ceives, that have been neglected; the difference between sense and perception, and the form of light. By perception, which he says resides in almost all natural bodies, he seems to mean nearly the same thing that in modern chemistry is called elective affinity; although he also confounds with that some of the effects of gravitation, of heat, and even of the principle of vegetable and animal life. In regard to light, he complains that its radiations have been treated of, but not their origin; and this and other defects he traces to the treatment of perspective as simply a branch of the mathematics. By the form of light Bacon must be understood to mean here nearly what would in common parlance be called its nature. He wishes the inquiry to be extended from the mere effects of light to its constitution or substance-to the examination, as he puts it, of what it is that is common to the emanations perceived by the eye to proceed from the sun and those perceived to proceed from rotten wood or the putrid scales of fish. Modern philosophy has turned very little of its attention to investigations of this latter description; and those who are fondest of proclaiming Bacon as the father of modern physics are not usually anxious to exhibit him as patronising such speculations. But they enter largely into his system of philosophy as he has himself expounded it. The Fifth Book of the De Augmentis is also extended to more than double the space occupied by the same portion of the subject in the Advancement of Learning. It consists of five chapters. This Fifth Book makes an especially important part of Bacon's exposition both of his own system and of his views of the old logic. He begins by observing that the doctrine of the Intellect of man and that of his Will are as it were twins by birth. For purity of intellectual light and freedom of will began together and perished together. Nor is there in the whole universe of nature so intimate a sympathy as that between truth and goodness. The more shame therefore to learned men, if for knowledge they be like winged angels, but in their desires like serpents crawl ing in the dust; bearing about with them minds resembling, indeed, a mirror, but a mirror foully stained. Of the two parts into which the Science of the Human Mind is commonly divided, one, Logic, is concerned with the understanding and the reason; the other, Ethics, with the will, appetites, and affections. The passage in the De Augmentis then proceeds nearly as in the Advancement: It is true that the imagination is an agent or "nuncius,”* in both provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to imagination before reason have judged: and reason sendeth over to imagination before the decree can be acted: for imagination ever precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards reason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print of good; which nevertheless are faces, Quales decet esse sororum.† Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested with or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, "That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen;" who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason; which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination. The part of Human Philosophy, which is rational, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is "pabulum animi ;" so in the nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned "ad ollas carnium,"* and were weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes, do turn and are conversant; but this same "lumen siccum "+ doth parch and offend most men's watery and soft natures. But, to speak truly of things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all other arts: for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly," that the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of forms:" so these be truly said to be the art of arts: neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow. The Logical Arts, or, as they are called in the Advancement, the Arts Intellectual, are declared to be four in number; "divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred. For man's labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must be four: art of Inquiry or Invention; art of Examination or Judgment; art of Custody or Memory; and art of Elocution or Tradition." In the De Augmentis the expression in this last sentence is Artes Rationales (the Rational Arts); and it must be borne in mind that by Logic Bacon understands the whole science of the operations of the Reason and the Understanding. It is in the Second Chapter, which treats of the art of Invention, that the additions made in the Latin work are the most considerable. The commencing portion of the disquisition, however, is translated with little alteration from the Advancement :— Invention is of two kinds, much differing: the one of arts and sciences; and the other, of speech and arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, in the making of an inventory touch ing the estate of a defunct, it should be set down, that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no farther discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over. That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a "cuique in suâ arte credendum."* And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, "That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered." And Plato, in his Theatetus, noteth well, "That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience." And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men. Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida, So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors, that the Ægyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but almost all brute. *Every man is to be believed in his own art. A branch of healing dittany she brought, To draw the pointed steel, and ease the grief. Omnigenumque Deûm monstra, et latrator Anubis, Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.* And, if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints he expected the spark, and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint that gave the first occasion. So as it should seem that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance or anything else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other : Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes Paulatim.† For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in use; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being for so Cicero saith very truly, "Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem sæpe vincit." And therefore if it be said of men, -Labor omnia vincit Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas! *They worship Gods of every monstrous shape, Experience and practice, devoted to one subj vercome both nature and art. O'er all things labour triumphs in the end |