It was thought the Persians would advance through this valley, and means were taken to defend it. But these failed, and the Barbarians took possession of Thessaly. As the passes leading from Thessaly to the territories of Phocis and Locris were still narrower and more difficult of access than those from Macedon into Thessaly, it seems extraordinary that they did not immediately direct their whole military strength towards that quarter; but this neglect may be explained by their superstitious veneration for oracles, the necessity of celebrating their accustomed festivals, and the dangerous delays and inactivity inherent in the nature of a republican confederacy. As they were acquainted with only one pass by which the Persians could arrive from Thessaly, they thought that a body of eight thousand pikemen might be equally capable with a larger proportion of troops to defend it against every invader. This narrow defile was called the Straits of Thermopylæ, in allusion to the warm springs in that neighbourhood, and was deemed the gate or entrance into Greece. It was bounded on the west by high and inaccessible precipices, which join the lofty ridge of mount Oeta; and on the east terminated by an impracticable morass bordered by the sea. Near the plain of the Thessalian city Trachis, the passage was fifty feet broad; but at Alpené there was not room for one chariot to pass another. Even these passes were defended by walls, formerly built by the Phocians to protect them against the incursions of their enemies in Thessaly, and strengthened, on this occasion, with as much care as time would allow. The troops sent to Thermopyla, which was only fifteen miles distant from the station of the Grecian fleet at Artemisium, consisted chiefly of Peloponnesians, commanded by Leonidas the Spartan king, who was prepared, in obedience to the oracle, to devote his life for the safety of his country.

As Xerxes had not any particular quarrel with the Spartans, whose opposition, though it could not prevent, would certainly retard his intended punishment of Athens, he sent messengers to desire them to lay down their arms; to which they replied, 'Let him come and take them." The messengers then offered them lands, on condition of their becoming allies to the great king; but they answered, "That it was the custom of their republic to conquer lands by valour, not to acquire them by treachery." Except making these smart replies, they took not the smallest notice of the Persians; but continued to employ themselves as before. their arrival, contending in the gymnastic exercises, entertaining themselves with music and conversation, or adjusting their long hair to appear more terrible to their enemies. The messengers of Xerxes, equally astonished at what they saw and heard, returned to the Persian camp, and described the unexpected event of their commission, as well as the extraordinary behaviour of the Spartans; of which Xerxes desired an explanation from their countryman Demaratus. The latter declared in general that their whole carriage and demeanour announced a determined resolution to fight to the last extremity; but he found it difficult to make the Persian conceive the motives of men, who fought, at the certain price of their own lives, to purchase immortal renown for their country. That a few individuals should be animated on some extraordinary occasions with this patriotic magnanimity, may easily be understood. But Xerxes could not be made to conceive the idea of a whole band So acting. He therefore waited four days, continually expecting they would either retreat into their own country, or surrender their arms, agreeably to his message. But as they still continued to guard the passage, he ascribed this conduct to obstinacy or folly; and on the

insolent opposition.

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The Medes and Cissians, who, next to the Sacæ and Persians, formed the bravest part of his army, were manded to attack these obstinate Greeks, and to bring them alive into his presence. The Barbarians marched with confidence to the engagement, but were repulsed with great slaughter. The places of those who fell were incessantly supplied with fresh troops, but they could not make the smallest impression on the firm battalions of the Greeks; and the great loss which they sustained in the attempt, proved to all, and particularly to the king, that he had indeed many men, but few soldiers. The Sacæ, armed with their hatchets, next marched to the attack, but without better success; and last of all, the chosen band of Persians, headed by Hydarnes, deigned to display their valour in what appeared to them a very unequal contest. But they soon changed their opinion when they came to close with the enemy; for, says Herodotus, their numbers were useless, as they fought in a narrow pass, and their short pointed weapons were ill calculated to contend with the length of the Grecian spear. The Greeks had the advantage still more in the superiority of their discipline, than in the excellence of their armour. Tired with destroying, they retreated in close order, and when pursued unguardedly by the Barbarians, they faced about on a sudden, and killed an incredible number of the Persians, with scarcely any loss to themselves. Xerxes, who was seated on an eminence to behold the battle, frequently started in wild emotion from his throne; and, fearing lest he should be deprived of the flower of his army, he ordered them to be drawn off from the attack. But as the Grecian numbers were so extremely inconsiderable, and as it seemed probable that the greatest part of them must have suffered much injury in these

day to renew the engagement. Next day he fought without better success than before; and after vainly endeavouring to force the pass, both in separate bodies, and with the collected vigour of their troops, the Persians were compelled to abandon the enterprise, and disgracefully to retire to their camp.

