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repairs. The total completed tonnage of the navy on January 1, 1902, was 481,967 tons. This would give a ratio of 60 men per 1,000 tons of shipping. Taking into account the authorized tonnage as shown by the last Navy Register, this same ratio would require a force of 45,000 men and boys for the 750,000 tons.


The problem of officers is far more grave. As already stated, there has been no increase whatever in the number of sea-going officers since the days of wooden steamers. It is estimated that a period of twelve years is required to make an efficient lieutenant, beginning at boyhood. Commander Smith thus describes the difficulties in which the navy now finds itself :

"In the report of the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, already referred to, it is shown that 1,026 additional line officers will be needed by the time all the ships then authorized shall be finished, and the estimate is stated to be at least

30 per cent. smaller than the practice abroad for ships in commission. As the navy then consisted of 1,042 line officers, counting the cadets doing sea duty, it meant that the number of officers would have had to be doubled in about three years from that time, or in two years from now. The 1,042 officers then on the list had been in training anywhere from four to forty-eight years. In the next two years an equal number must be added to the list to bring up the total strength to a minimum of efficiency! The problem is an impossible one. It means that there has been great shortsightedness in the past, but with that we are not now concerned.

For the future, while 1,026 trained officers cannot be provided in two years, still something may be done, and it should be done at once, for every year of delay means the chance of national humiliation, which may, however, possibly be avoided by acting now. From the figures quoted, that is, 2,068 officers and 750,000 tons of shipping, and as in the case of the enlisted men they are an exceedingly moderate estimate, made by considering the individual ships and the prac tice of foreign nations, the proper ratio of line officers to tons of shipping is seen to be about 3 officers per 1,000 tons. This does not mean that all the officers are required for sea duty. There are some technical duties in connection with administration and the preparation of ships that will always require some officers to be ashore. Also, a small reserve will be needed to allow for sickness, leave, and the interchange of duties. The total figure quoted above, that is, 2,068 offi-was made up of 1,479 officers, or 71 per cent., at sea; 425, or 21 per cent., on shore


duty; and 164, or 8 per cent., as a reserve. The total, as has been seen, amounts to 3 officers per 1,000 tons, which ratio should be authorized by law, as has been recommended in the case of the enlisted men, 1 officer for every 20 men, 3 officers and 60 men for every 1,000 tons of com. pleted and authorized shipping, the tonnage to be ascertained at the beginning of each fiscal year, and the quotas of officers and men to hold for that year. The above refers only to line officers, though the same reasoning applies equally to the staff corps."

The only feasible means of relief would seem to be an immediate increase in the Naval Academy appointments. It is first of all necessary, however, that Congress and the people should be aroused to the urgency of the matter.


THE British Admiralty order of January 9 last, directing that in future certain machinery is to pass from the charge and control of the engineer officer to that of the gunnery or torpedo lieutenants, respectively, is the subject of an article by Mr. Charles M. Johnson in the Engineering Magazine for September.


Mr. Johnson thus sets forth the present state of things in the British navy :

"Every reading man knows that for many years the engineering department of the navy has been in a more than unsatisfactory condition; it has been in a state of partial collapse. It is not from one public paper alone that the trumpet sound of danger has come. Every correspondent who has been permitted to accompany the ships on the summer cruise or in the autumn manœuvres, has to a greater or less extent, played on the same note. Some, like Mr. Rudyard Kipling, have not hesitated to call a spade a spade.' They have manfully and impartially endeavored to bring home to the man in the street' the deplorable weakness and inefficiency of this branch of the navy. Public men of all classes have joined in protest against this paralyzing state of affairs in Great Britain's first and only line of defense.

"And what has been the result, as far as the Admiralty is concerned, of all this great consensus of thought and opinion? Has it succeeded in removing one single disability from, or in adding even 1 per cent. of either officers or men to, this dangerously undermanned branch of the service? Has it strengthened the hands of the chief engineer by giving him a staff of

better-trained units, although no added numbers ? Has it in any way met the need of the engineer for greater authority and more control over his staff? In fine, has the board done anything to meet this widespread and public demand for reformation in the engineering department of the navy ?"

"If," says Mr. Johnson, these questions were put to the Lords of the Admiralty, they would doubtless be answered in the affirmative, but as a member of this overworked, undermanned, slighted, barely tolerated class, I not only answer it in the negative, but I must go further and charge the Admiralty with deliber ately sacrificing the national interests and the empire's safety to the professional interests and prejudices of their own class-the sailor element."

NO REPRESENTATION AT HEADQUARTERS. The reason, says Mr. Johnson, of the new order is not far to seek. All the four sea-lords belong to one or other of the sections to which by the new order is to be committed the care and maintenance of the machinery and weapons taken away from the engineer, who from their first introduction into the service has had them in charge.

