Then you are obliged to refuse the $10,000 cash retainer and to decline the employment. you could pay off the debt and retain your property? You know you would not, and neither would the rich man himself, if he were in the debtor's shoes. Again, if you would do justly and love mercy you cannot be an instrument of oppression in the hands Certainly you are, but your criminal practice is of a rich client; and you will note well that the rule apt to be extremely limited. But are you justified in accepting the cash retainer and setting up such defense as you believe to be honest; to be just; to be true? What defense, then, is a criminal lawyer justified in making? The answer is, every defense which is just; honest; true and right. The very foundation of our system of jurisprudence and government is justice according to law, and that is what the criminal is entitled to have, justice according to law; for it is better that nine guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should be unjustly punished; and the criminal lawyer has a right to demand that the entire truth shall be presented in the facts, and that after this has been done, his client, if convicted at all, shall be convicted according to law; and here it might be well to remark that the law is just as much enforced under a judgment of acquittal as under a judgment of conviction. Let us take another concrete example, and this time from the civil practice of the law. Let us suppose that the richest man in the county has loaned another citizen money and taken a mortgage upon all the goods and chattels and hereditaments and appurtenances and choses in action and franchises and things tangible and rights intangible, and, in fact, a mortgage upon everything except the man's soul; and that the debtor has had great misfortune and sickness and trouble, and is temporarily unable to pay; and that the rich man, whose friendship and favor and patronage is valuable to you, a lawyer, comes into your office and demands that the debtor be pursued in terms of the law; that the mortgage lien be foreclosed; that the debtor's property be forced upon the market, purchased by the creditor for one-tenth of its actual value, the amount of the execution sale be credited on the debt, and judgment held over the debtor for the balance remaining unpaid, although at a fair valuation the mortgaged property is double the amount in value of the debt; and the rich man tenders you $1,000 as a cash retainer to do this act. What does the code of legal ethics require? Shall you accept the retainer and keep the patronage and favor of the rich man, or shall you return the retainer, lose all the business which this rich man might give you, and incur his personal enmity and dislike? Let us apply the two rules given. Treat others as you like them to treat you. If you were in the debtor's shoes and temporarily embarrassed financially, would you like to have the mortgage lien foreclosed, and your property sacrificed, when by a delay of three months or six months does not read, thou shalt do justly or love mercy; but that you must do both things-you must act justly and love mercy. Now justice according to law would, perhaps, warrant your filing foreclosure proceedings and absolutely sacrificing the property of the debtor; but the rub is, that you must also love mercy; and mercy is the quality of being compassionate toward an of fender or adversary, and willing to spare or help him; and, therefore, under the rules you must decline the $1,000 retainer and refuse to take the case. But must no debtor be pursued according to law, and must no debt be paid? Certainly, the debt must be paid, for the debtor also is required to act justly, and to treat others as he would like them to treat him; and it suffices to say that as these rules apply to every case, so each man according to his own conscience must fit the rules to each individual case as it arises; nor must any other man assume to sit in judgment upon him, for he alone and no other is responsible for his own actions, in the day of judg ment. What is the duty of the lawyer in regard to abetting quarrels and provoking litigation? For instance, I will suppose that you are consulted by a husband who has plenty of money to spend in litigation and would like to get rid of his old wife and marry a new and younger one; in a case like this a client is apt to feel that he will not permit money to stand in the way of his wishes. You consult with your client carefully and ascertain, as a matter of fact, that he has no statutory ground for divorce; however, the client insists upon your bringing suit and says that he will furnish the evidence himself, although you know from your confidential relation to your client that this evidence must necessarily be manufactured. What is the duty of the lawyer in such a contingency? Well, he must treat others as he would like them to treat him; and in this particular event he might treat, in his mind, the wife of the client as though she were his own daughter. Again, the lawyer is required to act justly, and this means to be honest; to do right; and this train of reasoning would compel the lawyer to decline the employment; and generally in all cases where the