MODERN SCEPTICISM.*

WE are warned very frequently and very fervently in Holy Writ 'to take heed of the evil heart of unbelief' that is in all of us. But whilst unbelief is natural to man, in his present disorganized condition, it assumes various forms in different individuals and in different ages. There are many in whom it seems to remain as a kind of doubt waiting to be resolved. They do not take any steps to reach an assured conclusion, but hope, in an aimless and quite unintelligent way, that light will of its own accord somehow arise. What we mean by unbelief, however, generally takes the form of active hostility to the truth as it is in Jesus; but this hostility also varies in its manifestations. The hostility of to-day is not the hostility of a recent past. Except it may be in obscure and illiterate places, we do not meet with the foul onslaughts, the indecent accusations, the loathsome ribaldry in which the eighteenth century opponents of Christianity indulged, by which they defeated their own purpose, and brought indelible and everlasting disgrace upon themselves. It was not so much war against one form of religion, or code of morals, which they waged, as against all religion and every form of morality. They sought to subvert the entire order of things, and raze even to the foundation all that ennobles and adorns humanity. Hence, Robert Hall, in his famous sermon entitled 'Modern Infidelity Considered,' could exclaim with as much truth as eloquence:

'More than all, their infatuated eagerness, their parricidal zeal to extinguish a sense of Deity, must excite astonishment and horror.

'Is the idea of an almighty and perfect Ruler unfriendly to any passion which is consistent with innocence, or an obstruction to any design which it is not shameful to avow? Eternal God, on what are Thine enemies intent! What are those enterprises of guilt and horror, that, for the safety of their performers, require to be enveloped in a darkness which the eye of Heaven must not pierce? Miserable men! Proud of being the offspring of chance; in love with universal disorder; whose happiness is involved in the belief of there being no witness to their designs, and who are at ease only because they suppose themselves inhabitants of a fatherless and forsaken world!'

The unbelief, however, which so widely obtains at present among the educated classes, is not, in most instances, to be placed in the same category with that against which Hall so vehemently and impressively inveighs. It is honest, earnest, inquiring, and even reverential. It recognises religion as occupying a chief place among the objects of human interest, and in its Christian form is not to be rudely assailed and foully calumniated, but to be carefully considered, and its claims allowed or disallowed according to the strength or weakness of the evidence adduced. This attitude of a large part of Modern Scepticism is fully recognised in the volume before us. The spirit in which the lectures of which it consists was undertaken, and in which they are written, is one of respectful sympathy. Their object is not so much to slay a foe as gain a friend. Hence they are singularly and delightfully free from anything like invective and vituperation. The position of an opponent is sought to be intelligently ascertained, his arguments honestly met by counter arguments, and the difficulties by which he is beset, if possible, removed. In reference to this, Dr. Ellicott observes: The tower is being built really with the desire to reach heaven. If the sequel be what it was of old, it may still be conceded, with all fairness, that the attempt is not made in a bad spirit. To change slightly the allusion, the effort is not made in the spirit of the Titans, who piled Pelion on Ossa, but with all the earnestness and anxiety of hoping, inquiring, and searching, though we are bound to add, mistaken men."

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This extract is from an Explanatory Paper' by Dr. Ellicott, which is curiously placed at the end of the volume. In this paper he sets forth the nature and object of the Society in connection with which the lectures were delivered, gives a synopsis of the lectures, and states what he deems to be the chief causes of Modern

*Modern Scepticism: A course of Lectures delivered at the request of the Christian Evidence Society, with an Explanatory Paper by the Right Rev. C. J. Ellicott, D.D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1871.

Scepticism. The Society is composed of Christians of all denominations, who have set themselves for the defence of revealed truth. Its mode of operation is threefold: competitive examinations, the distribution of tracts and books of a simple but weighty kind among the humbler classes, and lectures addressed chiefly to the more educated. The present volume is the result of the last mentioned mode of operation. The Bishop's paper is pervaded by an admirable spirit; more remarkable, however, for kindly feeling than reach of thought. He tells us that the causes of present unbelief are chiefly these three: the application of historic criticism, as begun by Niebuhr, to the books of the Old and New Testaments, over-hasty generalizations in matters of science, and a too great eagerness to reach firm ground as to morality and religion. Perhaps some may be inclined to think that these are quite as much effects as causes, and may be reckoned forms in which infidelity appears; but in the spiritual world cause and effect act and react on each other, and what may be called a cause in one aspect, may be reckoned an effect in another.

'Faults in the life breed errors in the brain,
And these reciprocally those again.'

