the canal were kept under the fire of our artillery. The final attack began soon afterward, and by 3:45 P. M. the village of Oosttaverne had been captured. At 4 P. M. troops from the northern and western counties of England entered the Oosttaverne line east of the village and captured two batteries of German field guns. Half an hour later other English battalions broke through the enemy's position further north. Parties of the enemy were surrendering freely, and his casualties were reported to be very heavy. By the evening the Oosttaverne line had been taken, and our objectives had been gained. The rapidity with which the attack had been carried through, and the destruction caused by our artillery, made it impossible at first to form more than a rough estimate of our captures. When the final reckoning had been completed, it was found that they included 7,200 prisoners, 67 guns, 94 trench mortars, and 294 machine guns. Subsequent Operations (34) During the night our infantry consolidated the captured positions, while tanks patrolled the ground east of the Oosttaverne line, and in the early morning of June 8 assisted in the repulse of an enemy counterattack up the Wambeke Valley. At 4 A. M. on the same morning our troops captured a small portion of German trench near Septieme Barn, where the enemy had resisted our first attack. That evening, at 7 P. M., after an intense bombardment, the enemy counterattacked along practically the whole of our new line, but was repulsed at all points. Consolidation and the establishment of advanced posts continued during the following four days, in the course of which Australian troops captured La Potterie Farm, southeast of Messines, and the hamlet of Gapaard was occupied. Our Our progress on the right of the battle front made the enemy's positions between the Lys River and St. Yves very dangerous, and he now gradually began to evacute them. patrols kept close touch with the enemy, and by the evening of June 14 the whole of the old German front and support lines north of Lys had passed into our possession. That evening we again attacked south and east of Messines and on both sides of the Ypres-Comines Canal, and met with complete success. The strong points in which the enemy had held out north of the canal were captured, and our line was advanced on practically the whole front from the River Warnave to Klein Zillebeke. By this operation the 2d Army front was pushed forward as far as was then desirable. Henceforward our efforts in this area were directed to putting the line gained in a state of defense and establishing forward posts. (35) As soon as this preliminary operation had been successfully accomplished it be came possible to take in hand our final dispositions for our main offensive east and north of Ypres. Owing to the great extent of front to be dealt with, the 5th Army took over command of the front from Observatory Ridge to Boesinghe on June 10, and the whole of our available resources were directed to completing the preparations for the attack. It had been agreed that French troops should take part in these operations, and should extend my left flank northward beyond Boesinghe. The relief by British troops of the French troops holding the coast sector from St. Georges to the sea was accordingly arranged for, and was successfully completed ten days later. In the first week of July the Belgian troops holding the front from Boesinghe to Noordschoote were relieved by the 1st French Army, under the command of General Anthoine. The various problems inseparable from the mounting of a great offensive, the improvement and construction of roads and railways, the provision of an adequate water supply and of accommodation for troops, the formation of dumps, the digging of dugouts, subways, and trenches, and the assembling and registering of guns had all to be met and overcome in the new theatre of battle under conditions of more than ordinary disadvantage. On no previous occasion, not excepting the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, had the whole of the ground from which we had to attack been so completely exposed to the enemy's observation. Even after the enemy had been driven from the MessinesWytschaete Ridge, he still possessed excellent direct observation over the salient from the east and southeast, as well as from the Pilkem Ridge to the north. Nothing existed at Ypres to correspond with the vast caves and cellars which proved of such value in the days prior to the Arras battle, and the provision of shelter for the troops presented a very serious problem. The work of the tunneling companies of the Royal Engineers deserves special mention in this connection. It was carried on under great difficulties, both from the unreliable nature of the ground and also from hostile artillery, which paid particular attention to all indications of mining activity on our part. Minor Operations Continued (36) Meanwhile the policy of maintaining activity on other parts of my front was continued. Further ground was gained on Greenland Hill, and on June 14 British troops captured by a surprise attack the German trench lines on the crest of Infantry Hill, east of Monchy-le-Preux, with 175 prisoners. This important position had already been the scene of a great deal of fierce fighting, and during the following