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Votes may be added to the poll if duly tendered.

(2) 2.

And in the course of his judgment he said further as to this:— The ticket is merely given to the voter to enable him to vote with greater ease, it has nothing to do with the voting. Properly speaking, the poll-clerk ought to have nothing to do with tickets, but he should take from the mouth of the voter for whom' he votes, his number on the register, and his address.

The 2 Will. 4, appoint a clerk

c. 45, s. 65, enacts, that the returning officer shall
to take the poll, who, at the conclusion of the election, is to seal
up the poll-books and publicly deliver them to the returning officer.
It is therefore clear that the person to take the poll is the poll-clerk,
and it is the duty of all persons who go to vote to ascertain who
that poll-clerk is, and they must take the trouble to inquire. The
Act clearly means that it is to the poll-clerk whom the returning
officer has appointed to take the poll that the communication of
the will of the voter must be made, and that the communication
of that will to any one else will not do. It would be improper
and wrong to hold that a communication made by a voter to a
person not the poll-clerk, could be considered a legal tender of his
vote."

At the commencement of that part of the case which related to the second part of the prayer of the petition,

Mr. Price, for the Petitioners, handed in a list of the persons whose names he submitted should be added to the poll.

Mr. Baron MARTIN asked if there was any precedent for adding votes to the poll, when voters had done their utmost to record their votes, and by the mistake of the poll-clerk their names were omitted?

Mr. Price :-"I can find no precedent for that."

Mr. Baron MARTIN (to Mr. Quain) :-"I believe you do not dispute that if a vote has been duly tendered it may be added to the poll."

Mr. Quain :-" Not if in your Lordship's opinion it has been duly tendered."

Mr. Baron MARTIN:- "That is a mere matter of fact for me."

CASE IX.

BOROUGH OF WESTBURY.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE WILLES, FEBRUARY 2, 1869.

Petitioner: Mr. Abraham Laverton.

Respondent: Mr. J. L. Phipps.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. Cole, Q.C., Mr. Henry James. Agents: Mr. Rowland Rodway, and Messrs. Warry, Robins, and Burgess. Counsel for Respondent: Serjeant Parry, Mr. Besley.

Agents Messrs. Pinniger and Son, and Messrs. Godwin and Pickett.

THE petition contained the usual allegations of bribery, &c., and prayed the seat upon a scrutiny.

It was proved that a manufacturer in the town, who was an agent of the Respondent, told his workmen that no man should remain in his employment who voted for the Petitioner, who was his rival in trade, and that these men or some of them, were obliged to leave his employment in consequence of their refusing to abstain from so voting.

Evidence was given for the Respondent in support of a recriminatory charge against the Petitioner, which, although it failed, was of a serious character, and was said by the Judge to have been rightly brought forward.

In the course of the case,

It was proved that one Harrop, a manufacturer in the town, had been asked by the Respondent for his vote and interest; that

Limited

afterwards he had canvassed his workmen for the Respondent, and had dismissed certain of them because they refused to vote for the Respondent; and it was submitted thereupon on the part of limited extent. the Petitioner that the Respondent was liable for this act of

authority to canvass makes Respondent liable to that

Petitioner not obliged to be called as a

witness when

there is a

any

Harrop.

Mr. Justice WILLES said:" Asking a person in Harrop's position for his vote and interest' might mean 'go round and canvass your workmen for me,' though that might not be the case with ordinary voters. But if it did mean that, it would not be an authority to canvass beyond the scope of the workmen in his employ. With respect to anything done as to voters other than these workmen, it might very well be said there was no agency, but within the scope of the authority to act as agent there was quite as strong a responsibility on the part of the candidate as there would be in the case of a general authority to canvass."

The Petitioner himself not having been called as a witness in support of his case,

Serjeant Parry, in opening the Respondent's case, said that as a recriminatory recriminatory charge was made against the Petitioner, he had been charge, but if there is very much taken by surprise by the fact that he had not been called as a witness. This was almost the invariable practice. He apprehended his Lordship would have to make a report to the Speaker as to whether the Petitioner was guilty of any and what offences.

ground for sus picion, judge is bound to call him himself.

Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, s. 32.

