been divided in a manner different from that given in Josephus, because the result of the consultation differs from that stated by Josephus.

Bernays finally sums up the whole argument in this way: "We have two accounts of the Roman council of war, which give, without material difference, the import of the views advanced, but directly contradict each other in their statements as to the advocates of these views, and as to the decision arrived at. One account, according to which Cæsar Titus is said to have advocated and carried the preservation of the Jewish temple, and the untoward devastation is ascribed to an accident, was composed under the eyes of Titus, by his devoted client Josephus, at a time when the Emperor had, and wished to have, the reputation of clemency. The other account was written when Titus was dead and his dynasty extinct; it says nothing of an accident, and sees in the final destruction the carrying out of a decision which Titus, the leader of the council, had recommended for weighty reasons of imperial policy. The author of this second account is Tacitus, that is, an historian who, considering the age in which he lived and his social position, was in a condition to obtain, directly or indirectly, information concerning the proceedings in the council of war from independent members of the Roman General Staff. We may with propriety ask, as old Scaurus did, Whom do you believe, Quirites?"*

Not yet satisfied, Bernays goes a step further, and, calling in question the veracity of Josephus on another point, he says: "If we believe the account of Tacitus preserved in Severus as to the final catastrophe, we shall feel weighty doubts concerning the propositions of peace and surrender which, according to Josephus's narrative, the Romans did not tire, during the siege, to make to the Jews, finding in Severus the very reverse; namely, that the besieged were not admitted either to a peaceable arrangement or a surrender, and that consequently a famine broke out, which in Severus

* The anecdote to which Bernays alludes is related by Asconius in his commentary in the oration of Cicero pro Scauro (p. 22, ed. Orelli): “Quintus Varius Hispanus M. Scaurum principem senatus socios in arma ait convocasse; M. Scaurus princeps senatus negat; testis nemo est. Utri vos, Quirites, convenit credere?"

is painted even in gloomier colors than in Josephus, and in a manner which reminds us of the pencil of Tacitus. The Roman usage of war contradicts the leniency praised by Josephus; it was not usual to negotiate with rebels, and it would have been an inglorious beginning of the Flavian dynasty, if, instead of striking medals in honor of captured Judæa,' they had retreated from Jerusalem as Marcinus had done from Numantia. If Josephus was actually sent so often to the besieged as he asserts, it may have been done for strategical purposes, and the terms offered may have been of such a nature that their rejection was foreseen, or the Romans were resolved, in case the terms were accepted, not to keep them. Tacitus, and Severus who follows him, having no occasion to extol the leniency of the Flavian dynasty, say nothing of the offers of peace, but indicate, as the leading idea of the Roman proceedings, that a peaceable issue had become impossible, and annihilating subjection was the only end kept in view. The Flavii thought that they must sacrifice the personal glory and advantage which might accrue to themselves from the preservation and possession of the city, to the interest of the state. The strongest garrison could at most secure the quiet of the immediate neighborhood, while Jews and Christians, who were supposed to honor Jerusalem as their religious origin, being scattered through Italy and most of the provinces, the city and temple would have been an unceasing signal of revolt. This point of view did not escape Josephus, as is shown by the words which he puts in the mouths of his minority. To have gained the clear conviction that not the minority, but the majority controlled by Titus, had taken this view, and accordingly decided the destruction, is a result which history does not owe to Josephus, but to the Chronicle of Severus alone and its sources, classical historians like Tacitus."

Having thus given with all possible fidelity the substance of Bernays's argument, we shall subjoin a few brief remarks, following his course.

The first point made by Bernays is, that there existed not the same necessity to destroy in the case of Jerusalem as in those of Carthage and Corinth. Any one who follows the

history of the siege of Jerusalem, and observes the pertinacity and irreconcilable hatred with which the Jews conducted the contest, -a pertinacity which obliged the Romans to gain the advance of a few feet by the unremitting labor of days and months, and a hatred which was able even to overrule the violence of party spirit among the Jews themselves, will doubt the possibility of stopping short of the total destruction of the city and temple, apart from political considerations. It is somewhat singular that Bernays himself, in another branch of his argument, while speaking of the policy of the Romans as represented by Severus and Tacitus, seems to adopt the same view. There was unquestionably both a military and a political necessity for destroying Jerusalem and annihilating the national existence of the Jews, however generous and kind might be the wishes and intentions of Titus previous to, and even during the progress of, the final contest.

