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rectly with respect to any given subject, or to leave it to be dealt with through an act by the legislative body. Although Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the President, it may authorize him to determine in what cases a particular law shall apply. In suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the Civil War, Congress "empowered the President to exercise his judgment and supersede the writ in particular cases, as he might deem the public interest to require.” 1

No sovereign can bind itself for the future, nor can a legislature in any way limit its successor. This means that any law which a legislature may pass is subject to repeal by any succeeding legislature. All laws are, therefore, repealable.

The ninth section of the first article of the Constitution contains a number of specific restrictions on the powers of Congress:

1. That Congress shall not prohibit the importation of slaves prior to the year 1808.

2. That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus2 shall not be suspended unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.3

3. That no bill of attainder or ex post facto law1 shall be passed.

4. That no capitation or other direct tax5 shall be laid except under certain specified conditions.

5. That no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.

6. That no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

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7. That no money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.

8. That no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States.

These and other restrictions on Federal power, contained in the amendments to the Constitution, partake of the nature of a bill of rights or of constitutional guarantees for the protection of individual citizens or the States.

Topics. Character of restrictions on power of Congress.-No legislative power delegated.-Specific restrictions in ninth section of first article of the Constitution.

References.-Hinsdale, American Government, 236-242; Willoughby, Rights and Duties, 198-200.


The Debts of the Confederation, and State Debts.MacDonald, Select Documents, 46-58; Hunt, James Madison, 179, 200; Lodge, Hamilton, 85-96, 117-129; Gordy, Political Parties, i, 118-128; McMaster, United States, i, 567-579; Schouler, United States, i, 130-142; Hildreth, United States, iv, 152-174, 206216; H. von Holst, United States, i, 83-89; Morse, Jefferson, 97-106.

The Constitutional Doctrine of Implied Powers.-Jefferson, Writings, v, 284-289; Hamilton, Works, iii, 249-251; iv, 104-138; Madison, Letters, i, 528, 546; Hunt, James Madison, 201204; MacDonald, Select Documents, 76-98; Lalor, Cyclopædia, i, 199, 200; Hildreth, United States, iv, 262-267; Marshall, Writings, 288-291; Magruder, John Marshall, 172-179.

Citizenship. Story, Commentaries, §§ 1103, 1104, 1693-1695, 1805, 1806, 1928-1975; Political Science Quarterly, 1: 199-205; 5: 104-123; H. von Holst, Constitutional Law, § 83; Boutwell, Constitution, Chaps. X, XXII, XXIII, XLIV, LIII-LVIII, LXIII, LXIV.

The Alien and Sedition Acts.-MacDonald, Select Documents, 137-148; Gordy, Political Parties, i, Chap. XIX; McMaster, United States, ii, 389-403, 417-419, 424-427; Schouler, United States, i, 392-403, 420, 421; Lalor, Cyclopædia, i, 56–58.

The Monroe Doctrine.-Hart, Contemporaries, iii, 479, 480, 494-498, 499-501; Gilman, James Monroe, 156-174; Wharton, Digest, i, § 57; Gordy, Political Parties, ii, 488-496; Burgess, Middle Period, 122-128; Schouler, United States, iii, 277-291, 292, 293.

The Doctrine that "To the Victor Belong the Spoils." -Lalor, Cyclopædia, iii, 565–569; Morse, Jefferson, 215-225; Benton, Thirty Years' View, i, 159-162; Roosevelt, Benton, 79-85; Schurz, Clay, i, 332-336; Sumner, Jackson, 145-149; Wilson, Division, 26, 27, 30-34; Schouler, United States, iii, 175, 453, 455–462.

The Various Forms of United States Money.-Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report; Register of the Treasury, Annual Report; Sumner, American Currency; Hart, Contemporaries, iv, §§ 168-172; Knox, United States Notes; White, Money and Banking.

Congress and the Income Tax.-North American Review, 160, 589-606; Forum, 19: 48-56, 513-530, 158.

War Taxes.-Dewey, Financial History, 299-306; Bolles, Financial History, 1861-85, 159-196; Howe, United States under Internal Revenue System, 50-81; Review of Reviews, xvi, 167-174.

Implied Powers.-Channing and Hart, Guide, 333, 334. The Interstate Commerce Commission.-Prentice and Egan, Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution; Johnson, Railway Transportation; Reports of the Commission.




79. The Form of the Executive.-Many of the political ills which the people of the colonies had suffered or feared, they had attributed to the king. This made them hesitate to place any one man at the head of the new Government. Jealousy, moreover, made many persons reluctant to give power to any one man. In the Philadelphia convention of 1787, Mr. Randolph affirmed that a single executive was opposed by the people; that it would never have their confidence; and that a single chief executive would commonly come from the central part of the Union, and, consequently, the remote parts would be in a position of disadvantage.

On the other side a number of reasons were presented against an executive composed of a number of persons: (1) Such an arrangement would lead to constant struggles for local advantage. (2) The executive power would be weakened by its divisions and animosities. (3) The States all had single executives. (4) A plural executive would be ill adapted to controlling the militia, the army, and the navy. (5) The animosities arising from an executive composed of several persons would not only interrupt the public administration, but also diffuse the spirit of animosity through the other branches of the Government, through the States, and through the people at large.

It is probable that the presence of Washington, who was

generally regarded as eminently fitted to fill the office, was in itself also a reason for vesting the executive authority in one man. In the Constitutional Convention it was thus settled early, by a vote of eight States to three, that this should be the form of the executive.

Topics. Opposition to single chief executive.-Reasons against collegiate executive.-Probable influence of Washington's presence. -Vote in Constitutional Convention.

References.-Bryce, American Commonwealth, 35-39; Dawes, How We Are Governed, 167-170, 199; Fiske, Civil Government, 232; Hart, Actual Government, 259-261; Hinsdale, American Government, 248-250; Lalor, Cyclopædia, ii, 131; Miller, Lectures, 148.

80. Election of the President.-In the Constitutional Convention three methods of electing the President were considered: (1) By Congress; (2) by a direct vote of the qualified voters of the whole country; (3) by a college of electors. The delegates feared that the first method would make the President dependent on Congress, and that the second would arouse too much popular excitement. They finally agreed to cause the President to be elected by a body of presidential electors. The electors were to be appointed by the several States in such manner as the legislature in each State might direct. Under the exercise of this discretion, different methods of choosing the electors have been followed. They have been elected "by joint ballot of the State legislature, by a concurrent vote of the two branches of the legislature, by the people of the State voting by general ticket, and by the people voting in districts." The voting by districts would be likely to give the State a divided delegation in the electoral college, while by any one of the other modes all the electors of any given State might be expected to belong to the dominant political party.

The Constitution provides that the number of electors from any State shall be "equal to the whole number of

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