the Naval Cadets, at the Academy at Annapolis, will not be equally apparent hereafter in our naval operations.

The debates and enactments during the two last sessions of the last Congress indicate that the condition of the Navyat least that department of it which is composed of its officers-is unsatisfactory, and needs amendment, in order to increase its value to the nation. Upon this point there are various and conflicting notions, though it seems to be very generally agreed, there is some part of the system wrong. The debates show that very few members of Congress, including those who serve in the naval committees, are accurately informed in detail on the present organization of the naval service. The Chairman of the Naval Committee of the Senate, who is regarded as authority on details, asserted more than once in debate (July 10, 1856,) on a bill to amend the "Act to promote the efficieney of the Navy," what was and is erroneous. He stated that a Captain had authority at any time to supply any deficiency of Midshipmen which might exist on board of his ship by appointing Masters' Mates, selecting them from among the crew. "The Daily Globe" of Washington, for July 11, 1856, contains a report of the debate referred to. Mr. Mallory said:

"I will answer my friend on the spot if he desires it. If he had looked deeper into the subject, he would have seen the errors into which I say it with due respect to him-he has fallen. It has long been the practice in the Navy to appoint Masters' Mates. They are men grown; they are seamen; they are rated one grade above ordr nary seamen, and get low pay.* These men do the duty of Midshipmen. Midshipmen

are useless. They have been felt to be so ever since the last war. The number is decreasing rapidly. Even the Midshipmen in the Naval Academy, until they graduate, see

four months' sea service in a year, but they go in a practice ship, not in a man-of-war, as officers, to do the duties which Midshipmen did under Nelson, when a Midshipman was twenty-five or twenty-seven years old. The ship-master, by the authority of every Commander of every ship in every port of the United States, employs a Master's Mate to do the duties which Midshipmen did formerly, and they are necessarily much better done. We do not want these young men of whom the honourable Senator speaks, and the appointments of the Naval Academy are regulated accordingly."

"Mr. TOOMBS. That is entirely delusive. The gentleman is informing me on a subject that was not up. He need not suppose that, by the Senate constituting him the head of the Naval Committee, he is exclusively informed on all the details of seamanship, and that I know nothing about them except what I get from him."

"Mr. MALLORY.

I thought

I had explained them. I will do so again; first, on the point of Master's Mates and Midshipmen: He does not appreciate the fact which I asserted, that the appointment of a Master's Mate, to do the duty of Midshipman, depends on the Master of the ship; and he may change them and alter them at pleasure, and they are among the seventy-five hundred seamen allowed to the Navy. The honourable Senator from Georgia seems to regard them as a grade of commissioned officers, who have to be appointed perhaps by the President, by and with the advice and counsel of the Senate, and who are in the line of commission."

"Mr. TOOMBS. I said no such thing."

"Mr. MALLORY. I did not say the Senator said so; but I thought he was under the impression, because he called them officers; I say they are seamen; and of the seventy-five hundred allowed for service, the Captain takes one of these men and makes him a Master's Mate." Again: "I have corrected the honourable Senator from Georgia's statement about the Master's Mates, and I hope he understands me

thoroughly. They are not officers; they are appointed by the Captain of the ship, and come out of the seven thousand five hundred seamen."

"Mr. TOOMBS. I know about that!"

66

Had it occurred either to the Senator who asked information on this point, or to him who so confidently assumed to impart it, to have consulted the Navy Register of that date, it would have been discovered that Masters' Mates constituted a grade of "warrant officers," and that their names were recorded as a permanent part of the Navy, and as warrants" are signed by the President of the United States, a Captain in the Navy could not have power to appoint them. That errors of the kind should occur is not a wonder; but it is a little surprising to obscure and humble people, such as the writer, that an experienced Senator should state as fact anything which can be controverted, because we suppose that legislators are so habitually accurate that it is almost impossible for them to mistake, or fall into inadvertence. Yet, they are liable to be deceived whenever they confide in mere verbal statements of technical points by interested sophomores who, from lack of knowledge themselves, or from a hope to secure a legislation to suit their views, misinstruct their listeners.