six weeks was frequently counterattacked. Our advanced posts changed hands frequently; but the principal line, giving the observation which lent importance to the position, remained consistently in our possession. Early in May local attacks had been undertaken by Canadian troops in the neighborhood of the Souchez River, which formed the prelude to a long-sustained series of minor operations directed against the defense of Lens. Substantial progress was made in this area on June 5 and 19, and five days later North Midland troops captured an important position on the slopes of a small hill southwest of Lens, forcing the enemy to make a considerable withdrawal on both sides of the river. Canadian troops took La Coulotte on June 26, and by the morning of June 28 had reached the outskirts of Avion. On the evening of June 28 a deliberate and carefully thought out scheme was put into operation by the 1st Army, to give the enemy the impression that he was being attacked on a twelve-mile front from Gavrelle to Hulluch. Elaborate demonstrations were made on the whole of this front, accompanied by discharges of gas, smoke, and thermit, and a mock raid was successfully carried out southeast of Loos. At the same time real attacks were made, with complete success, by English troops on a front of 2,000 yards opposite Oppy, and by Canadian and North Midland troops on a front of two and a half miles astride the Souchez River. All our objectives were gained, including Eleu dit Leauvette and the southern half of Avion, with some 300 prisoners and a number of machine guns. The Lombaertzyde Attack (37) The appearance of British troops on the coast seems to have alarmed the enemy and caused him to launch a small counteroffensive. The positions which we had taken over from the French in this area included a narrow strip of polder and dune, some two miles in length and from 600 to 1,200 yards in depth, lying on the right bank of the canalized Yser between the Passchendaele Canal, south of Lombaertzyde, and the coast. Midway between the Passchendaele Canal and the sea these positions were divided into two parts by the dike known the Geleide Creek, which flows into the Yser southwest of Lombaertzyde. If the enemy could succeed in driving us back across the canal and river on the whole of this front, he would render the defense of the sector much easier for him. as Early on the morning of July 10 an intense bombardment was opened against these positions. Our defenses, which consisted chiefly of breastworks built in the sand, were flattened, and all the bridges across the Yser below the Geleide Creek, as well as the bridges across the creek itself, were destroyed. At 6:30 P. M. the enemy's infantry attacked, and the isolated garrison of our positions north of the Geleide Creek, consisting of troops from a Northamptonshire battalion and a rifle battalion, were overwhelmed after an obstinate and most gallant resistance. Of these two battalions some seventy men and four officers succeeded during the nights of the 10th-11th and 11th-12th of July in swimming across the Yser to our lines. On the southern half of the point attacked, opposite Lombaertzyde, the enemy also broke into our lines; but here, where our positions had greater depth, and communication across the Yser was still possible, his troops were ejected by our counterattack. The Third Battle of Ypres-Preliminary Stages (38) By this date the preparations for the combined allied offensive were far advanced, and the initial stages of the battle had already begun. A definite aerial offensive had been launched, and the effective work of our airmen once more enabled our batteries to carry out successfully a methodical and comprehensive artillery program. So effective was our counterbattery work that the enemy commenced to withdraw his guns to places of greater security. On this account, and also for other reasons, the date of our attack, which had been fixed for the 25th of July, was postponed for three days. This postponement enabled a portion of our own guns to be moved further forward, and gave our airmen the opportunity to locate accurately the enemy's new battery positions. Subsequently a succession of days of bad visibility, combined with the difficulties experienced by our allies in getting their guns into position in their new area, decided me to sanction a further postponement until the 31st of July. In addition to our artillery bombardment, gas was used extensively during the fortnight preceding the attack, and a number of highly successful raids were carried out along the whole front north of the Lys. The Yser Canal Crossed (39) As the date of the attack drew near, careful watch was maintained lest the enemy should endeavor to disarrange our plans by withdrawing to one of his rear lines of defense. On the 27th of July the German forward defense system was found to be unoccupied on the northern portion of the 5th Army front. British Guards and French troops seized the opportunity to cross the Yser Canal, and established themselves firm BATTLES OF YPRES AND MESSINES: SOLID LINE, FORMER ALLIED POSITION; BROKEN LINE, ALLIED FRONT AT END OF 1917. ly in the enemy's first and support trenches on a front of about 3,000 yards east and north of Boesinghe. All hostile attempts to eject them failed, and during the