doctrine which is meant to be conveyed. According to this doctrine, what is first presented is a particular object in its undivided entirety. But in point of fact the object consists of an universal inherent in its material; and this universal emerges to the view of the soul, which has contact with it in a suprasensual manner. But the universal, as such, inheres equally in all particulars; and, since it has no existence except as inherent, all the particulars come in some way into contemplation. Even a particular may act as an universal in view of the different other objects to which it stands in the same relation. There is, however, yet another factor of which we must take account. When we see a lump of sugar, we know that it is sweet, a fact which we explain by "association of ideas." The Nyaya (but not all other systems) will have it that we perceive the sugar to be sweet, and it admits another nonmundane contact under the name cognition-mark” (jñānalakshanā). Since, however, the object is clearly legitimate, namely, the distinction of the inherent universal from the associated, we need not quarrel with the way of putting the matter or discuss the arguments. Probably the most interesting feature in the theory as so far expounded is its attitude to the universals, which it holds to be involved in the perception. It is not so long since in this Society we heard it maintained that the perception of a thing involves in a way a consciousness of all its congeners. Possibly, therefore, some further observations, partly from the Indian side, may be in point. The particular functioning as an universal has already come before us. But there is another Indian system, that of the Jains, which deals more formally with the subject. Here also we may make a quotation :-* "Generality is of two kinds, crosswise generality and vertical generality. * Pramāna-naya-tattv-ālok-ālankāra, V, 3–5. Crosswise generality is a similar several particulars; for example, 'ox-ness,' in bodies "Vertical generality is substance common to prior and posterior developments; for example, 'gold,' persisting in 'armlet,' ' ring,' and so forth." In thus discriminating two kinds of universal, of which one depends upon difference of individual and the other upon difference of time, the Jains would seem to have the support of a passage in Mr. Bradley's Logic (I, c. VI, §§ 30 sqq.). But the Vaiseshika tenet seems to regard the individual even in its single occurrence as an universal, since it stands in various spatial relations. This, however, does not go for much, because their view was clearly that what is perceived is a particular, constituted by an universal inherent in certain matter. Perhaps in this connexion I may venture to dwell upon. a consideration which is certainly apposite. How far are we constituted capable of apprehending the strictly individual at all? May it not be said that the sense-organ always apprehends an universal, since it has no power of apprehending anything else? Just as a gun would impart precisely the same motion to every projectile having the same shape, size, and mass, and just as any other machine will function upon similar material to precisely similar effect, so the sense-organ is incapable of discriminating between precisely similar objects. We know, in fact, that beyond a certain degree of similarity it loses the power of distinguishing; and, if it is argued that this is only a matter of a variable limit, and that the existence of two absolutely similar things is a disputable, or a false, hypothesis, we may reply that not the actuality, but the mere possibility of such similars suffices to enforce the lesson that what we perceive is not the inner self of the object, but a semblance which might recur elsewhere and is therefore in its nature an universal. On this view the particularizing factor would be simply the junction of the two also general conditions here" and "now." What is ignored in this argumentation is the historical consideration? Can we not say that, failing other means, the history of the object gives a definite identification. Two cannon-balls may be as indistinguishable as we like; but they and their parts carry always theoretical, and probably physical, traces of the different situations in which they have taken a part. Even things which are actually classes may become, when we include the historical aspect, particulars: for example, man as a historical actuality is a single phenomenon. Upon this view the individual would be constituted by a crossing of two universals, one dependent upon similarity and the other upon temporal sequence, the cross and the vertical universals of the Jains. If it is rightly said that we are always dealing with a specious and not an absolute present, and that “iron” cannot in an atomic instant exist, it is clear that the time factor must always be included in the logical view. plainly no combination of universals can ever yield more than a relative individuality; and, if we require the absolutely individual, we shall have to apply to the mystics. Or might it be said that after all there is some essential difference between the universal "Socrates" and the universal "man," namely, that we suppose "man" to be in some way definable, that is to be composed of a finite number of universals, whereas in regard to the individual we have a feeling that his essence is inexhaustible? But it is hardly to be expected that even this hypothesis would command assent; for, while it is clear that "man" need not imply any of the peculiarities which distinguish Socrates from Plato, we should have to deal with the view that "man" also is something of infinite potentialities, including those very idiosyncracies which distinguish Socrates and Plato. But I must not imply that the Indian logicians had discussed the matter in this light. In fact, they certainly did not de so, but found in their atoms an absolute differentiation. But clearly the Jains, in admitting both a "crosswise" and a "vertical" generality, had taken a step which might ultimately render questionable the very idea of an individual. So far is it from being the fact, as has been alleged, that the Indians were unacquainted with the concept. § 4. The Post-apperception (anu-vyavasāya.) The completed perception results according to the Nyaya in a cognition of a "this" as qualified by a universal, the object being really qualified and the cognition correspondingly determined. But these philosophers recognized a further stage, at which the mind becomes by mental perception cognizant of its cognition. No doubt, their opponents in general admitted such a stage in thought. But there were essential differences as to its character and indispensability. Some philosophers held that the original cognition was suprasensual and inferred from a resultant "known-ness" in the object. But the main contention was with the upholders of "selfluminosity." These maintained that the cognition in itself without "post-apperception " was sufficient to lead to appropriate action; and to the objection that desire also should be similarly autonomous they replied that this was nugatory, since for all action they posited cognition as a requisite. What they mean by "self-luminosity" is that all cognition implies consciousness, and some of them state their view formally as follows: "The proof of self-luminosity is perception itself. For all presentations have at their origination the form 'I cognize this,' tracing out a cognizer, a cognition, and a cognized, wherein the self is glimpsed as agent, the cognized as object of the act, and the cognition as action; * Tattva-cintamani, Vol. I, p. 788. so that the cognition is experienced as including in its proper reference the cognizer and the cognized." The point of the debate is, no doubt, a little obscure. What the opponent really maintains is that all cognitions are in the form of a revelation of their object to the subject and not susceptible of error: as the connexion between a cognition and its (true) object he names a "special kind of own nature," which he says is established by experience, although it cannot be conveyed by any single word. The Nyaya denies that all cognitions are in the form "I cognize this," and claims that experience proves that factual certitude in the form "this silver" is sufficient to elicit response. Both admit that the response may be mistaken; but, while the Nyaya holds that this is the fault of a wrong perception, the opponent considers that it is due to a failure to distinguish between the thing perceived and something desired. $5. Truth and Error. Coming now to the matter of truth and error, we may recall how anxiously the later schools of Greek philosophy were occupied with the question of the non-illusory perception. The whole dispute between the Stoics and the later Academy centred about this point. The Stoics laboured to define an appearance which could not deceive, their κатаληπткη καταληπτκὴ pavraoía, and even appealed to the goodness of Providence, which would not have created two exactly similar things; while the Academy based upon the view that any appearance might be false its doctrine of the probable. At a much earlier period some of the Sophists denied the possibility of error on the ground that a false statement was simply a different statement, wherein, of course, they were considering merely the content of a judgment and ignoring the real question, which concerns its reference. In the Nyaya-Vaiseshika view perception does, as we have |