prosperity of states, their political and economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world.

The personal attacks contained in the article, the unheard-of aspersions and slanders of others, condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.

In closing, let me recall the memorandum of Prince Bismarck, which Hermann Oncken also has quoted in his work, The Old and The New Middle Europe the memorandum which was written in the year 1879, and in which the idea is developed that the German Empire can never permit a situation to arise in which it would remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France, side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that Germany had left in the lurch.

APPENDIX TO PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S

MEMORANDUM

Personal and Historical Notes

By MUNROE SMITH and HENRY F. MUNRO

I

The Berlin Foreign Office

During Prince Lichnowsky's term of service in the Foreign Office (1899-1904), Count (later Prince) von Bülow was chancellor, Baron von Richthofen was foreign secretary, and Herr von Mühlberg was undersecretary. The foreign secretary was director of the section of politics and personnel, in which Lichnowsky was employed, and it is he, presumably, who is described as laboring under insane delusions. The senior counselor in the same section was Herr von Holstein. His long service, which began in 1879, and the fact that he represented the traditions of the Bismarckian period naturally gave him a certain authority. His retirement from office, in April, 1906, was ascribed to "differences" with Prince von Bülow. It gave rise to much comment, since he had been regarded, in many circles, as the virtual director of German foreign policy since 1890. [Schultess, Europäischer Geschichtskalender, 1906, p. 97, citing Zukunft, July, 1906, and Preussische Jahrbücher, vol. 125, 3.]

In 1912, when Lichnowsky was sent to London, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was chancellor, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter was foreign secretary, and Herr von Stumm was director of the political section. Von

Stumm had previously been connected with the German embassies in London, Washington, Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Madrid, and then, a second time, with the London embassy. It is he, apparently, who is described by Lichnowsky as endeavoring to play the rôle of Herr von Holstein.

In January, 1913, Herr von Jagow was appointed foreign secretary.

II

Austro-Prussian and Austro-German Relations

The long struggle between the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns for a controlling influence in German affairs was brought to an end by the Prussian victory of Sadowa in 1866. Germany was reorganized under a Prussian hegemony.

In the 18th century, Count (later Prince) Kaunitz (1711-1794) was one of Prussia's most dangerous enemies. In retaliation for the conquest of a large part of Silesia by Frederick the Great, Kaunitz succeeded in forming an Austrian-French alliance against Prussia, to which Russia became a party. In the Seven Years' War which followed (1756-1763) Prussia was brought to the verge of destruction. It was saved only by Russia's abandonment of the Austrian cause. After the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation in 1804 and the reconstruction of Germany as a confederation in 1814, Austria remained the dominant power in Germany. On account of the large proportion of non-German elements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, many Germans began to desire a closer union of the rest of Germany under Prussian leadership. These were called "Little Germans" (Kleindeutsche). A more numerous party advo

cated the retention of all Germans within a single federal union. These were the "Great Germans" (Grossdeutsche). Inasmuch as neither of the two leading states could be expected to submit to a superior authority exercised by the other, it was clear that any such wider union must remain decentralized. "Great German" and "particularist" thus became practically interchangeable terms. The looser union recommended itself to most of the smaller states of Germany, as preserving their independence. In order that these states might be more effectively protected against both Austria and Prussia, a closer union among them and the organization of Germany as a "triad" found many advocates. The "old Bavarian" policy, to which Prince Lichnowsky alludes, aimed at the establishment of such a union of the smaller states under the leadership of Bavaria.

The question of a greater or smaller Germany became one of the chief issues in the revolutionary Frankfort Parliament of 1848. The refusal of Austria to come into the new German Empire with its German territories only, Hungary and the Slav provinces remaining outside, gave the Little Germans the victory; and the imperial crown was offered to King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. He rejected the offer; but his ministers took steps for a narrower union of North Germany through the coöperation of the kings of Prussia, Saxony and Hanover. This plan was not really welcome either to Saxony or to Hanover, and was bitterly resisted by Austria. A conflict was averted by a complete Prussian surrender at Olmütz, in 1850, and the old confederation, as it had existed since 1814, was reëstablished.

In this period the Austrian policy was directed by

Prince Felix Schwarzenberg (1800-1852). It was under his leadership that Austria forced Prussia to submit at Olmütz. His program was, first to humiliate Prussia, then to destroy it-"avilir puis démolir."

Count Moritz Esterhazy (1807-1890) was a member of the Austrian ministry from 1861 to 1866. He was of the clerical party and was bitterly hostile to Prussia. He is said to have been one of the strongest advocates of war with Prussia.

By the victory of Prussia in 1866, Austria was excluded from the new Germany. It was, of course, not reconciled to the new order of things, and its continued hostility to Prussia is shown in the selection of Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (1809-1886) as AustroHungarian minister of foreign affairs. From 18671871 he held the post of Austrian premier. He had been minister of foreign affairs in Saxony since 1849 and Saxon prime minister since 1853, and had been a persistent opponent of Prussia. After 1866 he was, of course, impossible as a Saxon minister. From 1866 to 1870 there were negotiations between France and Austria for an alliance against Prussia, but these came to nothing. At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, von Beust found it inadvisable to take sides with France in a war which was regarded, even in South Germany, as a national German war. Before the end of 1870 he established fairly friendly relations between Austria and Prussia.

Baron (later Count) Aloys von Ährenthal (18541912), whom Lichnowsky describes as more independent in his attitude than his immediate predecessors, was Austro-Hungarian foreign minister from 1907 to his death in February, 1912. In this office he was succeeded by Count Berchtold.