Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

layers not to jump off scaffolds and break their legs.

Does Mr. Bentham profess to hold out any new motive which may induce men to promote the happiness of the species to which they belong? Not at all. He distinctly admits that, if he is asked why governments should attempt to produce the greatest possible happiness, he can give no answer.

"The real answer," says he, "appeared to be, that men at large ought not to allow a government to afflict them with more evil or less good than they can help. What a government ought to do, is a mysterious and searching question, which those may answer who know what it means; but what other men ought to do, is a question of no mystery at all. The word ought, if it means any thing, must have reference to some kind of interest or motives: and what interest a government has in doing right, when it happens to be interested in doing wrong, is a question for the schoolmen. The fact appears to be, that ought is not predicable of governments. The question is not why governments are bound not to do this or that, but why other men should let them if they can help it. The point is not to determine why the lion should not eat sheep, but why men should eat their own mutton if they can."

The principle of Mr. Bentham, if we understand it, is this, that mankind ought to act so as to produce their greatest happiness. The word ought, he tells us, has no meaning, unless it be ased with reference to some interest. But the interest of a man is synonymous with his greatest happiness :-and therefore to say that a man ought to do a thing, is to say that it is for his greatest happiness to do it. And to say that mankind ought to act so as to produce their greatest happiness, is to say that the greatest happiness is the greatest happiness-and this

is all!

do it. Will the principle rua thus pursue the
greatest happiness of mankind, whether it be
your own greatest happiress or not? This is
absurd and impossible, and Mr. Bentham him.
self allows it to be so.
But if the principle
be not stated in one of these two ways, we can.
not imagine how it is to be stated at all. Stated
in one of these ways, it is an identical proposi-
tion, true, but utterly barren of consequences.
Stated in the other way, it is a contradiction in
terms. Mr. Bentham has distinctly declined
the absurdity. Are we then to suppose that he
adopts the truism?

There are thus, it seems, two great truths which the Utilitarian philosophy is to communicate to mankind-two truths which are to produce a revolution in morals, in laws, in governments, in literature, in the whole system of life. The first of these is speculative; the second is practical. The speculative truth is, that the greatest happiness is the greatest hap piness. The practical rule is very simple, for it imports merely that men should never omit, when they wish for any thing, to wish for it. or when they do any thing, to do it! It is a great comfort for us to think, that we readily assent ed to the former of these great doctrines as soon as it was stated to us; and that we have long endeavoured, as far as human frailty would permit, to conform to the latter in our practice. We are, however, inclined to suspect, that the calamities of the human race have been owing. less to their not knowing that happiness was happiness, than to their not knowing how to obtain it-less to their neglecting to do what they did, than to their not being able to do what they wished, or not wishing to do what they ought.

Thus frivolous, thus useles. 's this philosophy,-" controversiarum ferax, operum effœta, ad garriendum prompta, ad generandum invalida."*

The humble mechanic who discovers some slight improvement in the construction of safety lamps or steam vessels, does more for the happiness of mankind than the "magnificent principle," as Mr. Bentham calls it, will do in ten thousand years. The mechanic teaches us how we may, in a small degree, be better off than we were. The Utilitarian advises us, with great pomp, to be as well off as

we can.

