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citizens"; also with denying that the legislation of Congress was binding upon him, and that Congress had any power to propose amendments to the Constitution. The charges were distributed under eleven heads. A vote was taken, May 16, on the eleventh article first, showing thirty-five for conviction and nineteen for acquittal. Ten days later a vote was taken on the second and third articles with the same result. The majority lacking one vote of the twothirds requisite for conviction, the Chief Justice ordered. a verdict of acquittal to be entered on the records.

William W. Belknap, Secretary of War, was impeached in 1876. He was charged with receiving money for the appointment and retention in office of a post trader in Indian Territory. A few hours before the passage of the resolution to impeach him, he resigned; but it was decided by a vote of thirty-seven to twenty-nine that he was subject to trial by impeachment. This vote, however, indicated that the majority requisite for conviction could not be obtained; and after the presentation of the evidence and the arguments it was found that the vote on some of the articles stood thirty-five to twenty-five, on others thirtysix to twenty-five, and on still others thirty-seven to twentyfive. The requisite majority of two-thirds not being had on any article, the Senate rendered a verdict of acquittal.

Topics. Senator William Blount.-Judge John Pickering.Samuel Chase.-Judge Peck.-Judge Humphreys.-Andrew Johnson. Secretary Belknap.

References.-Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, ii, 298, 299; Hinsdale, American Government, 174, 175; Lalor, Cyclopædia, ii, 480.

124. Court-Martial.-A court-martial is a tribunal for the trial of offenses arising in the military and naval service. It is created under the authority of Congress and is composed of a varying number of officers. In Great Britain there are

three grades of court-martial-general, district or garrison, and regimental, and the distinction of these grades is observed also in the United States. The general court-martial consists of any number of officers from five to thirteen. They may be appointed by the President or by any general officer commanding the army of the United States, a separate army, or a separate department. In the case of the garrison or regimental court-martial, the members of the court are appointed by the commanding officer. Before the sentence in any case tried by the court is carried out, it must be approved by the appointing officer. The jurisdiction of a court-martial is confined to persons duly enlisted or appointed in the military or naval service; and the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the court is required to pronounce the sentence.

Topics. Description of a court-martial.-Grades in Great Britain and the United States.-Appointment.-Approval of sentence. Jurisdiction of a court-martial.

References.-Lalor, Cyclopædia, i, 693; Cooley, Constitutional Law, 137, 138.

FOR ADVANCED STUDY

The Supreme Court.-Bryce, American Commonwealth, i, Chaps. XXII-XXIV; Carson, Supreme Court; Thayer, John Marshall, Chaps. III-V; Tucker, Constitution, i, Chap. XIII; Willoughby, Supreme Court; Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, ii, 144-216; Cooley, Constitutional Law, Chap. VI; Cooley and others, Constitutional History, 29-52.

John Marshall and His Interpretation of the Constitution. Cooley and others, Constitutional History, Chap. II; Morse, Adams, 321, 322; Schouler, United States, i, Index; Magruder, John Marshall, 82-201.

Decisions of Chief Justice Taney and their Influence on the Constitutional Development of the United States. -Cooley and others, Constitutional History, 120-199; MacDonald,

Select Documents, 295-298; Supreme Court Reports, 11 Peters-2 Black.

The Dred Scott Decision.-MacDonald, Select Documents, 416-435; Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, ii, Chap. IV; Rhodes, United States, ii, 249-271; H. von Holst, United States, vi, Chap. I; Lincoln, Works, i, 228-235; Hart, Contemporaries, iv, 122-135; Lathrop, Seward, 181-186.

Relation of the Courts to Legislation.-Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law; Thayer, John Marshall, 61-78, 95-101, 104-110; Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, i, 9-47, 146-154; Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation; American Law Review, xix, 175-203; Cooley and others, Constitutional History, 9-14, 37-43, 76-80, 179–188, 221-223, 226–233.

The Decision in the Case of McCulloch vs. the State of Maryland.—Channing and Hart, Guide, 358; Supreme Court Reports, 4 Wheaton, 316.

The Webster-Hayne Debate.-Channing and Hart, Guide, 370.

The Interpretation of the Constitution.-Bryce, American Commonwealth, 366-375; Lalor, Cyclopædia, i, 610, 611; Channing and Hart, Guide, 326-328.

The Dartmouth College Case.-Supreme Court Reports, 4 Wheaton, 518.

Daniel Webster's Interpretation of the Constitution. -Webster's Works.

CHAPTER VIII

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF CITIZENS

125. The Historical Basis of Political Liberty.—The common, or so-called unwritten, law of England was a significant part of the heritage of the United States. It involved the rights that had been specifically set forth "in certain historical documents, which in both England and America, had been looked upon and revered as the charters of liberty."1 The most important of these documents are Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Bill of Rights. They represent stages in the growth of individual liberty, and together constitute the basis of many of the rights enjoyed by citizens of the United States. They were issued to redress grievances, or to furnish guarantees for the recognition of the rights of the people in the future.

In the thirteenth century the barons of England, in order to be able to force the king to restore their ancient rights, made common cause with the people. As a result of the conflict that ensued, the Great Charter was granted in 1215. With respect to the later liberties of the English people, whether in England or in any other part of the world, the most important provision of that charter was the following: "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will

1 Cooley, Constitutional Law, 6.

we pass upon him nor condemn him but by a lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land; we will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man, either right or justice." This provision confirmed ancient liberties and guaranteed personal security for the future. The common man was protected in the possession of the property especially necessary for his economical welfare: "even a villain or rustic should not by any fine be bereaved of his carts, ploughs, and implements of husbandry." The constitutional principle "that no taxes shall be laid except by consent of the persons taxed, expressed through their representatives," was established by the provision that "no scutage1 or aid shall be imposed in our kingdom unless by the General Council of our Kingdom."

The Petition of Right recited and reaffirmed the principles that had been established in Magna Charta. It is a statute passed in 1627, in the early part of the reign of Charles I. Its aim, like that of Magna Charta, was to secure the personal and civil liberties of the people against the encroachments of the king. It proposed not to create new rights, but to reëstablish and defend those which English subjects had previously enjoyed. It prohibited unlawful taxes and assessments, forced loans, illegal arrests and imprisonments, the quartering of soldiers on private citizens, and a resort to martial law in civil cases. This petition, having been voted by Parliament and approved by the king, strengthened the foundation of English liberty that had been laid by the Great Charter. It provided against illegal arrests and imprisonments; but in order to make effective these provisions, there was needed a clear and definitely established procedure of relief. This was furnished by the Habeas Corpus Act, passed in 1679, in the reign of Charles II.

1 Shield money (Latin, scutum, a shield); a tax paid in lieu of military service.

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