47 the others to its defense. With this league of neutrals the United States, being a belligerent, could clearly have no place. But Congress was under the belief that a meeting of all the Powers of Europe was about to be held to give sanction to the Russian declaration as a part of international law. Instructions were therefore given the American ministers in Europe to subscribe to the Armed Neutrality in behalf of their government, if they should be invited to do so.18 John Adams, on March 8, 1781, transmitted to the representatives of the neutral Powers at The Hague the resolution of Congress. But to Prince Gallitzin, the Russian Minister, he specifically requested the admission of the United States as a party to the league. *9 49 In order to gain the good will of Catherine II, Congress determined on December 15, 1780, to appoint a minister to the Court of Russia.50 The choice fell upon Francis Dana, who was then in Paris as the secretary to John Adams. The two great objects of his negotiation, Mr. Dana was informed, were to engage Catherine II "to favor and support the sovereignty and independence of the United States," and to secure "the admission of the United States as a party to the convention for maintaining the freedom of the seas. 51 The achievement of these objects must have seemed almost impossible from the outset. To Catherine II, the Americans were rebels. Panin, her Minister of Foreign Affairs, had assured the British in 1778, "that so long as the British treated the Americans as rebels, the Court of Petersburg would look upon them as a people not yet entitled to recognition.” 52 Prince Gallitzin expressed his pleasure when informed of the instructions given by Franklin in conformity with the Russian declaration, but at no time did the Empress change in her attitude toward the United States.53 Although France and Holland recognized American independence, the Russian Vice Chancellor, Count Ostermann, wrote Prince Gallitzin on May 6, 1782, That Her Imperial Majesty wishes that there shall be no demonstration that she approves this course. You will not receive or make any visits whatsoever to Mr. Adams, or any other person accredited on the part of the colonies which have separated from Great Britain.54 Francis Dana found his mission to St. Petersburg to be in vain. The United States could not, while a belligerent, become a party to the Armed 47 Kleen, Lois et Usages de la Neutralité, I, p. 21 ff. 48 Jour. Cont. Cong., XVIII, p. 905; Dip. Corr. Am. Rev. (ed. Wharton), IV, 49 Dip. Corr. Am. Rev. (ed. Wharton), V, pp. 274-276. 50 Jour. Cont. Cong., XVIII, pp. 1155, 1164, 1166. 51 Ibid., XVIII, pp. 1168-1173. 52 Bancroft, Hist. of the U. S., X, p. 257. 53 Franklin MSS., June 25, 1780. Library Am. Philos. Society. P. 80. 54 MS. Memoir on the relations between the Imperial Court of Russia and the United States of America in the reign of Catherine II. Library of Congress. Neutrality, and Catherine II refused to receive him so long as the independence of the colonies had not the recognition of Great Britain.55 The United States, although shut out from the league of the Armed Neutrality, continued to remain faithful to its principles. The American commissioners abroad, as soon as the preliminaries of the treaty of peace had been agreed upon, urged the adoption of the rules of the Russian declaration in the definitive treaty of peace.56 Franklin was hopeful that the complete immunity of private property from capture might be agreed upon." The Dutch Government early in 1783 proposed to John Adams that the United States accede to the Armed Neutrality as already concluded, or to enter into a similar negotiation with France, Spain and Holland.58 This suggestion met with the approval of the American ministers at Paris, but since Francis Dana was the only person having full power to sign such treaty, they were obliged to refer the matter to him.59 In the meantime, the accession of the United States to the league of the Armed Neutrality became the subject of debate in Congress. Mr. Dana had written that the United States could not become a party to the confederation while a belligerent. But the convention was designed only for the duration of the war. Although it might be continued between the parties for a longer period, Mr. Dana found that he would be obliged to make "presents" amounting to five thousand pounds sterling to various ministers of the Russian court for the liberty of acceding to the agreement. 60 On May 21, 1783, Hamilton rose in Congress and declared that the treaties of peace completely altered the situation, and the primary object of the mission to Russia was entirely removed. He thought it was unnecessary even to conclude a commercial treaty with the Court of St. Petersburg, and moved that Mr. Dana be permitted to return home. He was supported by Madison, who pointed out that, although Congress approved the principles of the Armed Neutrality, it would be "unwise to become a party to a confederacy which might thereafter complicate the interests of the United States with the politics of Europe." 61 The same view was taken by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Livingston, in his report to Congress on June 3d. Mr. Livingston hoped that the principles of the Armed Neutrality might be embodied in the definitive treaty of peace, 55 For a study of the Dana mission, see Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia. J. H. U. Studies, XXV, pp. 257-278. The correspondence will be found under appropriate dates in Dip. Corr. Am. Rev. (ed. Wharton). 56 Adams, Works, VIII, p. 15; Dip. Corr. Am. Rev. (ed. Wharton), VI, p. 191. 57 Works (ed. Bigelow), VIII, p. 245. 58 Adams, Works, VIII, pp. 29, 42. 59 Ibid., VIII, pp. 30, 40, 43. 60 Ibid., VIII, p. 51; Dip. Corr. Am. Rev. (ed. Wharton), VI, p. 403. 61 Dip. Corr. Am. Rev. (ed. Wharton), VI, p. 437; Jour. Cont. Cong., May 21-22, 1783. I am indebted to Miss Emily B. Mitchell of the Division of MSS., Library of Congress, for permission to use the galley proofs of the volumes of the Jour. Cont. Cong. for 1783. since the concurrence of Great Britain ought to be secured. But, he thought, no convention of this kind ought to be signed unless France and Spain were also parties thereto.62 Congress finally resolved, on June 12, 1783, upon a clear distinction between the principles of the Armed Neutrality and a confederation for their enforcement. The resolution set forth: The true interest of the States requires that they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations. But inasmuch as the liberal principles on which the said confederacy was established are conceived to be, in general, favorable to the interests of nations, and particularly to those of the United States, and ought, in that view, to be promoted by the latter as far as will consist with their fundamental policy, Resolved, That the ministers plenipotentiary of these United States for negotiating a peace be, and they are hereby, instructed, in case they should comprise in the definitive treaty any stipulations amounting to a recognition of the rights of neutral nations, to avoid accompanying