Does Mr. Bentham's principle tend to make any man wish for any thing for which he would not have wished, or do any thing which he would not have done, if the principle had never been heard of? If not, it is an utterly useless principle. Now, every man pursues his own happiness or interest-call it which you will. If his happiness coincides with the happiness of the species, then, whether he ever heard of the "greatest happiness principle" or The doctrine of a moral sense may be very not, he will, to the best of his knowledge and unphilosophical, but we do not think that it can ability, attempt to produce the greatest happi- be proved to be pernicious. Men did not enter ness of the species. But, if what he thinks tain certain desires and aversions because they his happiness be inconsistent with the greatest believed in a moral sense, but they gave the happiness of mankind, will this new principle name of moral sense to a feeling which they convert him to another frame of mind? Mr. found in their minds, however it came there. Bentham himself allows, as we have seen, that If they had given it no name at all, it would be can give no reason why a man should pro- still have influenced their actions: and it will mote the greatest happiness of others, if their not be very easy to demonstrate that it has ingreatest happiness be inconsistent with what fluenced their actions the more, because they he thinks his own. We should very much like have called it the moral sense. The theory of to know how the Utilitarian principle would the original contract is a fiction, and a very run, when reduced to one plain imperative absurd fiction; but in practice it meant, what proposition. Will it run thus-pursue your the "greatest happiness principle," if ever own happiness? This is superfluous. Every it becomes a watchword of political warfare man pursues it, according to his light, and will mean-that is to say, whatever served the always has pursued it, and always must pursue turn of those who used it. Both the one ex To say that a man has done any thing, is io say that he thought it for his happiness to

it.

Br con, Novum Organum.

pression and the other sound very well in de- were to be a radical insurrection_to-non bating clubs; but in the real conflicts of life, the "original contract" would stand just as well our passions and interests bid them stand aside for annual parliaments and universal suffrage and know their place. The "greatest happi- The "Glorious Constitution" again, has mean ness principle" has always been latent under every thing in turn: the Habeas Corpus Act the words, social contract, justice, benevo- the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the lence, patriotism, liberty, and so forth, just Test Act, the Repeal of the Test Act. There as far as it was for the happiness, real or ima- has not been for many years a single important gined, of those who used these words to pro- measure which has not been unconstitutional mote the greatest happiness of mankind. And with its opponents, and which its supporters of this we may be sure, that the words "the have not maintained to be agreeable to the true greatest happiness" will never, in any man's spirit of the constitution. Is it easier to ascer mouth, mean more than the greatest happiness tain what is for the greatest happiness of the of others which is consistent with what he human race than what is the constitution of thinks his own. The project of mending a bad England? If not, the "greatest happiness. world, by teaching people to give new names principle" will be what the "principles of the to old things, reminds us of Walter Shandy's constitution" are, a thing to be appealed to by scheine, for compensating the loss of his son's everybody, and understood by everybody in nose by christening him Trismegistus. What the sense which suits him best. It will mean society wants is a new motive—not a new cant. cheap bread, dear bread, free trade, protecting If Mr. Bentham can find out any argument yet duties, annual parliaments, septennial parlia undiscovered which may induce men to pursue ments, universal suffrage, Old Sarum, trial by the general happiness, he will indeed be a great jury, martial law, every thing, in short, good, bad, benefactor to our species. But those whose or indifferent, of which any person, from ra happiness is identical with the general happi-pacity or from benevolence, chooses to underness, are even now promoting the general happiness to the very best of their power and knowledge; and Mr. Bentham himself confesses that he has no means of persuading those whose happiness is not identical with the general happiness, to act upon his principle. Is not this, then, darkening counsel by words without knowledge? If the only fruit of the "magnificent principle" is to be, that the oppressors and pilferers of the next generation are to talk of seeking the greatest happiness of the greatest number, just as the same class of men have talked in our time of seeking to uphoid the Protestant Constitution-just as they talked under Anne of seeking the good of the Church, and under Cromwell, of seek-greatest number," for, “under existing circuming the Lord-where is the gain? Is not every great question already enveloped in a safficiently dark cloud of unmeaning words? Is it so difficult for a man to cant some one or more of the good old English cants which his father and grandfather canted before him. that he must learn, in the school of the Utilitarians, a new sleight of tongue, to make fools clap and wise men sneer? Let our countrymen keep their eyes on the neophytes of this sect, and see whether we turn out to be mistaken in the prediction which we now hazard. It will before long be found, we prophesy, that, as the corruption of a dunce is the generation of an Utilitarian, so is the corruption of an Utilitarian the generation of a jobber.

