and at second hand. For us it is somewhat difficult to estimate the full extent of its influence in its own day, seeing that so much of it has naturally, by the passage of time, become obsolete. But men like Fox, Sir William Jones, Gibbon, and Lord Mansfield were loud in its praise, and even Bentham, who set himself to demolish much of its reasoning and to point out its many flaws and shortcomings, recognized Blackstone as "the first of all institutional writers who taught jurisprudence to speak the language of the scholar and gentleman; put a polish upon that rugged science; cleansed her from the dust and cobwebs of the office." In these words of Bentham we find the key to Blackstone's influence; his ability to present in orderly form and in language bearing the stamp of style "the lawless science of the law." To have accomplished this was no slight merit. He attracted readers, whereas his predecessors in legal authorship usually repelled them by their lack of arrangement and their uncultured style. But Blackstone did more than this; he set a high standard for his successors in legal authorship to strive after, and, although comparatively few of these have been able to attain unto it, yet the body of legal literature as a whole has been considerably raised-a result largely traceable to the author of the Commentaries. Hitherto, we have been dealing with the influence of his work on law and its exposition as a whole; here is an instance of its influence exerted on an in-, dividual-on one who was destined to play a mighty part in the destinies of our kin beyond sea. We refer to Abraham Lincoln. One of the numerous

employments to which, as a young man, Lincoln turned as a means of livelihood, was that of keep ing a store in a little country town in the States; and it was during this period of his career that Blackstone crossed his path and profoundly influenced his after life. How this came about, Lincoln tells us himself in these words: "One day a western emigrant stopped at my store and asked me to buy a barrel of odds and ends of little value, for which he had no room in his wagon, with his family and household plunder. I bought it and put it away, and never thought of it again until one day, rearranging things, the stuff turned up. I found a two-volume copy of Blackstone's Commentaries. I devoured them, I assure you, and I never read anything which so profoundly interested and thrilled me. Soon after that I began the study of law, and that is how I came to be a lawyer." As one of his biographers has said, "The reading of Blackstone's Commentaries was the shock which crystalized all the results of Lincoln's omnivorous reading into one coherent unity. This chance purchase of Blackstone determined his career." But for this seeming accident it is probable that Lincoln would never have

reached the Presidential chair, and quite conceivable that his country would have been permanently dismembered! If Blackstone's great work could give unity and purpose to the life of such a man as Lincoln it accomplished much; its influence was potent for good.

Jeremy Bentham, the next great name in order of date to that of Blackstone, differed radically from the author of the Commentaries in his outlook on life, and in particular in his attitude towards English law. Bentham scorned Blackstone's easy optimism, derided and demolished much of his theory and reasoning, although, as we have seen, compelled to acknowledge the high quality of his work from the literary standpoint. Bentham's mission was destructive, and his mission was necessary; here it was that he made his influence felt. Mr. Bryce has said that Bentham was "the first man who had the courage to denounce the artificialities, absurdities and injustices of the unreformed law and procedure of England. No small part of the credit for the reforms which Romilly, Brougham and their fellowworkers carried out belongs to the man who had begun to call for them full thirty years before.” Referring to his important book, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, the late Sir James Fitzjames Stephen said that "it might be compared to a shell bursting in the powder magazine of a fortress, the fragments of the shell being lost in the ruins which it has made. The main object of the book is to show that rules tending to the exclusion of evidence must be pernicious, and with some exceptions Bentham proved his point, and with immense advantage to the cause of truth and justice. One only of the rules which he attacked still survives, and I do not think it will do so long. This is the rule which excludes the evidence of accused persons in most cases, but the exceptions already made to it are fatal to its principle." As we all know, that last surviving rule of those which were the target for Bentham's attacks succumbed in 1898 by the passing of the Criminal Evidence Act of that year. But Bentham's influence was by no means limited to his own country; on the Continent, especially in France and Spain, his name was even more honored than it was here, many of his writings having been first given to the world through the medium of the French language. A curious testimony to his influ ence in Spain is furnished by Borrow in his fascinating book, The Bible in Spain, where he tells how in the course of his wanderings through the peninsula at the time of the first Carlist war (18351838), he was arrested in the remote district of Galicia, near Finisterre, on the supposition that he was none other than Don Carlos himself, and on this charge taken before the Alcalde of Corcuvion, who, of course, being an educated man, was easily satis

haps, but with a common object and under a common code, the practitioner finds himself alone, acting merely as to him may seem good.