Gossip no evidence,

Mr. Justice WILLES said he was bound to inquire if there was reasonable ground for supposing or even suspecting that the Petitioner was guilty of anything, but for that purpose he was bound to act upon section 32 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, which gave him the authority to examine witnesses himself: but he was not bound to inquire into this when there was, as here, no ground of suspicion. It was not intended that the Judge should hold, so to speak, an investigation, but only follow up any clue which the evidence of either party might present, especially if he saw anything like collusion.

A witness was asked in cross-examination, Did you not say you were not a voter ?-A. No; I did not say so.

In re-examination he was asked, Did anybody else say you were except on a not a voter ?—A. Yes; William Raines said so.

Serjeant Parry, for the Respondent, objected to what Raines said, as not being evidence.

Mr. Justice WILLES said:-"Mere gossip is no evidence, except self-disabling evidence on a scrutiny."

A person who had not been subpoenaed as a witness having given evidence, at the close of his examination asked whether he could claim his expenses.

Mr. Justice WILLES said :-"I think as this witness was not subpoenaed, I ought before the examination of the witnesses to have been asked that the witness should be examined under section 32 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, which authorises a Judge either to send for a witness not in Court, or to direct a witness not in Court to be examined. This witness was not subpoenaed, and I think the section authorises me to order the expenses to be paid. The officer suggests that I should direct them to be paid by the Petitioner; but inasmuch as this witness was adverse to the Petitioner, if I gave him a remedy against the Petitioner, it might cost him a great deal more than his expenses. I had better, therefore, act on the equity of the section, and direct that he should be considered as a witness examined by the Court; then his expenses, whatever they are to which he is legally entitled, will be paid. If any other witness desires to take the same point about his expenses, he must do so before he is sworn."

scrutiny. (1) 30.

Expenses of subpoenaed.

witness not

(2) 70.

not a corrupt

It was proved (as part of the recriminatory case) that the Peti- Subscriptions tioner had sent a cheque for £10 as a subscription to a dissenting practice. congregation almost at the same time as he issued his address as a (3) 286. candidate.

Mr. Justice WILLES :-I wish I could be spared the theological part of the case, unless it is a very clear case.

Mr. Cole-If your Lordship thinks nothing of it, I will not press it.

Mr. Justice WILLES :-No; I do not say I think nothing of it. I have myself often observed that people who mean to become candidates often subscribe to things they would otherwise not

E

have subscribed to; but I think that is a step off corrupt practices; it is charity stimulated by gratitude or hope of favours to

come.

Treating
evidence of
intention.
(4) 110.

Threat of dis

missal of workmen intimidation

under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102,

s. 5.

At the close of the case,

Mr. Justice WILLES said he would take that opportunity of observing that he did not wish it to be supposed (as had been supposed by some people from some expressions of his in another case) that treating by a single glass of beer would not be treating if it were really given to induce a man to vote or not to vote. All he had ever said was that that was not sufficient to bring his mind to the conclusion that the intention existed to influence a man's vote by so small a quantity of liquor.

Mr. Justice WILLES in his judgment declared the election void on the ground of intimidation, within 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 5.

He said that the facts as to the case of Mr. Joseph Harrop were as follows:

"Mr. Harrop was a manufacturer and a large employer of workmen in the borough. The Petitioner was his rival in trade, against whom he entertained an angry feeling. Almost as soon as it was found probable or possible that the Petitioner was likely to come forward as a candidate for the borough, Harrop began interrogating his men as to whom they were likely to vote for. The men, or some of them, told him they did not intend to vote at all. He commended their resolution, and extracted a promise from them that they would adhere to it. Shortly afterwards he consented to become a member of the Respondent's Committee, and he then commenced canvassing for the Respondent those same men from whom, just before, he had extracted a promise not to vote at all. Certain men in his employ at the latter end of October declined to vote otherwise than for the Petitioner, having promised him so to do. When this came to Mr. Harrop's knowledge he brought these men before him and said what amounted in substance to this: 'I have determined that no man shall remain in my employment who votes for Laverton; if you vote for Laverton you shall have no further employment from me.' In the case of two men he asked affirmatively, 'Will you vote for

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