« AnteriorContinuar »
nothing except that 'he spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany' in invading Belgium.
"That a man knows the right while doing the wrong is not usually accepted as proof of his serious conscientiousness. The real nature of Germany's view of her 'responsibilities toward the neutral States' may, however, be learned on authority which cannot be disputed by reference to the English 'White Paper.'
"If those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously why, when Germany was asked to respect the neutrality of Belgium if it were respected by France, did Germany refuse? France, when asked the corresponding question at the same time, agreed. This would have guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium.
"The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's colleague, (the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow.) It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon Shakespeare: 'Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just, but four times he that gets his blow in fust.'
"They had to advance into France,' said Herr von Jagow, 'by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.'
Germany's real attitude toward Belgium was thus frankly given by the German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and the German Chancellor in his speech to the Reichstag claimed the right to commit a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of hacking his way through. The treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere scrap of paper.
"The truth was spoken in these first statements by the two German Ministers. All the apologies and arguments which have since been forthcoming are afterthoughts to excuse and explain away a flagrant wrong. Moreover, all the attacks upon Great Britain in regard to this matter and all talk about 'responsibilities toward neutral States' come badly from the man who, on July 29,
asked Great Britain to enter into a bargain to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.
"The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his 'efforts for years to bring about an understand. ing between England and Germany.' An understanding, he added, which would have absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe.'
"He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff,* that Germany required as the price of an understanding an unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression against Germany. They were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in case of aggression by Ger
*In his address at Cardiff, appearing in Vol. 1, No. 2, of THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY, Premier Asquith said:
In a communication to the German Government in 1912 regarding her future policy Great Britain declared that she would neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. But that was not enough for German statesmanship.
Germany wanted us to go further and pledge ourselves to absolute neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war. To that demand there was but one answer, and that was the answer which the Government gave.
"The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to the American correspondent may be brought to a very simple test, the application of which is more apposite because it serves to recall one of the leading facts which produced the present war.
"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg refused the proposal which England put forward, and in which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a conference at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and honorable terms without war. If he really wished to work with England for peace why did he not accept that proposal? He must have known after the Balkan conference in London that England could be trusted to play fair. Herr von Jagow had given testimony in the Reichstag to England's good faith in those negotiations.
"The proposal for the second conference between the powers was made by Sir Edward Grey with the same straightforward desire for peace as in 1912 and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of averting the war. He who does not will the means must not complain if the conclusion is drawn that he did not will the end.
"The second part of the interview with an American newspaper correspondent consists of a discourse upon the ethics of the war. The things which Germany has done in Belgium and France have been placed on record by those who have suffered from them and who know them at first hand. After this it does not lie with the German Chancellor to read to the other belligerents a lecture upon the conduct of the war"
The Kaiser at Donchery
A DISPATCH SENT BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS.
ERLIN, Jan. 29, 1915.-The Lokalanzeiger has published some further
The Emperor pointed out to the author where his father had stood at
The trip by automobile finally brought the party to the headquarters of
"One gets better things to eat at your headquarters than at mine. I
The Emperor here had an opportunity to see a thousand French prisoners march by. He was greatly pleased when some of them doffed their caps to him, and he returned their salute. During this review he turned to a photographer who was taking pictures and said:
Photograph the prisoners, and not always me."
The party later climbed a steep ascent to get a view of the surrounding region. When descending, Dr. Ganghofer slipped, but the Emperor quickly grasped him by the arm and saved him from a fall, saying at the same time; Soldiers and citizens must help each other all they can."
By H. G. Wells
The article which follows was written by H. G. Wells for publication in England. The British censor, however, refused to permit its appearance there, and thus it was printed in the United States for the first time by THE NEW YORK TIMES on Feb. 7, 1915. In the development of his argument Mr. Wells points out that "the Dutch hold a sword at the back of Germany." That Holland has no intention of sheathing this sword, so removing a menace from Germany, is indicated by the recent cable from The Hague telling of the message sent by the Government to the Second Chamber of the Legislature dealing with pending legislation to prolong the term of enlistment in the regular army, in which this language is used: " The position of our country demands today, as it did in August, that our entire military force should be at all times available."
HAT changes for Holland are likely to result from the present war?
Let me, as an irresponsible journalist, try to estimate them, and try to forecast what Holland is likely to do in the next few months. I do not want for a moment to suggest what Dutchmen ought to do; this preaching to highly intelligent neutrals is not a writer's business, but I want to imagine how things must look in the private mind of a wary patriotic Hollander, and to guess what may be the outcome. Because in many ways Holland does seem to hold the key to the present situation.
It is clear that whatever fears may have been felt for the integrity of Holland at the beginning of the war must now be very much abated. The risk of Germany attacking Holland diminishes with each day of German failure, and the whole case and righteousness of the Allies rests upon their respect for Holland. Holland's position as regards Germany now is extraordinarily strong materially, and as regards the Allies it is overwhelmingly strong morally. has behaved patiently and sanely through a trying crisis. She has endured much almost inevitable provocation and temp
That is the interesting thing about the Dutch position now. The Dutch hold a sword at the back of Germany. they to come into the war on the German side, they would, no doubt, provide a most effective but certainly not a decisive reinforcement to the German western front, but they would also lay open a convenient way for the Allies to the vital part of Germany, Westphalia. But were they to come in on the side of the Allies they would at once deliver a conclusive blow. They could cut the main communications of the German Army in Flanders, they could round up and assist to capture a very large portion of the German western forces, and they could open the road not only to attack but to turn the Rhine defenses. In fact, they could finish Germany.
This situation is already fairly obvious; I betray no strategic secret; it must become manifest to every Dutchman before many more weeks. One has but to look at the map. Every day now diminishes the possibility of Germany being