131 U. S. 88, 97, 9 Sup. Ct. 658, 33 L. Ed. 67; Park & Sons Co. v. Nat. Wholesale Druggists' Assn., 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136, 62 L. R. A. 632, 96 Am. St. Rep. 578; Standard Fireproofing Co. v. St. Louis Co., 177 Mo. 559, 76 S. W. 1008; Victor Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424, 61 C. C. A. 58; Heaton-Peninsular Co. v. Eureka Co., 77 Fed. 288, 25 C. C. A. 267, 35 L. R. A. 728; Central Shade Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353, 9 N. E. 629; Good v. Daland, 121 N. Y. 1.)" : 0: ter rendered necessary the addition of several new The author of this work, who is Colonel, JudgeAdvocate, U. S. Army, and also fills the post of Professor of Law at the United States Military Academy at West Point, has prepared it to meet the existing necessity at the United States Military Acadthorough outline of the science of military law, inemy for a text-book which should give a clear and cluding all recent changes and developments, and yet be contained within such brief compass as to be adapted for use in instruction of cadets within the limited period assigned to the study of the subject. The work also aims to deal with the general pro NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. Commentaries on the Law of Contracts. By Joel Prentiss Bishop, LL. D. Second Edition, revised and enlarged by Marion C. Early, of the St. Louis Bar. Chicago: T. H. Flood & Co. 1907. This is a second edition, revised and enlarged, of the incomparable work of Mr. Bishop. During the twenty years this work has been in the hands of the profession, it has been, perhaps, more extensively used by lawyers, and more frequently cited in and by the courts than any other volume on the subject of contracts. By common consent, almost, Mr. Bishop's work has been from the date of its practical value to the service at large. From such publication facile princeps. Mr. Early, in the pres-examination as we have been able to give to the work we are convinced that the author has succeeded will speedily take a foremost place as an authoritaadmirably in his self-imposed task, and that the book tive exponent of the science of military law. Homans' Self-Propelled Vehicles. New York: Theo. Audel & Company. 1907. ent edition, has in the main followed the plan and cedure of courts-martial and to constitute a text of This is one of the most complete and valuable works on the subject of self-propelled vehicles yet published. No phase of the subject has been neglected. On both the theoretical and practical sides it is singularly complete and satisfactory, and while scientific and accurate in statement, it is not so rigidly technical as to be beyond the comprehension of the ordinary reader. The text is illustrated and supplemented with a wealth of cuts and diagrams. Taken altogether, it is a book which should be kept for ready reference by every member of the rapidly increasing army of automobile owners. The Pure Food Law. By Arthur P. Greely. Washington: John Byrne & Co. 1907. This is a critical study of the Federal Food and Drugs Act, written from the standpoint of the trained lawyer. The full text of this important act is given, together with annotations, rules and regulations, food inspection decisions and official food standards. It constitutes a practical guide for the manufacturer, packer, wholesale dealer, jobber and retailer of food, drugs, medicines or liquors; giving the best available information on the many and often puzzling questions arising under this important act. Commentaries on the Constitution of Pennsylvania. By Thos. Raeburn White. Phila: T. & J. W. Johnson Co. 1907. Mr. White has performed a distinctly valuable service in preparing this excellent edition of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. Going to original sources, and sparing no pains, he has produced a work which cannot fail to be of lasting value to all students of constitutional government, wherever located. The Government of India. By Sir Courtenay Ilbert. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1907. are: This is a revised edition of a book published in 1898, and is a digest of the statute law relating to the government of India, with historical introduction and explanatory matter. The chapter headings Historical Introduction, Summary of Existing Law, Digest of Statutory Enactments Relating to the Government of India, Application of English Law to Natives of India, and British Jurisdiction in Native States. The work throughout is scholarly, painstaking and remarkably accurate. By Right Divine. By William Sage. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1907. The author of "The District Attorney" and other popular novels has here given us a vigorous romance of love and politics of the present day. The story deals with the struggle between a United States Sena "One word more, please, before I go." I am, I know, not one of the former class, and, candidly, I believe I am not one of the latter class. The remark of a bibulous gentleman on entering a church during the service may illustrate my position on this occasion. The preacher was discussing that great question, Who will be the sheep and who the goats on the last, great day? The first words that fell on the ear of the new arrival were "Who will be hte goat?" The question is an awful one, and to make it more impressive the preacher halted, "Who will be the goat?" he repeated, following the question with another long, impressive silence. The drunken man rose and answered, "Wall, parson, sooner than see the whole dum show stopped, I'll be the goat." I will not, however, myself make the application here, and I will not allow another to do so in my presence; I will not stand for it. I was a black sheep a long time, but I draw the line now on the goat. There is a companion story for this one; the two go together, and being inseparable, I must tell the other. A stump speaker, holding forth in the mountains of North Georgia, reached his climax by loudly inquiring, "And what do you think?" Instantly a man rose, looked the speaker squarely in the face and that if you and I were to stump the country together we would tell more lies than any other two men in the country-and I would not speak a word during the whole time." tor and a young Governor for political supremacy in replied: "I think, sir, I do, indeed, sir—I think their native State, and is complicated by the love of the Senator's daughter for both of the contestants. The setting affords opportunity for strong emotional situations. The book has a well-constructed plot, is full of stirring incidents and a denouement which is original and unexpected. It is written in the same crisp style as The District Attorney." 66 : 0: A Justice of the Peace-A Justice Court-A Justice Court Lawyer-A Justice Court Law. (By EUGENE RAY, of Columbus, Ga.) Do you ask why a title of such great length? I answer that these subjects are so insignificant and of such trifling consequence, I was ashamed to appear here with one, two or three of them; and even with the entire quartet as my topic for this occasion, I feel that I am engaged in the smallest business I ever undertook in my life-justice courts, justice court lawyers-a small business indeed! I am not quite at ease on the occasion. A noted divine has said that we are a nation of speakers and talkers, that when a man is born and gets fairly on his feet, the first thing he does is to say, "Fellow citizens," and that when a woman has gone through life and is about to take her departure to those ethereal realms where all women go, she exclaims, I would congratulate the committee for having done away with the program of talk, talk, for the sake of talk, and substituting a program of talk and business combined. This committee is the physician prescribing for the association as did a doctor for his lady patient: "You need only rest, ma'm, just rest." Of course no woman on earth would be satisfied with that prescription. Why, it only would make her sicker at least more hysterical. This lady answered: "But, doctor, you look at my tongue." "It needs rest, too," the M. D. quietly informed her. As an evidence of my appreciation of the innovation in the program, I will spend my opinion and make a few observations on at least two subjects in the symposium presented by the committee. I will proceed to do that before taking up the long, small subject at the head of this article. Indeed, as one of a profession that does things according to forms, I gave this offspring of mine a head for the sake of form, not a big head, if you please, but a long one. There are several reasons why I will not confine my remarks to my subject. In the first place, I do not have to; and, secondly, I realize that twigs and branches always outgrow and outspread the oak it- Why, it is a law merely for the purpose of allowing self-it is easy to branch." 66 I presume we all have our individual views on the divorce question. I have mine; I believe in divorces. If everybody, high and low, learned and ignorant, infidel and Christian, must at some time, somewhere, ask the question, whether marriage is a failure or not, isn't that pretty good evidence that often it is a failure? Marriage being a contract, why, as a matter of principle, may not those entering into the contract rescind it if the bargain is not a bargain at all, but a downright swindle? so, It is said that marrying is a leap in the dark. If and those doing the leaping do not land safe, may not the disappointed one have the opportunity to climb out, and even be allowed to try it again? We are taught that it is a virtue to try again if the first effort is not successful. Why this exception? But I admit the question is one of that great number that has two sides; and to those that are opposed to divorces I have to say that at last there has been suggested a remedy for the evil, if, indeed, it is an evil. An English author and philosopher advocates a separation after ten years of