de la communauté internationale, sans conférer nécessairement une égale participation à la constitution et au fonctionnement des organes préposés à la gestion de ces intérêts. Ils sont limités dans leur droit par leur obligation de respecter le droit des autres Etats.

This qualified interpretation of the principle of equality is characteristic of the attitude of the publicists of repute on international law. Few venture to assert as an inherent, inalienable, absolute right, without qualification, the claim to equality among nations. Nearly all recognize their glaring political inequalities. To some publicists equality is a logical corollary to the right of existence as a separate, independent, sovereign state. To many it signifies equality "in and before the law"—whatever that may mean. To others it is the assertion of a mere rule of international courtesy-the outward respect due to an international personality. To most of the publicists the principle of equality, in final analysis, would seem to signify a platonic ideal-a distant goal of perfection toward which nations are laboriously moving.

The confusion of thought on this subject is painfully apparent, as is also the frank denial of equality in the actual intercourse of nations. Witness the proceedings of the recent Peace Conference in Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations!

Dr. Dickinson has undertaken in a most judicial and scholarly manner to dissipate this confusion of thought concerning a fundamental problem, not merely of the law of nations, but of the very nature of international society and of international organization. His main conclusions are as follows (p. 334):

1. "The principle of state equality in international law was a creation of the publicists."

2. "It was derived from the application to nations of the theories of natural law, the state of nature, and natural equality."

3. "The conception of state equality was first developed as part of a coherent theory by the naturalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Grotius neither discussed the conception nor based his system upon it." Pufendorf, under the inspiration of Hobbes, was largely responsible. The later publicists rather blindly followed in his lead, though reënforcing the argument for equality by arguments based on the rights of existence, independence and sovereignty.

4. "The principle of equality . . . in the modern law of nations is the expression of two important legal principles. The first of these may be called the equal protection of the law or equality before the law. States are equal before the law when they are equally protected in the enjoyment of their rights and equally compelled to fulfil their obligations. . . . . . The second principle is usually described as equality of rights and obligations or more often as equality of rights. What is really meant is an equality of capacity for rights. Equality in this sense is the negation of

status. Equality of capacity for rights. . . is not essential to the reign of law. Strictly speaking, it has never been anything more than an ideal in any system of law."

5. "Conceding that equality of capacity for rights is sound as a legal principle, its proper application is limited to rules of conduct and to the acquiring of rights and the assuming of obligations under those rules. It is inapplicable from its very nature to rules of organization. Insistence upon complete political equality in the constitution and functioning of an international union, tribunal, or concert is simply another way of denying the possibility of effective international organization."

These conclusions, it will be observed, definitely accept inequality of status among nations, though affirming their potentially equal capacity for rights. Dr. Dickinson holds (p. 335) that: "Equality before the law is not inconsistent with the grouping of states into classes and the attributing to the members of each class of a status which is the measure of a capacity for rights. Neither is it inconsistent with inequalities of representation, voting power, and contribution in international organizations." In other words, though all nations have an equal capacity for rights, it is the privilege of certain superior nations to determine for the rest their exact status "which is the measure of capacity for rights!" The question would seem highly debatable, and Dr. Dickinson himself says that in the discussion of the status of small nations in the constitution of an international court of justice: "This distinction between having a political right and being able to use it was effectively refuted by Barbosa. The Brazilian delegate denounced the distinction as manifestement sophistique.' It would appear logical that if equal capacity for rights does not include the right to participate equally both in the organization of an international court of justice and in the formulation of the law to be applied by this court, such nation cannot be said to possess real "equality before the law." An inferior status determined by other nations renders justice arbitrary when accorded by these same nations. Such a conception of equality would appear manifestement sophistique.

Nothing can be said in criticism of Dr. Dickinson's method of analysis. His exposition of the relation of the law of nature to the law of nations is unexcelled in thoroughness, precision, and penetration. His chapters on "Internal and External Limitations upon the Equality of States" are most original and illuminating in setting forth the exact nature of international society as well as showing the various ways in which a nation may acquire an unequal status. His chapter on "The Equality of States in the Peace of Paris" is a most acute analysis of the work of the Conference and furnishes striking though melancholy confirmation of his own evaluation of the working significance of the principle of equality.

Dr. Dickinson has succeeded most admirably by the use of what he terms in the preface (p. viii) "a realistic outlook and the application to

the subject-matter of established principles of legal analysis" in avoiding "the pitfalls of 'loose writing and nebulous speculation.'" His book is a splendid contribution to the constructive thinking required to regenerate the law of nations and to establish it as a sound system on the basis of realities.

This book should be in the hands of all students of the science. It should be read with particuar care and interest by all advocates of international organization who desire first of all to understand the exact nature of international society before undertaking the difficult task of its higher organization.

PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN.

The Senate and Treaties, 1789-1817. By Ralston Hayden. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1920. pp. xvi, 237.

