It is easy to perceive from what precedes, that the ballista and its derivatives, which discharged stones at a great angle, corresponded to our mortars— whilst the catapulta throwing out, either stones or darts, in a nearly horizontal direction, corresponded to our cannon. But with this difference in both cases: that the range and the power of the ancient machines were in no way comparable to those of fire arms. The common flint musket has a greater range, when pointed at the same angle, than the most powerful ballista of antiquity.

It is evident, that as long as the only projectile weapons were those we have just mentioned, together with the bow, the cross bow, and the sling, the order of formation of troops was altogether independent of the effects of such arms. Accordingly we find the nations of antiquity and the armies of the middle ages adopting various modes of formation— which can be reduced in a general way to two. Several lines of several ranks each, or solid columns or phalanxes of great depth. During the middle ages there seems to have been an almost complete absence of tactical arrangements. Cavalry and infantry acted in huge masses. After the first onset, bows and slings were generally thrown aside for the sword or the spear. If the stone of the ballista or the dart of the catapulta happened to go in the right direction, (a rare occurrence,) it disabled only a few men, and then lay inert and harmless on the ground. Moreover, it was easy for the soldier to protect his body from the effects of most missiles, by defensive armor. So that we may assume as a general fact, that the number of men killed by projectiles in ancient warfare was quite insignificant. It was the close hand-to-hand conflict which decided the fate of battles. Hence, bodily strength and activity were the first requisites for the warrior. No pains were spared, no training was thought too laborious to fit the Greek soldier for his arduous career. He was taught to leap, to climb, to wrestle, to pitch the quoit, to throw the discus, and to hurl the javelin; he ran swift-footed races, wielded the cestus, he drove the war cha

he

riot; and his games and recreations were but a preparation for the labors of war. And the Roman, less polished, but more iron-nerved, with a strength of will and a tenacity of purpose never equalled, employed the same means to harden his frame to the toils of the field. There was less of poetry about him, but more of stern reality. The legionary soldier, though belonging to a race of small stature, has never been surpassed in endurance. Marching his thirty miles a day under a burden of seventy pounds, entrenching his camp with laborious care every night before laying himself down upon the hard earth, his only bed, he showed to the world what martial training and strict discipline could accomplish. He also was well practised in the use of all his weapons; and in many a dreadful conflict, the short Roman sword, wielded with the strength and skill which long experience confers, forced victory to crown the Roman eagles.

The necessity for this thorough personal training of the soldier remained evident until a comparatively recent period. We will show presently what were the causes which led to its abandonment. In the meantime some remarkable changes took place in warfare. Europe was invaded by innumerable hordes of Asiatic cavalry, sweeping over the plains like Egyptian locusts, and in the tracks which their horses had followed grass never grew again. From this period cavalry composes the main bulk of armies, and infantry is but an auxiliary. Yet no material alteration takes place in the training of the warrior. The knight of the middle ages no longer wrestles in the arena. He no longer throws the discus, or drives the chariot; but in him you behold the perfect rider, able

"To turn and wind a fiery Pegasus, And witch the world with noble horsemanship."

Completely encased in the armor under which, we fancy, moderns could hardly stand, he vaults unaided into the warsaddle. His sturdy arm wields the huge two handed sword, the ponderous battle

axe, and the still more crushing mace. Protected at every point by impenetrable steel plate, arrows and stones rattle harmlessly upon his helmet and cuirass, and it is only a weapon as heavy as a smith's hammer that can have any effect upon him. Bodily strength and activity are now more than ever the sine qua non of the soldier; and these joined to a finely-tempered armor will almost always ensure the victory. Woe the weak in body in this iron age! He is fit for nothing but the monk's cowl and shaven crown!

Until the introduction of fire arms, things remained unchanged. The man who is destined for the profession of arms, must harden his sinews by a constant practice of gymnastics, and the continual use of weapons; for his life may hang upon a moment's weakness, or a false motion of his hand. Hence his training is long, painful, incessant. But it makes him self-reliant. He does not depend for his defence upon his companions. He can fight alone as well as in the ranks; and with his good horse and trusty blade he feels himself able to meet the foe.

