Dr. MUELLER. Four each, because you have different launch complexes, they have different ground crews. Much of the safety depends upon the training of the people who outfit these equipments. Much of the safety is involved in how well the Mission Control Center people work and on what sort of training level they are working at. Now, I cannot say that four is the absolute minimum, because that becomes a matter of judgment. My judgment is that if anything, four launches a year is too low, and we ought to have more. But that, as I say, is a matter of judgment. But I would say that it would be safer to eliminate the Saturn I or the Saturn V on the long-term basis than to fly too few a year; yes, that is my view. Mr. GEHRIG. So as I understand it, four per year each of the uprated Saturn I and Saturn V is not the optimum launch rate to maintain crew proficiency; in your judgment, even that rate is too low to maintain it as high as you would like? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. SPACECRAFT PROCUREMENT Mr. GEHRIG. Could you tell the committee, in your Apollo Applications program, just exactly what the money in the budget request under Spacecraft Procurement is for? I know that it is based on a launch rate of four launches each of the uprated Saturn I's and Saturn V, but this money provides for certain things. Could you discuss this with the committee? Dr. MUELLER. It provides for six Command and Service Modules a year, because each of the Saturn I's are dual launches. Mr. GEHRIG. I am sorry, that is not quite the answer I am looking for. This provides for a certain rate of production and a certain launch rate, but the money in the budget, my understanding is, provides for the purchase specifically, for example, of two Command Service Modules. Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Let me give you the numbers. Four uprated Saturn I's are purchased with these funds; there are also two CSM. In addition to that, there are long lead items for three uprated Saturn I's, two Saturn V's, and three Command and Service Modules. Mr. GEHRIG. Would you provide for the record, then, how much is allocated to each one of these procurements? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. COST OF FIRST FOUR APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSIONS Mr. GEHRIG. Would you give us your best estimates of the costs of the flight hardware for the first four Apollo Applications Missions? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. GEHRIG. You can supply that for the record if you like, Dr. Mueller. Dr. MUELLER. I shall be glad to. I have a breakout of this and will supply it for the record. Funding required for procurement of space vehicles for Apollo Applications as submitted in the FY '68 Budget request is as follows: Cost of Apollo procured flight vehicle hardware for the first four Apollo Applications missions is approximately $290 million and includes four uprated Saturn I's, two Command and Service Modules, and one Lunar Module ascent stage. QUESTIONS ON THE APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS Mr. GEHRIG. Now, I would like to ask two more questions. If all of the additional funds for launch vehicles, the uprated Saturn I and Saturn V that you are requesting in the 1968 budget, are not made available to you, does it make sense to go ahead with the experiments for the Apollo Applications program? Dr. MUELLER. Well, yes, because you recognize that the experiments are being developed for the alternate Apollo, for alternate uses for the basic Apollo faunch vehicles, so that in order to get the most effective return on these flights, we would still want to develop the experiments. Now, obviously, there is a tradeoff involved there between what is an effective utilization, because we would lose, if you did not have the launch vehicles, for example, you would lose the capability of going back and revisiting the spacecraft. So the real return to the Nation would be considerably less. We have been examined in this program from every aspect that it is possible to examine a program from by the Bureau of the Budget and literally, these numbers are a minimum number that will provide a reasonable return to the Nation. If you cut any part of this, then you have to give something up, as Dr. Seamans has said, and give up something significant. Mr. GEHRIG. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of questions that I would like to submit to be answered for the record at this point, dealing with the Apollo Applications program. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done. (The following questions submitted by Mr. Gehrig and the answers supplied for the record by Dr. Mueller are as follows:) APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM Question 1. Each of the up-rated Saturn I and Saturn V launch vehicles has been assigned a number has it not? Can you place these in the record with the mission you expect to use that launch vehicle for? Answer. The currently assigned numbers of AAP launch vehicles with mission assignments are listed in Attachment. It should be noted that the assignment of Saturn V flights 510 through 515 to Apollo Applications is based upon the most optimistic results of the Manned Lunar Landing effort. In the event that the Manned Lunar Landing is not accomplished until 1969 or 1970 the proposed 1969 CSM/resupply. 1970-71.. 1971-72. 213 214 215 216 217 218 Principal missions: Meteorology experiments 212 219 221 CSM/resupply. CSM+APP-A/resupply. CSM/resupply. CSM. A/L, W/S No. 2, MDA. CSM. 4 man CSM/EC. 222 223 CSM/EC. Question 2. You are requesting $91,300,000 for spacecraft modification. What are the major cost elements for this request and how much money is allocated to each? For example, how much is requested for power supply, for life support system, for land landing capability, et cetera? How much is estimated for modifying the command module to accommodate six astronauts? Would this modified spacecraft be procured in the procurement request of $43.3 million? Have you considered the use of a Gemini Spacecraft with a Titan II for the earth orbit crew change function? This would appear to allow more economical and frequent rotation as compared with a larger crew change at one particular time. Answer. The major cost elements are detailed in Attachment. It is estimated that $18.5 million is required in FY '68 for providing a six man command module with land landing capability. This modified spacecraft is not included in the $43.3 million request which is for spacecraft procurement. This alternative has not been studied in depth because the Titan II Gemini launch vehicle does not have the ability to