night seventeen bridges were thrown across the canalby our troops. This operation greatly facilitated the task of the allied troops on this part of the battle front, to whose attack the Yser Canal had previously presented a formidable obstacle. Whether the withdrawal which made it possible was due to the desire of the German infantry to escape our bombardment, or to their fear that our attack would be inaugurated by the explosion of a new series of mines is uncertain. Plan of First Attack (40) The front of the allied attack extended from the Lys River opposite Deulemont northward to beyond Steenstraat, a distance of over fifteen miles, but the main blow was to be delivered by the 5th Army on a front of about seven and a half miles, from the Zillebeke-Zandvoorde road to Boesinghe, in clusive. a Covering the right of the 5th Army, the task of the 2d Army was to advance short distance only. Its principal object at this stage was to increase the area threatened by the attack and so force the enemy to distribute the fire of his artillery. I had other tasks in view for it at a later period. On the left of the 5th Army the 1st French Army was to advance its right in close touch with the British forces and secure them from counterattack from the north. This entailed an advance of considerable depth over difficult country, and ultimately involved the capture of the whole peninsula lying between the Yser Canal and the floods of the St. Jansbeek and the Martjevaart. The plan of attack on the 5th Army front was to advance in a series of bounds, with which the right of the 1st French Army was to keep step. These bounds were arranged so as to suit as far as possible both the position of the principal lines of the enemy's defenses and the configuration of the ground. It was hoped that in this first attack our troops would succeed in establishing themselves on the crest of the high ground east of Ypres, on which a strong flank could be formed for subsequent operations, and would also secure the crossings of the Steenbeek. For this purpose four army corps were placed at the disposal of General Sir Hubert Gough. The Battle Opened (41) At 3:50 A. M. on the morning of the 31st of July the combined attack was launched. English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh troops delivered the main assault on the British front. Preceded at zero hour by discharges of thermit and oil drums and covered by an accurate artillery barrage from a great number of guns, the allied infantry entered the Ger man lines at all points. rage was late and weak, were light. The enemy's barand our casualties On the greater part of the front of the main attack the resistance of the German infantry was quickly overcome and rapid progress was made. The difficult country east of Ypres, where the Menin road crosses the crest of the Wytschaete Passchendaele Ridge, formed, however, the key to the enemy's position, and here the most determined opposition was encountered. None the less, the attacking brigades, including a number of Lancashire battalions, regiments from all parts of England, and a few Scottish and Irish battalions, fought their way steadily forward through Shrewsbury Forest and Sanctuary Wood and captured Stirling Castle, Hooge, and the Bellewarde Ridge. Further north British and French troops carried the whole of the first German trench system with scarcely a check, and proceeded in accordance with the time table to the assault of the enemy's second line of defense. Scottish troops took Verlorenhoek, and, continuing their advance, by 6 A. M. had reached Frezenberg, where for a short time stiff fighting took place before the village, and the strong defenses round it were captured. South of Pilckem a Prussian Guard battalion was broken up by Welsh troops after a brief resistance and Pilckem was taken. Sharp fighting occurred also at a number of other points, but in every instance the enemy's opposition was overcome. At 9 A. M. the whole of our second objectives north of the Ypres-Roulers railway were in our possession, with the exception of a strong point north of Frezenberg, known as Pommern Redoubt, where fighting was still going on. Within an hour this redoubt also had been captured by West Lancashire territorials. On our left French troops made equal progress, capturing their objective in precise accordance with program and with little loss. By this time our field artillery had begun to move up, and by 9:30 A. M. a number of batteries were already in action in their forward positions. The allied advance on this portion of our front was resumed at the hour planned. English county troops captured St. Julien, and from that point northward our final objectives were reached and passed. Highland territorials, Welsh and Guard battalions secured the crossings of the Steenbeek, and French troops, having also taken their final objectives, advanced beyond them and seized Bixschoote. A hostile counterattack launched against the point of junction of the French and British armies was completely repulsed. Meanwhile, south of the Ypres-Roulers railway, very heavy and continuous fighting was taking place on both sides of the Menin road. After the capture of the German first-line system our troops on this part of our front had advanced in time with the divisions on their left