money which had been sent to him, returned the greater part of the soldiers as not being worth their food, and closed the road from Mogador to Marrakesh against any Azizist force. He was soon afterwards murdered by a slave who had been in the Mtoogi's service, and one of his sons was chosen to rule in his stead and to continue his policy. The murderer was caught and burnt alive with petroleum.

By the defection of Anfleuss the attack on Marrakesh from the south-west was made much more difficult; but the Mtoogi still remained loyal, and it was determined to reinforce him. Some troops were sent northwards from Mogador to a point outside Anfleuss's territory; they made their way inland, and were joined by nearly 1000 men who had disembarked at Saffi. When this force reached the Mtoogi he was able to take the offensive, and was ready to attempt an advance on Marrakesh at about the same time that Abd-el-Aziz was beginning his march from the borders of Showia. The moral effect of this combined advance was great; if it could have been continued, as it very nearly was, till the two forces met near Marrakesh it is almost certain that the city would have been taken. The Mtoogi, with about 1500 soldiers and about 2000 of his own tribe, reached to within about three hours' march to the west of Marrakesh; the Sultan, with about double the force, was defeated at a distance of about ten hours' march to the north of Marrakesh.

The Hafidists had no organised forces with which to oppose the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz and the Mtoogi. The country ruled over by the Glawi and Rahamna, the chief mountain tribes, and the most powerful lowland tribe of the 'Haz' (the district of which Marrakesh is the centre), could send a large number of tribesmen, but there was no organisation, nor any chief of sufficient weight to form the miscellaneous material into an army. Haz Thami, brother of the Glawi, and Governor of Marrakesh, showed great vigour and took such measures as were possible. On receiving news of the advance of Moulai Abd-el-Aziz he recalled some of the forces, chiefly composed of the Rahamna tribe, which had been opposing the Mtoogi—a dangerous step, which made the Mtoogi's advance much easier, and was sufficient proof of the difficulty that was found in raising an army to oppose Moulai Abd-el-Aziz.

The Glawi and Si Aïsna had, at the time that Moulai Abd-elAziz was advancing from Showia, left Fez with a considerable force, and were marching on Marrakesh through the east of the

Tedla country, almost at the same time that the army of Abd-elAziz was skirting the western border of the same tribe. They met with some little opposition in Tedla, and, either through necessity or by design, marched so slowly that they were still nearly two days' march distant from the Sultan's army at the time of its complete defeat.

The problem before Abd-el-Aziz was how best to cross the hundred miles or so of country which lay between Marrakesh and the inland boundary of the district in which the French forces were the chief power.

The line chosen offered many advantages. Many of the tribes on the line of march were Hafidists, but had no means of raising any force which could hope to oppose the Sultan's 'mehalla '; while one Tedla, though not Azizist, for tribal reasons was willing to help Moulai Abd-el-Aziz, and actually fought against the Hafidist forces on their way from Fez. The only tribe of the south which was, and still is, actually Azizist, Seraghna, was on the direct road, and within its territory, which extends to within a day's march of Marrakesh, the Sultan's army could prepare for crossing the dangerous country which lay in front, between the Glawi and Rahamna tribes.

The Sultan's advance was leisurely, but met with little opposition. Some of the tribes tendered a more or less real submission, and there were no signs of the universal resistance which, it had been said, the army would meet with as soon as it left the French sphere of influence. By the middle of August the army had reached the south-eastern boundary of the friendly country of Seraghna, within a long day's march of Marrakesh. This part of Seraghna forms part of the plain on which Marrakesh stands. This plain is perhaps the best-watered district in the empire of Morocco. In ancient times it was, no doubt, one great garden, and it is still crossed in every direction by watercourses and underground aqueducts, many of them extremely old, which distribute the water of the many little streams which flow from the mountains. The direct road from Seraghna to Marrakesh led across this plain, quite close to the mountains, and this part of the march was particularly dangerous, not only because it passed between the Glawi and Rahamna tribes, but also on account of the nature of the country. On the one side the Glawi mountaineers, who, as a rule, fight on foot and prefer to stay close to their own territory, would find encouragement in the nearness of the mountains, and, on

the other, the Rahamna horsemen would have in the numerous olive groves cover where they could collect in safety and to which they could retreat, and in the smooth plain admirable ground for delivering the short, wild charges, rarely driven home, and ending with an ill-aimed rifle fire, delivered from horseback, which is the traditional form in which Moorish horsemen fight.

A Sultan's 'mehalla' rarely moves fast. One of the measures of distance among country Moors is a 'Sultan's day's march,' and it is not much more than a third of the distance which the ordinary traveller can cover in the time. The Sultan's march to the south-eastern border of Seraghna had not been rapid, but there seemed every reason for attempting to finish the last part of the march at a very different pace, before the mountaineers had been fully roused to organise an opposition, and before their chief, with Si Aisna and the force from Fez, had arrived. Instead of a rapid march on Marrakesh an attack was made by part of Abd-el-Aziz's army on a post in Tuakah, in the Glawi country, known as the Dar Si Mohamed ben Jakur, held by a Khalifa of one of the Glawis brothers. The place was easily taken, the garrison fled, and the immediate district was eaten up.' The effect of the day's work was to thoroughly wake up the neighbouring tribes to the necessity of making a vigorous effort if they wished to avoid a similar fate.