But "a change comes over the spirit of his dream." An unknown monk, in an obscure cloister, ignites by accident a mixture of sulphur and saltpetre; and this involuntary experiment is the germ of a mighty revolution. By degrees, as fire arms become more common and more powerful, the knight's iron panoply drops off piece by piece. What Milan corslet could resist the cannon ball or even the bullet of the match lock? The mail which once ensured the safety of its wearer, is now but a useless encumbrance. Its occupation is gone, and after a few years, the soldier goes to battle without a vestige of defensive armor. Mark the contrast between the Black Prince of Poictiers, and the officers of Fontenoy. The former is encased in steel. His very steed is covered with impenetrable breast plate, chamfron and croupière, and his battle-axe rings on helmet and shield. The latter in powdered wigs, silk-stockings, and pumps, lace cuffs and ruffles, with no weapon but a switch-like rapier,

stand at the head of the English and French guards, courteously inviting each other to fire first!

We do not intend to discuss the consequences of the invention of gunpowder in a philanthropic point of view; but we will merely say, that it has made the overthrow of civilization by the invasion of barbarous hordes forever impossible. In modern times no nation can be successful in arms without cultivating science. The art of war is indissolubly connected with the mathematical and physical sciences, and the accomplished soldier must henceforth be a well instructed scholar.

Let us now glance at the effects of the introduction of fire arms upon the tactics of armies and upon the soldier individually.

While strategy, depending upon invariable principles, is in its nature fixed and unchangeable, it is far different with tactics. The latter is that branch of military art which treats of the movements of troops on the battle-field, their formation for battle and for the march, the changes of front and direction, and the different modes of passing from the line of battle into column and conversely; all this in presence of the enemy and subject to his attack. We have already seen that the feebleness of the ancient projectile weapons prevented them from exerting any influence upon the formation of troops. But it was quite another thing when modern artillery came into play. The velocity of balls is so great, even at 1200 or 1500 paces, that it is impossible to determine with precision the number of men that may be killed by them. At the battle of Zorndorff a Prussian cannon ball killed or wounded 42 Russian grenadiers. At Bleinheim a battery of fifty pieces killed or wounded 2000 men at the first discharge. A bombshell has been known to kill 100 men by its explosion. An eight inch howitzer shell filled with powder and balls may by its direct shock and expiosion, in a crowded mass, produce effects quite as terrible; and Thiroux says, that even a 6 pound ball, passing through a deep column, may sweep away as many as

thirty men. In presence of such dreadful engines of destruction it was madness to retain the deep order of formation. Accordingly the line of battle rapidly diminished from the depth of eight or ten ranks. At Lutzen, Gustavus Adolphus owed his success partly to the diminution of the depth and the consequent extension of the front of his lines, which were formed in six ranks, whilst the Austrians had their infantry formed in squares forty-five deep. Just imagine modern artillery firing into such masses! The cavalry of Gustavus was in four ranks, and that of the Austrians in eight. Later yet we find the lines of infantry reduced to three ranks of musketeers, and one of pikemen; and after the bayonet came into general use, infantry adopted the present formation of three ranks, and cavalry that of two. In the English service and ours, infantry is formed in two ranks only.

It is not one of the least curious facts of military history, that between the fall of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the last century, the art or practice of keeping the step in marching should have been entirely lost. This must be owing to the neglect into which infantry fell during the age of Chivalry. We find Marshal de Saxe about 1750, alluding to the fact, and reminding his cotemporaries that the Greeks and Romans used the cadenced step, and that the purpose of military music was to enable the soldiers to keep it better. Then he goes on to show the inconvenience of not keeping and locking the step. For example, the impossibility of a battalion's keeping its ranks and dress when marching to the front, and the elongation of the line when marching by flank. In this latter case, the space occupied by a company or battalion would be nearly double that which they ought to occupy in line of battle. The cadenced step came into use again with the introduction of the Prussian system of tactics.