married life. This plan has merit aside from the fact that it is the most effective remedy yet suggested for the "divorce evil." It would be a nice sort of an arrangement, when the old wife, faded and wrinkled, has to have repairs—a new set of teeth, a head of new hair, and other improvements requiring an expenditure of cash, you may simply say: "Ah, old woman, my time with you is up; I put you on notice that you must get a new home. Good-bye, I wish you well. I think you should ever be thankful that I have lived with you as long as I have; you'll never find another man who will stay with you as long as I have." Before I take up my own subject, I must relieve my mind of its burden of opinions on the third question. "Should the appearance term be abol ished?" Courts are the only things in the world not run on business principles. You file suit on a man, the consideration of which is five hundred dollars cash loaned the defendant. It has been long due and the debtor has not even shown any desire to settle. Under the law he has anywhere from six months and twenty days to almost a year to devise some scheme by which to delay you, to manufacture soine sort of plea, however frivolous it may be, and you must wait that long before you may even ask for judgment in the case. And, strange to say, even if he has no defense, and files no plea, you are still delayed that length of time. It seems to me that such a condition of affairs is a reflection on the intelligence of the Legislature that first enacted the law, and on the people for not having compelled its repeal. a defendant time to ascertain if there is not some scheme by which he may delay the plaintiff's action, although the latter is just and righteous. Suppose you are sick abed with fever, and send for a physician, who replies that he will call within twenty days. When he comes he rolls out some pills for you. "Take these," he directs, "take these now, and six months from now take a dose of caster oil. Six months later, or twelve months from to-day, take a few doses of quinine. In a few years you will be up and all right again." At first I thought that this parallel was not exactly parallel, not a pertinent illustration; but on second thought I was satisfied with both. Let me illustrate a little further. If you owe me two hundred dollars, and will not pay the debt; I need the .money so bad, your failure to pay makes me sick, and I institute suit. The court is the physician, and the judgment of the court and its execution are the remedy. I think you will see now that it is a fair illustration. It is not unusual for a man to throw down all other business that he may give his attention to some important matter that to put off would be disastrous. If a debtor, after being sued, wishes to make a defense, let him prepare it and come into court at once, even to the neglect of all other business. Business is business in the courts as well as elsewhere. Give a defendant five days' notice and require him, at the expiration of that time, to appear in court. If he shows good cause for a postponement, the court will grant it, just as it will now. But if he have no defense, tell me why five days are not sufficient time to give him? In my judgment, there isn't anything more absurd than the allowing to a defendant six months and twenty days in all cases, and even several months more in many cases, when he has no defense to make, and makes none. Courts should be in continuous session. There is no more reason for doing the legal business of the country in "jerks and spells" than there is in doing any other business at certain stated periods. The officers of the State and county had as well have terms for attending to the business of their offices as a court should have terms for the disposition of litigation. Courts should, I repeat, be in continuous session. We should be required simply to write the following notice to be served on the defendant by the proper officer: "I hereby notify you I have this day instituted in the Superior Court, suit on a note, a copy of which is hereto attached. On Monday next I will demand that the court enter judgment against you." We have all written duns; I have written some that I believe had literary merit and some that-well they are not fit for publication. We all write them. What are the contents of these billet-doux? Something like the following: "If you do not call and settle this claim within five days, I will institute legal proceedings." Why may we not, in the second letter, indite the following: "I have sued you, and if you do not call and settle within five days I'll take a judgment against you." It's the irony of fate that after threatening a fellow with suit within five days, if we carry out the threat, we can't collect a penny in five months. at once became silent. "I wish to thank you for the information you have just given it." The Columbus lawyer was not satisfied with the speech his associate had made in the case. He said he would not make the concessions and admissions that his foreign attorney had made. And he had more to say, criticising that poor fellow's speech, and closed his ninety-minute address with the statement that if their client lost the case the other counsel would be responsible for that disastrous result. The court gravely observed to him that, after all, it was the court's opinion that the other counsel in the case possessed one virtue he himself did not have. "What is that, sir?" he asked the court, in loud tones and a sort of menacing manner. 