The most elevated station that the "greatest happine... principle" is ever likely to attain is this, that it may be a fashionable phrase among newspaper writers and members of Parliament --that it may succeed to the dignity which has been enjoyed by the "original contract," by the "constitution of 1688," and other expressions of the same kind. We do not apprehend that it is a less flexible cant than those which have preceded it, or that it will less easily furnish a pretext for any design for which a pretext may be required. The original contract" meant, in the Convention Parliament, the co-ordinate arbority of th: Three Estates. If there

take the defence. It will mean six and eight
pence with the attorney, tithes at the rectory,
and game-laws at the manor-house. The sta
tute of uses, in appearance the most sweeping
legislative reform in our history, was said to
have produced no other effect than that of add-
ing three words to a conveyance.
The uni
versal admission of Mr. Bentham's great prin-
ciple would, as far as we can see, produce no
other effect than that those orators who, while
waiting for a meaning, gain time (like bankers
paying in sixpences during a run) by uttering
words that mean nothing, would substitute
"the greatest happiness," or rather, as the
longer phrase, "the greatest happiness of the

stances,"" now that I am on my legs,"-and,
" Mr. Speaker, I, for one, am free to say." In
fact, principles of this sort resemble those
forms which are sold by law-stationers, with
blanks for the names of parties, and for the
specia! circumstances of every case-mere
customary headings and conclusions, which
are equally at the command of the most honest
and of the most unrighteous claimant. It is on
the filling up that every thing depends.

The "greatest happiness principle" of Mr. Bentham is included in the Christian morality and, to our thinking, it is there exhibited in an infinitely more sound and philosophical form than in the Utilitarian speculations. For in the New Testament it is neither an identical proposition, nor a contradiction in terms; and, as laid down by Mr. Bentham, it must be either the one or the other. "Do as you would be done by: Love your neighbour as yourself;" these are the precepts of Jesus Christ. Under stood in an enlarged sense, these precepts are, in fact, a direction to every man to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number But this direction would be utterly unmeaning, as it actually is in Mr. Bentham's philoso phy, unless it were accompanied by a sanction. In the Christian scheme, accordingly, it is ac companied by a sanction of immense force. To a man whose greatest happiness in this

world is inconsistent with the greatest happi- | sect. He discovered truths; all that they have ness of the greatest number, is held cut the done has been to make those truths unpopular prospect of an infinite happiness hereafter, He investigated the philosophy of law; he from which he excludes himself by wronging could teach them only to snarl at lawyers. his fellow-creatures here.

This is practical philosophy, as practical as that on which penal legislation is founded. A man is told to do something which otherwise ne would not do, and is furnished with a new motive for doing it. Mr. Bentham has no new motive to furnish his disciples with. He has talents sufficient to effect any thing that can be effected. But to induce men to act without an inducement is too much even for him. He should reflect that the whole vast world of morals cannot be moved, unless the mover can obtain some stand for his engines beyond it. He acts as Archimedes would have done, if he had attempted to move the earth by a ever fixed on the earth. The action and reaction neutralize each other. The artist labours, and the world remains at rest. Mr. Bentham can only tell us to do something which we have always been doing, and should still have continued to do, if we had never heard of the "greatest happiness principle," or else to do something which we have no conceivable motive for doing, and therefore shall not do. Mr. Bentham's principle is at best no more than the golden rule of the Gospel without its sanction. Whatever evils, therefore, have existed in societies in which the authority of the Gospel is recognised, may, à fortiori, as it appears to us, exist in societies in which the Utilitarian principle is recognised. We do not apprehend that it is more difficult for a tyrant or a persecutor to persuade himself and others that, in putting to death those who oppose his power or differ from his opinions, he is pursuing "the greatest happiness," than that he is doing as he would be done by. But religion gives him a motive for doing as he would be done by: and Mr. Bentham furnishes him with no motive to induce him to promote the general happiness. If, on the other hand, Mr. Bentham's principle mean only that every man should pursue his own greatest happiness, he merely asserts what everybody knows, and recommends what everybody does.

