fessional philosophers are infallible in their judgments! By the popular mind it is supposed that a professor's verdict on any subject is the final conclusion with regard to it, and must necessarily be true. It may often be so in matters of no human interest, but in matters where human interests, and consequently self-interests, are involved, although there are noble men among them, like the late Professor Wallace, of Oxford, there are many cases in which a professor's verdict cannot really be taken as evidence of anything more than that it is for the self-interest of the governors of his college that such a verdict should be given. The verdict may be true, but it is just as likely, in the present state of society, to be false. The position of Professor Seth, therefore, is no guarantee that his verdict with regard to Nietzsche's philosophy will be correct. On the contrary, the very fact of Seth being a professor of philosophy is sufficient to cast a shade of suspicion on the truth of his conclusion apart altogether from his character. But there are other circumstances which cast even stronger suspicion on the soundness of Seth's verdict. The most important of his articles on Nietzsche, that in the Contemporary, was delivered as the opening address before the Theological Society of the Free Church* College at Edinburgh in October 1897, a college with which Professor Seth is most intimately associated. However unsatisfactory, therefore, his article may appear to impartial minds, no one can deny that it was peculiarly well adapted for the occasion on which it was delivered. "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" was asked long ago: "Can any good thing come out of the Free Church College?" is a more pertinent question to be asked at present. Theologians who are true to the priestly character cannot look at things as they are; everything presented to them, therefore, has to be more or less falsified; Professor Seth's article would consequently have been altogether unsuitable if it had given a true account of Nietzsche's opinions. But Professor Seth seems nothing loth to lower himself to the standard of the theologians. One can hardly treat him as one would treat an The name Free Church, as used in Scotland, is very misleading. The Free Church is really one of the least free of the Scottish Churches. In comparison with the freedom of the Established Church, the name Bound Church would be more appropriate for the denomination in question; because it is bound to the most bigoted evangelical dogmatism. It exercises nevertheless, a vast and mischievous influence, even over the University, where it prevents the professors of philosophy explaining the psychology of the conversion process (the greatest delusion of the age), on which Evangelicalism is based. honourable opponent; for his article again and again re-echocs the blustering tones of the bully who acts as the champion of a crowd of roughs. And perhaps in spite of their disguises, they are after all just a crowd of roughs for whom Professor Seth acts --the coarse, ignorant parvenus, the business men who having 'made their pile" under the false system of modern commercialism, endow theological colleges, and require from the theologians a falsified gospel and an inverted system of ethics, in order to have an easy conscience. 66 We shall now proceed to examine Professor Seth's articles more in detail, dealing with the subjects in the order of the following rough classification: I. Seth's revilings and reproaches. II. Seth's incidental mistakes. III. Seth's minor errors about Nietzsche's opinions. Although to some extent the divisions run into one another, we deal, in general, with the less important matters first, by way of prelude, approaching gradually to the more important and complicated branches of the subject. We do not by any means claim to have noticed all the points open to criticism in Professor Seth's extraordinary articles; a rich harvest of errors might still be gleaned from them; but perhaps it would hardly be worth while to collect anything more from such an uninviting field. I. SETH'S REVILINGS AND REPROACHES. Throughout both Professor Seth's articles, and especially in their latter portions, there is a continuous series of reproaches which quite lack justification. We do not condemn reviling and reproach when properly used-they have their proper place in the economy of human life, and are often convenient forms of punishment and restraint. Nietzsche himself often makes use of strong and reproachful language, but, on the whole, he seems to be quite justified in his censures; it is always, I think, with a truly good and clearly defined end in view that Nietzsche reproaches others; in fact, he is deserving of our highest approbation for pouring the utmost contempt on all false and degrading ideals tending to corrupt and deteriorate the human race. But I can see no justifiable plea which Professor Seth can urge for the violent and continuous torrent of abuse which he pours upon Nietzsche. The motive of his reproaches is nevertheless obvious enough--a poor, mean motive, however: he has cast in his lot with those who profit by the maintenance of a deteriorating social system—a Christian system, with its attempt at saving sinners and rooting out good men. Doubtless, as in the case of Shimei (a man apparently resembling Seth), who went along the hill side, throwing stones and casting dust at King David in his misfortune, cursing him and shouting, "Come out, come out, thou bloody man and thou man of Belial," Seth's God hath said unto him, "Curse Nietzsche"; to honest men, however, Seth's sinner-saving, knowledge-annihilating God* appears as a veritable devil, who is likely to lead his time-serving dupe to the same fate that ultimately befell the "dead dog," Shimei. Seth's bad language, therefore, which has a degrading end in view, is in remarkable contrast to the strong language which Nietzsche has a perfectly legitimate right to employ. We shall now proceed to give some specimens of the reproaches, revilings, and bad language which Professor Seth utters against Nietzsche. 