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primacy of the Great Powers, was out of harmony with American ideals, policies, and traditions, particularly in the lack of any provision for the establishment of a permanent international judiciary and by the introduction of the mandatory system.

This system had its origin in the proposal of General Smuts, that the League of Nations should become "the heir of the Empires," which in Mr. Wilson's mind took the form of making the League the "successor" and "residual trustee" of "peoples and territories"; a conception which Mr. Lansing describes as "a novelty in international relations sufficient to arouse conjecture as to its meaning; but giving to the League the character of an independent state with the capacity of possessing sovereignty and the power to exercise sovereign rights through a designated agent was even more extraordinary."

Of Lord Robert Cecil's plan, the text of which is presented in the Appendix to this volume, Mr. Lansing says that it was a "Quintuple Alliance based on the power to compel obedience, and the right of the powerful to rule"; and was "intended to place in the hands of the Five Powers the control of international relations and the direction in large measure of the foreign policies of all nations. . . . It seemed to provide for a rebirth of the Congress of Vienna which should be clothed in the modern garb of democracy." Notwithstanding the identity in principle of the Wilson and the Cecil plans, the latter did not meet with the President's approval because it omitted the mutual guarantee upon which he insisted and which was finally adopted as "the heart of the Covenant."

In separate chapters Mr. Lansing expresses his views on "Self-determination," which he considers "menacing to peace and impossible of application"; "A Resolution instead of a Covenant," which he thought sufficient, in the treaty of peace; "The Guarantee in the Revised Covenant," which he condemns; "International Arbitration," in which he speaks of "the contempt which Mr. Wilson felt for The Hague Tribunal"; "The Report on the Commission of the League," concerning which the President had no conferences with the American Commissioners, except Colonel House; "The System of Mandates," in which he raises the important question, Where does the sovereignty over the territories under a mandate reside? and demonstrates the legal vacuity of the whole conception; "The Proposed Treaty with France," which he did not support; "The Lack of an American Programme," which left the American Commissioners "without a chart of the course they were to pursue in the negotiations and apparently without a pilot who knew the channel"; "Secret Diplomacy,' which the President considered "was the normal and most satisfactory method of doing business"; "The Shantung Settlement," upon which the writer throws a strong light, citing the President's explanation to the Chinese delegation that he had been compelled to accede to Japan's demand "in order to save the League of Nations."

Mr. Lansing now has the satisfaction of knowing that his views on virtually all of these points have been sustained by those whose knowledge enabled them promptly to form an independent judgment regarding President Wilson's policies, and ultimately by the predominating decision of the American people. In his exposition of his dissent from those policies his narrative proceeds clearly, firmly, and convincingly. It is only when he wanders into the subjective domain of motives and hypothetical states of mind that his discussion becomes in a certain degree vague and inconclusive. Despite the relentless exposure of personal differences of judgment, and here nothing is concealed or extenuated, there is a total absence of malice or bitterness in this narrative. In the realm of motives, which he does not hesitate to explore somewhat minutely, there is an obvious desire to be charitable toward the President. "There never had been," he writes, "a personal intimacy between the President and myself, such as existed in the case of Colonel House and a few others of his advisers, and as our intercourse had always been more or less formal in character, it was easier to continue the official relations that had previously prevailed. I presume that Mr. Wilson felt, as I did, that it would create an embarrassing situation in the negotiations if there was an open rupture between us or if my commission were withdrawn or surrendered and I returned to the United States before the Treaty of Peace was signed." The President, Mr. Lansing thinks, feared that a rupture would jeopardize the acceptance of the Covenant by the Senate, while he himself was convinced that his withdrawal would "seriously delay the restoration of peace, possibly the signature of the Treaty at Paris, and certainly its ratification at Washington." Believing that no change could be made in Mr. Wilson's views on any fundamental principle, and that it was "a duty to place no obstacle in the way of the signature and ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany," Mr. Lansing declares, "I felt that there was no course for me as a representative of the United States other than to obey the President's orders however strong my personal inclination might be to refuse to follow a line of action which seemed to me wrong in principle and unwise in policy."

Highly honorable as this loyalty to the President's authority undoubtedly was founded upon the assumption that to this one person, and to him alone, the Constitution confides the absolute right to conduct the foreign relations of the country, and that he therefore is alone responsible, there may be room for difference of opinion at least as to the duration of time that such an obligation of loyalty would continue to be binding. Mr. Lansing's own view on this point is clear and uncompromising. To his mind there was no point of time short of the termination of the President's administration of his office, or at least the accomplishment of his purpose, when an adherence to his plans could be openly disavowed; and in this his course of conduct has been perfectly consistent.

There will be, no doubt, those who will consider that this theory of the exclusive authority and responsibility of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs is greatly exaggerated. To them it may seem, without any disposition to pass judgment, that when it became evident that the President's mind could be no longer influenced, the office of advisor was practically abolished; and that, being thenceforth exempt from further duty toward the President, a Secretary might regard himself as free by public expression to prevent, rather than promote, the ratification of a treaty so wrong in principle and so unwise in policy.