Disappointment, too, is waiting in other directions. The student has hoped to study principles, and finds instead he must learn a large number of more or less chaotic decisions. The practice of the law, he has imagined, would be the application of those principles to affairs. He discovers, however, that he must devote himself to obtaining the mastery of technicalities and to the avoiding of verbal pitfalls; for these will be his chief practical duties. Instead of considering whether facts or the words of documents are within principles which have been honored and accepted, and advising his client accordingly, the practitioner has rather to investigate constructions placed on words and phrases, and to decide whether by any subtlety the facts or words before him may be narrowed or stretched so as to receive a similar construction or to avoid it, as may be desired. Whether it be against the grain or not, which depends upon his desire to do right being stronger or weaker than his wish to do what will please his client, he finds that justice and righteousness are not the touchstones to be applied, for these are lost sight of in a mass of arbitrary and technical rules, which may be twisted, perhaps, to his client's advantage. Often he is overwhelmed by a feeling of weariness, if not of disgust. Law is supposed to be glorified common sense. It should indeed be the expression of something at least as high as the average sense of mutual rights and responsibilities; but there appears to be some justification for the public conception of it as unreasonable and unpractical, and for the taunt that its practitioners thrive on its imperfections and fatten on its technicalities.

It is, of course, clear that, however laws may be framed, some will for their advantage strive to evade them; and, as only by special knowledge can this be done, so lawyers will always be found who will exert themselves to devise methods of action and draft documents which comply with the letter of the law, little caring whether or not they accord with its spirit. But this does not account for the whole of the mischief. It is to be feared that even the judges are no guiltless of looking to the letter rather than the spirit of the laws they administer; unwittingly it may be, but none the less certainly. Hard cases, we know, make bad law, and occasionally one hears judges expressing regret that they cannot decide as they wish, but are bound by previous decisions to rule against their better judgment. Still is it true that "hide-bound precedent" and rigid adherence to formulas whose only sanctity is that of age, are often the basis of judgments that do not justice. No one who has had a legal training is likely to

underestimate the danger of allowing judges to be laws unto themselves, but there is surely a middle course to be steered between the Scylla of " precedent" and the Charybdis of "substantial justice."

A large proportion of litigation is doubtless the result of the bad draftsmanship of statutes and documents. The habit of exact phraseology is one to be admired and aimed at, but at its worst it is a fetish whose worship does harm to more than the worshipper; and the training of the practitioner in this form of worship is largely responsible for the result.

The most important part of the law of England is not, however, to be found in the statute books. It is the growth of ages, the result of innumerable actions developing into customs and ultimately becoming fixed into rules; and here lay the danger, in that the rules became too narrow and inelastic, from which fact arose equity, whose object was to mitigate the rigor of the common law. But, like many another healer, it has partially failed by itself succumbing to some of the ills it endeavored to cure. Equity in practice should be the application to the affairs of mankind of the highest ascertained principles of justice, giving relief from the harshness of ancient doctrines, and extending or modifying them, as may be found good in the light of the experience and progress of generations. But equity itself became almost as harsh and hide-bound as its predecessor, so that the courts which formerly had the exclusive privilege of its administration were a byword and reproach amongst the people; and the much-vaunted fusion of law and equity has not yet resulted in the disappearance of all the faults of either.

