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of trust companies as known to legislative usage, saying that: "It is matter of common knowledge, that after these companies had been clothed with extensive trust powers, they were commony known and designated as trust companies, and the Legislature in applying to them the name 'trust companies' adopted the popular designation. * * * It results that the title of the act of 1899 expressed the object of the act to be legislation concerning trust companies, including not only such corporations as were trust companies eo nomine, but all corporations which had the functions of trust companies and were recognized in legislation as such."

By this we get the conclusion that a trust company is not exclusively such, but there are other things not particularly of a trust nature, it may be empowered to perform, which does not rob it of its general appellation of trust company.

In New York it would appear that in common parlance and by general understanding, a trust company was not a corporation solely devoted to the accepting and executing of trusts, but it was empowered to do these things and had other corporate powers as well. Thus it was said: "A trust ocmpany, when so used in this chapter, is defined by section 2 to mean any domestic corporation formed for the purpose of taking, accepting and executing such trusts as may be lawfully committed to it and acting as trustee in the cases prescribed by law and receiving deposits of money and other personal property and issuing its obligations therefor, and of loaning money on real or personal property.' It would seem that the policy of New York

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4. Italics supplied.

5. Venner v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1900), 54 N. Y. App. Div. 271, 273, 66 N. Y. Supp. 773.

is not to confine such companies to a purely trust business, but the presence of such power assisted its characterization as a trust company. The English term, "Trustee Company," rather seems to indicate a more definite confinement of its activities, though if a corporation under such a name were clothed with other powers, as ́a general rule, latitude in description would be indulged, as admirably said in State v. Central Trust Co. supra.

In a New York Court of Appeals case, it is pointed out that statutory "trust companies exercise the powers conferred upon individual banks and bankers," but "it is very obvious that trust companies are not, in the legal and commercial sense, engaged in the business of banking." Among other things in the enumerated powers granted to trust companies under New York statute not of strictly trust nature, is that it "acts as agent for corporations in reference to the issuing, registering and transferring certificates of stock and bonds and other evidences of debt," to say nothing of the provision. that it "acts as guardian for the estates of infants,” a relation defined by specific statutory provisions.

The Federal Supreme Court in considering the New York statute regarding trust companies, differentiates them from banks as follows: "It is evident from this enumeration of powers, that trust companies are not banks in the commercial sense of that word, and do not perform the functions of banks in carrying on the exchanges of commerce. They receive money on deposit, it is true, and invest it in loans, and so deal, therefore, in money and securities for money in such a way as properly to bring the shares of stock held by individuals therein within the definition of moneyed

6. Jenkins v. Neff (1900), 163 N. Y. 320, 330, 57 N. E. 408.

capital in the hands of individuals as used in the Act of Congress. But we fail to find in the record any sufficient ground to believe that the rate of taxation, which in fact falls upon this form of investment of moneyed capital, is less than that impressed upon shares of stock in national banks."

This language surely does not apply to any function or title held, by a trust company purely as a trustee, but it does recognize that a trust company, as granted other powers, sustains a relation to depositors. similar to that of banks, viz: debtor and creditor, and that it is in business as a trust company to make money in the investment of such deposits and of other funds belonging to its capital.

§ 7. Enlarged Sense Given to the Word "Trust." A Pennsylvania case is interesting as showing how broadly the words "execute trusts" may be construed and also as showing that an opposing trust company in the case was brought in as a mere bailee, supposably under statutory powers conferred on it. It was objected that a trust company under a general grant of power to "execute trusts of every description" had no corporate capacity to act as committee of a lunatic, but the court ruled that in the absence of specific restriction in its charter, it must be presumed that it had such power. The words "trusts" therefore, is seen not to be confined to those of purely equitable nature, but they embrace a merely statutory relation as well. The defendant trust company came into the suit as having in its possession as a depository, a box kept for such purpose containing certain muniments of title, negotiable

7. Mercantile Bank v. New York (1887), 121 U. S. 138, 30 L. Ed. 895. 8. Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis et al. (1899), 190 Pa. 544, 42 Atl.

securities and personal property belonging to a lunatic for the possession of which his committee was suing. Probably both of these trust companies possessed similar chartered powers, embracing the doing of other things than to "execute trusts of every description."

The reasoning of the Pennsylvania court as to the broad meaning to be given to the words, "execute all trusts," is followed in a Missouri case, where a foreign trust company sued in that state as committee for the estate of an habitual drunkard, an individual being the committee of his person. Missouri statute provided no method for appointment of a guardian for a nonresident.

The New York statute was somewhat more specific than that of Pennsylvania, it authorizing the trust company to execute all such trusts as may be committed or transferred to them by order of the supreme court, or by a surrogate or by any of the courts of record. Nevertheless if trusts of purely equitable cognizance had been meant, and not those defined by statute, there is nothing in the statute itself specifically to the contrary. The trust company was recognized under the rule of comity.

§ 8. Protection of the Title "Trust Company." To prevent irresponsible corporations from trading upon the standing implied form the term "trust company," it has been found necessary to enact legislation to prevent the use of the word "trust" in the titles of corporations other than those formed under the special laws of states providing for trust companies. This legislation in its highest form, limits the names available to corporations of various classes and also makes it

9. Glaser v. Priest (1888), 29 Mo. App. 1.

criminal to use the word "trust" except as authorized by law. Under a statute of this class, it has been held that a pre-existing corporation may not change its name so as to use the word "trust" without violating the law," but such a corporation will not be compelled to eliminate the word "trust" from its title."

§ 9. Protection of Particular Trust Company Names. Fiduciary companies are protected in the use of their adopted titles the same as other corporations. A review of cases involving this question will illustrate the practical manner in which this is carried out. "The International Loan and Trust Company of Kansas City was prohibited from using this name in Massachusetts where there was a domestic trust company named the "International Trust Company." It was, however, permitted to operate under the titles "International Loan and Trust Company of Kansas City," or "The International Loan and Trust Company of Kansas City, Missouri."12 The decision was placed upon the following ground:

"We think it is clear that the defendant's corporate name is so nearly identical with the plaintiff's that it would be misleading, and that the ruling to that effect was correct. But we think the object of the statute was to protect corporations organized here, and engaged in any business named in it, from the injury which they might receive through the use in this state of the same or nearly identical name of a foreign corporation engaged here in the same business, and also to protect our own citizens who may be supposed to be familiar with, and to have more or less confidence in our own corpora

10. State v. Nichols (1905), 40 Wash. 437, 82 Pac. 741.

11. Pacific Title & Trust Co. v. Sargent (1915), Ore., 144 Pac. 452. 12. International Trust Co. v. International Loan and Trust Co. (1891), 153 Mass. 271, 26 N. E. 693, 10 L. R. A. 758.

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