would still be his action, based upon his contract with the defendants. If he sees fit to sue in his own name, although for the ultimate benefit of his insurers, the defendants have no cause to complain."

§ 116. When Statutes of Limitation begin to run on Title Policy. As a right of action does not accrue until the insured is evicted by a superior title, statutes of limitation do not begin to run until that time. This subject was thus discussed at length in an action on a policy of title insurance:

20

"It is contended that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, as the certificate. in question was issued November 25, 1890, and suit begun December 21, 1897, more than five years after the date of the certificate. If the five years' limitation applies, and the cause of action accrued at the date of issuance of the guaranty, then said contention must be sustained. * * * * A contract of insurance is an indemnity, and it would not be contended that the cause of action accrued at the date of the policy, and not at the time of the loss. A guaranty is also an indemnity similar to that of insurance, and is governed by the same rule. This stands to reason. It is true that the incumbrance under which the plaintiffs were evicted existed at the time of the issuance of the certificate in question, but the indemnity was not against the incumbrances, but against the assertion of such or other claims or rights against the property, and loss occasioned thereby. The plaintiffs had no cause of action under their contract until the adverse claim against plaintiffs' property was asserted, and the defendant afforded time and opportunity of defending against it. The defense was made by defendant and judgment of eviction against 20. Purcell v. Land Title Guarantee Co. (1902), 94 Mo. App. 5, 67 S, W. 726,

plaintiffs' tenant was rendered in June, 1897, and the suit was begun in December of the same year. We hold that, under the contract in suit, the breach did not occur until plaintiffs' eviction."

§ 117. Company's Right of Access to Public Records-Remedy of Mandamus. Under a law of New York authorizing it "to make, and cause to be made, and to purchase and pay for all such searches, abstracts, indices, maps and copies of records, as the trustees thereof may deem necessary," it was held" the "Title Guarantee and Trust Company" had the power "by persons in its employment, to examine the books, records, maps and papers of the register's office, and to make searches, abstracts and copies, so far as that may be considered necessary, to place itself in a position to examine and afford the means of examining titles, without afterwards resorting to the register's office. *

*

The obligation imposed upon the register to permit the books, records and maps of the office to be examined is absolute in its character. And so is the additional right given by the charter to the relator. When either may be applied for in an orderly way, he is bound to acquiesce in the application and permit the examination to be made and the copies and abstracts to be taken. The duty imposed upon him in this respect is entirely ministerial, and its observance may be lawfully required through the instrumentality of the writ of mandamus."

In New Jersey, however, it has been held that a corporation organized for "the examination, insurance, and guaranty of the title to lands and estates, or interests

21. People ex rel Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Reilly (1886), 38 Hun. (N, Y.) 429.

in lands, in the several counties of this state, and the issuing of certificates, policies, contracts, and undertakings therefor, upon such terms and conditions, restrictions and limitations, as may be determined by said company," has no power to make abstracts of records generally, although it has the same right as any individual, to make a search with reference to a particular title in which it is interested."

22

The Court of Errors and Appeals said: "The respondent by force of its incorporation, has the same right to inspect the public records which may lawfully be exercised by any individual. Every person, without legislative authority, may engage in the business of examining and guarantying titles as fully as this company is empowered to do by its act of incorporation. When such a person or a company with such authority is employed to examine and guaranty a particular title, the clerk, upon demand, is bound to give access to the records for that purpose, subject to reasonable rules and regulations."

§ 118. Right of Access to Public Records. "Patent or Short Form Indices" Not Required by Law to be kept. In New Jersey, where the question presented was "whether the clerk of the Supreme Court should be commanded to permit the Fidelity Trust Company to examine "patent or short form of indices" kept at public expense but not required by law, it was held. that mandamus would not be granted. Separate indices required by law were open to the use of the trust company. 23

22. Barber v. West Jersey Title & Guaranty Co. (1895), (Magie dissenting), 53 N. J. Eq. 158, 32 Atl. 222, reversing 49 N. J. Eq. 474, 24 Atl. 381.

23. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Clerk of Supreme Court (1900), 65 N. J. L. 495, 47 Atl. 451.

§ 119. Right of Access to Public Records. Indices of United States Courts Required by Law to be kept. In the case cited " Mr. Justice Brewer in delivering the opinion of the court said:

"The question presented is to what extent a company engaged in examining titles and certifying thereto may have access to and use the indices and cross indices of the judgment records prepared by the clerks of United States courts. The statute declares that they 'shall at all times be open to the inspection and examination of the public.' (25. Stat. at L. 358, Chap. 729, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 701.) This company as one of the public has a right to this inspection and examination. It has no monopoly therein, and cannot interfere with the clerk or his assistants in the discharge of their duties, or with the equal rights of other persons to such inspection and examination. * * Very likely at the time of the passage of the act, the monopolizing of the business of examining titles by one or two corporations was not. contemplated. The work was scattered among the separate members of the bar, each one for his own client examiùing the title to property in which such client was interested. But if Congress provided and intended to provide that one, interested in the title to real estate and desiring an examination of judgment liens thereon, should, either by himself or agent, have access to these indices, that intent and that provision are not changed by the fact that the business has passed from the many to the few. The same right of inspection exists whether one is examining only the title to a single piece of real estate or the titles to a hundred."

24. Vell v. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1903), 189 U. S. 131, 47 L. Ed. 741.

§ 120. Regulation by Register where Title Company is making complete copies of Records-Number of Employees Having Access to Records At One Time Limited. A representative of a new title company stated to a county register "that he wanted to put a number of men at work to obtain copies of records in the office, and saying, in effect, that these men were to be employed, not about the business or work of examining titles for transactions then being made, but that their business was to copy the records of the office and accumulate information, so that it would be of value to the company as matter of sale, merchandise or information in the business of searching titles in which it was about to engage; that he represented that he wanted to put from a dozen to twenty or twenty-five men in the office for that purpose; that the defendant (register) told him it would be impossible to have so many men as that for the reason that it would interfere with the current business of the office." It was finally arranged that three men were to be permitted to engage in this work. Thereafter a fourth man was added to the work, but ostensibly in behalf of another title company. The register refused to permit the fourth to continue with the work. Whereupon the second title company brought mandamus proceedings to compel access to the books in behalf of this fourth copyist. The court held that the two companies were practically identical, having the same officers, etc., that there was an attempt to violate the agreement limiting the work to three copyists, and that the limitation to three was reasonable; the relief asked for was denied.25

25. People ex. rel. German-American Loan & Trust Co. v. Richards (1885), 99 N. Y. 620, 1 N. E. 258.