go, and I have never allowed myself to be crowded from this road a hair's breadth, either to the right or to the left.

Since then I have become the undisputed darling of the Pan-Germans and those in the monarchy who imitate the Pan-Germans. At the same time I am calumniated as an inciter to war by those who want peace at any price, of which innumerable letters are proof. Neither has ever troubled me. On the contrary, these double insults are my only amusement in these hard times. I declare once more, I demand not a square foot nor a penny from Russia, and if Russia, as it seems to do, puts itself on that point of view also, peace will be made.

Those who want peace at any price might have doubted as to my non-annexationist purposes toward Russia if I did not tell them with the same inconsiderate openness that I shall never allow myself to make a peace which transcends the form I have just sketched. Should our Russian fellow-peacemakers demand the cession of territory from us, or indemnity, I should continue the war despite a desire for peace which I have as well as you, or would resign if I could not make my view prevail. *

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THE NEW RUSSIA

The Governments in question are, first, that part of Russia which is led by Petrograd; secondly, our own new neighboring State, Great Ukrainia; thirdly, Finland, and, fourthly, the Caucasus.

With the first two States we treat directly, with the two others now only more or less indirectly, because they have to date sent no negotiator to BrestLitovsk. These four Russian fellowpeacemakers are met by us four powers, and the case of the Caucasus, in which we naturally have no difficulty to remove, but which is in conflict with Turkey, shows the extent of the subjects under discussion.

What interests us especially and chiefly is the newly created great State which will be our neighbor in the future, Ukrainia. We have gotten very far in our negotiations with this delegation.

We have agreed on the above-mentioned basis of no annexations nor compensations and have agreed what and how commercial relations with the newly created republic are to be established.

But this very example of Ukrainia shows one of the ruling difficulties. While the Ukrainian Republic holds the point of view that it has the right to treat with us quite autonomously and independently, the Russian delegation stands on the basis that the boundaries of its country and those of Ukrainia have not been definitely fixed, and that St. Petersburg, consequently, has the right to participate in the negotiations with Ukrainia, a view which the gentlemen of the Ukrainian delegation do not care to agree with. But this troubled situation of domestic conditions in Russia was the cause of enormous delay.

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ATTITUDE ON POLAND

We want nothing at all of Poland, the boundaries of which have not been definitely settled. Poland's people shall choose their own destiny, free and uninfluenced. I consider the form of popular decision of this question not especially important; the more surely it reflects the general will of the people the more I shall be pleased. For I desire only voluntary union on the part of Poland, and only in the desire of Poland in this matter do I see a guarantee of lasting harmony.

I

removal of all obstacles which delay the conclusion of peace.

The second difficulty which we encountered and which found the greatest echo in the press is the difference of opinion between our German ally and the St. Petersburg Government in the matter of interpretation of the right of the Russian nations to determine their own destinies that is, those territories occupied by German troops.

Germany holds the point of view that it does not intend to make forcible territorial acquisition from Russia, but, to express it in two words, the difference of opinion is a double one.

First, Germany holds as justified the point of view that the numerous expressions of desire for independence by legislative bodies, communal bodies, &c., in the occupied provinces should be considered as a provisional basis for popular opinion which would be tested later by a plebiscite on a broad basis. The Russian Government is now opposed to this point of view, since it cannot recognize the right of existing organizations of Courland and Lithuania to speak in the name of these provinces any more than in the name of the Polish province.

The second difficulty is that Russia demands that the plebiscite should take place after all German troops and administrative organizations have vacated the occupied provinces, while Germany contends that by such evacuation, carried through to its extreme consequence, a vacuum would be created, which undoubtedly would bring about an outbreak of complete anarchy and the greatest misery.

Here it must be explained that everything which today permits political life. in the occupied provinces is German property. The railways, posts, telegraph, all industries and administrative parts of police and justice are in German hands. The sudden withdrawal of these parts would indeed create a condition which does not seem practically tenable. In both questions we must find compromise. The difference between these two points of view is, in my opinion, not big enough to justify the failure of the negotiations. But such negotia

tions cannot be completed over night. They take time.

GENERAL PEACE IN SIGHT

Once we have reached peace with Russia, a general peace cannot long be prevented, in my opinion, despite all the efforts of Entente statesmen. We have heard that it was not understood in places why I declared in the first speech after the resumption of the negotiations that it was now not a question of general peace, but of a separate peace with Russia in Brest-Litovsk. That was a necessary statement of clear fact which Trotzky has inevitably recognized and was necessary because we were treating on a different basis; that is, in a more limited scope, when the question was one of separate peace with Russia rather than a general peace. Although I have no illusions that the effort for a general peace might mature over night, I am still convinced it is maturing and is only a question of our holding through whether we are to have a general honorable peace or not.

REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON

I have been strengthened in this view by the peace offer which the President of the United States of America has made. To the whole world this is a peace offer, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson develops the basis on which he attempts to bring about general peace.

It is evident that no such offer can be an elaboration acceptable in all details. Should this be the case, negotiations would be unnecessary, for then peace might be made by simple acceptance-by a simple yes and amen. That, of course, is not the case. But I do not hesitate to say that I find in the last proposals of President Wilson considerable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and among his proposals are some to which we can agree with pleasure.