It was a spectacle which the world had never seen before, and which it was never again to behold, the persevering intrepidity of eight thousand men resisting the impetuous fury of an army. composed of millions. The pertinacious valour of Leonidas, and of his little troop, opposed, and might have long retarded, the progress of the Barbarians. But it was the fate of Greece always to be conquered rather by the treachery of false friends, than by the force of open enemies. A false Greek was found who showed the Persians a narrow passage over the mountain, by which they were able to arrive in vast numbers behind the small Spartan force. When the Greeks found that they were betrayed, the most valiant of them, with unanimous consent, solicited their general to dedicate to the glory of Grecce, and their own, the important interval yet allowed them, before they were surrounded by the Persians The ardour of Leonidas happily conspired with the ready zeal of the soldiers. He therefore commanded them to prepare the last meal of their lives, and to sup like men who should to-morrow dine in Elysium. His own example confirmed the propriety of the command, for he took an abundant repast, in order to furnish strength and spirits for a long continuance of tcil and danger.

It was now the dead of night, when the Spartans, headed by Leonidas, marched in a close battalion towards the Persian camp, with resentment heightened by despair. Their fury was. terrible; and rendered still more destructive through the defect of Barbarian

discipline; for the Persians, having neither advanced guards, nor a watchword, nor confidence in each other, were incapable of adopting such measures for defence as the sudden emergency required. Many fell by the Grecian spear, but much greater multitudes by the mistaken rage of their own troops, by whom, in the midst of this blind confusion, they could not be distinguished from enemies. The Greeks, wearied with slaughter, penetrated to the royal pavilion; but there the first alarm of noise had been readily perceived, amidst the profound silence and tranquillity which usually reigned in the tent of Xerxes, and the great king had immediately escaped. When day came and the Persians saw how small the enemy was in number, they gathered courage, and again advanced, whilst the Greeks halted in the broadest part of the pass, to receive the charge of the enemy. The shock was dreadful, and the battle was maintained on the side of the Greeks with persevering intrepidity and desperate valour. After their spears were blunted or broken they attacked sword in hand, and their short but massy and well-tempered weapons made an incredible havoc. Their progress was marked by a line of blood, when a Barbarian dart pierced the heart of Leonidas.

Then the Greeks retired to a narrow part of the pass, and prepared to sell their lives as dearly as possible. Before them was a narrow wall. Some of

their opponents beat down the wall, and entered by the breaches. Their temerity was punished by instant death. In this last struggle every Grecian showed the most heroic courage; yet if we believe the unanimous report of some Thessalians, and others who survived the vived the engagement, the Spartan Dioneces deserved the prize of valour. When it was observed to him that the Persian arrows were so numerous that they intercepted the light of the sun, he said it was a favourable circumstance, because the Greeks now fought in the shade. The brothers Alpheus and Maron are likewise particularised for their generous contempt of death, and for their distinguished valour and activity in the service of their country. What these and other virtues could accomplish, the Greeks, both as individuals and in a body, had already performed; but it became impossible for them longer to resist the impetuosity and weight of the darts, and other missile weapons, which were continually poured upon them; and they were finally buried under a trophy of Persian Two monuments were afterwards erected near the spot where they fell; the inscription of the first announced the valour of a handful of Greeks, who had resisted three millions of Barbarians; the second was peculiar to the Spartans, and contained these memorable words: "Go, stranger, and declare to the Lacedæmonians, that we died here in obedience to their divine laws."

arms.