them by any engagements which shall oblige the contracting parties to support those stipulations by arms.63 In the instructions to the peace commissioners, this resolution was embodied, where it stood as the settled policy of the United States.64 That the United States should have escaped from participation in a confederacy of this sort was fortunate. All the members of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 abandoned, upon the very next opportunity of their becoming belligerents, the creed which they had sought to enforce by arms when neutrals.65 The rules to which they had subscribed represented an interest rather than a principle of right for which they were willing permanently to contend. Whatever advantage might have been gained for American commerce by membership in the league would not have compensated for the political embarrassments of such an alliance. The principles of the Armed Neutrality survived, but they were recognized in conventional agreements and not as rules of international law. Under this guise, the rule that "free ships shall make free goods" found a warm exponent in the United States. In every treaty negotiation closely following the peace of 1783, the representatives of this government urged the rule, and in all but one secured its adoption. 62 Dip. Corr. Am. Rev. (ed. Wharton), VI, pp. 473-474. 63 Ibid., VI, 64 Ibid., VI, p. 717. 65 Phillimore (3rd ed.), III, p. 339. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUILIBRIUM AND THE PRESENT PERIOD * By TOR HUGO WISTRAND I. Politics require principles. When it is a question on the one hand of acquiring a position, and on the other hand of defending it, the opposed interests seek bases upon which they can rest. The sovereignties feel the necessity of invoking the authority of a principle which seems to draw its force from considerations superior to those that can inspire the political pretensions of a particular state. An appeal is made to a common interest the supposed existence of which is taken for granted-namely, that of maintaining the peace and good relations among the states-and it is presented in a definite formula, the principle of equilibrium. But this formula has no fixed significance in a juridical sense, its invocation being due to the fact that it claims to be the means of realizing that common interest and of expressing in a sense a natural law. In appealing to this principle, the state has ipso facto recognized that the ambitions of expansion can be justified only to the extent that they blend with a common interest, or at least are not opposed thereto. In order to utilize it, we must depart from the conception of the isolated state, abandon the national basis and place ourselves on the international plane. The principle of equilibrium necessarily imposes upon the ambitious sovereignties a motive of fear and might consequently result in a certain respect for the other states. But it is precisely in this regard for the others that the foundation of international law lies. By constituting a motive of fear for the states whose ambitious designs are likely to disturb the peace, the principle of equilibrium could form a veritable sanction of international law. But, as in internal law, it does not suffice to make the rules govern, to stipulate penalties for the offenses, without maintaining public order by moral convictions of the individual; it is likewise necessary in the field of international law to emphasize considerations of a moral order. Keeping in mind this twofold aspect, we shall examine first the historical development of the principle of equilibrium and thereupon arrive at an analysis of its character. *The present article reproduces in substance a paper read before the diplomatic section of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques of Paris. It was written at the suggestion of M. Dupuis, to whom the writer owes the most valuable suggestions.-AUTHOR. Translated from the French by Dr. Edwin H. Zeydel, of Washington, D. C. The form in which the principle of equilibrium has played a part during long periods before 1914 was determined under the influence of those ideas which signalize the end of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation. The Renaissance increased the authority of the sovereigns. The Roman ideas concerning their power helped to encourage them to act unscrupulously. The ancient conception of sovereignty justified the most sinister ambitions. The dissolution of the empire of Charlemagne had done away with the notion of political unity, offering the most favorable opportunity to the aspirations of the princes. The Reformation completely shattered the already greatly shaken spiritual unity; in conferring the religious authority upon the princes, it created a pretext for political enterprises. The disappearance of the power of the Pope was necessarily bound to signify an increase of the authority of the princes, who were freed from every regard of a religious order. The theories of the Renaissance with respect to sovereignty, on the one hand, and the absence of every moral principle, on the other, had to lead inevitably to a state of anarchy. It is natural that under such conditions the weakest sovereignties could not subsist without uniting, and that they had to seek to create in their united forces a motive of fear for anyone who wished to attack the integrity of one of them. These efforts were likewise necessary for the very life of the state, for in the absence of every obstacle which morality might offer, every sovereignty knows that the disappearance of its neighbor to the advantage of a stronger state will menace it. Thus during this period of anarchy the principle of equilibrium appeared to be the means most apt to safeguard the existence of the state, and the appeal made to it seemed to be due to an instinctive sentiment rather than to formulated reasons. The immense empire of Charles V was bound necessarily to arouse fears in the other Powers. The struggle between the ruling house of France and that of Hapsburg is the most remarkable historical manifestation of this fact. In a certain sense, above these Powers there was a third Power engaged in watching over the balance of power, namely, England. There remains no doubt that the diplomacy of Henry VIII was consciously inspired by this principle. The interest of England was best realized in a balance of power between France and Austria. As a matter of fact, English politics have never abandoned the thought of Henry VIII but have applied it in the foreign relations of England with the force of a tradition. In the struggle against the menacing power of Austria, Henry IV pursued the political designs of Francis I, and Richelieu supported them under changed conditions. The Peace of Westphalia is decisive for the part which the principle of equilibrium has played in European politics. This has a twofold aspect. Since none of the adversaries could get the upper hand, the house of Austria, which had been a menace to the other Powers of Europe, did not represent an imminent danger for the future. Thus there was realized |