The statement of this eminent authority, that no one can be prevented from proclaiming his theories, may be accepted as a general proposition, but under special conditions, where such proclamation incites to disorder and crime, the State has a right to prevent it.

Authority claims the right of self-defense, to defend the social institutions, as the family, prosperity and religion, etc. It creates numerous means to carry out its functions, as the law, the magistrate, army, legislation and executive power. The anarch ist attacks all these institutions.

BELIEFS OF ANARCHISM.

The anarchist believes in the absolute freedom and spontaneity of the individual; that men are not bad by nature, but social institutions have made them 80. The anarchists have unlimited confidence in human nature itself, which, according to them, will cause all men to have self-respect and mutually aid others without any need of prescription or authority. The anarchistic theory depends mainly on the emotional nature, to such an extent as to force its adherents to unbridled fanaticism.

ANARCHISTIC CRIME.

The anarchistic crime is propoganda by act, which in a large party of adherents, comes from anarchistic ideas and sentiments, and said act is committed with a double purpose of destruction and terrorism. Such acts not only endanger present society but prevent peaceful evolution of social institutions.

We all know that laws and customs cover many injustices and irrational irregularities. We are all desirous of discovering their causes and changing them. But whatever reforms are needed must not be by brutal force, by arms or by blind explosion of bombs, but by thought, reason and feeling.

The right to punish depends on (1) social defense, and (2) danger to society. The means of prevention and repression should be based upon the study of the causes of anarchism. In principle and in fact anarchistic crime is individual, and not in collusion with others. The real anarchist is a fanatical criminal.

Some anarchists have characteristics of habitual criminals. It is clear how anarchistic fanaticism can influence pathological or neurotic minds, especially when suffering from poverty or injustice. Some anarchists are either criminals or insane, or both. Some are on the border line of insanity, of an

The fanatical anachists may be criminals by passion, who, having unstable natures, and being under the influence of unfortunate social conditions, as want of regular employment or poverty, are easily inflamed by anarchistic literature to such an extent that most terrible crimes can result.

PREVENTION OF ANARCHISM.

To lessen or prevent anarchism, in the opinion of some, can only be done by the prison or death penalty. This method may be the most effective for certain anarchists. But for anarchists who seem to be mentally abnormal, manifesting a lack of equilibrium or other signs of degeneracy, it is a question whether such severe penalty will contribute most to the good of society. For not only are many anarchists more or less mentally abnormal, but they have strong altru istic ideas. Many of this class are misled and hysterical. Some are voluntary suicides, because they commit crimes for which they expect to receive the death penalty, which they may regard in the light of martyrdom.

FANATICAL ANARCHISM. Fanatics and nervously diseased persons, instead of being suppressed by the severest punishments, have their altruist aberration and thirst for martyrdom increased. In every class of society there are always persons who admire anyone they believe to be a martyr. It is a pleasure for martyrs to be persecuted, to believe themselves victims of the arrogance, cupidity and perversity of men. For such anarchists the more severe the punishment the greater the glory. Some are honest fanatics, who never committed a crime before, but are blinded by political passion and, like the ancient martyrs, are only spurred on by the punishment of death. This fanatical class of anarchists-the most dangerous of all—are without emotional equilibrium, and unbalanced morally. This mental, emotional and moral state of disequilibrium is a stigma of degeneration. The fanatical dynamyter, who acts through perversity, will make every preparation to escape. But one who is obsessed with his idealism, knowing in advance the certainty of death, is not concerned as to his personal safety. History and human nature show that violence only tends to produce violence. This is specially true in the treatment of fanatics. When any ruler advocates violent methods or allows them to be practiced, in the solution of social questions, there is no better way of inciting anarchistic fanatics to direct their forces against him. For the idea of death only spurs them on to sacri fice themselves. There are always, in every country, a large number of minds with more or less anarchiste tendencies, which, if only latent, are liable to be awakened and developed by governmental violence. Thus Russia, France and Spain suffer most from anarchistic crime.

But it may be said that these countries have been forced to violent methods of repression by the anarchists themselves. But the most elevated classes, the most powerful and richest, who constitute the governing power, should follow reason and calmness, and not resort blindly to violence; for the electric chair and gallows have no terrors for the fanatic. Exile and deportation are, perhaps, the most ra tional methods of punishing anarchists.