It is easier to point out defects than to suggest remedies, and the writer has no intention of attempting to propose practical cures. For he believes that improvement will come, not so much by amendment of systems as by a change of ideas. The profession has become a caste, and it has the faults of all castes. It is bound up in its own methods and precedents, and looks on law too much as a business and too little as a science. Even as a science the study of law is separated unduly from life. The student races after the shadow, and misses the substance. Words and phrases are not of importance, except in so far as they embody ideas and principles, and there is an ever-present danger, not often avoided, of looking so to the words that the ideas are lost, and the words themselves become of supreme and undeserved importance. Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing of religious thought, has suggested that words by long user and association attain a certain magnetic in fluence and become "polarised," and that it is necessary they should from time to time be changed and depolarised, so that by the use of new words the

ideas may have again their due prominence untrammeled by use and custom. It has not been sufficiently recognized that legal thought and legal terms have been similarly affected, and that the necessary changes must be suggested and initiated by those who have expert knowledge. The objects of statutes are presumably dependent on the will of the people, but the responsibility for their form rests largely on law yers. Equity as a system has been, and still is, to a considerable extent, moulded by the judges. The present-day students and practitioners are the future judges and administrators, and the nature of their training and their manner of practising must inevitably determine the way in which justice will be dispensed in the days to come. The study of the law requires humanising, and its practice needs idealising. Now that legal education is so prominent a subject of discussion, and means are no wanting, it should not be too much to hope tha some method will be found by which students may be impressed and continually influenced by the knowlelge that law is not a system of rules only but one of the noblest of sciences; that its practic is not merely a means of livelihood, but an aid to right conduct between man and man. Not merel a means of livelihood-though it must be that Every workman is worthy of his fee; but, as Ruski said, the good workman puts the work first and the fee second. He who puts the fee first and the work second is no true workman.

Essentially, law is ethics, and its practice is ap plied morality. The great need of our profession is that this truth should never be suffered to be los sight of, and to this end our leaders must them selves always recognize it, and from time to tim declare to their brethren, and commend with elo quent words, the high duties and privileges of their calling.-Law Times (London).

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The Legislature of Pennsylvania. The Legislature met on January 1st, at noon, that being the first Tuesday in January. The House or ganized by the election of Frank B. McClain, of Lancaster, as speaker, and the Senate by electing Cyrus S. Woods, of Westmoreland, as president pro tem. Both houses then adjourned until January❘ 15th, when the serious work of the session will begin.

This is the era of reform, and the coming session promises to be, in some respects, one of the most important in the history of the State. A few of the more important bills which will probably be introduced are as follows:

To establish two-cent fares and the right of trolleys to carry freight; to divorce the ownership of

coal mines from coal transportation; to enforce the provisions of the State Constitution relating to transportation companies, both canal and railway; to create a railway commission; to regulate traffic within the State; to recover State ownership in canals; to limit the duration of franchises hereafter granted; to lay a tax upon the franchises of public service corporations, modeled somewhat after the law of New York; to define the liability of employers for injuries to employees; to amend the Personal Registration Law by shortening the hours during which registrars must sit and to define more specifically the authority of the registration commissioners and the county commissioners, and to correct the existing act in certain other incidental matters; to amend the Uniform Primaries Law; to enact a ballot law which will simplify the present cumbersome ballot by providing a uniform system of voting for individual candidates and which shall contain a provision to prevent the bribery of voters by doing away with assistance, except in cases of physical disability or inability to read.

A constitutional amendment is also in contemplation which will do away with the requirement of the payment of taxes as a qualification to the right to vote, as is also a constitutional amendment to simplify the election system by abolishing the February election and providing that State officers and local officers shall be elected in alternate years.

Bills are also to be introduced to abolish assessors in Philadelphia and provide for assessment by the registrars; to improve the administration of the criminal law in Philadelphia by providing a separate criminal court; to establish a separate juvenile court; to make it a misdemeanor for the owner of property knowingly to permit it to be used as a disorderly house; to define more specifically the duty of magistrates, enlarge their jurisdiction, and provide for the keeping of records; to enlarge the functions of the grand jury, giving it power to inquire into offences of a public nature, and to subpoena witnesses and find bills of indictment on the evidence obtained; to provide for the decennial reapportionment of the city of Philadelphia into wards and reduce the number of representatives in city councils; to extend the Shern Law to all counties; to give more liberal support to schools and charities; to establish and support institutions for consumptive poor; to extend the list of legal securities for the investment of trust funds; to provide for the collection and maintenance of a reserve fund by trust companies, State banks, banking corporations, savings banks and savings institutions incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth of at least 15 per cent. of the aggregate of demand deposits, and 72 per cent. of the aggregate of time deposits; to provide for the taxation of shares of stock of trust

