vert a part of it into a direction into which it might not otherwife have gone; and it is not certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the fociety than that into which it would have gone of its own accord.

Dr. Smith obferves, that to prohibit by a perpetual law the importation of foreign corn and cattle, is in reality to enact that the population and induftry of the country fhall at no time exceed what the rude produce of its own foil can maintain. He admits, however, that there feem to be two cafes in which it will generally be advantageous to lay fome burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestic industry. The firft is when fome particular fort of induftry is neceffary for the defence of the country. He obferves as an example, -that the defence of Great Britain depends very much upon the number of its failors and fhipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the failors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in fome cafes by abfolute prohibitions, and in others by heavy burdens upon the fhipping of foreign countries. Our author remarks, that the act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it; but defence being of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of Eng. land.

The second cafe in which the author thinks it will be generally advantageous to lay fome burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, is when fome tax is impofed at home upon the produce of the latter.

In the third chapter the author confiders the extraordinary reftraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds, from those countries with which the balance is fuppofed to be difadvantageous. A recourfe to thefe restraints, Dr. Smith remarks, is the fecond expedient by which the commercial fyftem proposes to increase the quantity of gold and filver. Restraints of this kind, however, taking their rise from national prejudice and animofity, are, he obferves, unreafonable and in his opinion they are fo, even upon the principles of the commercial system. We shall present our readers with part of the arguments on this fubject.

Firft, though it were certain that in the cafe of a free trade between France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, it would by no means follow that fuch a trade would be difadvantageous to England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be turned more against

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against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than those of Portugal, or its linens than thofe of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occafon for of France, than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the fame quality were cheaper than thofe of the other two countries. This would be the cafe, even upon the fuppofition that the whole French goods imported were to be confumed in Great Britain.

But, fecondly, a great part of them might be re-exported to other countries, where, being fold with profit, they might bring back a return equal in value, perhaps, to the prime coft of the whole French goods imported. What has frequently been faid of the East India trade might poffibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of Eaft India goods were bought with gold and filver, the re-exportation of a part of them to other countries, brought back more gold and filver to that which carried on the trade than the prime coft of the whole amounted to. One of the most important branches of the Dutch trade, at prefent, confifts in the carriage of French goods to other European countries. A great part even of the French wine drank in Great Britain is clandeftinely imported from Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if French goods could be imported upon paying only the fame duties as those of other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England might have fome fhare of a trade which is found fo advantageous to Holland.

Thirdly, and laftly, there is no certain criterion by which we can determine on which fide what is called the balance between any two countries lies, or which of them exports to the greate value. National prejudice and animofity, prompted always by the private intereft of particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgement upon all queftions concerning it. There are two criterions, however, which have frequently been appealed to upon fuch occafions, the cuftom-house books and the courfe of exchange. The customhoufe books, I think, it is now generally acknowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated in them. The courfe of exchange, at leaft, as it has hitherto been estimated, is, perhaps, almoft equally fo.

When the exchange between two places, fuch as London and Paris, is at par, it is faid to be a fign that the debts due from London to Paris are compenfated by thofe due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is faid to be a fign that the debts due from London to Paris are not compenfated by thofe due

from

from Paris to London, but that a balance in money must be fent out from the latter place; for the risk, trouble, and expence of exporting which, the premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary ftate of debt and credit between those two cities muft neceffarily be regulated, it is faid, by the ordinary courfe of their dealings with one another. When neither

of them imports from the other to a greater amount than it exports to it, the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when one of them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to it, the former neceffarily becomes indebted to the latter in a greater fum than the latter becomes indebted to it: the debts and credits of each do not compenfate one another, and money must be sent out from that place of which the debts over-balance the credits. The common course of exchange, therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between two places, must likewife be an indication of the ordinary courfe of their exports and imports, as thefe neceffarily regulate that state.'

These observations are followed by a digreffion concerning banks of depofit, particularly that of Amfterdam; for which we refer to the work.

The fourth chapter is employed on drawbacks. These encouragements, he obferves, have no tendency to turn towards any particular employment a greater fhare of the capital of the country, than what would go to it of its own accord ; but only to hinder the duty from driving away any part of that fhare to other employments. They tend not to overturn that balance which naturally establishes itself among all the various employments of the fociety; but to hinder it from being everturned by the duty. They tend not, he adds, to deftroy but to preserve what it is in moft cafes advantageous to preferve, the natural divifion and distribution of labour in the fociety. He is of opinion that these reasons fufficiently justify drawbacks, and would juftify them, though the whole duties, whether upon the produce of domeftic industry, or upon foreign goods, were always drawn back upon exportation; but that they establish the utility of drawbacks only upon exporting goods to thofe countries which are foreign and independent, not to thofe in which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy a monopoly.