This monograph, published by authority of the Executive Board of the Graduate School of the University of Michigan, is designed to cover the period from 1789 to 1817, as regards the development of the treaty-making powers of the Senate. The author has confined himself strictly to this period, and is to be commended for his diligence. The work is primarily a study in history and politics. The treatment is in chronological order, rather than by topics. Any objection to this arrangement, for purpose of reference, is overcome by a carefully prepared index. The nine chapter headings are as follows: "The First Exercise of the Treaty-Making Power"; "Development of Treaty-Making Power through Action on Treaties with Indian Tribes, 1789-1795"; "The Treaties with Algiers and Spain, 1790-1796"; "The Jay Treaty"; "The Creek Treaty of 1796"; "Treaties of the Administration of John Adams"; "The Senate and the Treaties of Thomas Jefferson"; "The Genesis of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," and "The Treaty-Making Powers of the Senate at the End of the Formative Period, 1815-1817." The citations show that the author has examined fully the published writings of the leaders of the period to discover the motive for official action. Withal, it is a very valuable and interesting study.

S. B. C.

The New World Order: International Organization, International Law, International Coöperation. By Frederick Charles Hicks. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. 1920. pp. viii, 496.

Here we have a book packed with facts and written by one versed as a briefer. The author is the law librarian of Columbia University, but he has done more than to "turn over half a library to make one book"; he

has organized his informing data, until, with apologies to Hegel, his "creative synthesis" has given us something better than existed before.

There are 290 pages of text and 190 pages of appendices. The text is divided into three main divisions dealing respectively with: (1) International Relations, (2) International Law, (3) International Coöperation. The appendices give us the most relevant parts of the peace treaty; the treaty establishing the Dual Alliance in 1879; the published sections of the treaty establishing the Alliance, renewed finally in 1912; the French texts of the two papers relating to the Russo-French alliance; the Holy Alliance act; Central American treaties of 1907; the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; the draft convention relative to the creation of the Judicial Arbitration Court, and the convention relative to the creation of an International Prize Court, all taken from the Hague Conventions and drafts of 1907; the treaty between the United States and Guatemala, 1913, and a bibliography. There is a respectable index.

Hence we have here an ambitious work; but a dip into its substance does not disappoint. It contains excellence. History in abundance falls before the author's power of analysis. Thus a service is rendered to the inquiring mind bent on knowing something of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The early portions of the first chapter will bring prepossessions of many to the author's support at the outset. Like the men who gathered at The Hague in 1899 and in 1907, he recognizes in his beginning paragraphs "the solidarity uniting the members of the society of civilized nations." But a careful reading of the entire chapter reveals more caution than seems necessary. It may be true, as he says, that the society of civilized nations has no written covenant, no officers, no seat of government or administration; but the Hague Conferences with their statutes, their Court of Arbitration and other organs, came nearer to being these things than the author seems to grant or realize. Instead of saying dogmatically that no world legislature "at any time has been in existence," he might have acknowledged more appropriately the quasi-legislative acts, say, of those same Hague Conferences. Indeed, he does grant in another connection (page 107): "In any case the work of the two Hague Conferences and of the International Naval Conference ought not to be lost. In the light of a new and unparalleled experience, their product should be revised, if only to attempt anew to record the progress of custom and the common consent on which all international law is founded."

Many people will probably agree that the present League of Nations is "a new manifestation of the desire to give more definite organization to the existing Society of Nations upon which it is based and out of which it has grown." But all will not agree with "the author's personal conviction that the League of Nations should be supported not merely because

it provides means for putting war a few steps farther in the background, but because it emphasizes the necessity for coöperation between sovereign states." This "personal conviction," however, is expressed only in the preface. In justice to the author, it must be granted that in the body of his text "the facts have been allowed to speak for themselves, opinions and prophecies rarely being hazarded.”

The book is typical of the fact that a movement for some form of a governed world seems now to be substantially in that period of its development which science, particularly biological science, found itself following the work of the Swedish botanist, Carl von Linné, at about the time of the American Revolution. With Linné, collection and classification were a methodic passion. Because of his influence, in no small measure, the museums of Europe became choked with specimens. The naïve notion prevailed that by the collection of a sufficient number of specimens clearly classified, ultimate truth could be adequately attained. Dr. Hicks gives us something of an impression of a Linnæus bent upon attaining unto ultimate international truth by the method of collecting and briefing as many facts as possible relative to the League of Nations. This seems just now to be peculiar to most of the books treating of that hotly debated subject.

Yet the weaknesses of the book are but incidental to its elements of strength. It is evidently the product of a careful and conscientious note taker, assisted by his students, and bent upon using his notes for lecture purposes. Failure to employ a sufficient number of connectives, relatives, and periods leaves some of the passages correspondingly nebulous. In a book thus constructed, even the schoolmaster's "baby blunder" is probably inevitable; in any event, on page 14 there stands unabashed the unlawfully wedded sentences: "In 1919 the attempted answer was the League of Nations, but let us not imagine that this is a new conception produced by the latest necessity for something better than had yet been devised." It is difficult to defend the inclusion of the long quotation from President Lowell, pages 64 and 65, distinguishing futilely between an automatic and a delegated form of a league of nations. There are still more glaring errors. In his Economies Royales, Pfister seems to have disposed in 1894 of the theory that Henry IV was the author in fact of the "Great Design" rather than Sully, his Minister of Finance. It is very doubtful if this, as our author says, is "a doubtful question." On page 74 the author seems to have made two misstatements of fact within the compass of one sentence. Referring to William Ladd's plan for a separate court of international justice, the author says: "He had been preceded in this conception by Bentham in 1789, but as Bentham's plan was not published until 1843, Ladd could not have been indebted to him for the idea." Since Bentham's "common court of judicature" was essentially a diplomatic body usually referred to by its author as a "Congress or Diet," it cannot