy's opposition was overcome.

At 9 A. M. the whole of our second objectives north of the Ypres-Roulers railway were in our possession, with the exception of a strong point north of Frezenberg, known as Pommern Redoubt, where fighting was still going on. Within an hour this redoubt also had been captured by West Lancashire territorials. On our left French troops made equal progress, capturing their objective in precise accordance with program and with little loss.

By this time our field artillery had begun to move up, and by 9:30 A. M. a number of batteries were already in action in their forward positions. The allied advance on this portion of our front was resumed at the hour planned. English county troops captured St. Julien, and from that point northward our final objectives were reached and passed. Highland territorials, Welsh and Guard battalions secured the crossings of the Steenbeek, and French troops, having also taken their final objectives, advanced beyond them and seized Bixschoote. A hostile counterattack launched against the point of junction of the French and British armies was completely repulsed.

Meanwhile, south of the Ypres-Roulers railway, very heavy and continuous fighting was taking place on both sides of the Menin road.

After the capture of the German first-line system our troops on this part of our front had advanced in time with the divisions on

their left against their second objectives. Great opposition was at once encountered in front of two small woods known as Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood, while further south a strong point in Shrewsbury Forest held out against our attacks till the morning of Aug. 1. North of Glencorse Wood English troops continued their advance in spite of the enemy's resistance and reached the village of Westhoek.

Later in the day heavy counterattacks began to develop from south of the Menin road northward to St. Julien. Our artillery caused great loss to the enemy in these attacks, although the weather was unfavorable for airplane work and observation for our batteries was difficult. At Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood a few tanks succeeded in reaching the fighting line, in spite of exceedingly bad ground, and came into action with our infantry. Fierce fighting took place all day, but the enemy was unable to shake our hold upon the ridge.

Results of First Day

(42) At the end of the day, therefore, our troops on the 5th Army front had carried the German first system of defense south of Westhoek. Except at Westhoek itself, where they were established on the outskirts of the village, they had already gained the whole of the crest of the ridge and had denied the enemy observation over the Ypres plain. Further north they had captured the enemy's second line also as far as St. Julien. North of that village they had passed beyond the German second line, and held the line of the Steenbeek to our junction with the French.

On our left flank our allies had admirably completed the important task allotted to them. Close touch had been kept with the British troops on their right throughout the day. All and more than all their objectives had been gained rapidly and at exceptionally light cost, and the flank of the allied advance had been effectively secured.

Meanwhile the attack on the 2d Army front had also met with complete success. On the extreme right New Zealand troops had carried La Basse Ville after a sharp fight lasting some fifty minutes. On the left English troops had captured Hollebeke and the difficult ground north of the bend of the Ypres-Comines Canal and east of Battle Wood. Between these two points our line had been advanced on the whole front for distances varying from 200 to 800 yards.

Over 6,100 prisoners, including 133 officers, were captured by us in this battle. In addition to our gains in prisoners and ground we also captured some twenty-five guns, while a further number of prisoners and guns were taken by our allies.

Effect of the Weather

(43) The weather had been threatening throughout the day, and had rendered the work of our airplanes very difficult from the commencement of the battle. During the

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afternoon, while fighting was still in progress, rain began, and fell steadily all night. Thereafter, for four days, the rain continued without cessation, and for several days afterward the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The low-lying, clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain, turned to a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing streams speedily transformed into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy's artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting on several occasions both men and pack animals were lost in this way. In these conditions operations of any magnitude became impossible, and the resumption of our offensive was necessarily postponed until a period of fine weather should allow the ground to recover.

As had been the case in the Arras battle, this unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time was lost, the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the disorganization produced by our first attack, and the enemy was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.

St. Julien and Westhoek

(44) On the night of the 31st of July and on the two following days the enemy delivered further counterattacks against our new line, and in particular made determined efforts to dislodge us from the high ground between the Menin road and the Ypres-Roulers railway, and to recover his second-line system between Frezenberg and St. Julien. In this he completely failed. The violence of his artillery fire compelled us, however, to withdraw temporarily from St. Julien, though we retained a bridgehead across the Steenbeek, just north of the village.

In spite of these counterattacks and the great but unavoidable hardships from which our troops were suffering, steady progress was made with the consolidation of the captured ground, and every opportunity was taken to improve the line already gained.