And so, without the slightest intention of imputing unworthy motives, we may say, if, e.g., over-hasty scientific generalizations lead to Scepticism, the spirit of Scepticism may also prompt to unwarrantable generalizations.

The first lecture is on Atheism, and is given by the Archbishop of York. His Lordship is well known as a thinker of no ordinary merit, and a man of large Christian sympathy and activity. We remember being struck with the ability and effectiveness of the address delivered by him at the opening of the Edinburgh Philosophic Institution two years ago, and of the power which it displayed of grappling with the present forms of speculative and scientific unbelief. It proved him to be a fair, a faithful, and formidable expounder and defender of divine truth. As was to be anticipated, the lecturer shows a thorough acquaintance with his subject, and is very much at home in the discussion of it. It is replete with forcible arguments, apt illustrations, and eloquent statements. The arrangement, however, is not so felicitous as might have been expected from so practised a logician. There is a want of the lucidus ordo, and of that weight and conclusiveness which arise from accumulating evidence. Vires acquirit eundo should be as true of a cumulative argument as of a river. This one thing I do,' and persist and proceed in doing, till the irresistible 'it is done' forces itself upon us, ought to be the aim of him who labours to prove and argues to convince. Now, unfortunately, we are sometimes at a loss to know whether his Lordship is most intent on proving marks of design or on showing the superior nature of man. The gist of the argument, however, is contained in a pregnant sentence quoted from Kant. There are two things,' says that profoundest of thinkers and severest of moralists, 'there are two things awful to me; these are, the starry heavens, and the sense of responsibility in man.' This may be taken as the sum of the argument against Atheism that in which its great strength lies. We are reminded by it of an anecdote of Napoleon I. On a starry night, when on his voyage to Egypt, he heard the savans who accompanied him come unanimously to the conclusion that there was no God. Napoleon had paced the deck in silence, but as this startling announcement was made, he paused, and pointing to the glittering firmament, said, 'That is all very well, gentlemen, but who made all these? Yes, the heavens declare God's glory, the earth showeth forth His handiwork.' The marks of exquisite design, the marvellous and beautiful adaptation of means to end which is everywhere exhibited, irresistibly impress us with the conviction that there must be a great Designer. As Paley puts it, we cannot believe that a watch, with its minute and beautiful mechanism, arranged itself by chance. Much less can we believe that the world, so wonderful and varied in its arrangements, and all so entirely harmonious, could be the result of a mere fortuitous concourse of atoms. The mere attempt to think this does violence to the whole constitution of our mental and moral being.

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The sense of responsibility, of which man cannot divest himself, necessitates the idea of a God. If we are responsible, we must be responsible to some one, else

our sense of responsibility is an illusion, and our consciousness deceives us. We are so constituted, however, that we must receive as true the dictate of our own consciousness. Were it otherwise, universal Scepticism would inevitably be the result. Hence belief in the being of a God has always been characteristic of mankind-Atheism being the mere figment of the fancy of a few who have been bewildered by their vain researches and futile speculations, and, even in their case, the result of an illogical process of the understanding, not the irresistible conviction of the heart. And so, when a severe strain comes, such as death approaching, the heart asserts itself, and God, though robed in terrors, once more returns. The lecture on Atheism is fittingly followed by one on Pantheism. The Pantheist shrinks from the denial of the divine existence, but finds belief in a personal God encompassed by so many difficulties that he cannot accept it. So he affirms that nature is God, and God is nature. The two are identical—

'All we but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul.'

These lines, however, express the Pantheistic creed in too favourable a manner; for, according to it, body and soul are one and indivisible. Robert Hall said, 'The existence of God is a mystery: His non-existence is an absurdity. I accept the mystery-I reject the absurdity.' Certainly the Pantheistic theory solves no mystery; and if there be confusion, makes it only worse confounded. And yet for many minds, and these of a high order, it has a strange fascination. The Rev. Dr. Rigg, of Westminster Training College, discourses on this subject. In point of method this lecture seems to us superior to the first. It has not the poetic flush which occasionally beautifies his Lordship's essay, but it excels it in logical arrangement. It grows as it proceeds, and at the close the whole is thus succinctly summarized: 'What, then, have we found respecting this seductive and fashionable illusion, which has fascinated so many minds, especially of speculative, restless, and daring intelligence in the present age? We have found Pantheism is essentially only Atheism in disguise, and occupies a position in which it combines against itself the arguments which Theists have to allege against Atheism, and Atheists against Theism; that while it dethrones the true God, it sets up in His place development and natural selection as its divinities, clothing them with attributes which it denies to Deity; that its development hypothesis will not bear the test of science, of the natural science to which it professes to appeal; that the origin of protoplasm, the attributes of man, and the growth and transformation of germ-cells alike refuse to accord with the hypothesis; and that the very nature of science itself, as recognising law and organization, is incompatible with any philosophy which denies Theism; that the moral difficulties which rise up as a barrier against the denial of Christian Theism are no less insurmountable than the metaphysical and scientific difficulties; that morality, conscience, natural affection, immortal hope, every deepest, most tender and sacred, most blessed and humanizing instinct of our nature, is violated by the denial of a personal and holy God and Judge; in a word, that our whole humanity revolts against it.'