The reader may not know that in the organization of the British Navy, from which ours is copied with slight modification, the Sailing Master, or Master, is not in the line of promotion. He has especial charge of the sails and rigging, anchors and cables, and the stowage of the hold and spirit-room; and he keeps the ship's reckoning, or in other words, navigates the ship, and during battle manoeuvres the sails under the direction of the Captain. The assistants of officers, in nautical language, were termed mates. The assistants of the Master are called Masters' mates, and their number varied according to the size of the ship. We had a Master's mate of the hold and spirit-room, of the berth-deck; of the gun-deck; of the orlop-deck, &c., &c. Thirty years ago, in our Navy, the elder Midshipmen were assigned the duties of

Master's mates, and received the pay which was greater than that of Midshipmen, because the responsibility and labour were greater. Gradually the number in the grade of Masters' mate decreased, and now the grade itself may be said to have become extinct, as well as that of Master, for this grade has been brought into the line, although the duties properly pertaining to it are in military classification, staff duties.

The affections of the heart obscure from us defects in friends, which in strangers would appear salient. We receive, without examination, statements from a mere dinner acquaintance, which we would scrutinize when offered by an unknown man, especially if they touch our interests.

Legislators are men, and it is supposable that men who possess power to grant favours are liable to be approached by those who seek to induce them to exercise such power unfairly, as well as by those knowing fops who think themselves adroit teachers of sage statesmen. It may happen-such an event is quite within the range of possibility, and therefore the suggestion is pertinent to our purpose:It may happen that some of those vagrant sophomores or prattling literary dandies who sometimes, to sustain their assertions, venture to stake money, may form either dining-room, ball-room, or cardroom friendships with men of Congress during the sojourn in Washington, and thus, for reasons just hinted at, acquire a claim to be respected in some degree by their legislative friends, as reservoirs of information very useful in making laws. It may sometimes happen-the writer cannot assert that it has happened-that men of heedless habits may assist their law-making friends in the preparation of reports and speeches, by hunting up authorities in the Library, and copying statistics and doing other services of a character analogous to those of the professional "crammer" who, it is said, whether truly or not the writer cannot affirm, finds profitable employment in the vicinity of certain British Colleges and Universities. Mingling with this class of ready assistants to Congress may be found here and

there a Navy officer, connected with the office of the Coast Survey or other occupation not strictly Naval in character, who, prone to believe themselves adepts both in the theory and practice of naval affairs are ever ready to instruct the naval committees in all that they may need to know about the Navy. In the unwritten history of the capitol it is said, that wives of members have been indebted for substantial marks of respect to the disinterested efforts of naval men, sojourning in Washington, to secure certain reforms in the Navy through legislative action; and that committee men themselves might trace to the same source, acquaintance with choice wines considerately offered to their attention while acquiring information on the naval questions before the two Houses of Congress. It has been remarked that had naval officers been of accord in their opinions and statements, the Navy would at this time have had nothing to ask from Congress; but unfortunately the "crammers" had different views, which circumstance was generally discovered when the "crammed" delivered their speeches, much to the embarrassment of those who were ready to vote.

Extending the notion uttered by some flippant writer that poetry is only beefsteaks and porter in another form, the so called "lobby members" of the national legislature have succeeded in filling the minds of legislators with their own profound views, through the medium of gastronomic appliances. Nay, so suecessful has this mode of elaborating congenial ideas in others been found, that certain "lobby members" are said to maintain permanent establishments in Washington, at no small cost, to which dull members are allured by free viands and wines, of a quality suitable to be converted, under the operation of their organisms, into thoughts and conclusions, best adapted to an approaching vote, the result of which is always interesting to the lobbyites. Some of those who have claims pending before Congress have been compelled to visit the capital during several successive winters, in consequence of postponements resulting from pressure