On the 3d of August St. Julien was reoccupied without serious opposition, and our line linked up with the position we had retained on the right bank of the Steenbeek further north. A week later a successful minor operation carried out by English troops gave us complete possession of Westhoek. Seven hostile counterattacks within the following four days broke down before our defense.

During this period certain centres of resistance in the neighborhood of Kortekeer Cabaret were cleared up by our allies, and a number of fortified farmhouses, lying across the front of the French position, were reduced in turn.

Lens Operations Resumed

(45) Toward the middle of August a slight improvement took place in the weather, and

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advantage was taken of this second attack east of Ypres. settled weather again set in, closed as the wettest August that has been known for many years.

On the day preceding this attack at Ypres a highly successful operation was carried out in the neighborhood of Lens, whereby the situation of our forces in that sector was greatly improved. At the same time the threat to Lens itself was rendered more immediate and more insistent, and the enemy was prevented from concentrating the whole of his attention and resources upon the front of our main offensive.

At 4:25 A. M. on Aug. 15 the Canadian corps attacked on a front of 4,000 yards southeast and east of Loos. The objectives consisted of the strongly fortified hill known as Hill 70, which had been reached, but not held, in the battle of Loos on Sept. 25, 1915, and also the mining suburbs of Cité Ste. Elizabeth, Cité St. Emile, and Cité St. Laurent, together with the whole of Bois Rase and the western half of Bois Hugo. The observation from Hill 70 had been very useful to the enemy, and in our possession materially increased our command over the defenses of Lens.

Practically the whole of these objectives was gained rapidly at light cost and in exact accordance with plan. Only at the furthest apex of our advance a short length of German trench west of Cité St. Auguste resisted our first assault. This position was again attacked on the afternoon of the following day and captured after a fierce struggle lasting far into the night.

A number of local counterattacks on the morning of Aug. 15 were repulsed, and in the evening a powerful attack delivered across the open by a German reserve division was broken up with heavy loss. In addition to the enemy's other casualties, 1,120 prisoners from three German divisions were captured by us.

The Ypres Battle-Langemarck

(46) Close upon the heels of this success, at 4:45 A. M. on Aug. 16 our second attack was launched east and north of Ypres on a front extending from the northwest corner of Inverness Copse to our junction with the French south of St. Janshoek. On our left the French undertook the task of clearing up the remainder of the Bixschoote peninsula.

On the left of the British attack the English brigades detailed for the assault captured the hamlet of Wijdendrift and reached the southern outskirts of Langemarck. Here some resistance was encountered, but by 8 A. M. the village had been taken, after sharp fighting. Our troops then proceeded to attack the portion of the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line which formed their final objective, and an hour later had gained this also, with the exception of a short length of trench northeast of Langemarck. Two small counterattacks were repulsed without diffi

culty.

The attack of the 1st French Army delivered at the same hour was equally successful. On the right a few fortified farms in the neighborhood of the Steenbeek again gave trouble, and held out for a time. Elsewhere our allies gained their objectives rapidly, and once more at exceptionally light cost. The bridgehead of Die Grachten was secured, and the whole of the peninsula cleared of the enemy.

In the centre of the British attack the enemy's resistance was more obstinate. The difficulty of making deep-mined dugouts in soil where water lay within a few feet of the surface of the ground had compelled the enemy to construct in the ruins of farms and in other suitable localities a number of strong points or "pillboxes" built of reinforced concrete often many feet thick.

These field forts, distributed in depth all along the front of our advance, offered a serious obstacle to progress. They were heavily armed with machine guns and manned by men determined to hold on at all costs. Many were reduced as our troops advanced, but others held out throughout the day, and delayed the arrival of our supports. In addition, weather conditions made airplane observation practically impossible, with the result that no warning was received of the enemy's counterattacks, and our infantry obtained little artillery help against them. When, therefore, later in the morning a heavy counterattack developed in the neighborhood of the Wieltje-Passchendaele road, our troops, who had reached their final objectives at many points in this area also, were gradually compelled to fall back.

On the left centre West Lancashire territorials and troops from other English counties established themselves on a line running north from St. Julien to the old German third line due east of Langemarck. This line they maintained against the enemy's attacks, and thereby secured the flank of our gains further north.

On the right of the British attack the enemy again developed the main strength of his resistance. At the end of a day of very heavy fighting, except for small gains of ground on the western edge of Glencorse Wood and north of Westhoek, the situation south of St. Julien remained unchanged.

In spite of this partial check on the southern portion of our attack, the day closed as a decided success for the Allies. A wide gap had been made in the old German third-line system, and over 2,100 prisoners and some thirty guns had been captured.