The Sultan's camp was pitched close to the river Tessout, one of the tributaries of the Oom er Rbea. The camp itself was in the Azizist country of Seraghna, but it was only a few hours' march distant from the mountains, the country of the Glawi, and from Rahamna, the two first and strongest supporters of Moulai el-Hafid. The surrounding country was for the most part level, but in many places the ground was rendered difficult for cavalry by the number of artificial watercourses and by the numerous holes marking the line of underground aqueducts.

On August 18 a message reached the Sultan's camp from an Azizist kaid, Uld bil Kabor, who had taken advantage of the approach of the army to reoccupy his kasbah' (castle), which was only a few hours' distant, and now, finding himself threatened by the Glawi and Rahamna, requested immediate help.

On August 19, before dawn, Moulai Abd-el-Aziz with the greater part of his army started to attack the Glawi forces, leaving the camp standing, with the Sultan's harem inside the afrag,' or royal enclosure, and all the domestic impedimenta which a Moorish

army carries with it. The entire force amounted to over 4000 men, about half consisting of Showia, Seraghna, and Tedla tribesmen, and the rest made up of soldiers and 'mkhuznis.' The artillery, composed of several field guns and Maxims, was in charge of officers of the French and English military missions. After four hours' march, close to the mountains, and just beyond the boundary of Seraghna, at a place called 'Agadir Bo Ashubah (a name partly of Berber and partly of Arabic origin), a small camp, in the middle of some olive groves, was seen, and was taken to be the Glawi camp. The artillery opened fire at a long range. The shells fell short, but they produced a sudden and unexpected result. Large numbers of mounted men, out of all proportion to the apparent number of tents, suddenly appeared, and the tribesmen belonging to Moulai Abd-el-Aziz's army, who had been covering the front and flanks, as though the artillery fire had been a signal, at once turned and fled past the main body, firing wildly into it as they passed. Whether the flight was caused by sudden fright at seeing a considerable force advancing to attack when no great opposition had been expected, or was due, as is generally believed, to a previous arrangement between the Sultan's tribesmen and the enemy, or was a mixture of panic and treachery, the result was quite conclusive, and the army became at once a confused crowd of flying

men.

The Sultan behaved well. The Europeans who were with him, his own men, even the opposing tribesmen, agree that he did all that was in his power, even to firing repeatedly himself, to stop the panic. A Moorish army in advance has little order or cohesion, and in retreat loses all idea of discipline or obedience, and the men are as likely to fire on officers who attempt to delay their flight as on the enemy who are following them. The Sultan's efforts were useless. He had a horse killed under him, his brother Moulai Yusuf was wounded at his side, his own clothing was pierced by bullets, he could not stop the stampede, and there was nothing left to do but to secure the escape of his household and of himself. By the time that the Sultan reached the camp it was in the possession of the Showia and Seraghna tribesmen, who were fighting with one another and pillaging. In the middle of the wildest confusion the Sultan personally superintended the arrangements for the flight, and left with a large body of attendants some time before the camp was entered by the enemy. There was no pursuit, but the tribes through whose country the Sultan passed showed themselves

hostile, or alive to the chances of pillage, and did their best to cut off stragglers or any body of fugitives which was not strong enough to defend itself. The Sultan in the retreat, as in the first panic, showed himself very cool, and gained the admiration of his humble followers by the care he took of those who were forced to lag behind and in danger of falling into the hands of the tribesmen. Three days after the battle he reached the French camp at Settat, in Showia, and most of his principal people, as well as all the Europeans who had accompanied his advance, after running great risks and suffering severe hardships, succeeded in gaining the same refuge.

The camp itself was not taken till some time after the Sultan had left. Most of the tribesmen had fled, but the soldiers, encouraged by some of the French officers and by an Englishman, Sergeant Balding, who continued working a Maxim, and assisted by the fact that the watercourses near the camp checked the advance of the mounted enemy, resisted for a considerable time-until, indeed, a large body of Rahamna, making a detour, attacked from the other side.

Those who escaped from the battle had nothing to fear except from the inhabitants through whose country they passed. The Rahamna tribesmen preferred the rich booty of the camp to the dangers of pursuing the fugitives into the, for them, hostile territory of the Seraghnas.

The victory was chiefly due to the Glawi and Rahamna tribes. The first were under the command of Si Hessi, who had a few months before evacuated Azimoor on the approach of a French force from Casablanca. The Rahamna were commanded by five kaids, of whom the most important were Aïadi and Si Embark Benthami. There seems to have been no intention on the part of the tribes to attack the Sultan, at least on that day, and they were, to a certain extent, taken by surprise. The story of the morning of the battle, as told by the Rahamna tribesmen who took part in the fight, whether literally true or not, expresses very well the general feeling as to the chances which Abd-el-Aziz possessed.

A considerable number of the Rahamna had shortly before been busy, with the Glawi, trying to oppose the advance of the Mtoogi from Kahirab, some fifty miles to the east of Marrakesh. They had not been very successful, and when, recalled by Haj Tami, Governor of Marrakesh, in order to assist in opposing Moulai Abd-el-Aziz, they found in front of them an apparently stronger and better