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plish is held, in Griffith v. Lexington Terminal R. Co. (Ga.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 854, to assume the risk, although the danger is due to the master's negligence.

An employee sent to remove a pile of lumber is held, in McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Zakzewski (Ill.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848, to assume the risk of injury from its fall because the lumber is covered with ice and defectively piled, where the defects are plainly obvious to him, notwithstanding they are due to the master's negligence.

A brakeman on a railroad is held, in Johnson v. Boston & M. R. Co. (Vt.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 856, to assume the risk of injury from a low bridge and ice hanging therefrom, which, to his knowledge, is a usual condition.

The owner of a team, who is employed to remove a rubbish dump, is held, in Lindsey v. Hollerback & M. Contr. Co. (Ky.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 830, to assume the risk of injury to the team in attempting to drive it down a steep incline with a scraper attached, although assured by his employer that it

is safe.

Where a servant knows and appreciates the dan ger of the act which he undertakes, he is held, in Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Crotty (C. C. A., 8th C.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 832, to assume the risks of injury, or to become chargeable with contributory negligence, | as the case may be, although he undertakes it under the direction of his superior.

Attempting dangerous work in obedience to orders is held, in Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Jones (Ark.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837, not to involve an assumption of the risk if it was not fully appreciated.

Knowledge of defective conditions is held, in Tuckett v. American Steam & Hand Laundry (Utah), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 990. to be insufficient to make an assumption of the risk by an employee, if the danger is imperfectly appreciated.

Failure to repair defects within a definite time is held, in Andrecsik v. New Jersey Tube Co. (N. J. Err. & App.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 913, to make a continuance of work thereafter amount to assumption of risk.

The duty of an employee in a steel mill to warn other employees when a heat is to be blown is held, in Illinois Steel Co. v. Ziemkowski (Ill.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161, to make the former a vice principal with respect to that matter.

Injury to a child invited by an employee to ride on a wagon, but who falls off, is held, in Foster-Her

bert Cut Stone Co. v. Pugh (Tenn.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804, not to make the master liable.

A general employee assisting a third person without the master's knowledge or consent, in making repairs on the premises, is held, in Sherwood v. Warner (D. C. App.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 651, not to make the master iable.

The possessory right of the locator of a mining claim before applying for a patent is held, in O'Connell v. Pinnacle Gold Mines Co. (C. C. A., 9th C.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 919, to go upon his death, by descent from the locator, subject to probate jurisdiction, and the heirs are held not to take directly from the government, as its beneficiaries.

The owner of an interest in a mining claim, who has been excluded by a co-owner, is held, in Davidson v. Fraser (Colo.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1126, to be entitled to adverse his application and maintain an action in support thereof.

A widow's right to redeem, under her unassigned dower, from a mortgage, is held, in Hays' v. Cretin (Md.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039, not to be lost by her husband's giving a second mortgage in which she did not join.

A modification of the obligation made between a mortgagee and a subsequent grantee who has assumed the debt is held in Fanning v. Murphy (Wis.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666, to release the mortgagor.

The power of a municipality to contract debts for corporate purposes is held, in Luther v. Wheeler (S. C.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746, not to be implied.

A proceeding to punish the violation of a municipal police ordinance which is not a statutory offense is held, in Fortune v. Wilburton (C. C. A., 8th C.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 782, to be a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding.

A municipality is held, in Cunningham v. Seattle (Wash.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 629, not to be liable for damages done by a horse kept for a fire department, which escapes through the negligence of its em ployees.

Liability for negligence in handling an automobile on a highway so as to frighten a team of horses is sustained in McIntyre v. Orner (Ind.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130.

One alighting from a street car, going behind it, and stepping onto another track, where he is struck by another car going in the opposite direction, is held in Hornstein v. United Railways Co. (Mo.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729, to be negligent.

The right of a parent to sue a child for support is denied in Duffy v. Yordi (Cal.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159, where another child is furnishing the support already.

A wife's right, on separation, to partition the homestead, was denied in Grace v. Grace (Minn.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 786, where the husband had made a settlement on her in a divorce suit.