In the case of anarchists who are monomaniacs, epileptics or mattoids, hysterical or obsessed, confinement in an asylum for the criminal insane might be effective. Martyrs are heroes; but the insane are ridiculed, and, as a rule, a man ridiculed is not dangerous.

Some countries are so wisely governed that an archy cannot take root in them. All countries might unite in the treatment of anarchism by such methods as having general photographs and measurements of all anarchists, and an international obligation to give notice as to their movements.

A palliative measure against anarchists, criminals by occasion, where criminality is due to poverty, contagion or passion, would be to remedy the chronic uneasiness and ill-humor of a country, which gives to anarchy its real base of action. The general disease should be attacked in its roots, from which arises the local disease.

SOCIALISM AN ENEMY OF ANARCHISM.

Socialism is one of the greatest enemies of anarchism, for it believes that neither bomb nor sword can accomplish anything; that the evils do not come from riches, but are the product of the present economic system. anarchist principles, by showing that every new political or economical form arises only after long preparation. Just as an epidemic strikes the poorest and most filthy places, so anarchy develops and becomes bold in countries badly governed.

Socialism indicates foolishness of

LAWS AGAINST ANARCHISM.

To what extreme laws should go against acts of anarchistic preparation may be questioned; but on the ground of the right of society to protect itself and in accordance with criminology, almost any extreme can be undertaken by society or government that tends to protect it from a dangerous enemy. However justifiable any extreme measure may be, it may not always be wise to enforce it, that is, it may not lessen the evil intended.

But it may be said to stop the publication of anarchistic ideas is to attack the liberty of the press. But liberty never meant absolute liberty, liberty is relative to the conditions. In the opinion of many there is too much liberty of the press already. If a certain degree of liberty is detrimental to society, or the State, the State has a right to stop it. This does not mean that extreme measures are always

necessary. But if temporarily necessary only to the preservation of the State, the State has a right to protect itself against them; it has a right to selfdefense. The State on this point should not hesitate for a moment. Against anarchists who are common criminals the laws should be exposed in the usual way. England, a country where crime is said to be decreasing, enforces its laws rigidly and promptly against all criminals alike. England is the one country most free from anarchistic crime, though many anarchists sojourn or reside there.

It is true that the severity of punishment against the fanatic criminal may vary in its effect, according to the individual. The severity of punishment will stop some. Others, as we have seen, will have their hatred of society increased, and their desire to become martyrs stimulated. But this is not sufficient reason for not enacting most stringent laws against anarchism. All human nature is the same, and many anarchists-perhaps a large majority-fear severe penalties. The fact, then, that a few of the fanatical anarchists would be encouraged to sacrifice themselves is no reason against stringent legislation. The probability is that this particular type of fanatical anarchist will carry out his crime without the least regard to stringency or laxity of law. But this type represent a very small number of anarchists.

127 A Street, N. E., Washington, D. C.

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Notes of Cases.

Testamentary Capacity-Undue Influence-Spiritualism.-In Steinkuehler v. Wempner, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana (May, 1907, 81 N. E. 482), it was held that mere belief in spiritualism does not, ipso facto, constitute an insane delusion, rendering the believer wanting in testamentary capacity. It was further held that where testatrix, a firm believer in spiritualism, consulted a medium the night before the will was executed and the following morning stated that her deceased husband had told her that contestants (her orphan grandchildren) would cause trouble, and that she would thereupon make a will and give them $1 each, whereupon proponent advised testatrix to "give them a dollar," and the two then went to the office of a lawyer, who drew the will by which testatrix bequeathed to each of the grandchildren such sum, whether such allcged spiritualistic revelations constituted sufficient undue influence to invalidate the will was for the

jury. The court said in part:

"It is well known that many of the clearest and brightest intellects have sincerely believed in spiritualism, mind reading, clairvoyance, witchcraft and other vagaries, and it cannot be said as a matter of law that such belief is the certain offspring or evi

dence of an unsound mind. A belief that spirits communicate with human beings through mediums is a conviction produced by some sort of evidence, and not a mere conception of a morbid fancy rising spontaneously in the mind, and so does not, ipso facto, constitute an insane delusion. This must be declared to be the legal status, in the abstract, of minds entertaining such beliefs, notwithstanding our own opinion that such pretended spiritual manifestations were correctly characterized by Vice Chancel lor Gifford in Lyon v. Home (L. R., 6 Eq. 655, 682), as mischievous nonsense, well calculated, on the one hand, to delude the vain, the weak, the foolish and the superstitious, and, on the other, to assist the projects of the needy and of the adventurer.' It is entirely legitimate and proper for the wife to seek the advice of her living husband, and after death to pay some regard to his known wishes in the preparation of her will; but when such pretended counsel comes through the dubious channel of a 'medium,' as an oracle from one possessing knowledge from the great hereafter, under the solemn surroundings of a seance, its influence upon a credulous mind can hardly be measured. The indulgence of such belief | and practices may be so long continued and of such a character as to affect the mental status. The conduct of the decedent with relation to this subject, shown by the evidence, was a proper matter for the consideration of the jury in connection with other evidence upon the subject of testamentary capacity. A mere belief in spiritualism may be harmless and of no concern to any one other than its possessor, but occult revelations ' 'cannot be permitted to control the practical affairs of this world, and the belief upon this subject and consequent conduct of the testatrix with reference to the making of her will was particularly relevant upon the question of undue influence. It appears that the instrument in question was prompted, to some extent, at least, by these spiritual communications, and it was the province of the jury under proper instructions to determine whether such revelations' constituted such undue influence as invalidated the will. (Thompson v. Hawks, C. C., 14 Fed. 902; Matter of Beach, 23 App. Div. 411, 48 N. Y. Supp. 437; Greenwood v. Cline, 7 Or. 18; Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14, 49 N. E. 197, 63 Am. St. Rep. 211, 40 L. R. A. 256.) The following cases are illustrative and discuss the law ap plicable to this subject: Matter of Spencer, 96 Cal. 448, 31 Pac. 453; Matter of Storey's Will, 20 Ill. App. 183; Whipple v. Eddy, 161 Ill. 114, 43 N. E. 789; Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa, 23, 15 N. W. 578; Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, 16 Am. Rep. 473; Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376, 36 Am. Rep. 422; MeClary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 175, 62 N. W. 501; Middleditch v. Williams, 45 N. J. Eq. 726, 17 Atl. 826, 4 L. R. A. 738; In re Smith's Will, 52 Wis. 543, 8 N. W. 616, 9 N. W. 665, 38 Am. Rep. 756, note 36 Am. Rep. 426."

Trover and Conversion-Demand and RefusalConfusion of Goods.-In Rabe v. Jourdan, decided by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (May, 1907, 102 S. W. 1167), it was held that where a purchaser of rings and gems from a thief had intermixed them with his own stock so that neither he nor the owner was able to distinguish them from the others, such act of commingling amounted to a refusal of the owner's demands for the goods. The court said in part:

"The first assignment of error complains that the verdict was against the evidence and contrary to the following instruction: 'If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff demanded from the defendant the goods that the defendant had purchased from the boy who had stolen same from the plaintiff, and you further find that the defendant refused, after said demand, if any, to give to the plaintiff said goods, then you are instructed to return a verdict for the plaintiff for the reasonable market value at San Antonio of the goods that you find from the evidence that defendant purchased from the boy who had stolen same from plaintiff; but, unless you do so find, your verdict must be for the defendant.' The facts that are assumed in this charge show that the sole issue was whether or not plaintiff demanded from defendant the goods he purchased from the boy, and defendant refused to give them to him. No other issue was requested to be submitted, and the correctness of the above charge is not brought into question. We have examined the testimony and ascertain that there was evidence which would warrant finding that the goods received by defendant were so intermixed with defendant's stock that defendant stated, when asked for them, that he himself was unable to select them. It is true that he says he told plaintiff to pick them out, and he would let him take them; but plaintiff testified he was unable to select them, and told defendant so. There can be no doubt that there was evidence of a demand, of a confusion of the goods, consisting largely of loose stones, with property of defendant, and of both plaintiff's and defendant's inability to identify and select them, which practically amounted to a refusal of plaintiff's demand for them, inasmuch as the result of the confusion of the goods was chargeable to defendant. The demand was sufficiently shown to be refused if it appeared that defendant had placed himself in a position that rendered compliance impracticable. For these reasons the first and also the third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