It is not upon this "greatest happiness principle" that the fame of Mr. Bentham will rest. He has not taught people to pursue their own happiness; for that they always did. He has not taught them to promote the happiness of others at the expense of their own; for that they will not and cannot do. But he has taught them how, in some most important points, to promote their own happiness; and if his school had emulated him as successfully in this respect as in the trick of passing off truisms for discoveries, the name of Benthamite would have been no word for the scoffer. But few of those who consider themselves as in a more especial manner his followers, have any thing in common with him but his faults. The whole science of jurisprudence is his. He has done much for political economy; but we are not aware that in either department any improvement has been made by members of his

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

We entertain no apprehensions of danger to the institutions of this country from the Utili tarians. Our fears are of a different kind. We dread the odium and discredit of their alliance. We wish to see a broad and clear line drawn be tween the judicious friends of practical reform and a sect which, having derived all its influence from the countenance which they have impru dently bestowed upon it, hates them with the deadly hatred of ingratitude. There is not, and we firmly believe that there never was, in this country, a party so unpopular. They have already made the science of political economy-a science of vast importance to the welfare of nations—an object ci disgust to the majority of the community. The question of parliamentary reform will share the same fate, if once an association be formed in the public mind between Reform an Utilitarianism.

We bear no enmity to any member of the sect and for Mr. Bentham we entertain very high admiration. We know that among his followers there are some well-intentioned men, and some men of talents: but we cannot say that we think the logic on which they pride themselves likely to improve their heads, or the scheme of morality which they have adopted likely to improve their hearts. Their theory of morals, however, well deserves an article tu itself; and perhaps, on some future occasion, we may discuss it more fully than time and space at present allow.

The preceding article was written, and was actually in types, when a letter from Mr. Ben. tham appeared in the newspapers, importing, that "though he had furnished the Westminster Review with some memoranda respecting the greatest happiness principle,' he had nothing to do with the remarks on our former article. We are truly happy to find that this illustrious man had so small a share in a performance which, for his sake, we have treated with far greater lenity than it deserved. The mistake, however, does not in the least affect any part of our arguments; and we have therefore thought it unnecessary to cancel or cast anew any of the foregoing pages. Indeed, we are not sorry that the world should see how respectfully we were disposed to treat a great man, even when we considered him as the au thor of a very weak and very unfair attack on ourselves. We wish, however, to intimate to the actual writer of that attack, that our civilities were intended for the author of the "Preuves Judiciaires," and the "Defence of Usury,"—and not for him. We cannot con clude, indeed, without expressing a wish,though we fear it has but little chance of reaching Mr. Bentham.-that he would endea. vour to find better editors for his compositions If M. Dumont had not been a rédacteur of a dif ferent description from some of his successors, Mr. Bentham would never have attained the distinction of even giving his name to a sect.

UTILITARIAN THEORY OF GOVERNMENT."

[EDINBURGH REWEW, OCTOBER, 1829.]

be afraid;--that this logic will impose on n
man who dares to look it in the face.
The Westminster Reviewer begins by charg
ing us with having misrepresented an import

We have long been of opinion that the Utilitarians have owed all their influence to a mere delusion-that, while professing to have submitted their minds to an intellectual discipline of peculiar severity, to have discarded allant part of Mr. Mill's argument. sentimentality, and to have acquired consum- "The first extract given by the Edinburgh mate skill in the art of reasoning, they are de- Reviewers from the essay was an insulated cidedly inferior to the mass of educated men passage, purposely despoiled of what had pre in the very qualities in which they conceive ceded and what followed. The author had themselves to excel. They have undoubtedly been observing, that some profound and bene. freed themselves from the dominion of some volent investigators of human affairs had absurd notions. But their struggle for intel-adopted the conclusion, that of all the possible lectual emancipation has ended, as injudicious forms of government, absolute monarchy is and violent struggles for political emancipation the best. This is what the reviewers have too often end, in a mere change of tyrants. omitted at the beginning. He then adds, as in Indeed, we are not sure that we do not prefer the extract, that Experience, if we look only at the venerable nonsense which holds prescrip- the outside of the facts, appears to be divided on tive sway over the ultra-tory, to the upstart this subject; there are Caligulas in one place, dynasty of prejudices and sophisms, by which and kings of Denmark in another. As the the revolutionists of the moral worid have surface of history affords, therefore, no certain suffered themselves to be enslaved. principle of decision, we must go beyond the sur• face, and penetrate to the springs within.' This is what the reviewers have omitted at the end."

