An embryonic space station would be created by linking up the hardware launched for the second dual mission with the workshop left in orbit from the first dual mission, as shown here (fig. 6.) The single space station created would thus combine the hardware elements and supplies from the four separate launches.

The crew of the second dual mission would use the orbital workshop again during their flight. The total duration of this second manned flight would be about 56 days, depending upon the openended testing philosophy I mentioned earlier.

Later we expect that other experiments will be carried up to this cluster of equipment. We will reuse the solar telescope and we also will be trying out other experiments. In particular, we would expect to build up the duration of the crew's exposure to the space environment, first to 4 months, then to 8 months and, in 1970, if all goes well, we should be able to have men in orbit continuously.

INCREASING CAPABILITIES

The next chart (fig. 7) shows the increasing capabilities being provided by the expected growth pattern of manned space flight. In astronomy, the Gemini and Apollo programs provide the capability to accomplish visual observations with low pointing accuracies over

servations, fine pointing accuracy over sustained periods of time will be attained. The equipment will be designed to enable the selection of aiming points based on the observations of the crew, provisions will be made for film retrieval and resupply of the equipments, and the feasibilty of maintaining and reuse of complex equipments will also be established. These same developments are needed for stellar observations and we would plan to use this same basic design, if it works well, to eventually establish a stellar observatory consisting of a workshop and an Apollo Telescope Mount in synchronous orbit.

In such a program devoted to astronomy, the astronaut may erect large radio astronomy antennas and equipments as well, and monitor their function and discriminate between the targets upon which they are focused. The astronaut also can be expected to correlate operation of the multiple sensors being used and, in general, perform many of the functions which an astronomer accomplishes in an Earth-based astronomical observatory.

A similar basic growth capability could evolve in the Earth_resources, meteorology, and biology mission areas. In each of these cases, the Apollo Applications program provides not only for immediate use for scientific and applications needs, but at the same time provides a sound basis for the evaluation of man's usefulness in space and for the design of future space systems.

TIMING OF APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM

So far I have discussed what we can do with the Apollo equipment; now I would like to explain why it is essential to proceed with the Apollo Applications program in the fiscal year 1968 budget. The

chart (fig. 8) shows the status of Apollo Saturn launch vehicle procurement as of February 1967. Note, that all of the uprated Saturn I launch vehicles have been procured and that the last of these are now in fabrication and assembly. Of the 15 Saturn V launch vehicles needed for the manned lunar landing, all have been ordered except the last five. However, long lead procurement has been authorized for these vehicles and they will soon be in the Apollo pipeline. The next chart (fig. 9) shows that, of the 21 Command Service Modules, all have been ordered except the last three and again long lead procurement for these has been initiated. All of the 15 Lunar Modules have been ordered and they are in various stages of activity in the Apollo pipeline.

This chart (fig. 10) shows the leadtime relationship between the launch vehicles for the basic Apollo project and the follow-on Apollo Applications project.

The various elements of the launch vehicles have slightly different leadtimes, but planning is such that all launch vehicle entities arrive at the Cape at the proper time for integration and launch. For clarity, the total vehicle leadtimes are shown in this chart.

The chart does not begin to show the complexity of the follow-on procurement situation for Apollo Applications. I believe, however, in the time available, it will help to clarify our funding requirements for fiscal year 1968.

The leadtime problems we are currently facing-maintaining continuity of the capability developed for Apollo-are evident in this chart. Similar situations exist for the spacecraft and other Apollo equipments.

The approach we are using in this follow-on procurement is to minimize the cost in fiscal year 1968 and yet provide for the most economical transition to a rate of four Saturn IB's and four Saturn V's per year by 1970. The ordering of follow-on-Apollo hardware is shown

in the chart which accompanies this. I might add right here that we have carefully looked at both the economics of different rates of production of Saturn I leads and of Saturn V. We have also looked at the overall program problems that are associated with different launch rates. I would like to reemphasize what I said yesterday, that one of the real constraints on the launch rate of these very complex vehicles is maintaining that minimum launch rate that provides for the safety of the launches themselves. That involves both the training of the ground crew and maintaining that training at the proper level, and the utilization of the equipment by the flight crews in maintaining their capability. My own judgment is that four Saturn IB's and four Saturn V's as we have described them is the minimum rate that is consistent with a continuing safe flight program.

FUNDING REQUIRED

Now, these rates are also consistent with the President's Science Advisory Committee recommendations in their report published in February 1967.

The funding required for these space vehicles for fiscal year 1968