A note to this case reviews all the other authorities on partition of homestead.

All the other authorities as to right of way on share are callated in a vote to this case.

Means of knowledge, without actual knowledge, of a change in a firm, is held, in Gross v. Breckenridge Bank, to exonerate the retiring members from liability on a subsequent renewal of the firm note.

One who periodically appears at a hotel to treat patients is held, in State v. Davis (Mo.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023, to be practising medicine within the State, although he lives in another State, from which his medicines are forwarded.

The power of a receiver of a corporation to sue in a foreign jurisdiction, even with leave of the court, is denied in Fowler v. Osgood (C. C. A., 8th C.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 824.

A license to sell intoxicating liquors, which is by statute transferable, is held, in Deggender v. Seattle Brew. & Malt. Co. (Wash.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 626, to be an asset in case of a receivership.

A member expelled from a church for the fraudulent purpose of diverting its property in violation of the trust is held, in Hendryx v. People's United Church (Wash.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1154, to be entitled to equitable relief, although the rules allow the expulsion without trial.

A bill of review because of newly discovered evidence is held, in Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Gittings (Md.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 865, to be maintainable in the lower court after a decision on appeal.

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A purchaser is denied, in Edgemoor Iron Co. v. Brown Hoisting Co. (Del. Sup. Ct.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 858, the right to recoup against the price of a machine the amount he has been compelled to pay for personal injuries to a servant caused by defects in the machine.

Notes, mortgages and other evidences of indebtedness from residents of the State to a non-resident creditor are held, in Gilbertson v. Oliver (Iowa), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 953, not to be subject to succession taxes at the debtor's residence.

The liability of a telegraph company to an undisclosed principal of the addressee, is denied in Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Schriver (C. C. A., 8th C.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 678.

Fraudulent intent is held, in W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co. (Me.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 960, to be necessary to make unfair competition by the use of names so as to make the trade think the goods of one person are those of another.

A marketable title to land is held, in Howe v. Coates (Minn.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170, to mean a title free from reasonable doubt.

The right of the legislature to create a public right of way along the banks and beds of streams for fishing purposes is denied in Hartman v. Tresise (Colo.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872, under the constitu tional provision as to taking property for public use without compensation. All the other authorities as to right of way on shore are collated in a note to this case.

The election by a widow, for nine years, to accept the terms of her husband's will, which dealt with certain land in her name as if it were his, which her heirs had acquiesced in for eight years after her death, is held, in Hoggard v. Jordan (N. C.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1065, to preclude her administrator from dealing with the land as hers to pay debts.

A devise subject to a life tenancy to named children" and their children forever" is held, in Straw

to vest the fee in the first takers as heirs.

A sale of real estate by an exccutor to the surety bridge v. Strawbridge (Ill.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 948, on his bond, under an order of court obtained by fraud, is held, in Fincke v. Bundrick (Kan.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 820, to be void, though the purchaser was innocent.

A buyer's right to retain goods and defeat action for the price because the goods do not comply with

the contract is denied in American Theater Co. v. Siegel, C. & Co. (Ill.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1167.

The constitutional privilege against incriminating evidence is held, in State v. Duncan (Vt.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1144, to be waived if not claimed.

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Bequests for Masses Legal.

The New York Court of Appeals has decided that Joseph Hughes, of New York city, had a right to bequeath in his will that after his real estate had been sold and the amount divided among the legatees that "three equal parts thereof to the trustees of St. Francis Hospital, in the city of New York, for the benefit and use of the Blessed Virgin Mary

Purgatorial fund of said hospital." This was the only controversy, and the validity of the will was the only question presented. The action was brought for the construction of a will of Joseph Hughes, deceased. The court reversed the judgment of the Ap pellate Division and Special Term and judgment was directed for the plaintiff, declaring the bequest valid with costs payable out of the fund to all parties appearing in this court by separate attorneys and filing briefs. Judges Cullen, Willard, Bartlett, Hiscock and Chase concurred in the opinion. Judges Gray and Edward T. Bartlett dissented.