Since the adoption of the present order of formation, the power of fire arms has not remained stationary. Successive inventions have augmented the range and effects of projectiles. Artillery has

become much more rapid, both in its firing and its evolutions, especially since the creation of horse artillery by Frederick the Great. The introduction of the improved field howitzer, by means of which, a shell filled with powder and balls, can produce the effects of grapeshot at a distance previously attainable only by solid shot, and the lightening of the artillery "matériel," allowing the use of heavier calibres for field pieces, make it impossible to set a limit to the loss of life which a large and well served battery may cause in a deep attacking column. Napoleon, great as he was in strategy, too often neglected or under-estimated these tactical details. He exaggerated the use of the deep order of attack. In many instances, says Jomini, divisions of twelve battalions deployed behind each other, and presenting a depth of thirty-six ranks, were exposed to the fire of those tremendous batteries, of fifty or a hundred pieces, which played so important a part in the battles of that period. The column of McDonald at Wagram, which marched to the attack of the Austrian centre, 16,000 strong, and which numbered only 15,000 after piercing that centre, showed what awful havoc may be the consequence of the reckless use of deep masses under the fire of modern artillery.

For a long period, small arms were far from keeping pace with the improvements in ordnance. Since the invention of the flint lock and the bayonet, the musket had undergone no material alteration, except the substitution of the iron for the wooden ramrod. Of late years, the percussion lock has superseded the flint, but the only effect of this, has been to make the firing much more certain in all kinds of weather; and to remove the inconvenience caused by the blowing of the vent and the flashing and smoke of the powder in the pan, so troublesome when the firings were executed with closed ranks. The inaccuracy of the musket, and the shortness of its effective range were not remedied. These defects had long been felt by military men. Gen. Gassendi, a very distinguished artillery officer, estimated, that of 3000

shots fired by infantry, only one takes effect; and Decker, one of the most eminent military writers of Germany, says, that it takes an average of 10,000 shots to kill one man. These estimates are not a matter of conjecture; they are deduced from actual results, observed in a large number of campaigns. Take for example, the capture of Algiers by the French in 1830. The army, in fifteen days, used three millions of cartridges. The loss of the Arabs was probably under five thousand men, and as the French artillery played the principal part in the conflict, it is very probable that the number of the Arabs killed or wounded by musketry was under three thousand. This was less than one man to every thousand shots, and if the campaign had continued six months instead of fifteen days, the waste would have been still greater. Col. Mitchell, an English officer of some distinction, in a work published nearly twenty years ago, demonstrated very clearly the inefficiency of the musket as a projectile weapon, although he failed to indicate a good substitute. He quotes from Napier, an incident which took place in Spain. A French general came down to the bank of a creek to reconnoitre the British position. He advanced on horseback within 200 yards to the bivouac of a company of grenadiers; an English officer who was looking on, called out to one of the men :

"B—, you are a good shot-bring down the Frenchman!"

The man took deliberate aim and missed; thereupon, one and another fired with the same result, until the whole company had fired. All this time, the Frenchman was riding slowly along the front of the position, making his horse prance and curvet. Napier adds that the officer, struck with his gallant bearing, ordered the grenadiers to cease firing. Now, here was a case of a man and horse fully exposed, within 200 yards, receiving the fire of nearly one hundred men, without being touched; and we must observe, that the chances for hitting were unusually good. The men fired at will and from any position they chose, for they were not drawn up in ranks; which

would give them a vast advantage over the same number of men firing in rank, and at the word of command. This is merely an example of what happens. every day with troops armed with the musket. Thus Col. Pelissier, speaking of the first campaigns of the French in Africa, says, that during the marches, if the soldiers saw the flutter of a single Arab's burnous, five or six hundred muskets would be fired at it, and generally without the least effect. Such an enormous waste of ammunition is due no doubt, in some measure, to the awkwardness or the flurry of the soldier: but the inefficiency of the weapon is sufficient of itself to account for it. The musket, even when loaded with a charge of powder which creates an unpleasant recoil, has its point blank at about one hundred yards. At this distance its deviations are already considerable. At 200 yards, unless you aim above the object to be hit, (a very hard thing to teach the soldier to do,) all your balls go into the ground. At 300 yards, it may be said to be entirely useless. Take the weapon in hand and examine it. It has no breech-sight by which a determinate line of aim can be marked. The barrel is crossed by three several bands which intercept the aim. The lock generally works so stiffly that if y you get any aim, you must lose it when you pull the trigger. Finally, the ball fits so loosely, and is subject to so many causes of deviation, that if the musket were immovably fixed in a vice, and fired a dozen times, at the distance of 100 yards, no two balls would strike the same point; but all the balls would be scattered over a circle several feet in diameter. Is it any wonder that such a weapon is so uncertain in its effects? If numbers did not compensate in some degree for its want of accuracy, it is probable that it would never have been adopted as the chief weapon of modern armies. If we take in consideration, moreover, that lines of infantry generally open their fire at four or five hundred yards, we will not be surprised at finding that nearly all the shots are lost.

