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made her cry again? Why she cried now, since they had asked leave? What it was that troubled her now? And asked her several times very earnestly, before she made any Answer; but at last said, it was because, BECAUSE IT WAS SIN. She continued a considerable time crying; and said she would not go again if Eunice asked her an hundred Times; and she retained her Aversion to that Fruit for a considerable time, under the remembrance of her former Sin.

CONCERNING THE NOTION OF LIBERTY, AND OF MORAL AGENCY

[From the "Treatise on the Freedom of the Will"]

The plain and obvious Meaning of the Words Freedom and Liberty, in common Speech, is Power, Opportunity, or Advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other Words, his being free from Hindrance or Impediment in the Way of doing, or conducting in any Respect, as he wills.' And the contrary to Liberty, whatever Name we call that by, is a Person's being hinder'd or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.

If this which I have mentioned be the Meaning of the Word Liberty, in the ordinary Use of Language; as I trust that none that has ever learn'd to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in Propriety of Speech, neither Liberty, nor it's contrary, can properly be ascribed to any Being or Thing, but that which has such a Faculty, Power or Property, as is called Will. For that which is possessed of no such Thing as Will, can't have any Power or Opportunity of doing according to it's Will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its Will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very Will itself, is not to speak good Sense; if we judge of Sense, and Nonsense, by the original & proper Signification of Words. For the Will

'I say not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping Silence &c. are Instances of Persons Conduct, about which Liberty is exercised; tho' they are not so properly called doing.

it self is not an Agent that has a Will: The Power of choosing, it self, has not a Power of chusing. That which has the Power of Volition or Choice is the Man or the Soul, and not the Power of Volition it self. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his Will, is the Agent or Doer who is possessed of the Will; and not the Will which he is possessed of. We say with Propriety, that a Bird let loose has Power & Liberty to fly; but not that the Bird's Power of flying has a Power & Liberty of flying. To be free is the Property of an Agent, who is possessed of Powers & Faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these Qualities are the Properties of Men or Persons; and not the Properties of Properties.

There are two Things that are contrary to this which is called Liberty in common Speech. One is Constraint; the same is otherwise called Force, Compulsion, & Coaction; which is a Person's being necessitated to do a Thing contrary to his Will. The other is Restraint; which is his being hindred, and not having Power to do according to his Will. But that which has no Will, can't be the Subject of these Things.-I need say the less on this Head, Mr. Locke having set the same Thing forth, with so great Clearness, in his Essay on the human Understanding.

But one Thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty; namely, that Power & Opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his Choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the Meaning of the Word, any Thing of the Cause or Original of that Choice; or at all considering how the Person came to have such a Volition; whether it was caused by some external Motive, or internal habitual Bias; whether it was determin'd by some internal antecedent Volition, or whether it happen'd without a Cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the Person come by his Volition or Choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is Nothing in the Way to hinder his pursuing and executing his Will, the Man is fully & perfectly free, according to the primary and common Notion of Freedom.

What has been said may be sufficient to shew what is meant by Liberty, according to the common Notions of Mankind, and in

the usual & primary Acceptation of the Word: But the Word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians, & others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different Signification. - These several Things belong to their Notion of Liberty.

1. That it consists in a Self-determining Power in the Will, or a certain Sovereignty the Will has over it self, and it's own Acts, whereby it determines its own Volitions; so as not to be dependent in it's Determinations, on any Cause without it self, nor determined by any Thing prior to it's own Acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their Notion of it, or that the Mind, previous to the Act of Volition be, in iquilibrio. 3. Contingence is another Thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common Acceptation of the Word, as that has been already explain'd, but as opposed to all Necessity, or any fixed & certain Connection with some previous Ground or Reason of its Existence. They suppose the Essence of Liberty so much to consist in these Things, that unless the Will of Man be free in this Sense, he has no real Freedom, how much soever he may be at Liberty to act according to his Will.

A moral Agent is a Being that is capable of those Actions that have a moral Quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral Sense, vertuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral Faculty, or Sense of moral Good & Evil, or of such a Thing as Desert or Worthiness of Praise or Blame, Reward or Punishment; and a Capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his Actions by moral Inducements or Motives, exhibited to the View of Understanding & Reason, to engage to a Conduct agreable to the moral Faculty.

The Sun is very excellent & beneficial in it's Action and Influence on the Earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring forth it's Fruits; but it is not a moral Agent: It's Action, tho' good, is not vertuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a City, and consumes great Part of it, is very mischievous in its Operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any Punishment. The brute Creatures are not moral Agents: the Actions of some of 'em are very profitable & pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet, seeing they have no moral Faculty, or Sense of Desert, and don't act from Choice guided by

Understanding, or with a Capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from Instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral Inducements, their Actions are not properly sinful or vertuous; nor are they properly the Subjects of any such moral Treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their Faults or good Deeds.

THOMAS GODFREY

[Thomas Godfrey's fame rests largely on the fact that he was the author of the first tragedy written and acted in America, but he deserves to be remembered for the intrinsic merit, or at least promise, of some of his performances. He was born in Philadelphia in 1736, and died in North Carolina before reaching the age of twenty-seven. His father, who bore the same name, was a glazier of mathematical proclivities whose memory is preserved in Franklin's “Autobiography.” Thomas Godfrey the younger received but a slight education, and was apprenticed to a watchmaker, and afterward engaged in business. Some of his shorter poems were published in the American Magazine during his lifetime. The majority are in the heroic couplet, but the author attempted a variety of metres. It is noteworthy that, writing when he did, and of course following Pope and Dryden to a considerable extent, he was influenced by the more musical masters of English The "Assembly of Birds" is a paraphrase of Chaucer's "Parliament of Foules," and "The Court of Fancy" shows indebtedness to the same poet's "Hous of Fame." There are evident echoes of Milton, and hints of the influence of Spenser. Godfrey's tragedy, "The Prince of Parthia," was written shortly before his death, and was performed in Philadelphia in 1767. It is not certain that the author ever saw a play on the stage, and his reading in the dramatists could not have been extensive. "The Prince of Parthia" is a bloody story of ambition, the jealousy of man and woman, and revenge, and is almost ludicrously crude in many ways; but it is interesting as an attempt, unprecedented in America, at one of the higher forms of composition.

verse.

The selections are from the only edition of Godfrey's works, which were collected by his friend Nathaniel Evans and published in Philadelphia under the title "Juvenile Poems on Various Subjects, with the Prince of Parthia, a Tragedy," in 1765.]

PASTORAL

[To Dr. J-K-SL-Y, jun.]

The young Alexis drove his bleating Flock
To the sea's side, where seated on a rock,
That over-look'd the wave, in pensive mood,
He threw his eyes along the azure flood;

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