The Utilitarians have sometimes been abused as intolerant, arrogant, irreligious, as enemies of literature, of the fine arts, and of the dorestic charities. They have been reviled for some things of which they were guilty, and for some of which they were innocent. But scarcely anybody seems to have perceived, that almost all their peculiar faults arise from the utter want both of comprehensiveness and of precision in their mode of reasoning. We have, for some time past, been convinced that this was really the case; and that, whenever their philosophy should be boldly and unsparingly scrutinized, the world would see that it had been under a mistake respecting them.

It is perfectly true, that our quotation from Mr. Mill's Essay was, like most other quotations, preceded and followed by something which we did not quote. But if the Westminster Reviewer means to say, that either what preceded, or what followed, would, if quoted, have shown that we put a wrong interpretation on the pas sage which was extracted, he does not understand Mr. Mill rightly.

Mr. Mill undoubtedly says that, "as the sur. face of history affords no certain principle of decision, we must go beyond the surface, and We have made the experiment, and it has penetrate to the springs within." But these succeeded far beyond our most sanguine ex- expressions will admit of several interpreta pectations. A chosen champion of the school tions. In what sense, then, does Mr. Mill use has come forth against us. A specimen of his them? If he means that we ought to inspect logical abilities now lies before us; and we the facts with close attention, he means what pledge ourselves to show, that no prebendary is rational. But if he means that we ought to at an Anti-Catholic meeting, no true-blue baro-leave the facts, with all their apparent inconnet after the third bottle at a Pitt Club, ever displayed such utter incapacity of comprehending or answering an argument, as appears in the speculations of this Utilitarian apostle; that he does not understand our meaning, or Mr. Mill's meaning. or Mr. Bentham's meaning, or his own meaning; and that the various parts of his system-if the name of system can be zo misapplied-directly contradict each other. Having shown this, we intend to leave him in undisputed possession of whatever advantage he may derive from the last word. We propose only to convince the public that there is nothing in the far-famed logic of the Utilitarians, of which any plain man has reason to

sistencies, unexplained-to lay down a general principle of the widest extent, and to deduce doctrines from that principle by syllogistic ar gument, without pausing to consider whether those doctrines be, or be not, consistent with the facts, then he means what is irrational; and this is clearly what he does mean: for he immediately begins, without offering the least explanation of the contradictory appearances which he has himself described, to go beyond the surface in the following manner:-"That one human being will desire to render the per son and property of another subservient to his pleasures, notwithstanding the pain or loss of pleasure which it may occasion, to that othe individual, is the foundation of government Westminster Review, (XXII. Art. 16,) on the Stric-The desire of the object implies the desire of tures of the Edinburgh Review (XCVIII. Art. 1.) on the the power necessary to accomplish the object.” And thus he proceeds to deduce consequence

U.ilitarian Theory of Government, and the "Greatest
Happiness Principle"

airectly inconsistent with what he has himself conclusion, that good government is impossi stated respecting the situation of the Danish people.

If we assume that the object of government is the preservation of the persons and property of men, then we must hold that, wherever that object is attained, there the principle of good government exists. If that object he attained both in Denmark and in the United States of America, then that which makes government good must exist, under whatever disguise of title or name, both in Denmark and in the United States. If men lived in fear for their lives and their possessions under Nero and under the National Convention, it follows that the causes from which misgovernment proceeds, existed both in the despotism of Rome, and in the democracy of France. What, then, is that which, being found in Denmark and in the United States, and not being found in the Roman empire, or under the administration of Robespierre, renders governments, widely differing in their external form, practically good? Be it what it may, it certainly is not that which Mr. Mill proves à priori that it must be.-a democratic representative assembly. For the Danes have no such assembly.

