fcience, if laws and forms of government had not an uniform influence upon fociety? Where would be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular fentiments, and if these sentiments had no conftant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and fentiments of his actors, either natural or unnatural, to fuch characters, and in fuch circumftances? It seems almost impoffible, therefore, to engage, either in science or action of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of neceffity, and this inference from motives to voluntary actions; from characters to conduct.

And indeed, when we confider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we shall make no fcruple to allow, that they are of the fame nature, and derived from the same principles. A prifoner, who has neither money nor interest, difcovers the impoffibility of his efcape, as well when he confiders the obftinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars, with which he is furrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chufes rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The fame prifoner, when conducted to the fcaffold, forefees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the ax or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refufal of the foldiers to confent to his efcape; the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulfive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, in paffing from one link to another: Nor

is lefs certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects prefent to the memory or fenfes, by a train of causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical neceffity. The fame experienced union has the fame effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the names of things; but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change.

Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am furrounded with my fervants, I reft affured, that he is not to ftab me before he leaves it, in order to rob me of my filver ftandish; and I no more fufpect this event, than the falling of the house itself, which is new, and folidly built and founded.— But he may have been feized with a fudden and unknown frenzy. So may a fudden earthquake arife, and fhake and tumble my house about my ears. I fhall therefore change the fuppofitions. I fhall fay, that I know with certainty, that he is not to put his own hand into the fire, and hold it there, till it be confumed: And this event, I think I can foretell with the fame affurance, as that, if he throw himself out at the window, and meet with no obftruction, he will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No fufpicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least poffibility to the former event, which is fo contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A man who at noon leaves his purfe full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross, may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather, as that he will find. it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a fimilar nature, attended with more or lefs degrees of certainty, proportioned

to

to our experience of the ufual conduct of mankind in fuch particular fituations.

I have frequently confidered, what could poffibly be the reafon, why all mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine of neceffity, in their whole practice and reasoning, have yet difcovered fuch a reluctance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather fhewn a propenfity, in all ages, to profefs the contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for, after the following manner. If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from their caufes, we fhall find, that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation, than barely to obferve, that particular objects are conftantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary tranfition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclufion concerning human ignorance be the result of the stricteft fcrutiny of this subject, men ftill entertain a ftrong propenfity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive fomething like a neceffary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and feel no fuch connexion of the motive and the action; they are thence apt to fuppofe, that there is a difference between the effects, which refult from material force, and thofe which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced, that we know nothing farther of caufation of any kind, than merely the conftant conjunction of objects, and the confequent inference of the mind from one to another, and finding, that thefe two circumftances are univerfally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more eafily led to own the fame neceffity common to all

causes.

caufes, And though this reafoning may contradict the fyftems of many philofophers, in afcribing neceffity to the determinations of the will, we fhall find, upon reflection, that they diffent from it in words only, not in their real fentiment. Neceffity, according to the sense, in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philofopher." It may only, perhaps,, be pretended, that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, fome farther connexion between the cause and effect; and a connexion that has not place in the voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be fo or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on these philofophers to make good their affertion, by defining or describing that neceffity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of material caufes.

It would feem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and neceffity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the foul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them firft difcufs a more fimple queftion, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of caufation and neceflity, except that of a conftant conjunction of objects, and fubfequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that neceffity, which we conceive in matter, and if thefe circumftances be alfo univerfally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the difpute is at an end; or, at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. But as long as we will rafhly fuppofe, that we have fome farther idea of neceffity and caufation in the operations of external objects; at the fame time, that we can find no

thing farther, in the voluntary actions of the mind; there is no poffibility of bringing the queftion to any determinate iffue, while we proceed upon fo erroneous a fuppofition. The only method of undeceiving us, is, to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes; and to convince ourfelves, that all we know of them, is, the conftant conjunction and inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find, that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix fuch narrow limits to human understanding: But we can afterwards find no difficulty, when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is evident, that these have a regular conjunction with motives' and circumftances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in words, that neceffity, which we have already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and `in every step of our conduct and behaviour *.

But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and neceffity; the most contentious question, of metaphyfics, the moft contentious fcience; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of neceffity, and that the whole difpute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot furely mean, that actions have fo little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that the one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that the one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknow

* See NOTE [F].

ledged