66 It should be the same in the justice courts-allow a limit of only a few days. Some of the States allow only three. Bring me your claims, your accounts for meat and bread, your bill for services rendered as attorney, as physician, as dentist, your claim for clothing and hardware, etc. I'll give the defendant five days' notice; that will be my first gift; my second gift will be to you, a judgment; and my next gift will be another to the defendant, the "dickens." That would be business, in my humble judgment. I believe that these inferior courts are neglected anything to aid the court in determining your pro by those in a position and with the authority to make them effective for good. It is unfortunate that the Legislature of the State gives them no considera tion. Perhaps the chief reason there have been no revisions of the rules affecting these courts and of the laws that they oftenest are called upon to enforce and apply, is the demagoguery in our law-making body. I recall that once a young man and lawyer, whose intelligence and legal learning were far above those possessed by most young men of his class and profession, and whose prospects for promotion in political and civil life were promising, and who did in fact attain to fame in Georgia, wrote me, in reply to a request I had made that he endeavor to have changed a statute as it now stands, that he did not think the change I suggested would be "popular" with the people. The next time I met him I told him I admired his frankness and honesty; and that I thought those two virtues of his compared favor ably with those of a certain lawyer who appeared in the court over which I have the honor to preside. This lawyer was associated in the case with counsel of my own bailiwick, city of Columbus. He was from a foreign State, and had about him a pitiable and doubtful air. His clothes were seedy, his stiff hat was of a green hue-possibly a symbol of that part of the man's anatomy which it was constantly nearest his eyes were sad and watery, as if he had just taken a boo-hoo," or would soon indulge in one, his steps were unsteady, and the whole manner of the man was uncertain. He began his address with the declaration: "I am a lawyer; I come from a State" "Hold a minute, sir," the court demanded. He 'Well, he is a frank and honest man, sir. At the outset he informed the court that he is a member of the legal profession, a lawyer. You have stood and performed, speaking more than an hour and a half directly to the court, and you have not done or said fession." But probably the most interesting and remarkable colloquy this court ever had with the parties to a case was one in which there were no counsel. I was trying an old colored washerwoman, who was charged with larceny. The particular charge in the case was that she had failed to return certain articles of a weak clothing, among which was a pair of lady's hose. The latter insisted that the pair of hose was not delivered to her. The court asked the husband if it were not possible he overlooked the pair of hose. Continuing, the court philosophized thus: "Those stockings being soiled and with nothing in them, you likely didn't notice them as carefully as a man would ordinarily." But the fellow insisted that the pair of hose had been included with the clothes. So there I was. I didn't want to put the poor old black mammy in jail. Both sides had closed, and I had no idea what the truth was. I hesitated. Fin ally a bright idea was born in the mind of the court. To the old black mammy I said: "Have you got on any stockings?" "Yes, sir, I is," she indignantly answered. "Let me see them," the court modestly requested. “Those are my stockings, Judge," the lady vehemently put in, the moment the old woman's stockings were on exhibition. On hearing the claim the lady made to the stockings, the old black mammy proceeded at once to make a speech in her own defense. They's not yours; I bought dese stockings at -," and she continued at such a rapid rate the lady could not get in a word; and evidently unwilling to be outdone she screamed out: “Judge, I'll show you," and she proceeded forthwith to show me. The court very promptly silenced the old darkey. "Let somebody have the floor; sit down-everybody sit down," the court spake with emphasis. Some rascal whispered, "There is something in them now." After a comparison of some length, the court was convinced that the two pairs of hose were the same quality and the property of the