The third lecture on Positivism, by the Rev. W. Jackson, M.A., is one of great ability. We think, however, that it is disfigured by an undue display of pugnacity, and by occasional flippancy of expression. Sarcasm, or attempts at it, may be quite a legitimate weapon to use in moral warfare, but we do not feel as if it were happily used in this connection; and we could have wished that Mr. Jackson had kept to his argument and avoided uncomfortable and uncalled for reflections. No point is made against Positivism when the reader is told that he also looks at things through a kaleidoscope, and that a certain dictionary is much resorted to by metaphysicians for purposes of pillage. Mr. Jackson's rhetoric is not so satisfactory as his logic-he certainly fails in point of taste; and we can imagine the amiable prelate who introduces the lecturers, wishing much that power had been given him to erase a few flights of fancy, and regretting that infallible authority is not allowed to prefacers any more than to popes among good Protestants.

What is Positivism, and whence? These questions the reader will find answered in the lecture, and much beside that is noteworthy. Auguste Comte is its author, and its creed is facts, which it calls observed phenomena. It sees no causes, only

succession in all things, and things succeed each other by an irresistible fatality. It is, indeed, one of the most repellant of creeds, leaving no place for poetry, piety, reverence, or the exercise of any of the higher attributes of our nature. It is a system of gross materialism and utter fatalism. Its sphere is the bounded and the visible. As Littrè, one of the admirers and expounders of Comte, says: "The Positive philosophy does not concern itself with the beginning of the universe, if it had a beginning, nor yet what happens to living things, plants, animals, men, after their death, or in the consummation of the ages, if the ages have a consummation.' Could the force of doubt, or rather the feebleness of negation, farther go? It might have struck Comte that in calling facts observed phenomena, he took something for granted, viz., that there was an observer. But this he ignores. Mind finds no place in his system. On this Mr. Jackson well observes: 'The evidence for each fact is the condition of your own mind-your consciousness, as it is called. . . A science of mind therefore would seem to be the most Positive of all sciences. Yet, strange to say, the very first thing Positivism does is to dispense with a science of mind, as mind, altogether.' Then as to Theology, 'Comte held it (what is before stated) to be a code of Positive faith-a faith firmly founded on the self-sufficingness of human nature, read according to his version of course,void of a belief in a personality which survives the grave, without knowledge of, trust in, or prayer to God.'

And yet this oppressively dreary system, which is opposed to the clearest affirmations of our own consciousness, which strips the world of its beauty, and the life of man of all its rich possibilities of blessedness, has attracted many adherents among men of scientific powers and eminence, and even, strange to say—at least so it is currently rumoured-the most powerful novelist of the day. No wonder you rise from the terrible pictures which her page presents with a feeling of hopeless sadness, as if human life were one iron chain of wickedness and woe, and all of us victims of the rigorous fatalities which make the world what it is.'

These three lectures are meant to be introductory, to clear the ground, as it were, for the discussion of questions that are more closely connected with the sacred volume. They may be taken as meant to prove that man must have some kind of religion; those that follow are designed more especially to show the reasonableness and reality of the religion of Christ. They are eight in number. Their subjects and authors are, Science and Revelation, by the Very Rev. R. Payne Smith, D.D., Dean of Canterbury; The Nature and Value of the Miraculous Testimony to Christianity, by the Rev. John Stoughton, D.D.; The Gradual Development of Revelation, by the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Carlisle; The alleged Historical Difficulties of the Old and New Testament, and the Light thrown on them by Modern Discoveries, by the Rev. George Rawlinson, M.A., Camden Professor of History, Oxford; Mythical Theories of Christianity, by Rev. Charles Row, M.A., Pembroke College, Oxford; The Evidential Value of St. Paul's Epistles, by Rev. Stanley Yeathes, M.A., Professor of Hebrew, King's College; Christ's Teaching and Influence in the World, by the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Ely; The Completeness and Adequacy of the Evidence of Christianity, by the Rev. Canon Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter.