"The Admiralty have for years set their faces resolutely against increasing the engineer staff. Why? Because if they permitted the engineer department to grow to its legitimate proportions, -proportions corresponding to the multifarious duties which naturally and properly belong to it, -it would quickly equal in numbers, if it did not surpass, the sailor element. When we remember that in the present day everything is done as far as may be by mechanical means,that is, by the engineer, and that all the sailor is left to do is to fight the guns and keep the ship clean, are we not naturally surprised to find that the ratio between the sailor and the engineer branches respectively is as 4 to 1? Again I ask, why? Because cominand of men means power, and needs authority to wield that power. The engineer has no executive or military authority, he is a civilian! He can do nothing to reward or punish any member of his staff."


Mr. Johnson asks, "Is machinery of any sort likely to be as efficiently handled, to give as good results, or to last as long in the hands of amateurs as in those of experts ?" A naval engineer, before he is considered competent to undertake the independent charge of machinery, must spend five or six years in the workshops at Keyham; then for some ten years he acts as as

sistant engineer at sea under the orders of a superior engineer. perior engineer. After this he is considered eligible for an appointment in charge of the machinery of a gun or torpedo boat. This training cannot be contemplated for the executive officer in the new order.


It is pleasant to turn to Mr. Walter M. McFarland's paper upon "The Naval Engineer of the Future," which immediately precedes Mr. Johnson's gloomy article. Mr. McFarland was for a long time an engineer in the United States navy, and gives an account of the much happier state of things prevailing there. Criticising Mr. Johnson's article, he says:

"It seems to me that Mr. Johnson has missed the point that the Admiralty regulation transferring certain strictly engineering work to executive officers is really an admission that military titles are not inconsistent with engineering duty, and that consequently this move should be looked upon as an admission, although a half-hearted and very unsatisfactory one, that the claims of the engineers are just. In view of the outcome in the navy of the United States, which is well known to all students of the subject, it seems to me that this recent Admiralty regulation should really be a source of some satisfaction to British engineers, but it should not cause them to relax their efforts to secure their proper standing."


Mr. Johnson is always careful to exclude Lord Selborne and Mr. Arnold-Forster from his criticisms, on the ground that, being civilians, they cannot do anything except act on the advice of experts. The present fortunate state of things in the American navy is chiefly due to President Roosevelt's initiative when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. "A really strong civilian has no difficulty at all in getting at the facts of these technical matters," says Mr. McFarland.


The reform introduced by President Roosevelt is really an amalgamation between the engineer and the executive officer. To quote his own words:

"Every officer on a modern war vessel in reality has to be an engineer, whether he wants to or not. Everything on such a vessel goes by machinery, and every officer, whether dealing with the turrets or the engine-room, has to do engineer's work. There is no longer any reason for having a separate body of engineers, responsible for only a part of the machinery. What we need is one homogeneous body, all of whose

members are trained for the efficient perform ance of the duties of the modern line officer. The midshipman will be grounded in all these duties at Annapolis, and will be perfected likewise in all of them by actual work after graduation. We are not making a revolution; we are merely recognizing and giving shape to an evo.

respect and imperial position, she must be prepared to face heavy sacrifices when necessary, or this influence will decay."


lution which has come slowly but surely and THE European reviews continue to discuss

naturally, and we propose to reorganize the navy along the lines indicated by the course of the evolution itself."



HITHERTO unsuspected corollary of M. Bloch's doctrine, that the improvement of weapons will render land war on a great scale practically impossible, is dwelt upon by Commander G. A. Ballard, R. N., in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution for August. Every campaign, excepting those which are waged by overwhelming numbers against a comparatively few resolute combatants, will result in stalemate. Granting that this is so, says Commander Ballard, what follows? All future wars will be fought out at sea. Military men have brought their art or profession to such a pitch of perfec tion that, given forces of comparative equality, it is impossible to do more than bring matters to a deadlock. Therefore the deciding battles of the future will be fought out on the sea, where it is only too easy to fight to a finish. Commander Ballard thus summarizes his own conclusions:



Firstly, if his ideas prove to be wholly correct, and hostile operations between equally matched armies reach at length a condition of deadlock, the influence of sea power as an alternative force in the mutual relations of states will become not only greater, but paramount. ondly, if his ideas are only correct in a modified form, the reluctance to face the sufferings of land attack, even when it has prospects of ultimate success, will still heighten the advantages to be derived from resort to the alternative, although in a correspondingly modified form. either case the results will be beneficial to Great Britain so long as she maintains her maritime strength unimpaired; and, paradoxical though it may seem, if M. de Bloch were even approximately correct in his views, her influence on European politics, although not herself a great military power, will be enhanced rather than diminished by scientific improvements in military weapons. But if his views are correct, the tendency of the future will be toward the development of the sea power of other countries as well; and if England is to maintain her self

the military lessons of the Boer War. The Deutsche Revue for August opens with an article on this topic by General von Goltz, the famous soldier who reorganized the Turkish army, and who is looked upon as one of the greatest military authorities in Germany.