lady; and under the testimony and with the exhibits, the court easily reached a decision. The law I referred to in my communication to my legislative friend, and in which I am still interested, is that statute on garnishments exempting certain wages, etc. By taking it up here I am, I realize, not proceeding with my subjects in their regular order; I am taking up the last one first. There are not, of course, strictly speaking, any justice court laws. But there are a few, less than half a dozen, statutes we are called upon to interpret in a justice court at every term. This garnishment law is one of them. Leaving out the ordinary suit, there are in the justice courts more garnishment proceedings than any other, perhaps, than all others combined. Of all fool laws in the Code of Georgia and I speak with earnestness-this exemption statute, section 4732, Volume 2, of the Code of Georgia, is without an equal. If you are not willing to take my judgment, read it. "All journeymen mechanics and day laborers shall be exempt from the process and liabilities of garnishment on their daily, weekly and monthly wages." Do day laborers receive weekly or monthly wages? Who is a day laborer? Is it one that works for a fixed sum daily? If so, how can he be one receiving a fixed sum weekly or monthly? But that inconsistency is trifling compared with the inconsistencies in the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court on this garnishment exemption question. Day laborers are exempt. Who are laborers? The Supreme Court has evidently found it difficult to determine who is a laborer or day laborer. For instance, that court has declared a locomotive engineer to be one of the laborers mentioned in the statute. A conductor on a train is not one of them. I can not understand by what process of reasoning it reached the conclusion that the engineer who sits in his cab holding on to his levers and trying to hold on to his engine is a laborer whose wages are not subject, and at the same time reached the conclusion that the conductor who, at the various stations runs in and out of his caboose, runs hither and thither from one end of his train to the other, superintending the loading and unloading of it, and occasionally taking a hand in transferring the very heavy pieces of freight, is not a laborer and his wages are subject to the process and liabilities of garnishment. I am not 'criticising that court, no, no, not I. I sometimes overrule the superior court, but I haven't yet acquired the habit of overruling the Supreme Court. I have not gotten that far yet. Of course, I will in time overrule the Supreme Court. I have never seen a justice of the peace who did not overrule all the courts in the land. No doubt the Supreme Court, in construing this particular statute, has done the best it could with a law that means nothing and may mean everything and anything. Who are laborers? Everybody except vagrants; that's the only answer. The Supreme Court has held that a drummer or commercial traveler is not a laborer, and his wages subject, while it has also held that a clerk of a railroad president, receiving twenty-five hundred dollars a year, is a laborer and his wages not subject. It is, therefore, clear to the mind of any intelligent man that this statute should not be amended, but should be repealed. A law should be passed subjecting a part and exempting a part of every man's wages, whether he is a locomotive engineer or a commercial traveler, whether he is a railroad president or an Irish ditcher, whether he is a cook or a milliner. If a man digging in the streets receives a hundred dollars a month, a part of his wages should be subject to garnishment and applied to the payment of his debts. A greater part of his earnings should be so applied than there should be of the earnings of a bookkeeper, whose wages are only half as much. This thing of exempting or not exempting of one's wages should be based on the amount of his wages, and not on the character of his labor. Everybody that does not live in absolute idleness labors to some extent. I wished at the outset to criticise two or three other statutes, but I would cheerfully stop here, if I only knew that through this humble effort I have started a movement the result of which will be the repeal of the exemption part of the garnishment law and enacted in its place one such as I have indicated, subjecting a part of every man's salary. The fee system is an obstacle in the path of justice. If the costs in a case has accumulated to a large sum, comparatively, and the court needs the moneyand there was never a J. P. who didn't need it and who isn't out after it-if he is not an honest man and an upright judge, he will render a judgment that will enable him to collect his cost. And even an honest man and an honest judge may unconsciously be biased by his own interest or he may be so scrupulous, so solicitous lest he err under the influence of money he will render a wrong judgment and also lose the cost. |