client seems to be desirous of bringing unjust law suits, or to be malicious or anxious for revenge, it would appear to be the duty of the honest lawyer to decline employment in such litigation. Again, suppose you are consulted by a client who is rich and well able to pay; and upon discussing the case with him you feel that your client is entirely wrong and that if he brings suit he will undoubtedly lose. Should you candidly and honestly tell your client what you believe, or should you assure him that the law is proverbially uncertain, that he will as likely as not win, and that he ought to litigate. In this case you have to consider that you must act justly, and that means honestly and truthfully, and it would appear that in all such consultations you must frankly and fully advise your client that to the best of your judgment and ability he has no case. Let us suppose, as another example, that you have just collected $5,000 for a non-resident client, who is spending three months abroad; on the day that the collection is made you can remit the $5,000 in New York exchange to your client's home office, and the same will be deposited to his credit; on the other hand, your client knows nothing of the collection, and, as he is abroad, is not likely to know anything about it until he returns, three months from then; and in your judgment the wheat market or the cotton market is bound to advance in price; so that by investing temporarily the $5,000 of your client, you feel quite sure you can make $10,000, and when your client comes back you can remit him his $5,000, and you can have $5,000 to your own credit, without having done your client any harm. Query: Are you justified in using your client's money in this way, when you make $5,000 by the transaction and your client is done no injury? Would you like some friend of yours to collect $5,000 of your money and then, without your consent, invest it in cotton futures or wheat futures? You know you would not. Then you cannot use your client's money, for you must treat him as you would like him to treat you; and then, besides, you might lose, because the market might not advance but might accidentally decline; and then, perhaps you would not be able to return the $5,000 of your client's money; and if you could not repay him that would not be honest; and by the rule you are required to do justly, that is, to be honest. And from the above example we may deduce the general rule that money collected on account of a client should be remitted to that client on the day of collection. Another case: Let us suppose that you have been consulted for years by a client who has, naturally, confided to you his most confidential business affairs, and has consulted you, both in your office and on the public highway; when you had a specific retainer and when you had no specific retainer; sometimes consulting you as a lawyer and sometimes merely as a friend and confidential adviser. You finally fall out with this client, and he retains other counsel; and you quite naturally think that where your personal knowledge, obtained when your former client was your friend, would be of great advantage in the pending suit. Query: Are you justified in any way in acting upon such private information and personal confidence, to the injury or disadvantage of your former client? Again apply the rule: Treat others as you like them to treat you. Would you like a person in whom you at one time had reposed confidence to betray that confidence, because you had quarreled? You know you would not. Again, you are required to do justly; and that is to be honest; to be true. Is it honest to betray a confidence because you have a private grievance? Is it being true to a friend to betray private confidences, because you have later quarreled with him? Tested by these rules you will see that whatever may happen, you cannot betray the confidences that were reposed in you as a lawyer, no matter how you may try to silence and quiet your own accusing conscience by specious reasoning. Consider that you are consulted by a client, who has about half a million dollars of assets and about one million dollars of liabilities, which are just obligations. Some day this client consults you and tells you that while he appears to be a very rich man, yet his liabilities are twice his assets; that he is now getting along in years, and that he believes that his first duty is to his wife and to his children; and that he considers the duty he owes to them, to support them in the luxury and style to which they have been accustomed, is superior to the duty which he owes to pay his honest debts; and this client sug gests to you, that if, out of the wreck, you can save $200,000, you can have $100,000, and he will take the remaining $100,000 for the support of himself and his family in his declining years. Are you justified in accepting this case and assisting your client to deceive his creditors as to the true state of his affairs, by fraudulently conveying the property of the client to his relatives, kinsmen and friends; by converting personal property into ready cash and concealing the cash; by permitting your client to make false statements to the bankrupt court; and, generally, by devious