the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of inftinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any fuch relations or comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Tho' the inftinct be different, yet ftill it is an inftinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with fuch exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole oeconomy and order of its nursery. SECTION X. OF MIRACLE S. PARTI. as HERE is in Dr. TILLOTSON's writings an argument against the real prefence, which is as concife, and elegant, and ftrong as any argument can poffibly be fuppofed against a doctrine, that is fo little worthy of a serious refutation. 'Tis acknowleged on all hands, fays that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the fcripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witneffes to thofe miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine miffion. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our fenfes; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and 'tis evident it must diminish in paffing from them to their difciples; nor can any one be fo certain of the truth of their teftimony, as of the immediate object of his fenfes. But a weaker evidence can never deftroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real prefence ever fo clearly revealed in fcripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of juft reafoning to give our affent to it. It contradicts fenfe, tho' both the fcripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not fuch evidence with them as fenfe; when they are confidered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breaft, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. NOTHING is fo convenient as a decifive argument of this kind, which must at leaft filence the most arrogant bigotry and fuperftition, and free us from their impertinent follicitations. I flatter myflf, that I have difcovered an argument of a like nature, which, if juft, will, with the wife and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of fuperftitious delufion, and confequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For fo long, I prefume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all hittory, facred and prophane. THO' experience be our only guide in reafoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowleged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in fome cafes is apt to lead us into errors and mistakes. One, who, in our climate, fhould expect better weather in any week of JUNE than in one of DECEMBER, would reason juftly and conformable to experience; but 'tis certain, that he may happen, happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may obferve, that, in fuch a cafe, he would have no caufe to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent obfervation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their fuppofed caufes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been conftantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and fometimes to difappoint our expectations; fo that in our reafonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of affurance, from the highest certainty to the loweft fpecies of moral evidence. A WISE man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In fuch conclufions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the laft degree of affurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cafes, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the oppofite experiments: He confiders which fide is fupported by the greatest number of experiments: To that fide he inclines, with doubt and hefitation; and when at laft he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, fuppofes an oppofition of experiments and obfervations; where the one fide is found to over-balance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the fuperiority. A hundred inftances or experiments on one fide, and fifty on another, afford a very doubtful expectation of any event; tho' a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reafonably beget a pretty ftrong degree of affurance. In all cafes, we must balance the oppofite experiments, where they are oppofite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the fuperior evidence. To apply these principles to a particular inftance; we may obferve, that there is no fpecies of reafoning more common, more useful, and even neceffary to human life, than that derived from the teftimony of men, and the reports of eyewitneffes and fpectators. This fpecies of reafoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I fhall not difpute about a word. It will be fufficient to obferve, that our affurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our obfervation of the veracity of human teftimony, and of the ufual conformity of facts to the reports of witneffes. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conftant and regular conjunction; 'tis evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favor of human teftimony, whose connexion with any events feems, in itself, as little neceffary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not fenfible to fhame, when detected in a falfhood: were not thefe, I fay, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we fhould never repofe the leaft confidence in human teftimony. A man delirious, or noted for falfhood and villany, has no manner of authority with us. AND as the evidence, derived from witneffes and human teftimony, is founded on past experience, fo it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report, report and any kind of objects, has been found to be conftant or variable. There are a number of circumftances to be taken into confideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all difputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and obfervation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any fide, 'tis attended with an unavoidable contrariety in cur judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mutual deftruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hefitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the oppofite circumftances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a fuperiority on any fide, we incline to it; but ftill with a diminution of affurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist. THIS contrariety of evidence, in the prefent cafe, may be derived from feveral different causes; from the oppofition of contrary teftimony; from the character or number of the witneffes; from the manner of their delivering their teftimony; or from the union of all thefe circumftances. We entertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witneffes contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a fufpicious character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with doubt and hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent affeverations. There are many other particulars of the fame kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from human teftimony. SUPPOSE, for inftance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavors to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the evidence, refulting from the teftimony, admits a diminution, greater or lefs, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason, why we place any credit in witneffes and hiftorians is not from any connexion, which we perceive à priori between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attefted is fuch a one as has feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a contest of two oppofite experiences; of which the one deftroys the other as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very fame principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of affurance in the teftimony of witneffes, gives us alfo, in this case, another degree of affurance against the fact, which they endeavor to establish; from which contradiction there neceffarily arife a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority. I should not believe fuch a story were it told me by CATO; was a proverbial faying in ROME, even during the life-time of that philofophical patriot. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate fo great an authority. THE INDIAN prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of froft, reafoned juftly; and it naturally required very strong teftimony to engage his affent to facts, which arofe from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and bore fo little analogy to thofe events, of which he had had conftant and uniform experience. Tho' they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it ". PLUTARCH. in vita CATONIS. NO INDIAN, 'tis evident, could have expe. rience that water did not freeze in cold climates. BUT This is placing nature in a fituation quite anknown to him; and 'tis impoffible for him to tell à priori what will refult from it. "Tis making a new exY y peri 346 BUT in order to increase the probability against the teftimony of witnesses, let us fuppofe that the fact, which they affirm, inftead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose alfo, that the teftimony, confidered apart, and in itfelf, amounts to an entire proof; in that cafe there is proof against proof, of which the ftrongest must prevail, but ftill with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A MIRACLE is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men muft die; that lead cannot, of itfelf, remain fufpended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of thefe laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common courfe of nature. 'Tis no miracle that a man in feeming good health fhould die on a fudden; because fuch a kind of death, tho' more unufual than any other, has yet been frequently obferved to happen. But 'tis a miracle, that a dead man fhould come to life; because that has never been obferved, in any age or country. There muft, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous. event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform. experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can fuch a proof be deftroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an oppofite proof, which is fuperior d. periment, the confequence of which is always uncertain. One may fometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but ftill this is but conjecture. And it must be confeft, that, in the prefent cafe of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is fuch as a rational INDIAN would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water paffes in a moment, from the utmoft liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty ftrong teftimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But ftill it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the courfe of nature in cafes where all the circumftances are the fame. The inhabitants of SUMATRA have always feen water liquid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never faw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the confequence. d Sometimes an event may not, in itself, feem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of fome circumRances, be denominated a miracle; because,, in fact, it is contrary to thefe laws. Thus if a per- THE THE plain confequence is (and 'tis a general maxim worthy of our attention) "That no teftimony is fufficient to establish a miracle, unless the teftimony be "of fuch a kind, that its falfhood would be more miraculous, than the fact, " which it endeavors to establifh: And even in that cafe, there is a mutual de"struction of arguments, and the fuperior only gives us an affurance fuitable to "that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior." When any one tells me, that he faw a dead man reftored to life, I immediately confider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this perfon fhould either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates, fhould really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other, and according to the fuperiority, which I difcover, I pronounce my decifion, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falfhood of his teftimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. PART II. In the foregoing reafoning we have fuppofed, that the teftimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may poffibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falfhood of that teftimony would be a kind of prodigy. But 'tis eafy to fhew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our conceffions, and that there never was a miraculous event, established on fo full an evidence. FOR first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a fufficient number of men, of fuch unquestioned good-fenfe, education, and learning as to fecure us against all delufion in themselves; of fuch undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all fufpicion of any defign to deceive others; of fuch credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose in cafe of being detected in any falfhood and at the fame time attesting facts, performed in fuch a public manner, and in fo celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requifite to give us a full af furance in the teftimony of men. SECONDLY. We may observe in human nature a principle, which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the affurance, which we might have, from human teftimony, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reafonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, refemble thofe, of which we have; that what we have found to be moft ufual is always moft probable; and that where there is an oppofition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to fuch of them as are founded on the greatest number of paft obfervations. But tho' in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact, which is unufual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind obferves not always the fame rule; but when any thing is affirmed utterly abfurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits fuch a fact, upon account of that very circumftance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The paffion of furprize and wonder, arifing from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a fenfible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is derived. And this goes fo far, that even thofe who cannot enjoy this pleafure immediately, nor can believe those miracuY y 2 lous |