of the agent. The pooreft artificer, who labours alone, expects at leaft the protection of the magiftrate, to enfure the enjoyment of the fruits of his labor. He also expects, that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers them at a reafonable price, he fhall find buyers; and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to fupply him with those commodities, which are requifite for his fubfiftence. In proportion as mens dealings are more extenfive, and their intercourfe with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their fchemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from their proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclufions, they take their measures from paft experience, in the same manner as in their reafonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe, that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the fame, which they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labor of his fervants, for the execution of any work, as much as upon the tools, which he employs, and would be equally furprized, were his expectations difappointed. In fhort, this experimental inference and reafoning concerning the actions of others enters fo much into human life, that no man, while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not reafon, therefore, to affirm, that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of neceffity, according to the foregoing definition and explication of it?

NOR have philofophers ever entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular. For not to mention, that almost every action of their life fuppofes that opinion; there are even few of the fpeculative parts of learning, to which it is not effential. What would become of history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the hiftorian, according to the experience, which we have had of mankind? How could politics be a fcience, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon fociety? Where would be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain nor determinate power to produce particular fentiments, and if these sentiments had no conftant operation on actions? And with what pretext could we employ our criticifm upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and fentiments of his actors, either natural or unnatural, to fuch characters, and in fuch circumftances? It seems almost impoffible, therefore, to engage, either in fcience or action of any kind, without acknowleging the doctrine of neceffity, and this inference from motives to voluntary actions; from characters to conduct.

AND indeed, when we confider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we fhall make no fcruple to allow, that they are of the fame nature, and derived from the fame principles. A pri foner, who has neither money nor intereft, discovers the impoffibility of his efcape, as well from the obftinacy of the goaler, as from the walls and bars, with which he is furrounded; and in all attempts for his freedom, chufes rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The fame prifoner, when conducted to the scaffold, forefees his death as certainly from the conftancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the ax or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refufal of the foldiers to confent to his escape; the action of the executioner; the feparation of the head and body; bleeding, convulfive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural 1 caufes,

causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, in paffing from one link to another: Nor is lefs certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects prefent to the memory or fenfes, by a train of causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a phyfical neceffity. The fame experienced union has the fame effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the names of things; but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change.

I HAVE frequently confidered, what could poffibly be the reafon, why all mankind, tho' they have ever, without hesitation, acknowleged the doctrine of neceffity, in their whole practice and reasoning, have yet difcovered fuch a reluctance to acknowlege it in words, and have rather fhewn a propenfity, in all ages, to profefs the contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for, after the following manner. If we examine the operations of bodies and the production of effects from their caufes, we fhall find, that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowlege of this relation, than barely to observe, that particular objects are conftantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary tranfition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But tho' this conclufion concerning human ignorance be the refult of the stricteft fcrutiny of this fubject, men still entertain a strong propenfity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive fomething like a neceffary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and feel no fuch connexion of the motive and the action; they are apt, from thence, to fuppofe, that there is a difference betwixt the effects, refulting from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced, that we know nothing farther of caufation of any kind, than merely the conftant conjunction of objects, and the confequent inference of the mind from one to another, and finding, that thefe two circumstances are univerfally acknowleged to have place in voluntary actions; we may thence be more easily led to own the fame neceflity common to all caufes. And tho' this reasoning may contradict the fyftems of many philofophers, in afcribing neceffity to the determinations of the will, we fhall find, upon reflection, that they diffent from it in words only, not in their real fentiments, Neceffity, according to the fenfe, in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philofopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended, that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, fome farther connexion between the cause and effect; and a connexion which has not place in the voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be fo or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on these philofophers to make good their affertion, by defining or defcribing that neceffity, and pointing it out to us, in the operations of material caufes.

It would feem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and neceffity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the foul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more fimple question, viz. the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of caufation and neceffity, except that of a conftant conjunction of objects, and fubfequent inference of the mind from one to another, If these circumftances form, in reality,

the

the whole of that neceffity, which we can conceive in matter, and if thefe circumstances be alfo univerfally a knowleged to take place in the operations of the mind, the difpute is at an end; or, at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. But as long as we will rafhly fuppofe, that we have fome farther idea of neceffity and caufation in the operations of external objects; at the fame time, that we can find nothing farther, in the voluntary actions of the mind; there is no poffibility of bringing the difpute to any determinate iffue, while we proceed upon fo erroneous a fuppofition. The only method of undeceiving us, is, to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science, when applied to material causes; and to convince ourselves, that all we know of them, is, the conftant conjunction and inference above-mentioned. We may, perhaps, find, that 'tis with difficulty we are induced to fix fuch narrow limits to human underftanding: But we can afterwards find no difficulty, when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as 'tis evident, that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumftances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from the one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowlege, in words, that neceffity, which we have already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and behavior".

