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being brought into force were fulfilled when three of the Great Powers, namely France, Great Britain, and Italy, had ratified it by the middle of October. The formal deposit of ratifications, from the date of which the Treaty would actually come into force, was, however, delayed for two reasons:

1. To enable all the preliminary arrangements to be made for taking over the administration of the surrendered territory and plebiscite areas, as well as for the transport thereto of the troops intended as garrisons;

2. To obtain the signature by Germany of a Protocol to the Peace Treaty, the object of which was twofold, viz. :

(a) To safeguard the execution of certain unfulfilled conditions of the Armistice, the expiration of which would otherwise leave the Allies without legal redress in the matter.

(b) To obtain reparation for the scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, an unforeseen breach of the Armistice, which, by reason of the date and circumstances of the incident, was unprovided for in the terms of any other instrument.

This Protocol was duly drawn up and communicated to the German Government on the 1st November, with a request that a German Delegation should be sent to Paris with plenary powers to sign the Protocol and to settle, with the Representatives of the Allies, the details of the execution of the clauses of the Peace Treaty, which would have to be carried out immediately on its coming into force. Herr von Simson arrived in Paris, as the head of the Delegation, on the 25th November.

These incidents coincided with the non-ratification of the Peace Treaty by the American Senate. This was followed by an immediate change in the attitude of the German Delegates, who stated that they were obliged to return to Berlin to consult their Government regarding the terms of the Protocol, and the arrangements proposed by the Allies for the administration of the Areas of Occupation, although these were well known to the German Government at the time when the Delegation left Berlin. A series of Notes and verbal communications from the German Government through Baron von Lersner then began, in which:

1. The German Government endeavoured to secure the



repatriation of the German prisoners of war in French hands without reference to the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, and to obtain a modification of the Clauses of the Treaty concerning the surrender of guilty persons, in compensation for the possible absence of American Delegates on the various Commissions;

2. Objection was raised to the final paragraph of the Protocol, by which the Allies had reserved the right to use military measures in the enforcement of their demands;

3. A refusal was made to the demand for the surrender of 400,000 tons of floating docks, etc., in compensation for the loss of the German fleet at Scapa Flow, responsibility for the destruction of which was not admitted.

The counter-proposals of the German Government were considered by the Supreme Council in consultation with their naval and military advisors, and on the 8th December a Note was presented to Baron von Lersner for transmission to the German Government, which though not prescribing a time limit, was virtually in the nature of an ultimatum.

It maintained:

1. That there were no grounds on which Germany could base a claim for any modification of the Treaty on account of the possible absence of American Delegates from the various Commissions. France would automatically liberate her prisoners as soon as the Treaty came into force.

2. That the Allies still adhered to the terms of the Protocol regarding the reparation due by Germany for the destruction of their Fleet in Scapa Flow, but that they were prepared to examine in an equitable spirit any claims put forward by Germany that such reparation would seriously affect her ability to satisfy her legitimate needs, having in view the economic condition of her ports.

3. That from the time when the signing of the Protocol and the deposit of ratifications brought the Treaty into force, the execution of the clauses of the Protocol would be guaranteed by the general provisions of the Treaty as well as by the usual methods recognized by the law of nations.

Up to that time the denunciation of the Armistice would give the Allied Armies every latitude as regards the military measures that they might consider necessary.

The German Reply to the Allied Note was received in Paris on the 15th December. It was couched in conciliatory terms, and stated:

1. That the German Government desired to remove the misapprehension according to which it claimed the right to alter the conditions of peace regarding the surrender of guilty persons and the repatriation of prisoners of war in view of the temporary absence of the United States representatives from the Commissions provided for in the Peace Treaty. The German Government had never made its consent to the coming into force of the Treaty dependent on the previous settlement of this question.

2. That in view of the explanation given of the meaning of the final paragraph of the Protocol concerning the coercive measures to be used in certain eventualities, the German objections to the paragraph no longer held good.

3. That the German Government was ready to pay compensation for the sinking of the German warships at Scapa Flow, but was not in a position to do so in the manner provided in the Protocol. She was willing at the same time to submit detailed proposals regarding compensation, which, although involving a very heavy burden in Germany's present state, was yet not incompatible with her vital interests.

