Great Britain and the Next WarSmall, Maynard, 1914 - 48 páginas |
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Términos y frases comunes
admit airships ally Anglo-German ardor of attack argument attack Germany Austria believe Bernhardi Boer Boer War bombardment BOSTON SMALL Britain British Empire British Government Briton Channel Tunnel class in Germany colonial complete naval conquest cost coun countrymen danger Danish fleet destroyed Dover duty effect enforced British expeditionary force face favor fect feeling fight France frankly that Germany Frederic French German army German general's German menace Germany will attack hardi's historical hope hostilities ical imagine interest invasion Irish fellow-countrymen Lord Roberts manently many's matter MAYNARD & COMPANY military never numbers opinion ourselves passage peace political possible President Kruger propositions I dispute quarrel raid reason Russia seas seems serious notice service is based situation submarines surplus population tack take very serious tells us frankly Territorial Army thing tion torpedo troops ture UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA vital von Bernhardi
Pasajes populares
Página 17 - In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.
Página 12 - Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors — that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.
Página 47 - I would venture to say one word here to my Irish fellow-countrymen of all political persuasions. If they imagine that they can stand politically or economically •while Britain falls, they are woefully mistaken. The British Fleet Is their one shield. If it be broken, Ireland will go down. They may well throw themselves heartily into the common defence, for no sword can transfix England without the point reaching Ireland behind •her.
Página 11 - This law can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen.
Página 26 - All which other nations attained in centuries of natural development — political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade — was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we now wish to attain must be fought for, and won against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers.
Página 27 - Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.
Página 13 - Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in the civilized world.
Página 35 - France go down, and to give her effective help we must land an expeditionary force upon the Continent This force has to be supplied with -munitions of war and kept up to strength, and so the whole problem becomes a more complex one. The element of danger, which Is serious in either form of war, but more serious in the latter, is the existence of new forms of naval warfare which have never been tested in the hands of competent men, and which may completely revolutionize the conditions. These new factors...
Página 27 - A pacific agreement with England is a will-o'the-wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our political and military plans accordingly.