All these objections to the musket had long been acknowledged, but the diffi

culty was to find a substitute. The ordinary rifle, however efficient in the hands of a population of hunters and backwoodsmen, familiar with its use from infancy, and fighting without any regular order, either behind entrenchments or as sharp-shooters, was found to possess no advantage over the musket in the hands of troops formed of men whose habits of life had been different; and these necessarily constitute the great bulk of modern armies.

What was gained in accuracy was more than balanced by the difficulty of loading and the consequent slowness of firing. This difficulty was so great and so disagreeable to the soldiers, that the men, in action, would frequently throw away their rifles, to pick up muskets. Another objection was that the rifle would foul in a very few shots, and then it would require wiping out, or lose its accuracy. Moreover the small charge of powder used, gave only feeble velocities to the balls; and if the cartridges were at all damaged, the quantity of powder left in them, was hardly sufficient to produce any effect. To overcome all these difficulties, was the problem which, for many years, occupied the ingenuity of many military men. We will briefly mention the different steps which were taken towards its solution.

Windage being the principal cause of the deviation of balls, it was important to remove it. By giving to the ball rotary motion, which would be retained during its flight, another cause of deviation would disappear, the weapon therefore must have spiral grooving like a rifle. The conditions of the problem were consequently these-a rifle of great range was wanted, which could be loaded as quickly and easily as the musket, and yet, in which the balls would fit as tightly as in the common rifle. It must allow the use of heavier charges of powder than this weapon, in order to afford greater ranges. The cartridges to be used with it must be easy and simple to manufacture, and capable of being transported without any more danger of deterioration than the musket cartridges. In addition, the weapon must be of such a

size and weight as to be handled as easily as the musket.

It would seem, at first sight, that a breech loading rifle, in which the ball could be placed in a chamber, of a diameter slightly larger than the bore of the piece, would fulfil all the conditions which have reference to the case and rapidity of loading, and the complete destruction of the windage. It is true that, with regard to the latter condition, it is completely fulfilled; for before the ball can leave the barrel, it has to undergo a diminution of its diameter and a consequent elongation of its form; but we will state hereafter the reasons why breech-loading weapons have never proved satisfactory, and probably never will.

About twenty years ago, a French infantry officer, named Delvigne, invented a rifle which, in spite of many defects, may be considered as the germ from which all subsequent improvements sprang. Its peculiarity was this. At the bottom of the bore was a chamber of small diameter, forming a shoulder at right angles with the interior surface of the barrel. The charge of powder filled this chamber. The ball, which was spherical, slipped easily down the barrel, until it rested upon the shoulder of the chamber. One single blow of a heavy ramrod, with concave head would flatten the ball a little, and augment its diameter sufficiently to force it to fill the grooves of the rifle. This arm having been carefully tried at Vincennes in 1834, gave very satisfactory results. It was adopted for the use of the "Foot Chasseurs," a corps which had just been formed for the African service; but when brought to the test of actual service, it failed to fill the expectations which had been formed. The cartridges were too complicated. They contained a circular wad of greased serge; and in warm weather, during the marches, a part of the powder was spoilt by the melted grease, and the charge, which was only 60 grains, became insufficient. Besides this, if the soldier rammed the ball too hard, it would flatten too much; and if he did not ram it hard enough, it would not fill the