ways and means forcing the creditors to accept thirty cents on the dollar in full of all obligations, because out of the $500,000 of assets you have succeeded in concealing $200,000, thus leaving only $300,000 to pay $1,000,000 of liabilities. Are you justified in assisting your client in this manner, when personally you make no false statements, and merely obey the instructions of your client. Well, let us apply the rules. You are required to your client is entirely in the wrong. Finally, you act justly, not only toward your client, but toward the creditors; that is, you are required to be honest; are retained against your former client in a case to be upright; to be true, toward the creditors as well as toward your client. Again, you are required to treat others as you would like them to treat you. If you were a creditor would you like some lawyer to treat you as you propose to treat the creditors. If you were a creditor, would you consider that such a lawyer was upright and true? Would you consider that such a lawyer was acting justly and honestly? The answers to these questions will answer the suppositional case, and will indicate that no lawyer can be a party to such a transaction. Let us discuss the lawyer at the bar of the court by a consideration of certain specific cases. The statute law requires that when a lawyer files a motion, it shall be noted on the motion docket and that all parties connected with the case must take notice thereof. Let us suppose you have filed your motion and at the same time it has been noted on the motion docket, that the matter is one of importance, and that when the motion is called your adversary is not present to be heard, because you never have furnished him with any copy of the motion and never have notified him in any manner that you have filed the motion, or that you will call the same up for hearing. Are you justified in going ahead and submitting the motion? Let us test this matter by an applica tion of the rules. And you are also required to treat others as you like them to treat you; and no one would be more indignant than you, should your adversary proceed to hear a motion, without giving you some personal notice. It thus again appears that you cannot go on with the motion. Some fine morning you go into the court room with your client and witnesses, all ready to try your case; you have already carefully gone over the jury panel and have decided that it is a very favorable panel for this particular suit; but when the case is called for trial, although two members of the opposing law firm are present in court, it appears that the particular member of the firm who has prepared this case, and is the only member of the firm at all familiar with either the law or the facts, is sick at home, and cannot personally conduct the cause; or it appears that his wife is so dangerously ill that he does not feel that he can leave her bedside; or that his mind is so distracted by the serious illness of a child that he does not feel that he can properly try the case. Upon all these facts being presented to your client he insists that you try the case now, because he sees clearly that with a favorable jury panel and in the absence of the one lawyer on the other side who knows anything about the case, he will surely win. What is your duty upon the above state of facts? You are required to act justly toward your client, but you are also required to love mercy, that is, to show compassion toward your adversary; and you are also equally obligated to treat your adversary lawyer as you would like him to treat you, from which consideration it appears that if you would not like your adversary to proceed against you in a similar case, you cannot now proceed against your opponent; and if you would not like your client to be proceeded against in a similar case, you must not now proceed against your adversary; and you must never think that you can successfully throw off upon your client the responsibility of your own mean action and escape the odium thereof. Let us assume, as another example, that you are arguing a general demurrer in a case involving $30,000, and that you know there is a long line of authorities supporting your contention; but suppose you know, on the other hand, that there is one authority by a very eminent court absolutely adverse to your position; you have made a long argument and have presented all your authorities to the trial judge, who, apparently, is very much inclined to hold against you. In your argument you have said nothing about the adverse decision by one of the most learned courts in the land. You sit down. Your opponent attempts to answer you, but in his argument utterly fails to cite the strongest case in his favor. At the conclusion of your address the court turns to you and inquires if you know of any case or cases which conflict with the law as stated by you in your opening argument. Query: What is your duty to the court, as a sworn officer of that court? By the rules you are required to act justly toward the court; to be honest with the court; to be upright with the court; and you are required to treat the court as you would like the court to treat you, if your positions were reversed, and