URING the military operations at Thermopylæ, the Grecian fleet was stationed in the harbour of Artemisium, the northern promontory of Euboea. That of the Persian, too numerous for any harbour to contain, had anchored in the road that extends between the city of Castanæa and the promontory of Sepias, on the coast of Thessaly. Here this formidable armada suffered the calamities foretold by the wisdom of Artabanus. In a conversation with Xerxes, that prudent old man had warned him against two enemies, the sea and the land, from whom his own rash inexperience seemed not to apprehend any danger. Yet both these enemies occasioned dreadful misfortunes to the Per

sians, whose numbers first exposed them to be destroyed at sea by a tempest, and afterwards to perish on land by a famine. The first line of their fleet was sheltered by the coast of Thessaly; but the other lines, to the number of seven, rode at anchor, at small intervals, with the prows of the vessels turned to the sea. When they adopted this arrangement, the waters were smooth, the sky clear, the weather calm and serene; but on the morning of the second day after their arrival on the coast, the sky began to lower, and the appearance of the heavens grew threatening and terrible. A and dreadful storm of rain and thunder succeeded; and, what was more alarming, the billows began to rise to an amazing height, occasioned by a violent Hellespontin, or north-east wind, which, when it once begins to blow in those seas with any considerable force, seldom ceases

for several days. The nearest vessels were saved by hauling under the shore; of the more remote, many were driven from their anchors; some foundered at sea, others split on the promontory of Sepias, and several bulged on the shallows of Meliboa. Three days the tempest raged with unabating fury. Four hundred galleys were destroyed by its violence, beside such a number of storeships and transports, that the Persian commanders, suspecting this disaster might occasion the revolt of the Thessalians, fortified themselves with a rampart of considerable height, entirely composed of the shattered fragments of the wreck. Still the Persian fleet was very formidable, but the strength of the adverse parties being thus reduced nearer to an equality, the weaker seized the opportunity to display their courage in fight, and their superior skill in naval action. About sunset they approached in a line, and offered battle to the Persians. The latter did not decline the engagement, as their ships were still sufficiently numerous to surround those of their opponents. At the first signal the Greeks formed into a circle, at the second they began the fight. Though crowded into a narrow compass, and having the enemy on every side, they soon took thirty of their ships, and sunk many more. Night came on, accompanied with an impetuous storm of rain and thunder; the Greeks retired into the harbour of Artemisium; the enemy were driven to the coast of Thessaly. As the wind blew from the south, the dead bodies and wrecks dashed with violence against the sides of their ships, and disturbed the motion of their oars. The Barbarians were seized with consternation and despair; for scarcely had they time to breathe after the former storm and shipwreck near Mount Pelion, when they were compelled to a dangerous seafight; after darkness put an end to the battle, they were again involved in the gloom and horrors of a nocturnal tempest.

By good fortune, rather than by design, the greatest part of the fleet escaped immediate destruction, and gained the Pegasean Bay.

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The Persians felt that as by stratagem and under favour of the night, the Greeks had hitherto gained many important advantages, it now belonged to the Persians to choose the time for action. On the third day at noon they sailed forth in the form of a crescent, which was still sufficiently extensive to enfold the Grecian line. The Greeks, animated by former success, were averse to decline any offer of battle; yet it is probable that their admirals, and particularly Themistocles, would much rather have delayed it to a more favourable opportunity. Rage, resentment, and indignation, supplied the defect of the Barbarians in skill and courage. The battle. was longer and more doubtful than on any former OCcasion; many Grecian vessels were destroyed, five were taken by the Egyptians, who particularly signalized themselves on the side of the Barbarians, as the Athenians did on that of the Greeks. The persevering valour of the latter at length prevailed, the enemy retiring and acknowledging their superiority by leaving them in possession of the dead and the wreck. But the victory cost them dear, since their vessels, particularly those of the Athenians, were reduced to a very shattered condition; and their great inferiority in the number and size of their ships made them feel more sensibly every diminution of strength.

They found it necessary to withdraw their fleet, and Xerxes was allowed to proceed onwards and ravish Attica; but it was only for a little that the opposition was withdrawn. The fleets again met at the famous battle of Salamis.

Before the dawn of day the Grecian ships were drawn up in order of battle; and the Persians, who had been surprised at not finding them attempt to escape during night, were still more surprised