The opinion reads as follows:

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"There was not, at the time, in existence in the city of New York, a corporation by the name of the St. Francis Hospital, but there was a hospital building and grounds known to the public as St. Francis Hospital, which was owned and conducted by a society known as the Sisters of the Poor of St. Francis, who, by chapter 201 of the Laws of 1866, was incorporated under that name, having for its object, as stated in that act, the gratuitous care of the sick, aged, infirm and poor.' The act further provided that no misnomer of said corporation shall defeat any gift or devise, provided the intent shall sufficiently appear that an estate or interest was made to be vested in said corporation.' That the defendant, the Sisters of the Poor of St. Francis, was popularly or generally known and designated by the public as St. Francis Hospital, was found as a fact by the trial court and it was conceded by counsel upon the argument of this case that the testator intended that his devise should be paid over to the trustees of that corporation. It was contended, however, on the part of the respondents that the gift was void for the reason that the sisters had never maintained in the hospital a Blessed Virgin Mary Purgatorial fund;' that the only possible object of such a fund was the saying of masses for the spiritual welfare of the souls of the dead in purgatory, and that the sisters, as such corporation, had no power to act as trustees for such a fund or purpose, and that it was not for a corporate use.

"It

But we

may be conceded that if the devise was to the sisters in trust for the benefit of others that they, under the statute by which they were incorporated, were not empowered to execute the trust. entertain the view that no trust was created by the will so far as the bequest to the sisters' corporation is concerned. There was a gift to the executors of the real estate situated in the State of New York, in trust to sell and dispose of at public or private sale, but this was for the sole purpose of division designated by the testator. It was an imperative power of sale vested in the executors, thus operating to

convert the real estate into personalty for the purpose of division. Three-fourths of the fund so derived from the sale of the real estate was given to the St. Francis Hospital, so-called, but which in fact was the sisters' corporation. This bequest, as he states in his will, was for the benefit and use of the Blessed Virgin Mary Purgatorial fund of said hospital.' There is no gift to the corporation in trust no direction for investment or for the payment over of any income or portion of the fund for the use and benefit of any person in being. It is, therefore, quite apparent that no trust was created with reference to the proceeds of the sale of the real estate. As we have seen, there was a gift and devise to the corporation. In terms, it is an absolute gift, but there is added thereto the clause already quoted, for the benefit and use of the Blessed Virgin, etc., which, it is contended, operates to cut down the absolute bequest to a conditional gift limited to a specific purpose, for which the sisters had no power to use it.

"In the case of Clarke v. Leupp, 88 N. Y. 228, Tracy, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: 'It is well settled by a long succession of wellconsidered cases that when the words of the will in the first instance clearly indicate a disposition in the testator to give the interest, use and benefit of the estate absolutely to a donee it will not be restricted or cut down to any less estate by subsequent or ambiguous words inferential in their intent.'

"In Lambe v. Eames, L. R., 10 Eq. Cas. 267, it is said: 'Whenever the will begins with an absolute gift, in order to cut it down, the latter part of the will must show as clear an intention to cut down the absolute gift as the prior act does to make it.'

"In Clay v. Wood, 153 N. Y. 134, Gray, J., says: 'Where there is an absolute gift of real or personal property, in order to qualify it or cut it down, the latter part of the will should show an equally clear intention to do so by the use of words definite in their meaning and by expressions which must be regarded as imperative.'

"Are the words used by the testator definite in their meaning, showing an imperative intent on the part of the testator not to make the gift absolute? It seems to us not. It says that the bequest is for the use and benefit of the Purgatorial fund of the hospital. He merely adds it to the Purgatorial fund. He makes no imperative or other direction with reference to the use that should be made of it, but leaves it as the fund of the hospital to be disposed of by the authorities thereof. It turns out that there was no such fund in exisetnce and that the only use that could be made of such a fund was the saying of masses for the spiritual welfare of the souls of the