of business. They assert that it is next to impossible to secure attention to any private claim unless some of the legisla tive gentlemen can be induced to perceive they have a personal interest in it, directly or indirectly. The lobbies and halls of the capitol are crowded with men who are impatient for the dispatch of the affairs which brought them from their homes. They are not willing to wait a systematic succession-the miller's turnbecause the lapse of time is to them loss of money. Is it surprising, then, that human frailty suggests attempts to secure the influential action of members, but in a manner so delicate and gentle that the recipient of flattering attention is scarcely aware, how or when he was so lucky as to become interested? How men are fed gratuitously to secure their "good will," merely to obtain a vote in Congress upon some small matter, such as a pension of five dollars a month for a soldier's widow, is described in gossipping recitals of claimants' experiences in Washington during the winter season.

Officers of the Navy are not more censurable than other members of the human family for resorting to such appliances as have proved unsuccessful in hastening congressional action. It is not to be wondered at if some of them have learned lessons from common lobbyites and practised them with satisfactory results. These remarks on the practices of lobby members are based upon common rumor of several years continuance and not on any personal knowledge of the writer, but he believes the rumor is founded in truth.

To legislate wisely for the Navy, it seems desirable that members of the naval committees should not accept without scrutiny the mere colloquial statements and opinions of naval officers, however respectable they may be. It is conjectured that many a vote was procured in favour of the act "to promote the efficiency of the Navy" through the verbal statements of officers who have suffered severely under the law, and who therefore became clamourous for its repeal or amendment. It may be asserted in a general way, that officers do not look

to the common effect of any proposed act of legislation, but limit themselves to considering how they themselves will be individually affected by it. All those who fancied that their own promotion would flow from the act " to promote the efficiency of the Navy," warmly advocated the creation of a "reserved list," never dreaming in any instance that they themselves might be "reserved," "furloughed," or "dropped," by the action of a secret, recordless, oathless and irresponsible board. The effect of the law has been to divide the line of the Navy into two classes, the active and reserved. But the effect does not cease in this division, for it has created and possibly perpetuated an antagonism of a bitter character between the two classes, and there is discord and suspicion and conflicting interests where previously a common interest and harmony prevailed. The law to amend the "Act to promote the efficiency of the Navy" cannot efface this unhappy condition of feeling. It is the interest of those on the active list to oppose the restoration of any from the reserved list to their former positions, because every restoration must retard the promotion of some at present on the active list. Nor is it to be supposed that the officers restored can ever hereafter cordially cooperate with those who were not reserved, for the reason that they must always feel themselves to be labouring under a stigma, and that they are ever exposed to have it cast in their teeth, either flatly or by inuendo. Thus a constraint is fastened upon all those officers who are of a sensitive nature, which will surely not favour their exertions to acquit themselves well.

A vague notion that in the course of a few years another board may be assembled to retire officers, will probably found a system in the Navy of mutual observance and suspicion, and even of "notetaking," which must destroy that confidence which men embarked in the same profession should be willing to repose in each other. Under such a system, co-operation for the common glory of the Navy and of the Country, or reliable friendships, are not to be looked for in the ser

vice. Legislation has extinguished the soul of the Navy, and left it a mere automaton, embarrassed in its motives by conflicting interests and individual selfishness.

It may be pertinently asked, has the Navy acquired increased efficiency as a direct consequence of the creation of the reserved list? It is asserted in reply, there is less experience and less professional skill on the quarter deck and in the cabin now than prior to the passage of the law; and the habits of the newly promoted, generally speaking, are no better, and their courage is no greater than were those of officers of the period when general promotion was proclaimed to be the remedy for the unsatisfactory condition of the service. In corroboration of this assertion it is sufficient to allude to the Courts-martial trials which followed the return of the U. S. brig, Bainbridge, from the coast of Brazil. Analogous support may probably be found in reports and records of trials filed in the Navy Department since the law to promote the efficiency of the Navy was carried into effect. Yet, let it not be imagined that excess of conviviality and jollity is now either greater or less than it was; or that such vices only are in the way of Naval efficiency.