Effect of Hostile Resistance

(47) The strength of the resistance developed by the enemy at this stage in the neighborhood of the Menin road decided me to extend the flank of the next attack southward. It was undesirable, however, either to increase the already wide front of attack for which the 5th Army was responsible or to divide between two armies the control of

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the attack against the main ridge itself. therefore determined to extend the left of the 2d Army northward, intrusting the attack upon the whole of the high ground crossed by the Menin road to General Sir Hubert Plumer as a single self-contained operation, to be carried out in conjunction with the attacks of the 5th Army further north.

During the wet weather which prevailed throughout the remainder of the month, our efforts were confined to a number of small operations east and northeast of Ypres, designed to reduce certain of the more important of the enemy's strong points. In the meantime the necessary rearrangements of the British forces were pushed on as rapidly as possible so that our new attack might be ready directly the weather should improve sufficiently to enable it to be undertaken.

These arrangements included a modification of our artillery tactics, to meet the situation created by the change in the enemy's methods of defnse.

Our recent successes had conclusively proved that the enemy's infantry were unable to hold the strongest defenses against a properly mounted attack, and that increasing the number of his troops in his forward defense system merely added to his losses. Accordingly, the enemy had adopted a system of elastic defense, in which his forward trench lines were held only in sufficient strength to disorganize the attack, while the bulk of his forces were kept in close reserve, ready to deliver a powerful and immediate blow which might recover the positions overrun by our troops before we had time to consolidate them.

In the heavy fighting east of Ypres these tactics had undoubtedly met with a certain measure of success. While unable to drive

us back from the ridge, they had succeeded
in combination with the state of the ground
and weather in checking our progress. This
new policy, for our early knowledge of whien,
as well as for other valuable information
concerning the enemy's dispositions and in-
tentions throughout the battle, much credit.
is due to the zeal and efficiency of my In-
telligence Service, necessarily entailed corre-
sponding changes in our method of attack.
Minor Operations.

(48) In the interval, on Aug. 19, 22, and 27,
positions of considerable local importance in
the neighborhood of St. Julien were captured
with some hundreds of prisoners as the re-
sult of minor attacks conducted under the
most unfavorable conditions of ground and
weather. The ground gained represented an
advance of about 800 yards on a front of
over two miles. In combination with the at-
tack of Aug. 22 English troops also attacked
astride the Menin road, and after six days
of continuous local fighting established them-
selves in the western edge of Inverness

Copse.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of my policy of compelling the enemy to guard himself on other fronts, successful minor operations had been undertaken elsewhere. On the Lens front Canadian troops attacked on the 21st of August and carried the line of German trenches skirting the town to the southwest and west, taking 200 prisoners. Further south north country troops attacked on the 26th of August east of Hargicourt and captured the enemy's advanced positions on a front of a mile. In this operation 136 prisoners were taken, and on the 9th and 11th of September our gains were extended and further prisoners secured.

The Ypres Battle-Preparations for the Third Attack

(49) At the beginning of September the weather gradually improved, and artillery and other preparations for my next attack proceeded steadily. Both the extent of the preparations required, however, and the need to give the ground time to recover from the heavy rains of August rendered a considerable interval unavoidable before a new advance could be undertaken. The 20th of September was therefore chosen for the date of our attack, and before that day our preparations had been completed.

The front selected extended from the YpresComines Canal north of Hollebeke to the Ypres-Staden railway north of Langemarck, a distance of just over eight miles along the line then held by us. The average depth of our objectives was 1,000 yards, which increased to a depth of a mile in the neighborhood of the Menin road. Australian, English, Scottish, and South African troops were employed in the attack, and gained a success

conspicuous for precision and thoroughness
of execution.

The Menin Road Ridge

(50) During the night of the 19th-20th of September rain again fell steadily, and when dawn broke thick mist made observation impossible. Despite this disadvantage, the assembling of our troops was carried out in good order, and at 5:40 A. M. on the 20th of September the assault was launched.

Good progress was made from the start. and, as the morning wore on, the mist cleared. Our airplanes were able to establish contact with our infantry, to assist them by engaging parties of the enemy with machine-gun fire, and to report hostile concentrations and Counterattacks to our artillery.

On our right, Welsh and west country troops advanced down the spur east of Klein Zillebeke, and, after sharp fighting in the small woods north of the Ypres-Comines Canal,

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