The latent principle of good government ought to be tracked, as it appears to us, in the same manner in which Lord Bacon proposed to track the principle of heat. Make as large a list as possible, said that great man, of those bodies in which, however widely they differ from each other in appearance, we perceive heat; and as large a list as possible of those which, while they bear a general resemblance to hot bodies, are, nevertheless, not hot. Observe the different degrees of heat in different hot bodies, and then, if there be something which is found in all hot bodies, and of which the increase or diminution is always accompanied by an increase or diminution of heat, we may hope that we have really discovered the object of our search. In the same manner, we ought to examine the constitution of all those communities in which, under whatever form, the blessings of good government are enjoyed; and to discover, if possible, in what they resemble each other, and in what they all differ from those societies in which the object of government is not attained. By proceeding thus we shall arrive, not indeed at a perfect theory of government, but at a theory which will be of great practical use, and which the experience of every successive generation will probably bring nearer and nearer to perfection. The inconsistencies into which Mr. Mill has been betrayed, by taking a different course, ought to serve as a warning to all speculators. Because Denmark is well governed by a monarch, who, in appearance at least, is absolute, Mr. Mill thinks, that the only mode of arriving at the true principles of government, is to deduce them à priori from the laws of human nature. And what conclusion does he bring out by this deduction? We will give it in his own words:"In the grand discovery of modern times, the system of representation, the solution of all the difficulties, both speculative and practical, wiil perhaps be found. If it cannot, we seem to be forced upon the extraordinary

ble." That the Danes are well governed with out a representation, is a reason for deducing the theory of government from a general prin ciple, from which it necessarily follows, that good government is impossible without a representation! We have done our best to put this question plainly; and we think, that if the Westminster Reviewer will read over what we have written, twice or thrice with patience, and attention, some glimpse of our meaning will break in, even on his mind.

Some objections follow, so frivolous and unfair, that we are almost ashamed to notice them. "When it was said that there was in Denmark a balanced contest between the king and the nobility, what was said was, that there was a balanced contest, but it did not last. It was balanced till something put an end to the ba lance; and so is every thing else. That such a balance will not last, is precisely what Mr Mill had demonstrated."

Mr. Mill, we positively affirm, pretends to demonstrate, not merely that a balanced con test between the king and the aristocracy will not last, but that the chances are as infinity to one against the existence of such a balanced contest. This is a mere question of fact: We quote the words of the Essay, and defy the Westminster Reviewer to impeach our accuracy :

"It seems impossible that such equality should ever exist. How is it to be esta blished? Or by what criterion is it to be as certained? If there is no such criterion, it must, in all cases, be the result of chance. If so, the chances against it are as infinity to one."

The Reviewer has confounded the division of power with the balance or equal division of power. Mr. Mill says, that the division of power can never exist long, because it is next to impossible that the equal division of power should ever exist at all.

"When Mr. Mill asserted that it cannot be for the interest of either the monarchy or the aristocracy to combine with the democracy, it is plain he did not assert that if the monarchy and aristocracy were in doubtful contest with each other, they would not, either of them, accept of the assistance of the democracy. He spoke of their taking the side of the democra cy; not of their allowing the democracy to take side with themselves."

If Mr. Mill meant any thing, he must have meant this-that the monarchy and the aristocracy will never forget their enmity to the de mocracy, in their enmity to each other.

"The monarchy and aristocracy," says he, "have all possible motives for endeavouring to obtain unlimited power over the persons and property of the community. The consequence is inevitable. They have all possible motives for combining to obtain that power, and unless the people have power enough to be a match for both, they have no protection. The ba lance, therefore, is a thing, the existence of which, upon the best possible evidence, is to be regarded as impossible."

If Mr. Mill meant only what the Westminster Reviewer conceives him to have meant, his

« AnteriorContinuar »