Scrutiny will show probably that the condition of the Navy is indebted more to the system, the policy observed, than to the vices or virtues, the ignorance or intelligence, ascribed to individuals in the Navy. But who will attempt such scrutiny? Is the subject of sufficient interest to command the attention, the time, the labor, of the members of the Naval committees, necessary to make such a scrutiny as will surely exhibit to them the errors as well as the means of correcting them? The work to be accomplished is not of a nature to bring fame or profit to those who may assume the task. Yet until such investigation shall be made, of all that is on file in the Navy Department which partakes in any degree of the nature of complaint or of offence against the law, by the committees, after the papers are printed for their use ex

elusively, no legislation profitable for the Navy need be expected.

Discreetly read, the Navy Register will communicate some few important facts, which exert a strong influence for good or for evil, over the Naval service. But a hasty glance will convey very little information, because the arrangement of the volume conceals rather than fully exposes the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Including the lakes, the Navy afloat January 1st, 1857, was 26 vessels of all classes, bearing 536 guns. As usual it was distributed in six squadrons, each under the command of a Captain, who has the title of Commodore.

A squadron is defined to be part of a fleet, consisting of two or more ships. The Captain whose commission is oldest in a squadron, commands, and while he thus commands, he is distinguished in the British and American Navies by the title of Commodore; and in our Navy a courtesy and a custom observed by the Navy Department continue it to the officer forever, just as some men remain Honorable after being in Congress. The statutes of our Navy recognize no such grade as Commodore. Of later years, however, we find in the Navy Register, what indicates to unprofessional readers that there is a grade of Naval officers designated Commodore. We read in it as follows: "African Squadron-Commodore Thomas Crabbe, Commander-inChief." Finding that this "African Squadron" consists of two sloops of war, and a brig, bearing an aggregate of fortysix guns, only an armament for a single frigate, one may question the taste or fitness of applying so much paper "pomp and circumstance" to a position comparatively small and unimportant. To designate a Captain in the Navy both "Commodore" and "Commander-in-Chief," seems calculated to inflate the vanity of the individual rather than to add to his official quality and power, which are generally estimated by the number of ships and guns under his command. The words Captain Thomas Crabbe, Commodore, would make a true statement, conveying to all interested, the information

that this gentleman commands the squadron on the coast of Africa. The Constitution tells us that the "Commander-inChief" of the Army and Navy is the President of the United States. To apply the same title to a Captain who commands only a small detachment of our fleet is inconsistent with propriety. A recent law requires that Captains in command of squadrons shall be denominated "Flag Officers." In conformity to it we may read in the next edition of the Navy Register,-African Squadron; Captain Thomas Crabbe, Flag Officer, and Commander-in-Chief; or, Flag Officer, Thomas Crabbe, Commander-in-Chief. It might not be in conflict with good taste or good sense to state it, simply, Thomas Crabbe, Flag Officer. Possibly this recent law may be effectual in removing from the record six Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy of the United States, by substituting six Flag Officers.

Let us now seek in the Navy Register of January 1st, 1857, for such statistics as may form data upon which statesmen may base opinions.

A question has been discussed, whether ships of war, including their armament and appurtenances, or the officefs and privates employed on board of them, constitute the Navy? If public ships and Navy yards are the Navy, then we may declare that fortresses and barracks constitute the Army? The discussion of the question is waived here. Ships, Navy yards, &c., will be first considered, and then the men employed in them.

We have ten ships-of-the-line. Of these four are still, "on the stocks," three are "in ordinary," and three are in use as "receiving ships," in which recruits are entertained until required for service at The armament of these ten ships is an aggregate of 872 guns. They are all at home.

sea.

Of our thirteen frigates, three are at sea, and ten are "in ordinary." The aggregate of their armament is 656 guns, of which 156 are abroad.

Of nineteen sloops-of-war, six are “in ordinary," that is, "laid up," twelve are abroad, and one preparing for sea. The