§ 8. Members of the legislature and officers thereof, before they enter upon their official duties, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution, of the State of South Dakota, and will faithfully discharge the duties of (senator, representative or officer) according to the best of my abilities, and that I have not knowingly or intentionally paid or contributed anything, or made any promise in the nature of a bribe, to directly or indirectly influence any vote at the election at which I was chosen to fill said office, and have not accepted, nor will I accept or receive directly or indirectly, any money, pass, or any other valuable thing, from any corporation, company or person, for any vote or influence I may give or withhold on any bill or resolution, or appropriation, or for any other official act. This oath shall be administered by a judge of the supreme or circuit court, or the presiding officer of either house, in the hall of the house to which the member or officer is elected, and the secretary of state shall record and file the oath subscribed by each member and officer. Any member or officer of the legislature who shall refuse to take the oath herein prescribed shall forfeit his office. Any member or officer of the legislature who shall be convicted of having sworn falsely to, or violated his said oath, shall forfeit his office and be disqualified thereafter from holding the office of senator or member of the house of representatives or any office within the gift of the legislature. § 9. Each house shall be the judge of the election returns and qualifications of its own members. A majority of the members of each house shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may compel the attendance of absent members in such a manner and under such penalty as each house may provide. Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings, shall choose its own officers and employees and fix the pay thereof, except as otherwise provided in this constitution. § 10. The governor shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies as may occur in either house of the legislature. § 11. Senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the legislature, and in going to and returning from the same; and for words used in any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. § 12. No member of the legislature shall, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed or elected to any civil office in the state which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during the term for which he was elected, nor shall any member receive any civil appointment from the governor, the governor and senate, or from the legislature during the term for which he shall have been elected, and all such appointments and all votes given for any such members for any such office or appointment shall be void; nor shall any member of the legislature during the term for which he shall have been elected, or within one year thereafter, be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with the state or any county thereof, authorized by any law passed during the term for which he shall have been elected. A member of the legislature employed by the board of railroad commissioners during the period of an appropriation passed by such legislature cannot recover for his services from the state. Palmer v. State, 11 S. D. 78, 75 N. W. 818. Action in quantum meruit will not lie where the contract was between the state and a corporation, of which a member of the legislature was president and stockholder, and was authorized by a law passed during the term for which he was elected. Norbeck & N. Co. v. State, 32 S. D. 189, 142 N. W. 847, 39 Ann. Cas. 229. A contract with the state being invalid because authorized by the legislature of which the president and stockholder of the contracting corporation was a member cannot be made the ground of recovery even though there may have been funds available for payment other than the appropriation. Norbeck & N. Co. v. State, 33 S. D. 21, 144 N. W. 658. § 13. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings and publish the same from time to time, except such parts as require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of members on any question shall be taken at the desire of one-sixth of those present and entered upon the journal. The courts are concluded by the properly authenticated enrolled bill on file in the office of the secretary of state of which the printed laws are prima facie evidence, and it is not subject to be impeached by the entries in the journals of the two houses. Narregang v. Brown Co., 14 S. D. 357, 85 N. W. 602; State ex rel. Lavin v. Bacon, 14 S. D. 394, 85 N. W. 605; followed in Krakowski v. Waskey, 33 S. D. 335, 145 N. W. 566, notwithstanding ch. 167 '09. $ 14. In all elections to be made by the legislature the members thereof shall vote viva voce and their votes shall be entered in the journal. § 15. The sessions of each house and of the committee of the whole shall be open, unless when the business is such as ought to be kept secret. § 16. Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. § 17. Every bill shall be read three several times, but the first and second reading may be on the same day, and the second reading may be by title of the bill, unless the reading at length be demanded. The first and third readings shall be at length. A legislative act which makes the provisions of the standard policy of insurance a part of the law merely by reference to a form on file in the Insurance Commissioner's office would be contrary to the spirit of the constitution which requires every enactment to be twice read at length that the lawmakers may be advised of what they are doing. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 19 S. D. 59, 101 N. W. 1110. § 18. The enacting clause of a law shall be: "Be it enacted. by the legislature of the State of South Dakota" and no law shall be passed unless by assent of a majority of all the members elected to each house of the legislature. And the question upon the final passage shall be taken upon its last reading, and the yeas and nays, shall be entered upon the journal. The legislature of 1893 by joint resolution asked the Governor to request an opinion of the Supreme Court whether under the last sentence of this section a concurrence of the senate in house amendments to a senate bill must be by a majority of the senators elect and whether the vote must be taken by yeas and nays. The judges of said court declined to answer the inquiry, among other things, for the reason that Art 5 § 13 is confined to such questions as may raise a doubt in the executive department,-never in the legislative. In re Construction of Constitution, 3 S. D. 548, 54 N. W. 650, 19 L. R. A. 575. § 19. The presiding officer of each house shall, in the presence of the house over which he presides, sign all bills and joint resolutions passed by the legislature, after their titles have been publicly read immediately before signing, and the fact of signing, shall be entered upon the journal. If a title to a joint resolution is stitution. Lovett v. Ferguson, 10 S. not absolutely required it is fully D. 44, 71 N. W. 765. recognized by this section of the con § 20. Any bill may originate in either House of the legislature, and a bill passed by one house may be amended in the other. § 21. No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. The purpose of this section was. "first, to prevent hodge podge' or 'log rolling' legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked, and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and third, to fairly apprise the people through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they so desire." The subject must be single, yet all matters which are naturally and reasonably connected with it and all measures which may facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose are germane to the title. There is no constitutional restriction as to the scope or magnitude of the single subject of a legislative act. The title need not index the details of the act. It is sufficient if the language used in the title, on a fair construction, indicates the purpose of the legislation so that making every reasonable intendment in favor of the act it may be said that the subject of the law is expressed in the title. State v. Morgan, 2 S. D. 32, 48 N. W. 314; writ of error dismissed, 159 U. S. 261, 40 L. ed. 145, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1041. Even if the use of intoxicating liquors is a subject so distinct from and foreign to the subject of their manufacture, sale and keeping for sale that it could not be legally joined with the latter subject still as it is separable and may be eliminated without affecting other provisions the subject of the use may be altogether rejected from the law and title. The danger lies in putting into the law what is not in the title more than in putting into the title what is not in the law. State v. Becker, 3 S. D. 29, 51 N. W. 1018; State v. Mitchell, 3 S. D. 223, 52 N. W. 1052; writ of error dismissed, 163 U. S. 696, 41 L. ed. 306, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1204. The subject of ch. 64 '95 is single. State v. Ayers, 8 S. D. 517, 67 N. W. 611. The title of ch. 80 '91 is clearly sufficient to sustain the substantial features of the act and the title of the amendatory act, ch. 103 '95 is unobjectionable. Miles v. Benton Twp., 11 S. D. 450, 78 N. W. 1004. The title of ch. 41 '97 was suffi ciently broad to include the submission of the question of the change in the boundaries to the voters of Stanley county. Stuart v. Kirley, 12 S. D. 245, 81 N. W. 147. The title to ch. 94 '01 embraces only one subject, viz: the authority of counties to fund outstanding indebtedness. It was not necessary for the title to indicate the character of the indebtedness to be funded. Walling v. Lummis, 16 S. D. 349, 92 N. W. 1063. The subjects now embraced in §§ 2148, 2149 Pol. Code were clearly within the scope of the titles