In his chapter on the "Bullitt Affair," the last in the book, Mr. Lansing declares that he could not at the time publicly deny, because without the President's approval he could not publicly explain, the truth that was contained in the words which Mr. Bullitt's breach of confidence attributed to him, which he quotes as follows:

Mr. Lansing said that he, too, considered many parts of the Treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the League of Nations. He said: “I consider that the League of Nations at present is entirely useless. The Great Powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France have gotten out of the Treaty everything that they wanted, and the League of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the Treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and the Great Powers will never give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker peoples."

We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. Mr. Lansing said: "I believe that if the Senate could only understand what this Treaty means, and if the American people could really understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they will ever understand what it lets them in for." (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1276.)

Mr. Lansing's explanation of the paradox that, notwithstanding the truth contained in this disclosure, he still desired and publicly advocated the immediate ratification of the treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, without reservations, and even feared the Senate would fail to ratify it if all that it involved was understood, is so personal, so peculiarly a question of motive, and so difficult to set forth in justice to the author in any other words than his own, that it is best left to the precise language employed by him, which is too extended to be quoted here.

It is but just to add to the imperfect summary of the contents of this volume that it is written with dignity, sincerity, and learning, and in the opinions held and defended on subjects of law and policy is worthy of careful study.

Some interesting illustrations embellish the book and a useful Appendix and excellent Index add to its value as a work of reference.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.

The United States and Latin America. By John Holladay Latané, Ph.D., LL.D. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. 1920. pp. 346. $2.50. In the preface to this interesting volume, the author states that it is based on a smaller book issued by the Johns Hopkins press in 1900, under the title The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America, which contained the first series of Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History. In its present form this work contains nine chapters on as many different topics relating to the political history of Latin-American countries and the diplomatic relations of the United States with them from the beginning to the present time.

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In the first chapter, which deals with "The Revolt of the Spanish Colonies," the author reviews, although rather briefly, the principal events which ultimately led to the political emancipation of the Spanish Colonies in America. The next chapter deals with "The Recognition of the Spanish-American Republics. Here the author makes a presentation of the political conditions and circumstances which led, not only to the recognition of the new governments, but also to the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, which indirectly insured their existence, protecting them against European aggression and intrigue.

Chapter three, which treats on "The Diplomacy of the United States with Regard to Cuba," contains a condensed exposition of the historical facts and diplomatic situations which brought about the Spanish-American War, the liberation of Cuba and the establishment of that island as a virtual protectorate of the United States under the terms of the so-called Platt Amendment, which determines the political relations existing between that country and the United States. The next chapter contains "The Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal," which resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Panama, the building of the Canal, and the present strained relations of Colombia and the United States.

Chapter five deals with "The French Intervention in Mexico," and Chapter six with "The Two Venezuelan Episodes." These two chapters are of positive historical value to the students of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine against the encroachment of European Powers upon Latin-American countries. It was on the occasion of one of these episodes that Señor Drago of Argentina restated the Calvo doctrine, which is now usually known as the Drago Doctrine, to the effect that no state has a right to resort to armed intervention for the purpose of collecting the private claims of its citizens against another state, which subsequently found expression in a resolution of the Pan-American Conference held at Rio, and later on in the Porter Resolution, which, after much discussion, culminated in the well-known resolutions of the Second Peace Conference at The Hague by which the contracting Powers agreed not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as being due

to its nationals, which undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer for arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any compromis from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award.

The last three chapters are really the most interesting in this volume, as they deal with the history of the three most important subjects of the new world politics: "The Advance of the United States in the Caribbean,” "Pan-Americanism," and "The Monroe Doctrine." In respect to the latter, the Latin-American reader will probably agree with the author that the imperialistic tendencies of our Caribbean policy, whether they be regarded as logical deductions from the Monroe Doctrine or not, have undoubtedly aroused the jealousies and fears of our Southern neighbors. One of the results has been the formation of the so-called A B C Alliance, based on treaties between Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the exact provisions of which have not been made public. This alliance doubtless serves a useful purpose in promoting friendly relations between the three great states of South America, and since the acceptance of the mediation of these powers in Mexico by President Wilson there is no reason to regard it as in any sense hostile to the United States. While the United States may very properly accept the mediation of other American states in disputes like that arising out of the Mexican situation, the United States would not feel under any obligation to consult other American states or accept their advice on any question involving the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States has always maintained the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of self-defense and, consequently, on its own authority. In 1825 the Brazilian Government proposed that the United States should enter into an alliance with it in order to maintain the independence of Brazil in case Portugal should be assisted by any foreign Power in her efforts to reconquer Brazil. Secretary Clay replied that while President Adams adhered to the principles set forth by his predecessor, the prospect of peace between Portugal and Brazil rendered such an alliance unnecessary.

In recent years the proposal has been more than once made that the Monroe Doctrine be Pan-Americanized. This proposal was discussed by Mr. Root in his address before the American Society of International Law in 1914, in the course of which he said:

Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this nation's right of selfprotection, it cannot be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American states or any number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil were to contribute the weight of its influence toward a similar end, the right upon which that nation would rest its declaration would be its own safety, not the safety of the United States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the safety of Chile, Argentina would declare what was necessary for the safety of Argentina, Brazil, what was necessary for the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself and in its own right, and it would be impossible to go beyond that except by more or less offensive and defensive alliances. Of course, such alliances are not to be considered.

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