you were attempting to do justice according to law. In view of these rules it would appear that you are compelled to advise the court of the adverse decision, although your client should thereby lose his suit. With regard to the elemental consideration of courtesy and politeness toward the court, toward opposing counsel, opposing witnesses, and the adverse party: You have but to apply the rule, to treat others as you would like them to treat you; and as this world is much like a looking-glass, the chances are that if you treat them as you would like them to treat you, they will treat you as you would like to be treated. whole basis of legal ethics, I know that these rules are absolutely right. As to the application I have made of the rules, I may be entirely wrong; and every lawyer must apply the rules according to his own judgment, as he alone is responsible for his own actions in the forum of conscience. : 0: ers Protected by Labor Legislation. Comparatively few persons have any idea of the great and noble work that is being done by the legis lative bodies of the different States in the interest of the working women of this country. But what about the lawyer doing his full duty by his client? Well, this may be said about that proposition: That the oath of office, taken by a lawyer in Texas, is that he will honestly demean himself in the practice of law, and will discharge his duty to his client to the best of his ability, but it is Morals, Health and Rights of Woman Worka great mistake to suppose that the lawyer owes no fidelity to any one except his client; and no lawyer ought to represent any client in any case in a matter which is contrary to the dictates of his own conscience; for if he honestly demeans himself in the practice of the law, then he must be honest, not only with his client, but with the court, with the jury, with the witnesses; with the lawyer opposed to him, and with the adversary party; for there is no limit in the oath which he takes when he is admitted to the bar; and this oath that he will demean himself honestly in the practice of the law means no more than the command of Micah to do justly. It will not be contended, I think, that a lawyer's fidelity to his client demands that he lie for his client, or steal for his client, or swindle for his client, or, prepare fraudulent papers for his client, or make false statements of either the facts or the law for his client. In my view of the profession of the law, the lawyer is not a hired mercenary; nor a hired blackguard; nor a hired vilifier of the other side; but rather he is to be compared to the noble knights of the Middle Ages, who were professional warriors in the interest of truth and justice; who donned their armor and fought their battles, after due notice, in the open; their oath was to conquer or die on the field of honor, but they were to conquer in a fair and open fight. Again, the lawyer may be looked upon as a professional duellist, who sends a challenge to his enemy, naming the time and place of the meeting, and with courtesy and courage defeats his adversary in an open, fair conflict, if he can. It is not an open, fair fight that offends against legal ethics, for the hard fighter at the bar is always respected by his brethren; but the lawyer who is justly condemned is the one who appoints a time and place for the contest, and then secretly ambushes and waylays his adversary in the dark and stabs him in the back. I have given only a few instances to show the application of the rules, where ten thousand instances might be given, and will continually occur in the practice of the law. It may be truthfully said that there is seldom a regular session of a State Assembly that does not enact some law which affords greater protection for these fair workers. According to the last government census, there are 5,333,000 women in the United States who are enployed in gainful occupations. Of this vast army, 2,100,000 are employed in domestic and personal service, 1,316,000 in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, 981,000 in agricultural pursuits, 504,000 in trade and transportation, and 432,000 in the professional service. These figures certainly speak words of highest praise for the ambition and courage of the working girls and women of our country; women who are ready and willing to go forth and brave the hardships of the world of labor along with the millions of men toilers. Looking at these figures again, it seems but just and right that the "law makers" of every State should strive to enact many more laws which will benefit these working women. Surely the members of the general assemblies of the States could not devote their energies to a grander or better cause than the enacting of laws which will demand that a working woman be accorded the same respect in the shop as she is accorded in the street, or at her own home. Of the numerous laws enacted of this kind, a great many were made for the purpose of protecting the morals of working women, many others are used to protect the health, while others are used to protect their rights. The laws of the former class are very numerous and varied, therefore only a few of them can be mentioned in this article. Those