The second point relates to the veracity and reliability of Josephus. Bernays, of course, in order to gain credence for the account of Severus, must impugn the character of Josephus for veracity in this part of his work; for he does not carry his hardihood so far as to deny the general reliability of Josephus. A moment's consideration will determine whether there is a shadow of evidence for this charge. Bernays supposes (we say supposes, for he adduces not a particle of evidence, direct or indirect) that Josephus was influenced and fettered by his personal relation to Titus. This is certainly not the character of Josephus. There are many portions of his works in which we might expect him to write under the influence of national or religious prejudices, but we find him above them. This unusual freedom from prejudice is acknowledged by such men as Neander. Neander (Vol. I. p. 34), speaking of the destruction of Jerusalem, and of the influence of false prophets over the fanatical people, says: "Josephus, who was not a Christian, but regarded with more independence of judgment than others the fate of his nation, of which he had been an eyewitness, closes his narrative with this remarkable reflection: The wretched people suffered themselves to be cheated by impostors, who dared to lie in the

name of God. But they disregarded the evident miracles predicting the impending destruction." In the same volume (p. 38), Neander, while giving an account of the sect of the Esseni, and of the description which Philo furnishes of them, says: "The account of Philo does not in this agree with that of Josephus; but the more historical Josephus in general deserves more credit than Philo, who is too much given to philosophizing and idealizing." A little later, after adverting to the advantages enjoyed by Josephus, being a resident of Palestine, and knowing the sect from personal intercourse, he adds: "Josephus shows himself, in this description particularly, entirely free from bias." And any one who knows the controlling tyrannical influence of sectarian prejudices, and remembers that Josephus had after mature consideration joined the sect of the Pharisees, will appreciate this testimony of impartiality. We think so strong, so unqualified a testimony in favor of the veracity and independence of Josephus weighs more than the sly insinuations of Bernays, altogether unsupported by evidence.

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But suppose, for argument's sake, that Josephus allowed himself, through outside influence, to misrepresent the facts, that Titus, who had himself voted for the destruction of the temple, later, when his dynasty was established, wished it to be understood that he had been in favor of sparing the city and temple. Whose good opinion was to be gained by this assumed appearance of clemency? That of the Jews? They were too insignificant and despised a fraction of the Roman empire to render such a falsification worth the trouble. Of the Romans? Can any one seriously suppose that the lenient course advocated by Titus would have been a recommendation to the Romans, who still preserved, even at that period, much of their political instinct, which did not admit of the existence of a really independent nation within the limits of the Roman empire, and whose national vanity was tickled by the destruction of the temple and stronghold of a nation that had dared to resist the Roman power? The supposition of Bernays, that, after the excitement of the war was passed, a change took place in public opinion as regards the expediency of the destruction of the temple, besides being at variance

with the character of the Romans, whose feelings were to be conciliated, is entirely destitute of proof; it is nothing but a gratuitous supposition. Another circumstance is not to be overlooked in connection with this point. If the object of Josephus and Titus was to substitute a false for the true representation of the occurrence, were they likely to succeed by a work written in Greek? The great mass of the Romans were of course ignorant of this language, and to them the book would have been a sealed one; and the educated who were acquainted with Greek, and whose minds it would have been the object to influence by such a falsification of history, were guarded against the attempted imposition, their very education rendering other sources of information, whether histories or memoirs, accessible to them. That such sources then existed, is known; for instance, the work of Antonius Julianus, referred to by Bernays himself. That most of them have in the lapse of time been lost to us, is greatly to be lamented; at the time when this fraud was to be perpetrated they were both extant and accessible.

The third point relates to the council of war and its decision. Josephus says that three members voted for the destruction, and three, together with Titus, for the sparing of the temple; while Severus says some were for sparing, some, with Titus, for destroying the temple. We notice, in the first place, the fulness, distinctness, and precision in the account of Josephus, and their absence in that of Severus. Josephus mentions the names of the six members of the council, and after setting forth the several opinions expressed in the meeting, he states definitely that Fronto, Alexander, and Cerealis agreed with Titus that the temple was to be spared under any circumstances. How is it possible to suppose that a man of Josephus's position, a leading man among his own nation, a man of uncommon culture and information, an historian of unquestioned honesty, could be fool enough, even if he were a knave, to manufacture such a story, designating by name the individuals present at the council, and the part taken by each, when he must have expected to be at once and flatly contradicted, not only by the six members of the council, but by hundreds and thousands of others. Credat Judæus! Credat Judæus! This is carrying his

VOL. LXXII. 5TH S. VOL. X. NO. I.

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