boost the Gemini spacecraft to the without carrying the supplies and expendables that will be needed to support continued operation. Further, in addition to limitation of crew size (2 men for Gemini, 3 to 6 for Apollo CSM as planned for late 1970), the 8,000# Titan II earth orbital payload capability, compared with the 40,000# uprated Saturn I capability, means that 4 or 5 Gemini/Titan II launches would be required to accomplish the same logistic re-supply function as one uprated Saturn I. At $40-50M per Gemini/Titan II launch versus approximately $110M per Apollo CSM/uprated Saturn I, the use of Gemini/Titan II for logistic re-supply of the Orbital Workshop/ATM cluster appears considerably less cost effective than the Apollo CSM/uprated Saturn I. [Attachment] Fiscal year 1968 AAP budget-Spacecraft modification Extended CSM modification---- ECS Crew systems__ EPS Communication RCS SPS G. & N.. Structures GSE Extended LM modification__. Subsystem development and test_-_ Development support_. Offsite tests--- Communication G. & N_____ Propulsion (RCS and SPS). Crew systems-- GFE flight hardware_. Payload module interface_. Land landing and 6-man CM___ SATURN I PROCUREMENT 93.7 34. 4 3.0 .7 6. 7 3.0 5.0 2.5 5.0 5.0 3.5 5.0 29.9 7.0 1.4 1.0 2.0 2.3 .7 1.0 14.5 3.9 18.5 Question 3. You are requesting $78.5 million for up-rated Saturn I procurement on an incremental funding basis. How many vehicles do you plan to procure? Is this quantity determined by defined mission requirements or by a production level of four per year? How many up-rated Saturn I vehicles would remain from a most optimistic accomplishment of the lunar landing commitment? How many missions for the up-rated Saturn I are now defined? (a) Could the Titan IIIM perform these? (b) To what extent has NASA studied this approach? The Michoud Assembly Facility now employs about 2700 people on the uprated Saturn I program. How many would be employed at the production rate of four per year? Would a rate of two vehicles per year maintain the up-rated Saturn I production capability until the needs are better defined. What would your fiscal year 1968 funding needs be at a rate of two per year? Answer. 1. We plan to procure 4 Uprated Saturn I's plus long lead items for an additional 3 vehicles. (See Attachment.) 2. Refer to answer to question #2 on page 156. 3. If AS 205, AS 501 and AS 502 are successful and AS 503, the first manned Saturn V mission, is successful, seven uprated Saturn I vehicles would remain, 4. For the program submitted (fiscal year '68) missions for uprated Saturn I vehicles have been defined in some detail for 4 flights each in 1968 and 1969 with a projection of 4 manned flights per year thereafter. (a) The Titan IIIM could perform the required trajectories with slight payload reduction, and so could nearly accomplish the objectives of the defined mission. Titan IIIM availability to NASA: late 1970, early 1971. (b) During this past year NASA has considered carefully whether the Titan IIIM launch vehicle or the Titan IIIM-MOL system should be used in the past-Apollo non-military manner space flight program in lieu of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. The key questions have been : 1. Possible use of the Titan IIIM instead of the uprated Saturn I to launch the Apollo system: (a) Would it be technically feasible? (b) Would it be less expensive? (c) What would be its advantages and disadvantages? 2. Possible use of the Titan IIIM-MOL system in place of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system: (a) Could essentially the same objectives be accomplished? (b) Would it be less expensive? (c) What would be the advantages and disadvantages? Several specific possible programs and alternatives were studied in some depth by NASA, with the collaboration of the Department of Defense in providing data and cost estimates with respect to the Titan IIIM and MOL systems. Ground rules for performance and cost comparisons were worked out jointly by NASA and DOD. In the studies, NASA used without modification or independent validation the technical data and cost estimates on the Titan IIIM and the MOL systems provided by DOD. These studies have led to the following main conclusions with respect to the questions listed above: 1. With respect to the possible use of the Titan IIIM instead of the uprated Saturn I to launch the Apollo system: (a) The use of the Titan IIIM to launch the Apollo system appears to be technically feasible, but its feasibility would have to be confirmed by further ground and flight testing. Use of the u-segment Titan IIIM from ETR would provide capabilities approaching but not equal to those of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. The low orbit payload performance penalty would be about 10% per launch. At least 32 years would be required for systems integration, facility modifications at ETR, and flight qualification of the Titan III-Apollo configuration. (b) Funding requirements for the first several years for programs using the Titan IIIM would be substantially higher than for corresponding alternative programs uisng the Saturn IB-Apollo system because of the non-recurring costs of about $250 million for systems integration, facility modifications at ETR, additional check-out equipment, control center modifications, and two unmanned launches to qualify the new Titan IIIM-Apollo system. The Titan IIIM-Apollo system would have lower recurring costs than the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system by about $15 million per launch, and after about 17 launches the savings would amortize the initial non-recurring costs. Compared to a corresponding program using the uprated Saturn-Apollo system, and assuming four launches per year in both cases, it is estimated that the cross-over point at which a lower total program cost would result from introduction and use of the Titan IIIM-Apollo system would not occur until seven years after a decision to proceed with it. (c) Use of the Titan IIIM-Apollo system would have several disadvantages as compared to the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. These include: (1) the payload penalty of about 10%; (2) the problems of integrating the Apollo system with the Titan IIIM; (3) the program discontinuities involved in shifting to the Titan IIIM-Apollo after 12 uprated Saturn I-Apollo launches; (4) the delay of about two years in the time at which a post-Apollo non-military low earth orbital manned program could get underway; and (5) the fact that the Titan IIIM cannot be used to place S-IVB stages in orbit for use and reuse with the airlock in the approach to the development of long duration flight capabil |