against their second objectives. Great opposition was at once encountered in front of two small woods known as Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood, while further south a strong point in Shrewsbury Forest held out against our attacks till the morning of Aug. 1. North of Glencorse Wood English troops continued their advance in spite of the enemy's resistance and reached the village of Westhoek. Later in the day heavy counterattacks began to develop from south of the Menin road northward to St. Julien. Our artillery caused great loss to the enemy in these attacks, although the weather was unfavorable for airplane work and observation for our batteries was difficult. At Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood a few tanks succeeded in reaching the fighting line, in spite of exceedingly bad ground, and came into action with our infantry. Fierce fighting took place all day, but the enemy was unable to shake our hold upon the ridge. Results of First Day (42) At the end of the day, therefore, our troops on the 5th Army front had carried the German first system of defense south of Westhoek. Except at Westhoek itself, where they were established on the outskirts of the village, they had already gained the whole of the crest of the ridge and had denied the enemy observation over the Ypres plain. Further north they had captured the enemy's second line also as far as St. Julien. North of that village they had passed beyond the German second line, and held the line of the Steenbeek to our junction with the French. to On our left flank our allies had admirably completed the important task allotted them. Close touch had been kept with the British troops on their right throughout the day. All and more than all their objectives had been gained rapidly and at exceptionally light cost, and the flank of the allied advance had been effectively secured. Meanwhile the attack on the 2d Army front had also met with complete success. On the extreme right New Zealand troops had carried La Basse Ville after a sharp fight lasting some fifty minutes. On the left English troops had captured Hollebeke and the difficult ground north of the bend of the Ypres-Comines Canal and east of Battle Wood. Between these two points our line had been advanced on the whole front for distances varying from 200 to 800 yards. Over 6,100 prisoners, including 133 officers, were captured by us in this battle. In addition to our gains in prisoners and ground we also captured some twenty-five guns, while a further number of prisoners and guns were taken by our allies. Effect of the Weather (43) The weather had been threatening throughout the day, and had rendered the work of our airplanes very difficult from the commencement of the battle. During the afternoon, while fighting was still in progress, rain began, and fell steadily all night. Thereafter, for four days, the rain continued without cessation, and for several days afterward the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The low-lying, clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain, turned to a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy's artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting on several occasions both men and pack animals were lost in this way. In these conditions operations of any magnitude became impossible, and the resumption of our offensive was necessarily postponed until a period of fine weather should allow the ground to recover. As had been the case in the Arras battle, this unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time was lost, the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the disorganization produced by our first attack, and the enemy was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements. St. Julien and Westhoek (44) On the night of the 31st of July and on the two following days the enemy delivered further counterattacks against our new line, and in particular made determined ef forts to dislodge us from the high ground be tween the Menin road and the Ypres-Roulers railway, and to recover his second-line system between Frezenberg and St. Julien. In this he completely failed. The violence of his artillery fire compelled us, however, to withdraw temporarily from St. Julien, though we retained a bridgehead across the Steenbeek, just north of the village. In spite of these counterattacks and the great but unavoidable hardships from which our troops were suffering, steady progress was made with the consolidation of the captured ground, and every opportunity was taken to improve the line already gained. On the 3d of August St. Julien was reoccu pied without serious opposition, and our line linked up with the position we had retained on the right bank of the Steenbeek further north. A week later a successful minor operation carried out by English troops gave us complete possession of Westhoek. Seven hostile counterattacks within the following four days broke down before our defense. During this period certain centres of resistance in the neighborhood of Kortekeer Cabaret were cleared up by our allies, and a number of fortified farmhouses, lying across the front of the French position, were reduced in turn. Lens Operations Resumed (45) Toward the middle of August a slight improvement took place in the weather, and |