The general discusses the war solely from the point of view of its teaching value for the German army. He, however, points out that there is much more to be learned from it than tactics and strategy. When a small nation of farmers and shepherds-numbering less than the inhabitants of Munich or Cologne-wages war for almost three years against the first world power, and forces it to put forth the greatest efforts, the matter deserves attention. The nature of the seat of war explains a good deal, but not all. The difficulties of transport, etc., should not be overlooked, but, after all, the area was not large enough to be the sole cause why such a huge army was needed.

How can the reported astonishing shooting of the Boers be the cause? An experienced European officer who went through the war told the general that the average shooting was no higher than in the German army. The tradition has also been long ago destroyed that the Boers met every danger fearlessly. Robust health and a good eye had a good deal to do with success. It is also wrong to seek the explanation in the abnormal unskillfulness of the English troops. While the strategy of the campaign is open to much criticism, the earlier leaders were almost obliged to divide their forces in order to save Ladysmith and Kimberley. As regards the be havior of the English troops, the above-mentioned officer said that they behaved, when attacking, just as did the Germans at manœuvres.


The first fact which was noticeable is the comparative uselessness of the immense superiority of the English in artillery. This point is even more important than the infantry fights. The German field artillery has been greatly strengthened recently, and in consequence the matter has a double interest. The Napoleonic lesson was that artillery should be massed. The Boer War teaches the contrary. The numerically inferior

guns of the Boers again and again checked the British artillery attack, and the preparation for an infantry attack by concentrated artillery fire proved futile. The explanation is that with modern weapons the danger lies in having the guns too close together, and the lesson is that, unless there is a great deal of room, it is useless to increase the number of guns. An officer who fought at Beaugency-where the cannonade was parti cularly fierce said that the noise of the guns at Colenso preceding the infantry attack made the row he heard in 1870 sink into insignificance. Every one thought that the Boers were annihilated, as the dust made by the bursting shells entirely covered the spot where they were. As

a matter of fact, hardly any damage was done at all. "The only question is," said he, "if the nerves of German soldiers could stand the strain when such a rain of fire was descending on them. I rather doubt it; but the Boers, it is well known, have no nerves!"


The war has repeated the lesson that a defending army has all the advantage in a frontal attack, and that a bold defender in a good position can hold out against tremendous odds. The same lesson may be learned for infantry as for artillery,—namely, that the old massing methods must be abandoned. At last it has been clearly demonstrated that, with modern weapons, it is impossible to attack without cover. None of these points are new; they were only emphasized.


The use of mounted infantry was, however, quite new. The resistance which small mobile parties can offer to a huge orderly army, which overruns the land and occupies the towns, deserves close attention. Such a possibility could, however, hardly occur in Europe, as the necessary conditions are absent, -namely, huge space, sparsely populated country, natural hiding-places, and an immobile enemy. Another point to be noted is that huge numbers are not so necessary in war as is at present considered to be the case. He points out that in the Franco-German War thewar madness" was even more dangerous than the foe to the Germans. It is on such occasions that men like Botha, De Wet, Delarey, and Beyers come to the front.


The Boers failed, and one of the chief reasons he assigns is that they defended only, never attacked. Their object was to retain what they had, their opponents' object was to take their country. We learn, says General von Goltz, with

much greater pleasure from the Boers, but we must not overlook the lessons of the English. Why did they win? Because when they go in for a thing they stick to it, no matter how much it costs them. An Englishman wrote him, on the outbreak of the war:

"Africa is necessary for our future, and we cannot allow an enemy to be at the back of our colonies there. If, therefore, 100,000 men are not sufficient to overthrow the republic, we will send 200,000; and if 200,000 are not enough, we will send 300,000."


Leading English statesmen were of the same opinion, and took the right moment to begin. The American-Spanish war had been used by them very cleverly in order to get into good re.lations with their American cousins, so that they should not disturb things. The shrinking from war of the Continent, where the great powers kept the balance even by mutual mistrust, was plain to their eyes. The Eastern troubles of the last few years had proved how great powers, even when apparently united, can, nevertheless, paralyze one another. Russia, who could have vetoed the war the soonest of all, was not to be feared because of her, peace-loving monarch. Such a moment was not likely to occur again for another hundred years, and Chamberlain and his colleagues were not only quick to see it, but resolved to use it regardless of consequences. That was, perhaps, morally not very beautiful, in any case not very magnanimously managed, but it was logical statesmanship."