"The second assignment alleges that the verdict is against the evidence, and also contrary to the following clause of the charge: If you find from the evidence that the defendant offered plaintiff an opportunity to select and take the goods that defendant had purchased from the boy, who had stolen same from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed and refused to select and take his goods, then the plain

a

tiff cannot recover and your verdict must be for the defendant.' We are unable to say that the evidence shows conclusively that plaintiff had an opportuity offered him by defendant to take his goods, and failed and refused to do so. If, as appears from some of the evidence, plaintiff's goods had been so disposed of by defendant that neither was able to distinguish them, it cannot be said that an opportunity was afforded plaintiff to take them. The jury may properly have found that defendant did not in fact offer plaintiff the opportunity, although he may have said to him, 'Select your goods and take them.'"

Evidence Documentary-Carbon Copies.-In international Harvester Company of America v. Elfstrom, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota (June, 1907, 112 N. W. 252), it was held that the different numbers or impressions of a writing produced by placing carbon paper between sheets of paper and writing upon the exposed surface are duplicate originals, and either may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the other. On this point the court said:

"The remaining question relates to the reception in evidence of what the appellant claims was a mere copy of the contract without having first accounted for the absence of the original. This presents an interesting and somewhat novel question, but which, by reason of the introduction of labor-saving devices in modern offices, is liable to arise more frequently in the future. A sheet of carbon paper was placed between two sheets of order paper, so that the writing of the order upon the outside sheet produced a facsimile upon the one underneath. The signature of the party was thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface, or exposed, impres sion. In State v. Teasdale, 97 S. W. 996, 120 Mo. App. 692, it was held that a carbon copy of a letter was not admissible in evidence until the original letter from which it was made was accounted for. The signature would not under ordinary circumstances appear upon the carbon copy of such a letter. In Chesapeake, etc., Ry. v. Stock, 51 S. E. 161, 104 Va. 97, it was held that a carbon copy made at the same time and by the same impression of type may be regarded as a duplicate original of the letter itself and admitted in evidence without notice to produce the letter. We think this view can be sustained and that a clear distinction exists between letter press copies of writings and duplicate writings produced as was the contract in the case at bar. It is well settled that where a writing is executed in duplicate or multiplicate, each of the parts is the writing which is to be proved, because by the act of the parties each is made as much the legal act as the other. Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 148; Hubbard v. Russell, 24 Barb. N. Y. 408; Lewis v. Payn, 8 Cow. N. Y. 71, 18 Am. Dec. 427; Jackson v.

Dennison, 4 Wend. N. Y. 558; Barr v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 586; Weaver v. Shipley, 127 Ind. 526, 27 N.. E. 146; Cleveland, etc., Ry. v. Perkins, 17 Mich. 296; Phillipson v. Chase, 2 Camp. 110.) It is very generally held that a reproduction of a writing by a letter press cannot be considered as a duplicate. (Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1234, and cases there cited; Menasha Ware Co. v. Harmon, 107 N. W. 299, 128 Wis. 177.) The distinction between letter press copies and instruments produced by the use of carbon paper, as in this instance, seems reasonably clear and satisfactory. What makes two numbers of an instrument duplicates and equivalents is the fact that the legal act of the parties as consummated embraces them both. Letter press copies are produced by an act distinct from and subsequent to the consummation of the legal act of execution. It may or may not be the act of the parties to the contract. We know from common experience that such copies are ordinarily produced by the labor of clerks and other employees, and that the results are not always satisfactory. But all the numbers of a writing which result from the completion of the legal act of the parties, although aided by mechanical devices or chemical agencies, meet the requirements of origi nals. If the reproduction is complete, there is no practical reason why all the products of the single act of writing the contract and affixing a signaturethereto should not be regarded as of equal and equivalent value. In this instance the same stroke of the pen produced both signatures. The argument that the recognition of these instruments as duplicates would encourage fraudulent practices does not touch the principle involved.”

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Among the Late Decisions.