dead in purgatory. The fact remains, however, that charge of the sisters. It not only includes the suphe thought there was such a fund in charge of the plying of food, clothing, medicine and nursing, but sisters and that he wished his fund to be devoted to may also properly include the providing of means for a similar use by the sisters, but there is nothing physical exercise, the occupation of the mind and the in this that indicates an intention on his part to cut | administering of religious consolation to the inmates down or deprive the sisters of the control of the be who are about to close this life. It is quite possible quest. It will be observed that there are no con- that the sick, aged and infirm persons in this hosditional or qualifying words used. Had he made the | pital derive great comfort and peace of mind from bequest upon the condition that the sisters should do the knowledge of the fact that the sisters daily offer some specified act inconsistent with their corporate prayers in the chapel for departed souls, and that power a different question would have been presented. such prayers will be continued for their benefit after He has not imposed any conditions whatsoever. He they have passed away. The mind has an important merely indicated a purpose, thus making the gift his influence upon the body, and it is not for this court primary object and the use to be made of it his see- to say that such consolation and peace of mind may ondary purpose. Had he stated the use to be the not be beneficial to them physically and tend to prosupplying of clothing to the inmates of the hospital long their lives. The supplying of books and papers and the sisters had found that it was unnecessary to to those who could read in the hospital, by which use it for clothing, but that its use was necessary they may occupy their minds and pass their time, for the supplying of food, it would hardly be claimed would not be foreign to the purposes of the corporathat the use suggested operated to deprive the be- tion, but instead it would be an act tending to proquest of its absolute character and constituted the mote their welfare; and if this be so, may not also gift conditional; or even that the diversion of its the consolation derived from the religious instructions use to another purpose worked a forfeiture. Should and prayers of the sisters also add to the physical a testator leave to his daughter a sum of money with comfort and welfare of these beings? which to purchase for her use a diamond necklace, the gift would be absolute and vest the money in her, and if she should thereafter choose to invest it in bonds instead of diamonds there would be no cause for complaint that the gift was invalid.

"The act incorporating the defendant specifically names a number of sisters, and then states that their associates and successors shall constitute a body corporate and politic. The successors are to be chosen from the society of The Sisters of the Poor of St. Francis. It is a matter of common knowledge that this is a religious society connected with the Roman Catholic church. It appears from the testimony of Sister Josephine, the secretary of the corporation, that there is a chapel connected with the hospital, in which they have morning mass and religious devotion during the day, in which prayers are offered for departed souls. We, therefore, have a charitable corporation organized for the gratuitous care of the sick, aged, infirm and poor to be conducted by the sisters of a religious society. In considering its powers we should give to the provisions of the act a fair and reasonable interpretation, such as was evidently contemplated by the Legislature in constituting the sis ters a body corporate. The gratuitous care of the sick, aged, infirm and poor call for the exercise of many powers not specifically named. The powers of the corporation are those which are included in those specifically granted, which are necessary or essential to the fulfillment of the purpose for which it was created. It authorizes the doing of that which adds to the comfort and welfare of the persons under the

"We fail to see why the provisions of this will as to the use of the bequest by the sisters is not fairly within the legislative intent, one of the powers under the incorporation which these sisters might properly exercise in their gratuitous care of the sick, aged, infirm and poor. In this case the bequest was to a corporation duly organized, and it is not, therefore, subject to the objection that was made in the case of Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, but is rather in accordance with the spirit of that decision. In Le Coutreulx v. City of Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333, it was held that a corporation is not limited to the exercise of the powers specifically granted, but possesses in addition all such powers as are either necessarily included in those specified or essential to the purposes and objects of its corporate existence. In Matter of Griffin, 167 N. Y. 71, there was a bequest to the Round Lake Association of the Methodist Episcopal church, to be prudently invested by the association and the income and profits arising therefrom to be devoted and applied to the support and maintenance of the school known as The Round Lake Summer Institute, and yet it was held that the gift was absolute to the Round Lake association and was valid. In Bird v. Merkles, 144 N. Y. 544, there was a bequest to a Methodist church for the purpose of buy ing coal for the poor members of the church. Such power was not specifically provided in the articles of incorporation, but it was held that the power was included and the gift was absolute and valid.

"We, therefore, conclude that the use to which he desired the fund devoted is consistent with the ob

ject and purpose of the corporation, included in the powers given to it, and is, therefore, valid.'