of the general revenue acts of 1891 and 1897. Harris v. Stearns, 17 S. D. 439, 97 N. W. 361. The contention that ch. 72 '97 as construed was a prohibitory law instead of a license law and was therefore unconstitutional because the term "prohibition" was not used in the title was held to be without merit. State ex rel. Crothers v. Barber, 19 S. D. 1, 101 N. W. 1078. Ch. 72 '97 contains but one subject which is expressed in its title and the provisions of §§ 11 and 16 thereof are germane to the act. Garrigan v. Kennedy, 19 N. W. 11, 101 N. W. 1081, 117 Am. St. Rep. 927, 8 Ann. Cas. 1125; Palmer v Schurz, 22 S. D. 283, 117 N. W. 150. The title to ch. 163 '05 providing for a Capitol Commission etc. and providing for funds therefor was not double. The subject was the construction of a capitol building and the use of funds was a natural, reasonable and appropriate means of accomplishing the purpose and thereDavenfore germane to the title. port v. Elrod, 20 S. D. 567, 107 N. W. 833. The title of ch. 139 '07 contains one general subject and the contents of the act are germane thereto. Morrow v. Wipf, 22 S. D. 146, 115 N. W. 1121. The title to ch. 135 '07, contains but one subject, viz: the establishment of a uniform system of education. This section should be liber ally construed. Stephens v. Jones, 24 S. D. 97, 123 N. W. 705. That part of ch. 218 '07, which does not relate to double damages violates the constitution because not expressed in the title of the act. Bekker v. White Riv. Val. Ry. Co., 28 S. D. 84, 132 N. W. 797. Those portions of ch. 215 '07, purporting to relieve the party damaged from proving negligence on the part of the railway company not being represented in the title of the act are invalid. Kennedy v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 28 S. D. 94, 132 N. W. 802. Ch. 40, '05, held to embrace matters not expressed in its title. Pierson v. Minnehaha Co., 28 S. D. 534, 134 N. W. 212, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 261. The penalties prescribed for a violation of ch. 4 '09, are germane to the title of the act. State v. Carlisle, 30 S. D. 475, 139 N. W. 127. The title to ch. 222, '09 does not conflict with this provision of the constitution. State v. McPherson, 30 S. D. 547, 139 N. W. 368. State v. Stewart, 30 S. D. 585, 139 N. W. 371. Since the title of ch. 73, '05 did not include accident nor casualty companies ch. 243, 1909 which purports to amend said act by including acident and casualty companies within its provisions, violates this section of the constitution. Met. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Basford, 31 S. D. 149, 139 N. W. 795. The title to the act adopting the Revised Pol. Code of 1903 is not obnoxious to this section in that Art. 29 of ch. 27 is not specifically embraced therein, indeed the title would have been sufficient if it had merely been, "An act to provide a Revised Political Code for the State of South Dakota." Wilson v. Western Surety Co., 31 S. D. 175, 140 N. W. 263; State v. Devers, 32 S. D. 473, 143 N. W. 364; Street v. Farmers El. Co., 34 S. D. 523, 149 N. W. 429. Whether the title to ch. 125, '99 was adequate not determined in as much as it is incorporated in the Revised Civil Code, the title to which is broad enough to cover the section incorporated. J. P. Schaller Co. v. Canistota Gr. Co., 32 S. D. 15, 141 N. W. 993. State ex rel Kronschna_ bel v. Issenhuth, 34 S. D. 218, 148 N. W. 9; State v. Horner, 35 S. D. 612, 153 N. W. 766. The title to ch. 90, '07 is not broad enough to include liability for death and the words "or death" in said act held to be surplusage. Rowe v. Richards, 32 S. D. 66, 142 N. W. 664, L. R. A. 1915E 1069. The title to ch. 180, 07 purporting to be merely regulatory will not carry legislation confiscatory of vested rights or establishing new rules of evidence or pleading nor legislation tending to interfere with the constitutional jurisdiction of courts. St. Germain Irr. D. Co. v. Hawthorne D. Co., 32 S. D. 260, 143 N. W. 124. The title to ch. 207, '11 is broad enough to embrace the provisions of section 12 imposing a penalty for a carrier's refusal to pay damages within 30 days after demand. Dunlap v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 32 S. D. 581, 144 N. W. 226. The title to ch. 134 '07 is broad enough to cover the terms of the act authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain, providing methods for apportioning benefits and for levying assessments. Milne v. McKinnon, 32 S. D. 627, 144 N. W. 117. The game law, ch. 240, '09 embraces but one subject which is expressed in its title. State v. Kirby 34 S. D. 281, 148 N. W. 533. The title of an act should never be construed or required to be an index of the contents of the act. Cessna v. Otho D. & P. Co., 35 S. D. 557, 153 N. W. 380. § 2 ch. 94 '07 being superseded by sub. 79 § 53 ch. 119 '13 it is unimportant whether or not the title to the act of 1907 is sufficient. Murphy Liquor Co. v. Medbery, 35 S. D. 589, 153 N. W. 654. An interpretation of §2 ch. 128 '09 |