In the fifth chapter the learned author investigates with great precision the theory of bounties, particularly those upon the exportation of corn; and he evinces by the cleareft and jufteft reafoning, that they are founded on principles of miftaken policy. Whatever be the actual ftate of tillage, he maintains that the bounty renders our corn fomewhat dearer in the home market than it otherwife would be, and likewife fome

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fomewhat cheaper in the foreign; and as the average money price of corn regulates more or less that of all other commodities, it lowers the value of filver confiderably in the one, and tends to rife it a little on the other.

It enables foreigners, fays he, the Dutch in particular, not only to eat our corn cheaper than they otherwife could do, but fometimes to eat it cheaper than even our own people can do upon the fame occafions; as we are affured by an excellent authority, that of fir Matthew Decker. It hinders our own workmen from furnishing their goods for fo fmall a quantity of filver as they otherwife might do; and enables the Dutch to furnish their's for a fmaller. It tends to render our manufactures fomewhat dearer in every market, and their's fomewhat cheaper than they otherwife would be, and confequently to give their industry a double advantage over our own.

The bounty, as it raifes in the home-market, not the real, but only the nominal price of our corn, as it augments, not the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can maintain and employ, but only the quantity of filver which it will exchange for, it difcourages our manufactures without rendering the smallest real fervice either to our farmers or country gentlemen. It puts, indeed, a little more money into the pockets of both, and it will perhaps be fomewhat difficult to perfuade the greater part of them that this is not rendering them a very real fervice. But if this money finks in its value, in the quantity of labour, provifions, and commodities of all different kinds which it is capable of purchafing, as much as it rifes in its quantity, the fervice will be merely nominal and imaginary.

There is, perhaps, but one fet of men in the whole commonwealth to whom the bounty either was or could be really ferviceable. These were the corn-merchants, the exporters and importers of corn. In years of plenty the bounty neceffarily occafioned a greater exportation than would otherwise have taken place; and by hindering the plenty of one year from relieving the fcarcity of another, it occafioned in years of scarcity a greater importation than would otherwife have been neceffary. It increased the bufinefs of the corn-merchant in both, and in years of scarcity it not only enabled him to import a greater quantity, but to fell it for a better price, and confequently with a greater profit than he could otherwife have made, if the plenty of one year had not been more or lefs hindered from relieving the fcarcity of another. It is in this fett of men, accordingly, that I have obferved the greatest zeal for the continuance or renewal of the bounty."

With respect to bounties our author obferves, that thofe upon the exportation of any home-made commodity are liable, first, to that general objection which may be made to all the

different expedients of the mercantile fyftem; the objection of forcing fome part of the industry of the country into a channel lefs advantageous than that in which it would run of its own accord; and, fecondly, to the particular objection of forcing it, not only into a channel that is less advantageous, but into one that is actually difadvantageous; the trade which cannot be carried on but by means of a bounty being neceffarily a lofing trade. The bounty upon the exportation of corn, he adds, is liable to this further objection, that it can in no respect promote the raifing of that particular commodity of which it was meant to encourage the production. He obferves that when our country gentlemen, therefore, demanded the establishment of the bounty, though they acted in imitation of the merchants and manufacturers, they did not af with that clear comprehenfion of their own interest which commonly directs the conduct of thofe two other orders of people. They loaded the public revenue with a very confiderable expence; but they did not in any respect increase the real value of their own commodity; and by lowering fomewhat the real value of filver, they discouraged in fome degree the general industry of the country, and instead of advancing, retarded more or less the improvement of their own lands, which neceffarily depends upon that industry.

The author afterwards pursues this important fubject by a particular examination of the nature of the corn-trade, and of the principal British laws which relate to it; concluding from the whole, that the praises which have been bestowed upon the law for establishing the bounty upon the exportation of corn, and upon that fyftem of regulations which is connected with it, are altogether unmerited.

[ To be concluded in our next. ]

VI. A Relation of a Journey to the Glaciers in the Dutchy of Savoy. Tranflated from the French of M. T. Bourrit, by Charles and Frederic Davy. 8vo. 5s. boards. Robinson.

THE

HE Glaciers of Savoy are juftly reckoned among the most ftupendous works of nature, and what heightens the idea which an accurate description of them muft convey, they have hitherto, on account of the extreme danger and fatigue attending the enterprize, not been furveyed with any tolerable accuracy by the moft inquifitive travellers. Inclofed within the bofom of almoft impervious mountains, they bid defiance, as it were, to the refearches of human curiofity, and cannot poffibly be viewed without exciting aftonishment and admi

ration.