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A Writ Served by a Dog. Business was dull, debtors were shy and weary, and Tim, the process server, was playing in hard luck. A case was on the list for trial in which an important witness named Reardon had defied all efforts to summon him. At last recourse was had to Tim, who was told to get a service in hand.

Tim

Tim took the writ and started on his errand. On the road he met Reardon's dog. The dog had a small package in his mouth, and a bright idea at once struck Tim. "Come here, my good fellow," said Tim caressing the dog in a friendly manner. untied the bundle and placed the summons securely within, and then the dog took up the package and scampered away to his destination. Tim followed at a respectable distance, watched the dog go into the house, saw his master undo the package, and saw the legal paper fall immediately into his grasp.

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That's the copy," joyfully exclaimed Tim, peering forth from his hiding place under the window, "and here is the original."

Tim returned his writ to court, and the court decided after hearing an objection that the service was valid.-Exchange.

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Judicial Punning.

Notes of Cases.

Real Estate Agents-Commissions.-In Quist v. Goodfellow, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in December, 1906 (110 N. W. 65), it was held that where the owner of real estate, which he has listed with an agent for sale for a definite price, sells the same to a person who was induced to purchase it by the efforts of the agent, but in good faith and in ignorance of those efforts and for a consideration less than that given the agent, he is not, there being no exclusive agency, liable for the commission agreed to be paid for the production of a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy. The court said in part:

"There is no question but what plaintiff was authorized to make a sale of this property, and, had he procured and presented a purchaser ready, able and willing to make a purchase on the terms prescribed by defendant, viz., $18,500, he would have earned his commission, whether the transaction was closed by him or by defendant. But plaintiff at no time presented Gulbrandsen as a purchaser ready or willing to purchase the property on the prescribed terms. His first offer was $15.000, which was rejected. He next attempted to obtain an option on the property, which defendant also rejected. Upon being informed that defendant had rejected his last offer, he requested that the matter be dropped for a few days, and within the next few weeks Gjertsen entered into the contract referred to, through which Gulbrandsen finally acquired title to the property.

Punning is an exercise of wit and humor, but not Plaintiff was not therefore entitled to a commission a good habit.

on the theory that he procured a purchaser ready A dignified judge, however, will sometimes enliven and willing to buy the property at the price fixed by a case by a punning allusion. In a Philadelphia | defendant. (Putnam v. How, 39 Minn. 363, 40 N. case some years ago, a woman sued a street railway company for damages for injuries caused by being thrown by the sudden stopping of the car. The straps were where she could not conveniently reach them. The company appealed from a judgment against it, but the higher court sustained the judgment and said: "Possibly a woman may be so fantastically and foolishly hooped, wired and pinned up as to deprive her of her natural power to help herself; but, if so, the question is one of fact and not of law, and so we incline to leave it, instead of imposing upon our brethren below, the difficult duty of prying into the artificial stays' of the plaintiff's case."-Exchange.

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A demonstrative legacy, if the fund is ample to satisfy it, is held, in O'Day v. O'Day (Mo.), 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 22, to stand on the same footing as specific legacies with respect to abatement, if the residue of the estate is insufficient to pay debts.

W. 258; Cullen v. Bell, 43 Minn. 226, 45 N. W. 428; Fairchild v. Cunningham, 84 Minn. 521, 88 N. W. 15.) But plaintiff contends that he was in fact the procuring cause of the sale actually made, and is entitled to his commission, even though defendant did not know at the time of closing the transaction with Gjestsen that plaintiff's efforts were instrumental in bringing it about. It is insisted in this connection that the appearance of Gjertsen was a scheme to deprive plaintiff of the commission to which he would have been entitled had he perfected the sale. It is probable that the evidence on this subject was sufficient to take the question of the good faith of that transaction as between Gjertsen and Gulbrandsen to the jury. But, if all that plaintiff claims in this respect be conceded, still he is not entitled to a commission, in the absence of evidence tending to show that defendant, before he closed the sale to Gjertsen, knew that Gulbrandsen was the real purchaser, or the facts and circumstances before him were such as to put him upon inquiry. We find no

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