This German reply practically ended the matter. On the 10th January ratifications were formally exchanged and the Treaty came into force. The repatriation of German prisoners in France began. M. Clemenceau on the same day addressed a letter to Baron von Lersner, in which he informed him that the Allies did not desire to injure the vital interests of Germany, but that the 192,000 tons of dock materials, offered by the German Government as a complete settlement, must be handed over at once. The balance of the Allied demand was about 200,000 more tons, and, as there might have been a mistake as regards the 80,000 tons of floating docks at Hamburg, a new inquiry would be held. The Allies would then be disposed to reduce their total demands to 300,000 tons, or even below if the necessity for reduction is shown by convincing argument'. All such tonnage, when the amount was finally fixed, would have to be handed over in thirty months. This letter marked the final stage of what had threatened to be a most serious


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incident. It seems evident that the Allied original demand for 400,000 tons of floating dock material was excessive, but the German Government's attempt to evade their obligation was most serious in view of the non-ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate. The Allied Governments felt that the authority and prestige of the Conference were at stake and acted accordingly. The situation was a grave one, but the Allied offer to compromise as to the amount of material to be surrendered enabled the German Government both to save its face and to give way. The German Government accepted in principle the demand for compensation for the sinking of their interned fleet, but obtained a guarantee of substantial reduction of the amount demanded; on the other points raised in this last diplomatic duel the German Government gave satisfactory replies and assurances. Consequently from this final contest as to its authority the Conference emerged victorious. When the final judgment is taken it will be seen that the Conference procured the disarmament of millions of men and enforced their authority over a great country which they never held by effective military occupation. In the main the points, on which the Conference had to give way, were those on which the interpretation of articles in the agreements was difficult, or where the obligations entered into by Germany were such as she could not practically carry out. Even in such cases as that of the Baltic Provinces the Conference eventually enforced its will. On the whole, as regards Germany, it is the success, and not the failure, of the Conference to enforce its will which should arouse notice.

13. Hungary. Armistice Difficulties. No better instance than that of Hungary could perhaps be chosen if it were desired to find an occasion for criticizing alike the basis, that is to say the Armistice terms, on which the Supreme Council endeavoured to base its control of an enemy Power pending the conclusion of peace, and the illogical policy which resulted from the nature of that basis.

The origin of many of the difficulties which took the Conference so long to solve was the unsatisfactory Armistice concluded on the 3rd November 1918, between representatives of the Italian Supreme Command and the Supreme Command of what still called itself the Austro-Hungarian army. According to the solemn declarations of the spokesmen of the peoples which composed it, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had ceased

to exist; not only had the Poles, Czechs, and Yugo-Slavs proclaimed their independence, but the two sovereign peoples of Austria-Hungary themselves, the German-Austrians and the Magyars, had, during the preceding ten days, by solemn acts fully representative of the population, and, in the case of Hungary, with the constitutional consent of the King, pronounced respectively for full independence. It might have been argued that the Austro-Hungarian army was still in existence, and that it was necessary to treat with it as an entity. Unfortunately, even on this basis the Armistice must be considered in the highest degree unsatisfactory. Based as it was almost entirely on the particular desiderata of Italy, it, in fact, satisfied Italian requirements only. Consequently, the question of Hungary was covered only by such general clauses as the right of Allied armies to move freely over, and to occupy, all such places in Austro-Hungarian territory as they should consider necessary.

A further Military Convention relating specifically to Hungary was consequently necessary, and on the 13th November such a Convention was signed at Belgrade on behalf of General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in South-east Europe, by Voivode Mishitch (the Serbian Chief of Staff), and General Henrys on the one hand, and by the delegates of the new Hungarian Government on the other. This Convention provided for the occupation of a specified zone of Hungarian territory, the right to extend this occupation wherever it might be thought necessary, and the demobilization of all the Hungarian forces except six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions.

Drawn up as it was by the Franco-Serbian Command, this convention took sufficient account of Serbian requirements; and allowed the Serbs to occupy an area in the south of Hungary which exceeded not only the boundaries they received under the Treaty, but which even went beyond their territorial claims. The same, however, was not the case with regard to the territories in which the new Czecho-Slovak State and Rumania were respectively interested.

14. Difficulties between Rumania and Hungary, November 1918-March 1919. Rumania had re-entered the war only on the 9th November, and consequently had not participated in the final hostilities on the Hungarian front. Little account was therefore

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