1. On page 489, in Blackwood's, Seth speaks of Nietzsche's "maniacal pride of will" finding "perhaps unmatched expression" in one of the passages in Zarathustra. Again, on page 493, Seth speaks of "the colossal egotism and self assurance" of Nietzsche, which at the end "attain proportions not to be distinguished from mania." Again, on the same page, Seth says: "What could match the insane egotism of his 'I pronounce my sentence-I condemn Christianity'?" (Professor Seth here refers to the passage at the close of the Antichrist.) The fact is that Nietzsche is thoroughly in earnest about philosophy; he therefore uses expressions which are unmatched by those of the professional philosophers who merely retail saleable philosophy as a merchant retails his wares as a moneymaking business. In other respects, however, Nietzsche can be matched. The spiritual pride, colossal self-assurance, and insane egotism of the late Professor Drummond and other authorities of the Free Church, (including also Professor Seth), who arrogate * See Nietzsche Antichrist, sect, 45, and the passages of Scripture there referred to. to themselves the right to send to hell not only non-believers, but even believers in Christianity who have not undergone evangelical conversion (a process analogous to bewitchment in its supposed supernatural character), go far beyond Nietzsche's so-called "egotism"; which, in fact, is generally quite justifiable when such notorious examples of the worst form of it are pointed to as patterns of virtue; and it is more especially justifiable in those who, in the cause of truth, have to deal with perhaps the most extraordinary system of presumption, deceit, and degradation that ever existed. 2. On page 489, Seth condemns Nietzsche for "gratuitous offences against good taste and feeling," and goes on to say (page 491) that in the chapter on the Awakening, and in "the following section on the Feast of the Ass, he touches the lowest levels of taste." What taste? we would ask. Is Seth not aware that tastes differ? There are also healthy tastes and diseased tastes. I think I may say with truth that Nietzsche ever remains in perfect accordance with good taste, as taught by healthy aesthetics. It is, however, implied in the accusation that he (Professor Seth) is in possession of the absolute standard of taste, and that those who differ from him have an incorrect standard. Considering Seth's position in philosophy, however, it is unlikely that he should possess the true standard of taste and Nietzsche the false one. In fact, we find that what Seth calls good taste is a glorification of deteriorating life and a condemnation of ascending life (a Nihilist* æsthetic corresponding to his Nihilist ethic); whereas Nietzsche's standard is the very reverse. But even in the special case in which Seth condemns Nietzsche's taste, the case of laughing at a false religion, Nietzsche acts so far in accordance with Seth's own practice; for Seth never doubts that he is perfectly justified in laughing not only at false religions and philosophies, but also at true ones, when he finds it convenient to do so. Elijah and other prophets did the same. 3. Again, on page 489, Professor Seth speaks of "the hysterical violence which grows upon him [Nietzsche] in his latest writings"; and further on, (page 493), he refers to another characteristic of Nietzsche as "a growing loss of self-restraint in his con * Nietzsche frequently uses the term Nihilist in this sense. troversial utterances; denunciation degenerates into foul-mouthed abuse; and the hysterical violence with which he dashes himself against the greatest names and ideals of human history seems to resemble nothing more than the impotent fury of a naughty child." Very clever of Professor Seth! One imagines one hears the Philistines at his back giving him a cheer for such a clever remark which they can appreciate! How much easier it is to make such a remark than to show that Nietzsche's increased opposition to false ideals is unjustified! It is rather unfortunate, however, for Seth to speak of "impotent fury," for those acquainted with Nietzsche's writings know how he (Nietzsche) applies the term. One is at once reminded that it is the hatred of impotence which is thus speaking in Professor Seth, and it seems to be so violent as to be unconscious that, in thus adopting Nietzsche's language, it completely unmasks itself, and adds new confirmation to Nietzsche's theory. In so far, however, as there is any element of truth in Professor Seth's accusation, Nietzsche was perfectly justified in his increased opposition to false ideals. As time went on Nietzsche became more and more conscious of the evil wrought by the prevailing system of pseudo-morality; and he accordingly became more and more zealous in his opposition to it. The same remarks also apply to another of Seth's flings at Nietzsche, where he speaks of Nietzsche's "wilder onslaughts upon modern civilisation and accepted modern ideals." To be sure, how presumptuous it is for anyone to question the "accepted modern ideals" of Professor Seth and the Philistines of the Free Church who stand behind him! They cannot err! Professor Seth and his friends are therefore entitled to a monopoly in the use of bad language! For the time being, they have the same monopoly, and the same authority for it, as Shimei had when he cursed David! 4. On page 730 of the Contemporary, Professor Seth speaks obscurely of "a doctrine of immanent idealism, sufficiently free from the taint of other-worldness,' which Nietzsche always has on his nerves." The last assertion is quite a misrepresentation of Nietzsche; but even if it were true, it would just be similar to the way in which Seth always gets excited, though without justi |