Psychology - William James - Google Libros

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nated acts, 140. Necessity for guiding sensations in secondarily

automatic performances, 141. Pedagogical maxims concerning

the formation of habits, 142.

Analytic order of our study, 151. Every state of mind forms

part of a personal consciousness, 152. The same state of mind

is never had twice, 154. Permanently recurring ideas are a

fiction, 156. Every personal consciousness is continuous, 157.

Substantive and transitive states, 160. Every object appears

with a 'fringe' of relations, 163. The 'topic' of the thought,

167. Thought may be rational in any sort of imagery, 168.

Consciousness is always especially interested in some one part

of its object, 170.

The Me and the I, 176. The material Me, 177. The social

Me, 179. The spiritual Me, 181. Self-appreciation, 182. Self-

seeking, bodily, social, and spiritual, 184. Rivalry of the Mes,

186. Their hierarchy, 190. Teleology of self-interest, 193.

The I, or 'pure ego,' 195. Thoughts are not compounded of

'fused' sensations, 196. The 'soul' as a combining medium,

200. The sense of personal identity, 201. Explained by iden-

tity of function in successive passing thoughts, 203. Mutations

of the self, 205. Insane delusions, 207. Alternating person-

alities, 210. Mediumships or possessions, 212. Who is the

The narrowness of the field of consciousness, 217. Dis-

persed attention, 218. To how much can we attend at once?

219. The varieties of attention, 220. Voluntary attention, its

momentary character, 224. To keep our attention, an object

must change, 226. Genius and attention, 227. Attention's

physiological conditions, 228. The sense-organ must be

adapted, 229. The idea of the object must be aroused, 232

Pedagogic remarks, 236. Attention and free-will, 237.

Different states of mind can mean the same, 239. Concep-

tions of abstract, of universal, and of problematic objects, 240.

The thought of the same' is not the same thought over

Discrimination and association; definition of discrimination,

244. Conditions which favor it, 245. The sensation of differ-

ence, 246. Differences inferred, 248. The analysis of com-

pound objects, 248. To be easily singled out, a quality should

aiready be separately known, 250. Dissociation by varying

concomitants, 251. Practice improves discrimination, 252.

The order of our ideas, 253. It is determined by cerebral

laws, 255. The ultimate cause of association is habit, 256.

The elementary law in association, 257. Indeterminateness of

its results, 258. Total recall, 259. Partial recall, and the law

of interest, 261. Frequency, recency, vividness, and emotional

congruity tend to determine the object recalled, 264.

recall, or association by similarity,' 267. Voluntary trains of

thought, 271. The solution of problems, 273. Similarity no

elementary law; summary and conclusion, 277.

THE SENSE OF TIME

The sensible present has duration, 280. We have no sense

for absolutely empty time, 281. We measure duration by the

events which succeed in it, 283. The feeling of past time is a

present feeling, 285. Due to a constant cerebral condition, 286.

What it is, 287. It involves both retention and recall, 289.

Both elements explained by paths formed by habit in the brain,

290. Two conditions of a good memory, persistence and nu

P

merousness of paths, 292. Cramming, 295. One's native re-

tentiveness is unchangeable, 296. Improvement of the mem-

ory, 298. Recognition, 299. Forgetting, 300.

conditions, 301.

What it is, 302. Imaginations differ from man to man; Gal-

ton's statistics of visual imagery, 303. Images of sounds, 306.

Images of movement, 307. Images of touch, 308. Loss of

images in aphasia, 309. The neural process in imagination,

Perception and sensation compared, 312. The perceptive

state of mind is not a compound, 313. Perception is of definite

things, 316. Illusions, 317. First type: inference of the more

usual object, 318. Second type: inference of the object of

which our mind is full, 321. 'Apperception,' 326. Genius

and old-fogyism, 327. The physiological process in percep-

tion, 329. Hallucinations, 330.

The attribute of extensity belongs to all objects of sensation,

335. The construction of real space, 337. The processes

which it involves: 1) Subdivision, 338; 2) Coalescence of differ-

ent sensible data into one thing,' 339; 3) Location in an en-

vironment, 340; 4) Place in a series of positions, 341; 5) Meas-

urement, 342. Objects which are signs, and objects which

are realities, 345. The third dimension,' Berkeley's theory of

distance, 346. The part played by the intellect in space-per-

What it is, 351. It involves the use of abstract characters,

353. What is meant by an essential' character, 354. The

'essence' varies with the subjective interest, 358. The two

great points in reasoning, 'sagacity' and 'wisdom,' 360. Sa-

gacity, 362. The help given by association by similarity, 364.

The reasoning powers of brutes, 367.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND MOVEMENT

All consciousness is motor, 370. Three classes of movement

to which it leads, 372.

Emotions compared with instincts, 373. The varieties or

emotion are innumerable, 374. The cause of their varieties,

375. The feeling, in the coarser emotions, results from the

bodily expression, 375. This view must not be called material-

istic, 380. This view explains the great variability of emotion,

381. A corollary verified, 382. An objection replied to, 383.

The subtler emotions, 384. Description of fear, 385. Gene-

sis of the emotional reactions, 386.

Its definition, 391. Every instinct is an impulse, 392. In-

stincts are not always blind or invariable, 395. Two principles

of non-uniformity, 398. Enumeration of instincts in man, 406.

Description of fear, 407.

Voluntary acts, 415. They are secondary performances, 415.

No third kind of idea is called for, 418. The motor-cue, 420.

Ideo-motor action, 432. Action after deliberation, 428. Five

chief types of decision, 429. The feeling of effort, 434.

Healthiness of will, 435. Unhealthiness of will, 436. The

explosive will: (1) from defective inhibition, 437; (2) from

exaggerated impulsion, 439. The obstructed will, 441. Effort

feels like an original force, 442. Pleasure and pain as

springs of action, 444. What holds attention determines ac-

tion, 448. Will is a relation between the mind and its

Volitional effort is effort of attention, 450. The

question of free-will, 455. Ethical importance of the phe-

nomenon of effort, 458.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

What the word metaphysics means, 461. Relation of con-

sciousness to the brain, 462. The relation of states of mind to

their 'objects,' 464. The changing character of consciousness,

466. States of consciousness themselves are not verifiable

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