laws which forbid the employment of women in selling or handling intoxicating drinks or working in places where they are sold or handled are perhaps the best example regarding the morals of female workers. Under the laws of Louisiana, women may not be employed in selling, distributing or taking orders for intoxicants in saloons or concert halls; the State As to the rules which I have cited as forming the laws of Missouri forbid the employment of females as servants, bartenders, waiters, dancers or singers in a dramshop, or any place where spirituous liquors are sold (members of the family, however, are excepted); females cannot be employed in any place where intoxicants are sold in Washington and Iowa; women may not be employed on premises or in rooms in which a liquor license is operated in the State of Vermont (hotels, common victualers and drug stores excepted). In New York and New Hampshire it is unlawful to permit any girl or woman to sell or even serve liquor, members of the family in New York being excepted. Michigan has very strict laws in this respect. No female can act as barkeeper or serve liquors, furnish music or dance in a saloon or bar-room where intoxicants are sold; although in Maryland the law applies to the city of Baltimore only. Here it is unlawful to employ females in theaters, museums or other places of amusement for the purpose of “ selling, serving, receiving orders or pay for spirituous or malt liquors, wines, lager beer, etc." The Territory of Alaska also forbids the use of women to dispense intoxicating liquors. It will be seen that nine States and one Territory have strict laws in this case. These laws are ideal in every respect, and could be copied by the remainder of the States to great advantage. Another law which deserves great praise, is the State law of Delaware, which makes it a misdemeanor for any foreman, "straw-boss," superintendent or any overseer or boss, to use abusive, indecent or profane language to a female employee, or to maltreat her or to expose her unnecessarily to hardship. even The laws relating to health of working women are more numerous than those pertaining to immoral occupation, or occupations which tend to lower the morals. Under this class may be mentioned laws governing hours of labor, laws governing night work, laws regulating the employment of females to work in dangerous occupations, and general health laws. Limitations have been placed upon the number of hours per day, or per week, that women may work in manufacturing, mechanical or mercantile establishments in 18 States and one Territory. Although these laws generally specify the number of hours per day in which a woman can work, they usually provide that, where time has been lost on account of repairs, etc., or to allow for a shorter day at the end of the week, additional hours may be used, but in no case must the time amount to more than that allowed for a week's work. In the State of New York females cannot be employed in factories over 10 hours per day, or 60 hours per week. No female between the ages of 16 to 21 years can be employed over 10 hours per day, or 60 hours per week, in any mercantile establishment, exceptions being made for the holiday season. Colorado has enacted a law which limits the hours of labor of females in factories, mechanical and mer cantile establishments to eight hours per day. There is also a law which provides that a woman cannot be employed over eight hours per day where the nature of their work requires them to stand. In Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota and Oklahoma a woman may work as many hours as she may wish, but in none of these States can they be compelled to work in manufacturing or mechanical establishments over a specified time. In Wisconsin it is eight hours per day, and ten hours per day in the other three States. Women 18 years of age, and over, may work longer than 10 hours per day for extra pay in the State of Maine, but in no case is it permissible to work over six hours extra in one day, or 60 hours in one year. In Maryland these laws do not cover so wide a scope as in other States. They simply provide that a woman cannot be worked over 10 hours per day in cotton and woolen manufactories. Following is a summary of the laws of this nature, giving the number of hours in which females may be employed. The first column of figures are by the day, the second column by the week: Colorado.. Connecticut. Louisiana. Maine (exceptions).. New York (exceptions). 8 Employment of females for night work has been considered seriously by five States. In Nebraska women or girls cannot be employed in any manufac turing or mercantile establishment, hotel or restaurant before 6 a. m. or after 10 p. m. The State law of New York prohibits the employment of females in factories before 6 a. m. or after 9 p. m. Females between the ages of 16 and 21 may not be employed in mercantile establishments before 7 a. m. or after 10 p. m., exceptions being made for Saturdays and for the holiday season. Of all the States, New Jersey has the prize law of this class. The hours in which a female may work in the factories of this State are from 7 a. m. to 12 noon, and from 1 to 6 p. m., every working day ex- |