It will thus be seen that the line of defence is skilfully arranged, and includes much that is of deepest interest. There are advantages, too, if there are, as we have seen hinted, also disadvantages, in having these great subjects briefly treated by different men. When a man has a special aptitude for any study, and has devoted much time and thought to it, he is able to present, in a clear and condensed form, the rich results of a vast amount of reading and reflection, the possession of which is very precious to those who are unable, from the pressure of business or the want of the necessary appliances, to gain it otherwise.

It is quite impossible to give even a brief resumé of these eight lectures. Suffice to say, they are characterized by the excellences of the first three-ability, learning, kindliness, and candour. We may expect much good to result from the publication of such a volume as this on Modern Scepticism. What, it is anxiously asked, are we to do, to confirm the waverers within and win the enemies without? Various replies are given. We are told that what is needed is the exhibition of a more vigorous and consistent life by professing Christians. And truly there is a loud call for this. While frankly and gratefully acknowledging the good that is,

and that is being done, amongst us, yet we fear we cannot altogether escape the sneer of the sceptic, when he asks, What do we more than others?' We profess to believe, it is said, in a heavenly morality, and yet how worldly our practice! Our creed is, that riches are an uncertain and unsatisfactory possession, and yet how the Church is cursed with covetousness! All around us, except those who know the truth, are going down, we say, to a hopeless hell, and where are efforts worthy of the name to rescue them? For men to sit at ease, and grasp their gold, while they say souls in myriads are perishing, is so grossly inconsistent, that we are told the conduct must interpret the creed, since the creed does not sway the conduct—and is there faith in such things in the Church? But whilst a practical answer must be given to these questions, and the Church arise and shine with something like the earnestness and self-sacrifice of her Divine Head, we must also have theoretical expositions and defences of the truth of God. All right practice must have right principle as its origin and explanation. If we are to act in a certain way, we must know the reason, and be guided by it. We must always be ready to give a reason for the hope that is in us, and be well persuaded that we follow 'no cunningly devised fables.' Towards this end the volume before us is an important contribution. And further, if it be perused by sceptics in the spirit in which it is written, we may hope that, by the divine blessing, arguments so cogent and conclusive, and appeals so sincere and persuasive, will convince their understanding and win their heart. They will learn from it, that, if the followers of Christ do not join their ranks, but rather seek to gain them to their side, it is not because they are not acquainted with the arguments for and against both positions, but because, after having themselves had their fiery trial of unbelief, and deeply felt 'the burden and the mystery of all this (to sense) unintelligible world,' and calmly considered the difficulties by which they are beset, they felt that rest, such rest as the soul needs and the judgment approves, could be found in Christ alone.

BALERNO.

PORTER'S LIFE OF DR. COOKE.—THE BELFAST DISCUSSION. THE life of Dr. Cooke, by his son-in-law Dr. J. L. Porter, has just been published. We refer to it, not for the purpose of reviewing it, or giving any outline of the life and labours of Dr. Cooke, or forming an estimate of his character, but for the purpose of referring to the account given of his discussion on Voluntaryism with Dr. Ritchie at Belfast. From his relationship to Dr. Cooke, his sympathy with his views, and his admiration of his talents, it could hardly be expected that Dr. Porter's biography would be impartial; but we confess we were not prepared for a chapter so one-sided and defective as that in which the history of this discussion is given. Justice to the memory of Dr. Ritchie and the others who were associated with him in that discussion, and a regard to the interests of the cause which he so ably advocated, demand that the story should be accurately told.

Some considerable time ago, we were led to make special inquiry into the Belfast Discussion. We procured the Report, The Christian Liberator, and Dr. Ritchie's Critique on the Report. We also wrote for information to an aged and honoured minister who had been present at the discussion, and he favoured us with a carefully prepared narrative. That minister, we may mention (for his name is a guarantee of the trustworthiness of his account), was the late Rev. Dr. M'Intyre of Loanends. His paper was drawn up in the midst of much bodily weakness, and contains, we believe, almost the last lines written by his own hand. From these sources, we propose to correct the unfairness of Dr. Porter.

According to his representations, nothing could be more triumphant than the defeat of Dr. Ritchie. Dr. Cooke, he says, met argument by argument, and stones of abuse with cutting irony and withering sarcasm, and Dr. Ritchie was overwhelmed with a flood of argument and splendid declamation. An authentic report of the discussion,' he also says, was published, and had an enormous sale.' From two reviews of this report by papers favourable to the Church party, extracts are given lauding Dr. Cooke in unmeasured terms, and speaking most contemptuously of Dr. Ritchie and Voluntaryism. A letter from Dr. Cooke to his wife, when in Scotland subsequent to the discussion, is also given, in which the Doctor thus