companies, etc., incorporated under the Act of April 29, 1874, and its supplement approved June 27, 1905, on the basis of 5 mills upon their actual book value; to prohibit domestic and foreign corporations that receive deposits, execute trusts or act in surety for the performance of any duty or obligation for any person, firm, corporation or public officer, except in the course of proceedings in courts of record, other than criminal courts, or for executors, administrators, receivers, sequestraters, assignees, masters, committees, guardians, trustees or other fiduciaries appointed by or directly answerable to a State or Federal court of record.

This last act was recommended by the Pennsylvania Bar Association at its last meeting, and will be set out in full in The Legal Intelligencer of July 6, 1906 (15 District Reps. 490, etc.).

A brief summary of the reasons for the passage of such an act will be found in The Legal Intelligencer of June 22, 1906 (15 District Reps. 446, etc.).

It is sincerely to be hoped that the Legislature will bear in mind the fact that the value of the session will be determined by the quality of the work rather than the mere number of acts passed; that it will "make haste slowly," and that no bill will become a law until the subject has been thoroughly threshed out and its character and probable operation are clearly understood.-Legal Intelligencer (Phila.).

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For Jury Reform.

The Bar Association, the Law Institute and the Civic Federation have joined hands to secure a reform in our present system of securing juries. Through a joint committee they have formulated the draft of a bill which will be presented to the next general assembly with their indorsement.

In this enterprise the three associations have rendered a distinct public service. Such a reform has long been needed. The Shea case only serves to emphasize the need. The initiative in matters of this kind must inevitably come from outside the legislature, and when there is a united indorsement by associations of standing such as those behind the present plan, action by the legislature can be secured with comparative ease.

We cannot hope to see citizens liable to jury serv ice accept their duty willingly so long as it is apt to place a most unreasonable burden upon them. Make the conditions of service reasonable and the juror who falsely asserts that he is prejudiced to such an extent as to bar him from service will be come the exception rather than the rule.

The proposals for changes in the law will be discussed in detail by judges and lawyers who can esti

mate their merits and defects. Especially should the judges of the Cook county bench cause their opinions to be known. It is, indeed, one of their constitutional duties to make recommendations on changes in the law of just such a character as this. The judges of the Supreme Court are under constitutional obligation to make a report to the governor before the first of January on any defects in the laws which they may deem in need of cure. Chicago would thank them for a little aid in this matter, which, while of interest to all the State, is of special interest to it.-Albany Argus.

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The Endless Chain.

His

In accordance with the request of Judge Patterson, the presiding justice of the Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department, Governor Higgins has designated an additional justice to sit with that division of the judicial establishment. choice has fallen on Justice John S. Lambert, of the Eighth judicial district, an able and well qualified jurist, against whom, personally, no criticism can be made. His selection adds one more to the large number of Republican judges who are serving outside the districts in which they were elected, and in Democratic territory, by the appointment of Republican governors.

In many cases, which might be remarked, there has been the added impropriety of a direct and active machine partisan manipulation, to procure such assignments; this does not exist in Justice Lambert's case, we think.

Last winter, when the matter of additional justices for the various judicial districts was pending in the Legislature, it was freely admitted by the papers in the Eighth judicial district that there was no real necessity whatever for any more judges in that district, and that, in fact, if all the judges were to return to duty in the district where they were elected, there would be not enough for all of them to do.

SO

many

in the

The State Bar Association, after taking into account the artificial judge-famine created in the Eighth judicial district by the assignment of of its to work justices metropolis, reported in favor of allowing one additional justice to that district, under the constitutional amendment of 1905. Finally, in the closing hours of the session, and after the Senate had in fact adjourned sine die and separated for the last time, and hours after the fixed time of final adjournment, a bill was jammed through the Assembly by the influence of the State administration, creating two more justiceships for the Eighth district.

This was by no means a permanent solatium to the many lawyers who aspire to the bench; and they