were spending their brains and activities upon "politics and, thirdly, to the fact that England was hopelessly wedded to obsolete traditions and barren " Liberal ideas. Lensch's contempt for "Liberalism" and Free Trade is unbounded. Germany, he remarks, was helped at every turn by the rivalry of her enemies, and especially by the fact that England was too proud to see "the meaning of Germany's successful wars between 1864 and 1871. With the utmost gusto he writes :

66

"Nothing is more touching than the soft assurances of German politicians and professors about German peacefulness. Of course! Of Germany's subjective peacefulness there is no doubt. But that ought not to prevent us from recognising that, regarded objectively, we are and must be the disturbers of the peace."

One might quote Lensch at length concerning the "death and burial" of "Liberalism," and the need for Germany to root out the last remnants of bourgeois faith in English "catchwords such as "freedom" and " democracy." For him all that is necessary is for Germany to break down old-fashioned political barriers in her stride towards world-power through ever greater State concentration. He is satisfied that the necessary amount of " freedom " will be granted to the German people, simply because that will be a necessary relief from the ever tighter domination by the State. For example, the Prussian franchise will be reformed because it has become the interest of German finance to remove such obstacles to German prestige abroad!

Particularly interesting are the passages in which Lensch ridicules the hesitation of "official" German Socialism "to recognise the tremendous historical mission of Germany." He attributes this to a traditional " 'humility" and sense of inferiority, and writes sarcastically :

"Germany and a special historical mission! But what would become of international brotherhood? What would the French and English Socialists have said if German Socialists had talked of an 'historical task of Germany' in this war? Had not the time of chosen people passed away for ever?

And would this argument not be arrogance,' and amount to a wicked hurting of the feelings of our foreign brethren '? No, one was defending his country because it had been attacked, and as long as it was attacked, and that was enough. For the rest, he was serving peace best who insisted most emphatically upon German peacefulness and modesty, and represented this policy at home as well as abroad.

"This was a policy' without political thought, and that is why, the longer the war lasted, the German Socialist Party more and more obtained the unearned reputation of being a Government Party. In order to dissipate this painful impression, it occurred to some of the Parliamentary and literary spokesmen of the Party to say rude things occasionally to the Imperial Chancellor and to demand his removal; but this could not be a substitute for the lack of political ideas."

Lensch remarks that the German Socialist Party became "a sexless Fatherland-saving party" and "dangerously approached pacifism." He repeatedly exults in the charges of barbarism that are levelled against Germany, and says that they are really a measure of foreign admiration. In one place he writes:

"They call us barbarians. So let it be! We ought to drop all our whimpering or horrified protests against the barbarism cry of the English-to say nothing of the French."

In general, Lensch holds that the German "mission" in this war was to overthrow both Russia and England. "Tsarism lies crushed upon the ground," and " the English world-despot will soon have also to descend from his throne." For France Lensch expresses the utmost contempt, and declares that it is almost a matter of indifference what attitude France may choose to adopt towards Germany after the war. According to him the main point is that "a weakened France has ceased to be the point of attraction for the neighbouring small States, and especially for Belgium." Drunk as he is with the doctrine of the organised State going hand in hand with organised Capital, Lensch attributes all the "weakness" of France to

the fact that she did not after the Revolution concentrate all her forces upon aggressive aims, as Prussia-Germany has done, but dissipated her energies and in particular became a nation of small-holders. Of Austria-Hungary Lensch candidly observes that she has served her turn. Thus:

:

Owing to the necessary renunciation by the Russian democracy of Constantinople, world-domination, and other childishnesses,' Austria has lost the necessity of her existence for Europe. That is the new situation. The consequences cannot yet be seen, but it need hardly be said that they by no means require the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. For the German Empire a strong Danube Monarchy and a firm alliance with it remain the corner-stone of Germany's world-position. For the Slav peoples in the Danube Monarchy the maintenance of the State remains a real interest, and all that is necessary is to make them conscious of this interest and so to secure their active co-operation."

As for Russia and the Balkans, Lensch easily regards them all as mere instruments of German policy and spheres of profitable invasion, with whose peoples Germany will deal by separate agreement."

The importance of Lensch's book lies in its candid, if boisterous, expression of what the ordinary German Socialists think but do not dare to say, and in its penetrating analysis of the economic foundations of militarism. Lensch regards England as the one great enemy, and he expects that England after the war will adopt Protection and be "rejuvenated" by faithful imitation of the whole Prussian State system, economic and military. What he has never attempted to face is the possibility that Germany's enemies will achieve real economic unity and destroy the German system in the only way by which it can be destroyed-by the destruction of its economic foundations.

I have long foreseen the true aims of German policy,1 and I cannot agree with The Times that it is a new creed of Pan-German socialism. The 1 See National System of Economics (Peddie),

whole of German society is saturated with the doctrines outlined by Lensch, of which he is merely an exponent, whether they be Junkers or Socialists. It has been a consistent policy of the latter to deceive the Internationalists as to their real object and policy. And as for Lensch's remarks that " England is the one great enemy, and that after the war she will adopt Protection and be rejuvenated' by faithful imitation of the whole Prussian State system, economic and military," I would truly plead that the Lord save us from the error of any such spurious imitation.

The war has demonstrated, more than anything else, that the social ideal of internationalism can never be made practicable. The conception is dead. It was, like Bolshevism, invented in Germany, and although the proletariat of that country paid lip service to its principles for the good of the Fatherland, they never had any intention, as Dr. Lensch confirms, of carrying them to a logical conclusion.

The working men of this country should therefore guard themselves against the disintegrating force still existing in their midst. Although it is a small one it is nevertheless active, and they may be certain that it will again seek to establish internationalism or Bolshevism as the working man's ideal, Working men should understand

that as a Government cannot extend its influence beyond the immediate care of its own citizens, or subject races, it likewise follows that the concern of every individual should be their own immediate welfare. It is a true proverb which says, "Charity begins at home."

Nationalism must precede internationalism. There is more logic in the ideal of a League of Nations. In such a league each nation would be left free to attain its own standard of civilisation, and develop its own conception of social progress and particular characteristics. After all, does not the word internationalism signify a cooperation or community of organised nations? And would it be possible to attain the ideal of internationalism by merely organising the citizens of the world? We very much doubt it. It is a Utopian dream.

In the four works I have now developed I have endeavoured to outline an alternative system to the German which, if completely adopted, as it seems likely to be, would go far towards placing an effective check on Germany's ambitious world economic policy. Moreover, it is consistently democratic.

Adam Smith has established the doctrine that "Defence is of more importance than opulence." And wherever one turns nowadays we are constantly finding out that Smith was a true national