If I shall now be allowed to discuss these proposals in greater detail I must say two things in advance: As far as those proposals relate to our allies-and in them there is mention of the German holding of Belgium and of the Turkish Empire-I declare that, faithful to the duties of the alliance which I have ac

cepted, I am determined to go to every extreme in defense of our allies. The state of the property of our allies before the war we shall defend as our own. This is the point of view of the Allies in complete reciprocity.

Secondly, I should say that I must refuse politely but definitely any advice as to our internal government. We have a Parliament in Austria, elected by common, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. There is no more democratic Parliament on earth, and this Parliament, in conjunction with other constitutionally authorized factors, alone has the right to decide the internal affairs of Austria. I speak only of Austria because I am speaking in the Austrian delegation and not about the general affairs of the Hungarian State. I should not consider that constitutional. We do not interfere in American affairs, and we wish as little foreign guardianship by any other State. Having said this in advance, I allow myself to answer the remaining points as follows:

SECRET DIPLOMACY

I have nothing to say on the point which discusses abolishing secret diplomacy and complete publicity of negotiations. As for the question of publicity of negotiations, nothing can be said against this method from my point of view as far as it is based on complete reciprocity, although I have serious doubts whether it is always the most practical and quickest way to reach a result.

Diplomatic treaties are nothing but business affairs. I can easily think of cases, for instance, when commercial treaties are being made between States, and when it would be undesirable that the incomplete results should be told to the whole world beforehand.

In such negotiations both sides naturally begin by making as large as possible demands and by using one desire after another as compensation until that balance of interest is present which must be reached to make the conclusion of a treaty possible.

Should such negotiations be conducted before the eyes of the general public, it could not be avoided that the public

should passionately take sides for every single one of the demands, so that the renunciation of such a demand, even if made only for tactical reasons, would be considered a defeat.

Should the public take sides especially strongly for one disideratum, then the conclusion of a treaty might become impossible, or the treaty, should it be concluded, might be felt as a defeat perhaps on both sides. This would not further peaceful relations, and the points of friction between the States would be increased. But what is valid for commercial treaties would be just as valid for political ones which treat of political business.

If abolishing secret diplomacy means that there are to be no secret treaties -that treaties shall not be made without the knowledge of the public-I have nothing to say against the realization of this. How the realization of this principle and its safeguard is to be considered I know not. When the Governments of two States agree, they will always be able to make secret treaties without any one discovering it. these are minor points. I do not stick to formulas and will never be responsible for the failure of reasonable arrangement because of more or less formalities. We can, therefore, dismiss Point 1.

seas.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

But

this clearly. I permitted myself to develop the same a few months ago in a Budapest speech. It is part of my political creed.

As far as Russia is concerned, we are proving with deeds that we are ready to create a friendly, neighborly relationship.

As far as Italy, Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro are concerned, I can only repeat the point of view which I have expressed already in the Hungarian delegation.

I refuse to figure as surety for enemy war adventures. I refuse to make onesided concessions to our enemies who remain stubbornly on the point of view of war to final victory concessions which would forever injure the monarchy and give immeasurable advantage to our enemies and drag on the war indefinitely.

I trust Mr. Wilson will use the great influence he doubtless has on all his allies that they explain conditions on which they are willing to negotiate, and he will have gained the immeasurable merit of having called a general peace conference to life.

Just as openly and freely as I am here replying to President Wilson, I will also speak to all those who desire to speak themselves, but it is quite comprehensible that the time and continuation of the war cannot remain without influence on our relations in this connection.

ITALY'S ENTRANCE

I said this once before, and may refer to Italy as an example. Italy had the opportunity before the war to attain great territorial acquisitions without a shot. She refused, entered the war, lost hundreds of thousands of dead, billions in war costs and destroyed property, brought upon her population misery and need, and all this only for advantages which she could have had once, but which are now lost forever.

Regarding Point 13, it is an open secret that we are supporters of the idea that there must be an independent Polish State," which shall "include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations." Regarding this, I

am also of the opinion that we could soon reach an agreement with Mr. Wilson.

Nor will the President find anywhere in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy any opposition to his proposal regarding the idea of the league of nations.

As may be seen, then, from this comparison of my views with those of Mr. Wilson, we agree not only on great principles in general, according to which the world is to be newly regulated after the end of this war, but our views also approach each other on several concrete peace questions. The remaining differences do not seen to me great enough to lead to the belief that a discussion at this point should not bring clearness and rapprochement.

This situation, which probably arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary and the United States of America are the two great powers among the two groups of enemy States whose interests least conflict, suggests the thought that an exchange of ideas between these two powers might be the starting point for conciliatory discussions between all States which have not entered into peace conversations. So much for President Wilson's propositions.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA

I now hasten to finish, and the conclusion is perhaps the most important thing I have to say. I am working on a peace with Ukrainia and with St. Petersburg. But peace with St. Petersburg does not change our definite situation. Nowhere do Austrian troops oppose those of the St. Petersburg Government. Ukrainian troops do oppose us.

Nothing could be exported from St. Petersburg because it has nothing but revolution and anarchy to export, articles which Bolsheviki would like to export, but acceptance of which I politely refuse. Still, I desire peace with St. Petersburg also, because it makes general peace nearer, as does the conclusion of any peace.

Affairs with Ukrainia are definite, for Ukrainia has stocks, foodstuffs, which it will export if we agree. The food question is today a world worry. Everywhere, with opponents, as with neutral States, it plays an important rôle.