The immunity of national securities from State taxation is held, in Home Sav. Bank v. Des Moines, Advance Sheets U. S. 1907, p. 571, to be violated by a tax imposed under the authority of a State statute drecting that shares of stock of State banks shall be assessed to such banks, and not to individua' stockholders, the substantial effect of which is to require taxation upon the property, not including the franchise, of such banks, and to adopt the value of the shares as the measure of the taxable valuation of such property, without permitting any deduction from such valuation on account of bonds of the

United States owned by the banks.

The right of the Legislature, under its police power to forbid the discharge of unpurified sewage into a river from which a public drinking supply is taken, is sustained in Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills (N. C.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 321, although no injury to the public health or comfort is actually shown.

The right of a riparian owner to project jetties

into the stream, even to protect his own land, is denied in Morton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (Ore.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 344, if the effect is to deflect the current or shoal the water to the injury of a lower proprietor.

The State of Kansas, having recognized the right to appropriate the waters of a stream for irrigation purposes, subject to the condition of an equitable division between riparian proprietors, is held, in Kansas v. Colorada, Advance Sheets U. S. 1907, P. 655, not to be entitled to enjoin Colorado from diminishing the flow of the Arkansas river by appropriating its waters for purposes of irrigation, which has resulted in reclaiming large areas of arid lands in Colorado, while the influence of such diminution, though of perceptible injury to some portions of the Arkansas valley in Kansas, has worked little, if any, detriment to the great body of the valley.

Soliciting through its district freight and passenger agent in Philadelphia freight and passenger traffic for a railway company incorporated in Iowa and having its eastern terminal at Chicago is held, in Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., Advance Sheets U. S. 1907, p. 595, not to be doing business within the eastern district of Pennsylvania in such a sense that process can be served upon the corporation there.

A bank for whose benefit a note is taken in the name of its president, and which has always had exclusive ownership and possession of it, is held, in Best v. Rocky Mountain Nat. Bank (Colo.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1035, to be entitled to maintain an action thereon in its own name as the real party in interest, notwithstanding the statute provides that an action may be maintained by a trustee of an express trust, which will include a person in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another.

The right of an alien husband to take an estate by the curtesy in land of which his wife died seized is sustained in Cooke v. Doron (Pa.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659, under a statute providing that aliens shall be capable of taking by descent lands within the State, in the same manner as citizens may do.

The wounding of one while shooting at another with intent to kill is held, in State v. Mulhall (Mo.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630, not to sustain a prosecution for shooting the former with intent to kill, under a statute providing that every person who shall shoot at another with intent to kill such other shall be punished.

Whether or not a bank receiving and crediting to a depositor a check on another bank is entitled to enforce it as owner is held, in Fayette Nat. Bank v. Summers (Va.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694, to depend upon its having been the intention of the parties

overdraft.

The secretary of a local branch of a fraternal society, charged with the duty of collecting the assessments on benefit certificates issued by the grand lodge, is held, in Trotter v. Grand Lodge, I. L. of H. (Iowa), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 569, to be the agent of such lodge with respect to the business of such collections.

The promise of a clerk of a local camp of a mu tual benefit society to notify the representatives of an insane member of assessments is held, in Sheridan v. Modern Woodmen of America (Wash.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973, not to bind the society so as to prevent its claiming a forfeiture of the certificate for non-payment of dues, notice of which is regularly mailed to the member, although no notice is given to the representatives according to the promise, where the laws of the order provide that no act on the part of the clerk shall have the effect of creating a liability on the part of the society, or of waiving any right belonging to it.

The right of a mutual benefit society to amend its by-laws so as to increase the assessments on its members, where the existing rate has proved inadequate, is sustained in Reynolds v. Supreme Council R. A. (Mass.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1154, under charter authority to provide for the payment of a certain death benefit, to be secured by assessment, and to provide for the amendment of its by-laws.

Where it appears that there is usually a large crowd at a particular station to take a particular train, and that there have been on many occasions surging and struggling to get upon the cars, it is Boston & N. Street R. Co. held, in Kuhlen v. (Mass.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729, that the jury may find the carrier negligent in failing to anticipate such occurrences, and take precautions to protect intending passengers from injury therefrom.