TOLSTOY THROUGH FRENCH EYES. 'H. BENTZON" (Madame Blanc) contributes to the Revue des Deux Mondes a Charming paper on Tolstoy, with whom she spent a day during a recent visit to Russia. She describes with what eagerness she went forward to meet the great man who, "tall and vigorous, advanced to meet us; far more remarkable in appearance than any of his portraits would lead one to suppose, for no painter has been able to present adequately the leonine structure of the head, the quaint, powerful aspect of the flowing beard, the rough-hewn features gathered together under the broad forehead of the great imaginative thinker. . . . In the smile there is much kindness, and the homely blouse of the peasant cannot conceal the manners of the grand seigneur." She also gives a rapid word-picture of Countess Tolstoy : "One cannot help seeing that here is a woman of the world, affable, gifted with good sense, still youthful (she is twenty-five years

younger than her husband), and while quite able to hold her own with the great man, holding loy. ally to his side in the moment of peril. The whole woman is summed up in a phrase once attributed to her: When I first married Count Tolstoy I was very simple in my habits, and I always traveled second class; but as his wife he compelled me to go first. Now he expects me to travel third; I myself prefer my old mode of going second class!'"


Tolstoy discussed with Madame Bentzon the literature of France. He spoke with bitter irony of the more extravagant symbolistic and naturalistic writers of the present day, but expressed


At the present time he is engaged in editing his diary, and he is also writing a "Manifesto on Liberty of Conscience." He spoke with indulgent kindness of those who persecuted him, but his wife, with indignation, read their French visitor a letter from the local pope, or priest, imploring her to insure Tolstoy's conversion before death supervened ! In the neighborhood of whatever place they happen to be staying all the popes preach against Tolstoy and his works, and the Archbishop of Simferopol, in the course of a sermon delivered in his cathedral, declared him to be anti-Christ!


great admiration of the philosophical authors of ONE of the most interesting of the articles in

the nineteenth century, notably of Rousseau. Of comparatively modern French writers he prefers Balzac; and though full of enthusiasm concerning Maupassant, deplores his choice of subjects, considering that the feminine element influences far too much the modern French novelists. He spoke with respect and liking of the thoughtful and sincere work of Edouard Rod, and also of that of the brothers Margueritte. Tolstoy's favorite novelist is Charles Dickens. With him he feels in complete sympathy, for Dickens always took the side of the poor, the humble, and the unfortunate. He reserved all his anger and contempt for Kipling, to whom he even denied talent; but then it must be remembered that Tolstoy has an intense horror of warfare, and this although or, perhaps, because he himself took part as a combatant in the Crimean War.


During the course of this interesting interview Tolstoy spoke at great length of religion. He is horrified to think that in France the school children are in future to be taught nothing concerning God. He is an ardent Christian, or rather an ardent Gospeller; the four Gospels alone, he says, should suffice for the conduct of life. Countess Tolstoy listens to her husband's religious views in silence; she has remained, in spite of her fine letter apropos of the excommunication of Tolstoy, sincerely Greek Orthodox, and she refused to copy, when acting as her husband's secretary, a passage in " Resurrection,' dealing with the Mass, of which she disapproved.


Concerning Tolstoy's future plans, he informed Madame Bentzon that he intended to write a se

quel to " Resurrection," but that before he did so he had much to write,- Enough to take up my time for the next forty years," he said, smil

the September number of the Art Journal is a discussion of the influence which Dante exercised on the art of his century. Mr. Addison

McLeod writes:

To all who know anything of Tuscan art, the names of Cimabue, Giotto, Orcagna, are household words. Yet the ideas connected with them are apt to be merely scattered and vague, or else the over-emphasized perceptions of some strong mind which has made one of them its especial study. Let it be allowed us to particu larize in a general way.


Cimabue was a painter of purely religious pieces, with no attempt at naturalism, but a very definite seeking after beauty. Giotto was both much wider in scope and intensely realistic in aim striving by all his powers-imperfect though they were-to paint life as it is. symbolism, when it comes, is plain and direct, usually expressed in single figures. Next after him comes Simone Memmi. He has made no advance as a craftsman, and has only become more introspective and thoughtful. Then comes the period with which we propose to deal.


"There is a spirit very clearly visible to the visitor in Florence, and though he may connect it with no very definite time, he does with one name, viz., that of Orcagna. It is a spirit, suggestive but unmistakable; betrayed rather by change of mood than change of subject, though it has to a large extent introduced, instead of the painting of life actual, the symbolical treatment of all that connects it with things beyond. Even subjects of a more ordinary kind, however, are given a mystic turn. We notice strange beasts about the fringes of the picture, stray uncouth demons intruding here and there, giving us the feeling that there are gentlemen of their kind in abundance lurking outside. What is the cause

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