BUT to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the queftion of liberty and neceffity; the moft contentious queftion, of metaphyfics, the most contentious science; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of neceffity, and that the whole difpute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot furely mean, that actions have fo little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumftances, that the one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other,

The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for, from another caufe, viz. a falfe fenfation or feeming experience which we have, or may have of liberty or indifference, in many of our action. The neceflity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly fpeaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may confider the action; and it confifts chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the exiflence of that action from fome preceding objects; as liberty, when opposed to neceflity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain loofeness or indifference, which we feel, in paffing, or not paffing, from the idea of one object to that of any fucceeding one. Now we may obferve, that, tho' in reflecting on human actions we feldom feel fuch a lootenefs or indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with confiderable certainty from their motives, and from the difpofitions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in performing the actions themselves, we are fenfible of fomething like it: And as all refembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative and

even an intuitive proof of human liberty: We feel, that our actions are fubject to our will, on moft occafions; and imagine we feel, that the will itfe'f is fubject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself, (or a Velleity, as it is called in the fchools) even on that fide, on which it did not fettle. This image, or faint motion, we perfuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated into the thing itfelf; because, should that be denied, we find, upon a fecond trial, that, at prefent, it can. We confider not, that the fantaftical defire of fhewing liberty, is here the mo tive of our actions. And it feems certain, that however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a fpectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumftance of our fituation and temper, and the moft fecret fprings of our complexion and difpofition. Now this is the very effence of neceffity, according to the foregoing doctrine.

and that the one affords no inference, from which we can conclude the existence of the other. For thefe are plain and acknowleged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean, a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we chufe to remain at reft, we may; if we chufe to to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is univerfally allowed to belong to every body, who is not a prifoner and in chains. Here then is no fubject of difpute.

WHATEVER definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful to obferve two requifite circumstances; first, that it be confiftent with plain matter of fact; Secondly, that it be confiftent with itself. If we obferve these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it.

'Tis univerfally allowed, that nothing exifts without a caufe of its existence, and that chance, when ftrictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power, which has, any where, a being in nature. But 'tis pretended that fome causes are neceffary, and fome are not neceffary. Here then is the admirable advantage of definitions. Let any one define a caufe, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary connexion with its effect; and let him fhew diftinctly the origin of the idea, expreffed by the definition; and I fhall frankly give up the whole controverfy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received, this must be abfolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other, we fhould never have entertained any notion of caufe and effect; and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding, which is the only connexion, that we can have any comprehenfion of. Whoever attempts a definition of caufe, exclufive of thefe circumftances, will be obliged, either to employ unintelligible terms, or fuch as are fynonimous to the term, which he endeavors to define . And if the definition above-mentioned, be admitted; liberty, when opposed to neceffity, not to conftraint, is the fame thing with chance; which is univerfally allowed to have no existence.

PART II.

THERE is no method of reafoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than in philofophical debates, to endeavor the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretext of its dangerous confequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads into abfurdities, 'tis certainly falfe; but 'tis not certain that an opinion is falfe, becaufe 'tis of dangerous confequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne ; as ferving nothing to the difcovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist odious. This I obferve in general, without pretending to draw any advantage from it, I fubmit frankly to an examination of this kind, and shall venture to affirm, that the doctrines, both of neceffity and of

b Thus if a cause be defined, that which produces any thing; 'tis easy to obferve, that producing is fynonimous to caufing. In like manner, if a caufe be defined, that by which any thing exifts; this is liable to the fame objection. For what is meant by these words, by which? Had it been faid, that

a caufe is that after which any thing conftantly exifts; we fhould have nderftood the terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the matter. And this conftancy forms the very effence of neceffity, nor have we any other idea of it.

liberty,

liberty, as above explained, are not only confiftent with morality and religion, Lut are abfolutely effential to the fupport of them.

NECESSITY may be defined two ways, conformable to the two definitions of caufe, of which it makes an effential part. It confifts either in the conftant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another. Now neceffity, in both thefe fenfes, (which, indeed, are, at bottom, the fame) has univerfally, tho' tacitly, in the fchools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to belong to the will of man; and no man has ever pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences are founded in the experienced union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and circumftances. The only particular, in which any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refufe to give the name of neceffity to this property of human actions: But as long as the meaning is understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain it poffible to discover something farther in the operations of matter. But this, it must be acknowleged, can be of no confequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philofophy or metaphyfics. We may here be mistaken in afferting, that there is no idea of any other neceffity or connexion in the actions of body: But furely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what every one does, and must readily allow of. We change no circumftance in the received orthodox fyftem with regard to the will, but only in that with regard to material objects and causes. Nothing therefore can be more innocent, at least, than this doctrine.

ALL laws being founded on rewards and punishments, 'tis fuppofed as a fundamental principle, that thefe motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We may give to this influence, what name we please; but as 'tis ufually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a caufe, and be looked upon as an inftance of that neceffity, which we would establish.

THE only proper object of hatred or vengeance, is a perfon or creature, endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that paffion, 'tis only by their relation to the perfon, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perifhing; and where they proceed not from fome cause in the characters and difpofition of the perfon who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil. The actions themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the perfon is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, 'tis impoffible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies neceffity, and confequently caufes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character any way concerned in his actions; fince they are not derived from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other.

MEN are not blamed for fuch actions as they perform ignorantly and cafually, whatever may be the confequences. Why? but because the principles of thefe actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are lefs blamed for

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